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Late American Consul at Durango, Mexico. For two years connected 

with the United States Philippine Commission during the estab- 

lishment of civil government in the Philippines 






Published March IQI4 


The publication of the Americans in the Philippines was 
made possible by the tender sympathy and loving appreciation 
and loyalty of the author's friends. To the Honorable William 
H. Taf t, for the Introduction ; to Mr. Harry Coleman for the 
Biography, and to Mr. Hobart Hoyt and Mr. Robert Grouse, 
brothers in Delta Upsilon, without whose help the manuscript 
would not have been published, thanks are gratefully expressed. 

Mabel Pound LeRoy. 


Introduction, by William H. Taft ix 

Biographical Sketch, by Harry Coleman xiii 

I. The Spanish Regime — A Three-Century Prelude . . 1 

11. Municipal Reorganization 42 

III. Revolt against Spain: A Race War 79 

IV. Intervention of the United States . . , . . 147 
V. Germany displays Interest in America's Intentions . 210 

VI. The Capture of Manila by "Threat" 232 

VII. The Filipino Organization 280 

VIII. Drifting into Disagreement 307 

IX. The Treaty of Paris 354 

X. Mutual Distrust 378 

XI. Military Diplomacy 399 

Note. The colored map of the Philippines, used as frontispiece to the 
first volume, is from Atkinson's Philippine Islands, by permission of Ginn & 
Company. The portrait of James A. LeRoy, which faces page xiii, 
is from a photograph. The map of Manila Bay, facing page 148, is re- 
produced from a government map. 



Mr. James A. LeRoy was a graduate of the University of 
Michigan. He and his wife were classmates at the same high 
school, and the friendship that they made under those condi- 
tions ripened into an engagement. They were married and 
spent their honeymoon on the trip with the second Philippine 
Commission which went to Manila to begin its labors. Mr. 
LeRoy was the secretary of Commissioner Worcester, the one 
of the commission who knew most about the islands, the most 
concerning their flora and fauna, — for he had twice made 
trips of scientific research through the islands, — and the most 
concerning the people, because he knew the Spanish language 
and had traveled the islands over, living with the people in 
their villages and with the priests in their conventos. 

As confidential secretary and assistant of Mr. Worcester, 
Mr. LeRoy's attention was very early directed to a study of 
the whole situation there, and from his conversations with Mr. 
Worcester he received accurate impressions before he reached 
the islands. He had great facility in the study of language, 
and he became, before he left the islands, well versed in Cas- 
tilian. He learned something, too, of the local dialects, espe- 
cially of Tagalog. While he was in the Philippines, this desire 
to learn the languages and the dialects, and the acquaintances 
that he formed through Mr. Worcester, who knew a great 
many of the natives from former trips, led him to move in 
circles into which few Americans ever went. He studied the 
opinions of the native Filipinos of the different classes, and he 
became greatly interested in the early history of the islands. 
He had a judicial mind and a very great love of accurate re- 
search and investigation. I think he was possibly not free from 


some prejudices, for those usually affect all men, but, on the 
whole, his intense love of the truth and his desire to be correct 
historically were so strong that his account and his view of 
what he learned from his investigations were likely to be as 
little colored as that of any historian. 

While there is a good deal of material for history in the 
form of accounts written by various persons of the different 
centuries, it still is true that there is much inaccurate tradition 
about things in the history of the islands that needs careful 
modification and keen sifting. This, I think may be fairly 
said, Mr. LeRoy has supplied. 

Mr. LeRoy remained in the islands some three years or more, 
but having contracted tuberculosis he felt it necessary to seek 
a country in which recovery was more likely than it could be 
in the moist climate of the Philippines. Through the recom- 
mendations of the commission, he was appointed as consul at 
Durango, a place in Mexico where the climate was such that 
it was hoped he might live down the disease which had posi- 
tively established itself in his lungs. He longed for the oppor- 
tunity to visit Seville and other places in Spain where there 
were records in manuscript of conditions in the Philippines 
transmitted by the friars of ancient day, who were the historians 
of that period, and by the reports of Spain's of&cial represen- 
tatives in her far-off colonies. This he was denied, and he was 
obliged to take at second hand the contents of the records. It 
was a great loss that his health prevented his making a life 
study of that which was nearest his heart. The dread disease 
from which he was suffering increased its ravages, and his 
condition aroused his anxious concern lest he might not live 
to finish the history that he had undertaken so that the pro- 
ceeds from the copyright could support his wife and two chil- 
dren. Much of what he wrote was written as he looked death 
in the face. He had intended to bring his history down through 
the first five years of the Commission Government, but the 
pen dropped from his hand, and he was not permitted to com- 


plete his narrative beyond the date when he first arrived in 
the islands. 

In spite of his failure to round out the work, he has left a 
most valuable aid to the student of Philippine history in that 
which he did complete. It is very essential, in order to under- 
stand the problems that the American Government has had to 
meet and solve in those far-off Gems of the Pacific, to know 
what their history was under the Spanish regime. The influ- 
ence of the theocracy which prevailed in the islands under the 
friars, the constant friction between the civil and the religious 
governmental influences, on the one hand, and the union of the 
two in control of the people, on the other, all make not only 
an interesting study, but one which throws great light on the 
present conditions in the islands. 

Nowhere can a clearer and more judicial statement be found 
than in these chapters which Mr. LeRoy, who had really given 
up his life for the Philippines, was able to complete. There 
will be differences of opinion with Mr. LeRoy's conclusions, 
but what makes his work so valuable is that he states the evi- 
dence on both sides of controversial issues, and while he draws 
his own inferences, he adduces the sources of his information 
and states the evidence on both sides in such a way as to enable 
the reader to exercise his judgment, and affirm, or differ from, 
the conclusion of the author. 

I sincerely hope that the work may have the circulation that 
it deserves as a real contribution to the history of a people 
whose fate is now so much bound up with that of the people 
of the United States. 

William H. Taft. 
August 1, 1913. 


Editor of the Pontiao (Mich.) Press Gazette 

Emerson has said that every commanding monument in 
the annals of the world is the triumph of enthusiasm. It fol- 
lows that any life which leaves upon the progress of the world 
the mark of labor well performed must be sustained by un- 
selfish enthusiasm of the kind that overcomes all obstacles^ 
goes deeply into the fundamentals, and, thus, passes on to fu- 
ture generations and history something tangible and inspiring 
for others to follow. The true historian lives for generations. 
Time cannot erase what has been impartially written of the 
years that have passed, and he who has executed a true word- 
picture of the world's progress has made for himself a monu- 
ment of truth that must take first rank by the side of other 
high arts. 

When the President of the United States came to Pontiae, 
Michigan, in the fall of 1911, it was not to speak of the all- 
absorbing problems of the day. There was no word of the 
tariff or the currency question ; there was no reference to any 
of the details of government. He had come to pay a tribute 
to the life and public services of Mr. James Alfred LeRoy and 
to lay a wreath upon his tomb : " Here near the school where 
he graduated," said President Taft, "I wish to pay a debt of 
gratitude to his memory in behalf of the people of this nation. 
He went to the Philippine Islands, learned the people and 
their history, and he finally gave up his life, as a soldier gives 
up his life on the field of battle, because he there became a 
victim of impaired health. His death did not occur, however, 
until after he had rendered a service to the Government of a 
most important character, and one which entitles him to the 
gratitude of all the people of the United States." 


A great task calls for uninterrupted effort, even, it may be, 
to the extent of a lifetime ; and it devolved upon Mr. LeRoy 
to crowd into the thirty-three years of his career a knowledge 
of Spanish and Philippine history that would ordinarily take 
the full span of a long life to acquire. This he did by apply- 
ing himself to the subject with an abounding enthusiasm, with 
an unremitting effort directed into every avenue where knowl- 
edge was to be found, and by personal contact with the vari- 
ous phases of latter-day Philippine development. Once wholly 
engrossed in the task of securing a thorough understanding 
of the subject, there was no barrier too great for him to sur- 
mount. Exacting in nature and a foe to slipshod methods of 
research and in the determination of true facts, he spared no 
effort in the acquirement of the minutest bit of information 
which might enable him correctly to inform himself. 

During the last four years of life his brilliant mind per- 
formed a feat which would have baffled any less determined 
individual. His health had been seriously impaired by tubercu- 
losis contracted in the Philippines, and, with all his knowledge 
and grasp of the various phases of Oriental and Spanish his- 
tory, he had thus to labor in his writing with the handicap 
of a weakened body. Striving to overcome the ravages of the 
disease by change of climate, he, nevertheless, pursued his 
interest in the subject of his deep concern with undaunted 
effort. Men of his will-power do not surrender even under the 
impending danger of the plague. Like the pathetic instance 
df Robert Louis Stevenson, stricken in like manner, his mind 
kept up its unceasing effort both to conquer the plague and 
at the same time give to the world what abundant preparation 
and inclination had prompted. His heart was in the new co- 
lonial experiment of raising the Filipinos to a position of ample 
educational and self-governing qualifications. He had seen the 
islands fall into our hands through the exigencies of war. It 
was not a question with him of the wisdom of their becoming 
a part of our possessions. They were already ours; therefore, 



what was our duty toward them ? His sense of justice frowned 
upon their exploitation by selfish seekers after treasure. His 
viewpoint carried only the thought that as a nation we had, 
by the Treaty of Paris, assumed an obligation which was to 
test our righteousness and exemplify the spirit of a democracy 
turned missionary. The fruitful interest and enthusiasm of a 
man of Mr. LeRoy's character, applied to so great a problem, 
meant much not only to this country, by way of informing the 
people here at home of the exact truth of the progress in 
the Far Eastern experiment, but to the Filipinos themselves, 
the confidence of whom he possessed to a marked degree. 

He had gone to the Islands as secretary to Professor D. C. 
Worcester of the Second Commission appointed by President 
McKinley. A man of his ambition and attainments could not 
be confined to the details of this assignment. Like the indus- 
trial leader, who rises from the ranks by gaining each day 
additional and valuable experience from tasks not assigned but 
nevertheless taken up through enthusiastic desire, Mr. LeRoy 
faithfully did his routine task and then left no avenue closed 
against the completion of his fund of information. From 
early young manhood he had earned his way, and by combin- 
ing practical newspaper work with his course in college he 
became not only a close student of contemporary events, but 
particularly well informed concerning the events which were 
finally to make up the history of the new possessions. His 
position with the commission placed him in close contact with 
the membership of that governing body. Being endowed with 
qualities that command attention, and manifesting an eager 
desire to go far beyond the requirements of his duties in the 
active work of establishing the new government, men of the 
highest rank soon gave him their confidence and began to 
seek his counsel. These men were not slow to observe his in- 
tense interest in the subject which was giving them much con- 
cern. That he had the faculty of turning off work of the most 
intricate and exacting nature, and with the dispatch of a 


trained journalist, early came to the attention of the commis- 
sion ; that he possessed tremendous energy and intense love 
for his task was apparent within but few months; that he 
sought to cooperate and assume the fullest share of responsi- 
bility which his position made possible, were facts that pressed 
themselves upon the notice of his higher associates. 

A trained secretary, one whose education has been of the 
practical kind, combined with mastery of fundamentals em- 
bracing a higher course in professional or literary attainment, 
soon demonstrates his true worth. Such a man is not a mere 
machine, but a trained diplomat and executive. He carries in 
large measure the burden of responsibility resting upon his 
superiors, and hence, if serving in the highest degree of effi- 
ciency, must take rank with those above him. Mr. LeRoy ful- 
filled these demands, and then on his own account began to 
delve into all past events leading up to the establishment of 
the Taft Commission. The task was a heavy one and, in many 
cases, such information as existed was fragmentary and col- 
ored by the viewpoint of partisanship. Within a short time, 
however, he had acquired the basis of a library covering early 
Spanish periods and leading on through the various stages of 
the insurrection against the rule of Spain. This library in- 
creased in size until it embraced practically everything written 
on the subject. Over this vast accumulation of print, every page 
of it in a foreign language, he went with painstaking care, 
and in the end was rewarded with a comprehensive view 
extending over the old Spanish regime. 

Having literary connections with numerous publications in 
the United States, he turned the knowledge to account, his 
contributions appearing in the Political Science Quarterly, 
the American Historical Review^ the Atlantic Monthly, and 
the Independent. In addition, a volume entitled Philippine 
Life in Town and Country (Putnam) appeared in 1905 and 
is now in its third edition. This work was designed only to 
set forth the Filipinos as they are, and was in no sense an ex- 


position of any policy with regard to the "Philippine Question." 
A demand existed for a brief outline of native life which 
should picture the typical Filipino community, its activities, 
and the social and educational phases of the Islanders. In set- 
ting forth the status of the great majority, as differentiated 
from the traditional leaders and economic bosses of these 
masses, — the ignorant peasantry, rather than the somewhat 
distant and unsympathetic upper proprietary classes, — the 
author supplied a new picture of the situation, and removed, 
to an appreciable extent, the average reader's unfamiliarity 
with numerous tribes making up the population of the Philip- 
pine possessions. In this work, by way of introduction, he 
assumed an attitude frankly and cordially in sympathy with 
the aspirations of the Filipinos towards liberalism and modern 
life and progress. The best Filipinos, he argued, are optimis- 
tic as to their race and its future, and we ourselves can at least 
be decent enough to give them the benefit of the doubt, if not 
to encourage their optimism. He was, however, in much doubt 
as to how far we are justified in accepting the proportionately 
small class of natives possessing education and social position, 
as spokesmen and representatives of their people. 

It was in his treatment of Filipino life that Mr. LeRoy ac- 
corded to Spain a full measure of credit for her aims and 
achievements in the line of colonization. He regretted the ig- 
norant attitude inspired by race prejudice which would deny 
to the Spaniard an influence for good as applied to the Philip- 
pine subjects. That the Spanish rule resulted to a profound 
extent in an amelioration of conditions was freely stated by the 
author, and in particular did he lay stress upon their benevo- 
lent achievement and its net result. While condemning the 
backward and halting step, however, which at last turned the 
Filipinos against Spain's rule, it was Mr. LeRoy's belief that 
in order to put the Filipinos of to-day in their proper category, 
full justice should be done Spain's actual accomplishments, if 
not as ruler, at any rate as teacher and missionary. He fully 


realized that Spain, in the Peninsula itself, had never yet 
entered into the nineteenth century, politically or intellectu- 
ally. On this account, how much less, as he reasoned, was she 
able to guide a backward people of the Orient, themselves but 
awakening to contact with the world at large and but dimly 
aware of the goal toward which they f^el it within them to 
strive. It was his opinion, as a conclusion to his allusion to this 
phase of the Philippine question, that dogmatize as one might 
about the racial and environmental inheritance of the Filipinos, 
as being of the Orient, the fact that they themselves rejected 
Spain, as an unsatisfactory mentor in Occidental civilization, 
is an indication of their fitness for further progress in that 

Through his numerous contributions to various publica- 
tions, and by reason of the extended comment aroused in the 
press as they appeared, Mr. LeRoy soon became known, among 
those best able to judge, as an authority on subjects connected 
with the Philippines. His services were sought in many addi- 
tional directions, but human minds and hands, even when 
backed by the store of energy which this man possessed, have 
their limits. He performed what has been conceded as the work 
of two men as secretary, and with it all he labored long into 
the evenings, many times until sunrise, in quest of stray bits 
of information which would enable him finally to attain the 
object of his vision : '^ A Review of the American Occupation 
of the Philippines." 

As a preparation for this worthy ambition he had gained the 
knowledge and the place of a competent and unbiased observer. 
His research into Spanish history had been that of a close 
student ; his contact with the various governmental activities, 
military and civil, in the Islands had enabled him to separate 
fictional and unreliable data, which always accompany a new 
situation, from the facts as history should record them. An 
omnivorous reader and one who kept an extensive daily record 
in his own handwriting of all events that might later become 


the basis of misunderstanding or controversy, he launched into 
the introductory pages of what was to be his important Hfe 

Going to the Islands with athletic strength and possessed 
of stupendous energy, he, nevertheless, drew too heavily upon 
his physical resources. The uncertain and depressing climate, 
together with the unsanitary conditions then existing, pro- 
duced a run-down condition that later made a place for the 
germ of tuberculosis. At the threshold of many a strong man's 
career there appears before him the threatening force of an ill 
fate. It comes creeping to the doorway and stands ready with 
upHf ted hand to strike without warning or command ; its clinched 
fist is raised in defiance of all that is good ; its insidious nature 
knows neither the weak nor the strong, and its victims are not 
measured by the great usefulness that is in them. Mr. LeRoy 
had been met by the demon of disease. It was to drive him 
from the Islands and the people in whose interest the impulse 
of his brave and abiding heart had been directed toward a more 
satisfactory governmental and educational development. 

Returning to the United States on the advice of a physician 
at Manila, he sought medical advice in San Francisco, and was 
informed that his case had reached a serious stage. Another 
physician, at Los Angeles, contradicted this diagnosis, and 
informed him that a change of climate was not necessary. 
Returning to his home state, Michigan, the advice of the first 
doctor was corroborated, and he was informed that his future 
depended upon his living in a dry climate. With all this con- 
flicting professional advice of a disconcerting and disappoint- 
ing nature, he was greatly perplexed; but a friend who owned 
a ranch in New Mexico persuaded him to make the trip there, 
and within a short time he accepted. Behind him he left his 
young wife and baby, to search in a far-off, rough country for 
health and strength with which to continue his work. In this new 
location "he remained eleven months, and while there regained 
much of his lost weight. Filled with his characteristic spirit 


to be busy, he could not be persuaded to take a complete rest, 
and within a short time was surrounded by piles of periodicals, 
Philippine bulletins, and Spanish publications. The habits of 
study and daily labor could not be broken, and he was soon 
engaged with his writing. 

During a trip on horseback to Santa Fe he was thrown and 
sustained a fracture of his right arm. His daily letter to his 
wife, written in a cramped left hand, caused her to leave imme- 
diately for his side. She found him with his broken arm in a 
plaster cast, busily engaged with his left hand manipulating 
the keys of the typewriter. Within a short time husband and 
wife were located on a small fruit ranch near the Tesuque Res- 
ervation, just out of Santa Fe. 

About this time the agitation against the so-called imperial- 
istic tendencies of the Government were rife, and a strong 
party in the United States called for the independence of the 
Philippines. Mr. LeRoy, while favorable to the largest partici- 
pation of the natives in their own government consistent with 
their qualifications, looked with grave concern upon any move- 
ment which had for its end the turning over of the Islands to 
complete native control. He traced much of the impulse under 
which many well-intentioned Americans were arguing for inde- 
pendence, to designing native politicians whose influence, if 
allowed to have recognition, would overturn the reconstructive 
work already accomplished. And it may be well to state here 
that up to the time of his death (1909) he had never changed 
his mind in this respect. It was his firm belief that until the 
great mass of Filipinos have been raised to a higher standard 
of citizenship, both from an educational standpoint and with 
a knowledge of stable governmental discipline, any efforts 
toward independence would tend to the creation of factional 
difficulties of a disrupting and demoralizing nature. To promise 
the Islanders any particular time when independence would 
be granted seemed likewise to him unadvisable, in that such 
promise would keep ahve within the minds of certain leaders 


a burning desire for power, and of a kind that was pregnant 
with bad results both to themselves and the people over whom 
they would expect to exercise direction. He desired that the rule 
of the home government should prevail, without giving promise 
of termination, so long as the best interests of the natives should 
be served, and he believed that such service must be rendered 
until the people had undergone a long process of education 
both in governmental principles and through contact with 
the better civilizing influences. 

And thus it was from his temporary home in New Mexico, 
that the keen interest of Mr. LeRoy was aroused toward the 
"anti-imperialistic" propaganda being carried on, particularly 
in the Eastern States. He plunged into magazine and news- 
paper writing, allowing no argument in favor of Philippine 
independence to go unchallenged. Day after day, and week 
after week, his contributions appeared. In none of these was 
there any attempt at controversy other than properly to inform 
the people of the United States of the duty resting upon them, 
to the end that the Filipinos should not be cast adrift while 
undergoing a sane and unselfish process of amelioration. That 
his influence was greatly felt at this critical time is shown by 
the fact that very early the anti-imperialistic talk largely 
subsided and in its place was implanted a general behef, held 
even to-day by the best informed, that to turn the government 
of the Islands back to the natives would be a serious mistake, 
fraught with uncertainty as to their ultimate destiny. 

After two months spent in putting the little fruit ranch into 
livable condition, a telegram came to Mr. LeRoy offering him 
the post of consul to Costa Rica. Inquiry as to climatic con- 
ditions satisfied him of the un suitableness of the altitude; but 
later came an offer of similar services at Durango, Mexico, 
which he accepted. Ranch life was not to his liking, and while it 
had been resorted to for the outdoor life, he was without capi- 
tal, and the call to become active once more in work that was 
congenial proved irresistible. A long, tedious trip to the City 


of Mexico followed. The United States Ambassador was in the 
States, and it was four weeks before the formal details neces- 
sary to taking up the post at Durango had been completed. 
Once located in this quiet atmosphere, and having organized 
the consulate office, he proceeded in his endeavor to regain 
health in a dry climate, at the same time relinquishing little 
of his active concern in world affairs, and especially the Philip- 
pines. His consular reports were varied and of a nature to 
attract the commendation of the State Department. In fact, 
many of his suggestions for improvement of the service figured 
in the many reforms that came as a result of Secretary Root's 
efforts. All of his spare time, aside from the duties of the 
consulate, was applied to writing of the events leading up to 
the American occupation of the Philippines. The old city, 
with its quiet, easy-going life, offered abundant opportunity 
for delving into old and rare Spanish books. Day after day 
the book collectors brought everything to his door which they 
thought the taste of the new consul would fancy. The great 
majority of these tenders were, of course, useless, but there 
were a number of historical works that proved a valuable ad- 
dition to his already extensive library. To the large amount 
of data in his possession was constantly added fresh and re- 
liable information from friends in the Islands. Back and forth 
a chain of letters was passing which made new inquiries and 
further informed him of such facts as would prove of historical 
use. He could not touch in a light way the extensive subject 
which he had chosen to handle. There had been too much 
superficial literature written upon Philippine subjects, and as 
much misinformation as fact was already abroad to peqDlex 
him, but, at the same time, to stimulate his own thorough 
treatment of the questions involved. It was a most exacting 
duty, and yet a loved one for him. Through all the agony of 
his ill fate, and with a body succumbing gradually to the rav- 
ages of the disease, he, nevertheless, labored on. There was 
no complaint, no surrender, and through it all he maintained 


the iron will and determination which were characteristic of 
him. Far from the associations of people from whom he was 
accustomed to receive inspiration, and with hopeful heart, he 
completed a page to-day and a page to-morrow of the manu- 
script that was to become the basis of his review. Of that re- 
view he wrote: — 

I have said that the manuscript sent to you will comprise about 
one half of the work when completed, — I think it will, — one half, 
that is, of the text proper. It contains the Introductory Chapter on 
the Spanish regime and the four chapters ^ carrying through the his- 
tory of 1898-1900 inclusive, the four longest and most difficult chap- 
ters of the book, I think; at any rate, I regard my work of com- 
position as now more than half done, though there are eight more 
chapters as planned. Then, too, there will be bibliographical lists and 
notes at the end of each chapter, some four to six appendices (one 
consisting of some 30,000 words, the others relatively short), and, of 
course, a very comprehensive index, indispensable in a work which 
will be, like this, so largely a reference work merely. 

The other chapters to come are : V, Progress in Pacification, re- 
counting the events of 1901 to the latter part of the year, the col- 
lapse of the insurrection, and the establishment of civil government 
in part ; VI, the Recrudescence in Rebellion, seen in the Batangas and 
Samar campaigns, this chapter dealing with the question of the re- 
lations between the American army and the Filipinos ; VII, the 
Philippine Question in the United States, primarily a review of the 
"army cruelty" campaign and the enactment of the constitutional 
law of the Philippines in 1902, but also reviewing the history of 
anti-imperialism (strictly without taking sides, and to a considerable 
extent merely in a bibliographical way), and of the discussion of the 
Philippine question and legislation upon it in the United States, 
1898-1905; VIII, describing the essential features of the new Philip- 
pine government and their practical workings, from 1901 on ; IX, 
the various Philippine questions which are economical in character, 
notably Chinese labor, the question of tariffs, the development of 
agricultural, mining, and forestry resources, etc. ; X, the friar and 
religious question, in its various phases ; XI, the questions related 
with the government of the Moros and the pagan tribes, historically 
and bibliographically treated in the main ; and, XII, the summing-up, 

* For the convenience of the reader, the author's original five chapters have 
subdivided in the printed book. 


which I think I can make short, and in which I desire to review 
the salient things brought out in all the preceding chapters, histor- 
ically speaking, showing plainly the things which may be regarded 
as established facts from 1898 on, and stating the main elements 
of the " Philippine problem " from the diverse points of view from 
which it is at present regarded. 

This will, I think, set before you a very complete idea of the na- 
ture and comprehensiveness of what I am trying to do. 

During the last year Mr. LeRoy was at Durango new 
developments had arisen in the Philippines and the State 
Department determined to send Secretary Taft to the scene. 
A congressional party was soon organized to accompany the 
former governor and to obtain full knowledge of the progress 
which had been made. Mr. LeRoy was made a member of the 
secretary's ofl&cial staff. It was not until his death that his 
wife, in the reading of his diary, found a warning that had 
been sent him of the danger attending such an exertion, and 
that he had suffered a slight hemorrhage due, he recorded, to 
the cramped position assumed while at work on his typewriter. 
He chose to make the trip, however, inasmuch as it once more 
afforded him opportunity for contact with men of affairs. 
Aboard ship and with long trips to China and Japan, these 
months were a delight after the monotonous years of exile in 
Mexico. For this diversion he may have sacrificed a few weary 
days of life, but it was " worth the while," as he would say, 
to one whose tastes were for purely intellectual pursuits. 

Directly upon his return to Durango he was tired and some- 
what indifferent to completing his review. But the stout heart 
was not broken — the will-power still remained, and with reso- 
lute courage he went forward collecting the data for the later 
chapters. Upon his return from the Lake Mohonk Conference, 
in 1905, where he lectured on the Islands, the work of writ- 
ing occupied five months, this being followed by a serious 
illness. He had put his whole soul into the effort. It was 
to be his life work ; it was to be a heritage to his wife and 


children. Upon its pages he had placed the image of his im- 
partial mind; and whatever may become of the Islands, their 
true friend and adherent had, during his declining days, 
striven to give a faithful portrayal of the many events that 
went hand in hand with their governmental existence. He had 
rebuked an earlier fate, though his remaining days were num- 

After his severe illness he resolved to seek out-of-door em- 
ployment. Offers of a change of posts, among them that of 
consul-general to Madrid, had to be refused, and the telegram 
declining this place he never saw until three days after, being 
too ill to speak. When he arose he never referred to the inci- 
dent, so keen was his disappointment at being obliged to forego 
a position of greater responsibility. 

Coming north to Michigan, following the resignation of the 
post at Durango, he strove to interest capital in Mexican 
lands. While the negotiations were in progress he again suf- 
fered a relapse, after having started back to Durango, and, 
reaching the city, was carried to the old barracks, formerly 
occupied by the consulate. Here his faithful servant waited 
upon him for the following three months. All of this time 
hope did not relinquish its hold upon his mind, and, in spite 
of broken strength, he saw the possibility of help in the 
mountain air. Being obliged, however, to abandon any move- 
ment in this direction he asked for admittance to the military 
hospital at Fort Bayard, New Mexico. For a time he showed 
improvement, and the brave fight which he waged, that he 
might once more have with him his wife and three little chil- 
dren, excited the deepest sympathy and close personal concern 
of the officials of the hospital. Just when the dread disease 
appeared to be baffled and his courageous fight seemed won, 
the summons came, and a message to his family and friends 
at home announced his death. 


James Alfred LeRoy was born at Pontiac, Michigan, De- 
cember 9, 1875, the son of Edward and Jennie LeRoy. At 
twelve years of age he had demonstrated an extremely preco- 
cious mind and was far advanced in his studies. During vaca- 
tion, at this period of life, he learned stenography while an 
instructor was engaged in teaching an older member of the 
family. At thirteen he had read Blackstone in a local law 
office, and at fourteen he accepted a temporary position as 
stenographer in the office of the Pontiac, Oxford & Northern 
Railway. At fifteen he busied himself outside of school hours 
by reporting for local newspapers, pursuing this activity until 
he graduated from the high school at the early age of seven- 
teen. His work in the school attracted general comment among 
the teachers, inasmuch as he embraced in his studies all four 
of the courses offered, his diploma allowing him one year's 
credit at the University of Michigan. 

Being thrown on his own resources he arranged, in connec- 
tion with his university course, to supply a chain of newspa- 
pers with news of an athletic nature. Of robust body and pos- 
sessed of a desire to show his full prowess, the records in high 
jumping, hurdling, and sprinting which he made during his 
freshman year served to honor him in Western collegiate 
circles. A new running broad jump record was soon estab- 
lished, and its equal was not found until many years after. 
His college course was marked by efficient accomplishment in 
languages, mathematics, and history, and with all this difficult 
classroom work went much writing in connection with a daily 
published and maintained by students. Every university has 
its leaders in various lines of student activity, and it would be 
difficult to separate many of these diversions from the man 
LeRoy, who was always doing his part in worthy collegiate 
enterprises. While in college he became a member of the 
Delta Upsilon Fraternity. He was graduated in 1896 from the 
University with the degree of Bachelor of Arts, his standing 
throughout his course entitling him to the highest honors. 


Thirteen years after, when the Phi Beta Kappa Society, 
founded on scholarship, was organized, he was made a member, 
his high standing while in college making him eligible for 

Following his graduation he became, at twenty years of 
age, principal of the Pontiac High School, from which he had 
graduated only three years previously. Within a year the super- 
intendent resigned, and the Board of Education was divided 
on the question of LeRoy's eligibility for the position. All 
admitted his educational qualifications, but some believed him 
too young to be entitled to the place. Resigning his position 
at the close of the term he entered the ranks of journalism, 
being successfully connected with the Detroit Free Press and 
Evening News, ?Lui occupying a responsible position as political 
reporter. New York being the goal of all starving newspaper 
men, he was soon in that city, where he made extensive con- 
nection with the best publications. Later he became Sunday 
editor of the Baltimore Herald, It was while on this news- 
paper that he had an assignment in Washington which placed 
him in touch with the members of the Philippine Commission 
only recently chosen by President McKinley. While only 
twenty-four years of age at this time, he was of mature mind, 
and his extensive experience gained him the responsible posi- 
tion of secretary to Commissioner Worcester. Only a few days 
remained before the commission was to leave for Manila, and 
at this juncture Mr. LeRoy did a characteristic act and one 
which showed him equal to any emergency. He was unmar- 
ried, and the young woman of his choice. Miss Mabel Pound, 
lived in Michigan. Immediately after accepting the call to 
the Islands he telegraphed her as follows: "Will you marry 
me Friday in Pontiac and go immediately to the Philippines?" 
The wedding was arranged and the bride and groom were soon 
on the way to San Francisco, joining the members of the Com- 
mission at Chicago. 

Since his death the widow and her three children have 


taken up their residence in Washington, where Mrs. LeRoy is 
the only person, outside of the President himself, who is 
authorized to sign his name to official papers. And now as the 
years go by, and three little children are left with the mother 
to make their way without the guidance and care of one who 
loved and labored for their future, it is good to know that 
they are fulfilling his every hope. The inspiration of his life 
will one day come to lead them to new visions of usefulness, 
for the world is wide and, in its struggles, calls for the same 
unselfish and ennobling service that their father rendered. 

Beset with difficulties and ill fate on every hand, he had 
never shirked a duty nor overlooked the many little things of 
life that busy men are prone to forget. His active career was 
dedicated to expounding the truth and attempting to set the 
progress of the world one step farther toward the ideal. When 
disease and weakness were upon him, and the tremendous 
energy he was expending to combat the '^anti-imperialistic " 
cry caused one of his friends in Washington to suggest that 
he enter outdoor business life and cease his writing, he re- 
corded these words in his diary : " I wrote that, if it came 

down squarely to a decision between a mere chase to add years 
to a life and also ' make a competence,' and the living of a 
life more after my own inclinations and doing something satis- 
fying, even though shorter, I should prefer the latter." 

Here was the measure of the man. He believed in the cause 
through which the United States was turned missionary to the 
Filipinos. He beheved in the usefulness of the administration 
of their affairs by this country. Only one barrier could, he 
firmly believed, be erected against a successful ultimate result 
in the Islands, and that was an ill-timed and badly advised 
change. Such a devout adherent of the Filipino-American ex- 
periment could not in conscience relinquish his work. And he 
died fighting — fighting for the faith that was in him. 







The people of the Philippine Islands were, on the 1st day 
of May in 1898, the product of a mixed Asiatic ancestry, both 
of blood and of environment ; of more than three centuries of 
rule by mediaeval Spanish ecclesiastics; of commercial and 
political contact for that length of time with Spaniards of a 
more progressive type, and for a half-century back with the 
world in general ; and of a generation of strife and of evolu- 
tion, on the part of their somewhat homogeneous civilized 
elements, toward a more independent existence and a dimly 
recognized ideal of nationality. That neither the statesmen 
nor the public of the United States knew the elements of this 
composite did not in the least lessen the fact of its complexity. 
And since the ignorance was reciprocal, and the Filipinos knew, 
in fact, even less of the history, the national characteristics, 
and the aims and ideals of the "North Americans," the 
events that brought these two peoples close together at the 
end of the nineteenth century were invested with something 
of awe and mystery, blinding them both at the time to the 
real trend of enlightened self-interest and leaving the issue of 
their contact, both for themselves and the outside world, very 
much in doubt. If the time has not yet come to dispel that 
doubt, at least 'there is much to be gained by a sober, careful, 
and critical weighing of the events and the facts revealed by 
their relationships for the more than half a decade that has 
since passed. 



The first requisite to such a review is a knowledge of the 
facts. Not only have these often been obscured in the heat of 
partisan discussion in the United States, but the very mass of 
accumulated data is a hindrance to that clarity of understand- 
ing which ought to prevail under government by the people. 
And if, in the fury of our scribbling, our debating and our re- 
solving, we have confused the very events happening under our 
eyes, less creditable yet to us of the greater and more respon- 
sible side of this partnership is it that we still plan and resolve, 
discuss and legislate, in careless ignorance of the antecedent 
data of our " new problem," untroubled and almost contemp- 
tuous as to the history of those whose welfare we have, with 
or without their consent, assumed to control. It is not less 
necessary now, in attempting to review the events of these six 
years, than it was in the early days of 1898, to go back and 
consult previous PhiUppine history for enlightenment as to our 

Because we of a favored continental expanse had never be- 
fore 1898 turned our attention to the Philippines, they were 
not necessarily bound to disclose themselves an El Dorado of 
riches to our magic touch. Because as a nation we had grown 
to bearded manhood in ignorance of the existence of the Fil- 
ipinos, it was not perforce to be assumed that they were un- 
discovered children of free nature, to be catalogued and clas- 
sified after their kind and to be governed from an ethnological 
textbook. If this had been the case, much of the advice which 
was so generously lavished upon us by our British guides, 
counselors, and friends, and by their imitators in some of our 
new collegiate " colonial laboratories " at home, would have 
been more pertinent. But the Filipinos had developed, or, at 
any rate, had acquired, some degree of civilization before the 
Spanish friars and arquebusiers came upon them, and the 
plain truth of their history since teaches him who will consult 
it that glib phrases about the " degenerate influence of corrupt 




Spain" do not sound well upon the lips of those who are 
proud to call themselves Anglo-Saxons. 


An investigation of the careless and contemptuous way in 
which the Spanish conquerors, lay and ecclesiastical, almost 
uniformly dealt with the characteristics and institutions of the 
sixteenth-century Filipinos, as well as of the more advanced 
Mexicans, and sought to sweep them away as wholly evil, and 
of the equally intolerant and unscientific way in which their 
Spanish successors have treated these more or less primitive 
communities in their writing of history, might well have 
preached modesty to us. An excellent piece of scientific work 
lies open to him who shall first reconstruct for us the com- 
munities of the pre-conquest Filipinos. Of late years, in Spain 
and the Philippines, the heat of bitter partisan controversy 
has tended more and more to obscure the facts, already so un- 
satisfactorily brought out in earlier writings. What may be 
called the " friar party " has sought to paint the primitive 
Filipinos as savages pure and simple, and the tendency has 
been to heighten the colors of the picture as imaginations and 
passions were worse mixed. Two motives inspired this cam- 
paign, one the desire to enlarge the importance of the work 
wrought by the friars, and the other to combat the extension 
of liberal institutions to the Filipinos. On the other hand, cer- 
tain superficial Filipinos and mentally exuberant Spanish Lib- 
erals have gone to as great extremes in painting the early Fil- 
ipinos as models of virtue, intelligence, and social progress, 
and their society as one unique in Oceania, an antipodal civil- 
ization in the midst of a sea of ignorance and vices. 

As stated, it is not yet possible to pronounce a critical 
judgment as to the status of the pre-conquest communities of 
lowland Filipinos, the Christianized population of to-day. 
Doubtless, much of interest wiU be brought to light when 


careful studies are made of the still half-wild Malay commu- 
nities of the hills of Luzon and of the Moro settlements of 
Mindanau ; it must be remembered, however, that there is a 
probability that the former are Malay immigrants to the Phil- 
ippines of an earlier date than are the lowlanders, and that 
the Moros represent later migrations from Java and other 
islands, where they had, in part at least, acquired before com- 
ing the Mohammedan religion, and with it various social insti- 
tutions, modified since by communication not only with other 
Mohammedan communities of similar institutions, but also to 
some extent with the world in general. Of the early Spanish 
writings, most of which are unsatisfactory for the reasons 
stated, the best and more informative are a treatise on the 
customs of the natives written by Father Plasencia, a Francis- 
can friar, in 1589, and adopted by the Government for the 
use of its officials, and Dr. Antonio de Morga's work on the 
progress of affairs in the Philippines up to 1606, its author 
having been a member of the supreme court of the islands.* 
These works and others that supplement them go to show that 
the Filipinos of the central islands and Luzon's western coasts 
were somewhat past the clan stage, and had a political organi- 
zation under local chiefs which virtually amounted to a mild 
feudalism, their so-called slavery and their land tenure fitting 
better into such a conception of their society ; that they had 
a system of laws or customs, administered by the councils of 
old men ; that their religious ideas, undeveloped and imbued 
with superstitions as they were, included, nevertheless, the 
recognition of a Supreme Being — the contest between Mo- 
hammedanism and Christianity among these Malays in the 
sixteenth century, with their readiness to accept either, being 
significant and illustrative ; that they had a system of writing, 
based on a phonetic alphabet, probably derived ultimately 
from the same source as that from which ours came in the 
dawn of history, and that some in each community could read 

1 See Bibliography. 


and write; that they had long since passed the nomadic state 
— probably long before the Malay migrations to the Philip- 

Discarding exaggerations and matters in doubt, we know 
that polygamy was then practiced by Filipinos of sufficient 
status to maintain more than one wife ; that the morality of 
the women left much to be desired, under the standard then 
obtaining, publicly at least, in European society; that gam- 
bling was by no means learned from the Spaniards, although 
new ways of gambling were ; that the petty chiefs were fre- 
quently at strife with each other, these tribal wars not con- 
tributing to the progress or the happiness of the people ; that 
agriculture and such arts as weaving, ceramics, etc., were in 
a primitive state (as, indeed, they still are). The natives had 
iron implements of warfare and various articles of other 
metals ; but contact with the continent of Asia explains these. 
They were in regular intercourse with China and with Japan, 
Borneo, and other islands some centuries before Spanish dis- 
covery. In the little-known work of Chao-Yu-Kua, a Chinese 
geographer of the thirteenth century, is a chapter on the Phil- 
ippine trade.* The Chinese then obtained from the Filipinos 
not only such raw materials as yellow wax, cotton, pearls, 
tortoise-shells, betel-nuts, cocoanuts, and vegetables, but also 
jute fabrics (probably those woven from ahaka, Manila hemp, 
as to-day), other woven goods (of cotton, Blumentritt sug- 
gests),^ and fine mats. The Filipinos took in exchange porce- 

» Chapter xi is devoted to the Philippines. For the data herein derived from 
this interesting work, the only reference available to the writer has been a Span- 
ish version of the chapter in question, printed in La Alborada, oTg&n of the Manila 
Lyceum (a secondary school), on November 9, 1901. This translation was sent to 
Jos^ Rizal by his intimate friend and co-worker in Philippina, Dr. Ferdinand 
Blumentritt, in 1894. The letter of transmission and the translation are in the 
collection of Mr. Clemente J. Zulueta, of Manila, who was, prior to his decease in 
1904, ofiBcial bibliographer of the Philippine Government. Blumentritt states in 
his letter to Rizal that a poor version of this chapter had been published in Madrid 
the year before, but he had since carefully compared his Spanish version with the 
English version of Dr. Hirth. 

* Father Pedro Chirino, in his RelaciSn d« las Itlas Filipinos (Rome, 1601), 


lain, gold, iron, needles, vases for perfumes, lance-heads, arti- 
cles of lead, silk parasols, black damask, and other silks. 
Chao-Yu-Kua tells of their settlements, some of a thousand 
families each, their houses of cane being clustered on high 
places. This was nearly three centuries before Magellan. 


The history of the Spanish conquest is by no means com- 
prised in the events of the four expeditions from the glori- 
ously disastrous one of Magellan, which discovered the islands 
in 1521, to the successful one of Legaspi, which planted the 
city of Sebii in 1565 and that of Manila in 1572. Roughly 
outlined, the conquest period lasted until 1700. By that time 
the islands were almost as fully occupied by the outposts of 
Spanish power and Spanish Christianity as they were two 
hundred years later. Spasmodic attempts were made there- 
after to bring into the fold of the Church the wild commu- 
nities of the mountains which form the spine of every large 
island in the group, but in the main these communities 
were only crowded farther back by the growth of the lowland 
population and the extension of its quasi-civilization. In the 
eighteenth and again in the nineteenth century, there were 
sustained efforts, only partially successful, for the subjection 
and settlement of the Moro country in the south (as there had 
already been in the seventeenth century). But by 1700 the 
Spanish flag had been raised and Spanish churches built 
over practically all the territory which, upon the transfer of 
sovereignty to the United States, could be said to have been 
effectively subjected to the mixed civil and ecclesiastical dom- 
inance of Spain. Progress thereafter was mainly in the growth 
of population within these limits, leading to the formation of 

speaks of the natives weaving cotton into fabrics for clothing, which was worn by 
the women in long robes reaching the ankles. See the English translation of this 
work in The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898 (cited in the Bibliography at the end 
of volume ii), vol. xn, pp. 187, 206; also pp. 187 et seq,, for references to the 
prehistoric trade with Japan. 



new pueblos and new parishes out of places that were at the 
end of the conquest period outlying districts of the older 
Church centers. Even the island of Negros, which lay for 
the most part undeveloped until the nineteenth century, when 
it became the chief sugar-producing center of the Bisayan 
Islands, forms, strictly speaking, no exception to this general 

Certain features of the conquest period detach themselves 
as significant to the student of recent Philippine history. First 
of all, it need not be said, at least to one who has read even 
slightly in the history of Spanish colonization, that the conquer- 
ors considered it a work of necessity and also of beneficence 
to stifle all manifestations of the life of former times and to 
supplant all the social institutions of the new-found peoples. 
Yet they went to work to do so in a fairly tolerant sort of 
fashion, in a way, indeed, that was destined in large part to 
render their efforts unavailing. It is a trite remark that the 
Christian religion was in Mexico merely grafted on existing 
beliefs and rites, which fact, coupled with certain superstitions 
connected with the coming of the white men, made the appar- 
ently marvelous acceptance of a new faith by some milHons of 
considerably civihzed people really only the following of the 
line of least resistance.^ Any one who comes in contact to-day 
with the Pueblo Indians of our Southwest, whom the Spanish 
friars ostensibly Christianized three hundred years ago, will 
readily observe how they have preserved all the intricate mass 
of superstitions, poetic imagery, and nature-worship which 
formed their primitive creed under a very thin veil of the out- 
ward forms of the Roman Catholic Church; their \evj fiestas 
are the same as of old, cloaked under the name of some more 
modern saint. Without entering into a comparison of the civil- 
ization of the primitive Filipinos with that of the Aztecs or of 

* Humboldt more than once paused to wonder at this invariable result of Spanish 
eolonization in Central and South America, then to demolish with his clear analyses 
•11 the miraculous features claimed for it 


the Pueblos, it is perfectly apparent that much the same thing 
took place in the islands discovered by Magellan. The early 
missionaries had just as little tolerance here as elsewhere for 
the customs of the natives, — " ways of the devil " all, — and 
scarcely ever turned aside even carelessly to record or comment 
upon them. Yet ingrained ways of living and doing were not 
lightly to be suppressed, had the new regime been much more 
rigid than it was, and perhaps we may even suspect that the 
institutions and habits which have survived are quite com- 
monly those of a less desirable sort. Where the main stress 
was laid upon the outward forms of the new life, religious or 
political, vices and superstitions had great opportunity to flourish 
underneath. If we may not say that this is what happened 
with the Filipinos, at least this is the most charitable and sym- 
pathetic way of passing judgment upon those islanders to-day. 
Recent writers have developed rather unwarrantable gener- 
ahzations from the survival of the harangay, in which they see 
a primitive Filipino institution.^ It was the survival of a name 
(and the name itself transformed from the Malay form of 
haldngay) rather than of an institution, and has of recent 
years been made conspicuous both because of the almost total 
disappearance of Malay names for social or political ideas and 
also because certain Spanish and mestizo writers laid great 
stress upon it in the campaign for " assimilation " which pre- 
ceded the municipal reform of 1893. As already seen, we must 

^ The name means a sort of small boat in Tagalog and other dialects. It was 
applied also to a family group or clan, under the leadership of a petty chief, some 
conjecture, because of the way in which the Malays migrated to the Philippines in 
groups. The name survived to the close of the Spanish regime, the cdbeza de ba~ 
rangdy being the lieutenant charged with tax collection in the barrios (outlying 
groups) of a pueblo. See the Philippine history of Father Rodrigo de Agdnduru 
Moriz, reproduced in volume 78 of ColecciSn de documentos ineditos para la historia 
de Espana (Madrid, 1882), p. 515. See also Cronicas de la ApostSlica Provincia de 
San Gregorio de Religiosos Descalzos de N, S. P. San Francisco en las Islas FilipU 
nas, etc., by Father Juan Francisco de San Antonio (Sampalok, 1738-44), part 1, 
book 1, chapter xuv. This institution is also dealt with in Pedro A. Paterno'g 
El Barangay (Madrid, 1892), a pamphlet only slightly less fanciful and more 
unscientific than the other writings of this Filipino. 



reject the claim so often reiterated of late years that the early 
missionaries found nomadic or half -fixed clans and taught them 
the ways of village life. Village life there was already, to some 
extent, and it was upon this that the friars built. Doubtless 
they modified it greatly, until in time it approached in most 
ways as closely to European village life as might be expected 
in tropical islands whose agricultural resources are not as yet 
well developed. From the first there would be a tendency to 
greater concentration about the churches,^ beginning with the 
rude structures of cane and thatch, which were replaced before 
1700 in all the older settlements by edifices of stone, frequently 
massive and imposing, especially so as they tower over the acres 
of bamboo huts about them, from the inmates of which have 
come the forced labor which built them. From the first, 
too, it was to the interest of the Spanish conquerors, lay and 
priestly, to improve the methods of communication between 
the communities which formed their centers of conversion or 
of exploration and collection of tribute. Yet to represent either 
the friars or the soldiers as great pathfinders and reconstructors 
of wilderness is the work of ignorance. When Legaspi's grand- 
son, Juan de Salcedo, made his memorable marches through 
northern Luzon, bringing vast acres under the dominion of 
Spain with a mere handful of soldiers, he found the modern 
Bigan a settlement of several thousand people ; his successors 
in the conquest of the Upper Kagayan Valley, one of the most 
backward portions of the archipelago to-day, reported a popu- 
lation of forty thousand in the region lying around the modern 
Tugegagau, and so it was quite commonly everywhere on the 
seacoasts and on the largest rivers. Some very crude deductions 
have been made as to the conquest period by writers of recent 
years who assume that the natives were at the beginning mere 
bands of wandering savages, and that all the improvements 

^ How the miMionaries in some of the central islands gathered the scattered 
elnsters of native huts into one town may be seen in Chirino (7^e Philippine 
Itlandi, 1493-1898^ toIs. xii and xm, especially toI. xin, pp. 90-91). 


visible in their external existence to-day were brought about 
in these early years. It was in the decade 1830-40, under 
Governor-General Enrile and the soldier administrator Pefia- 
randa, his chief assistant, that the Philippines first felt a real 
stimulus to road- and bridge-building and internal improve- 
ments generally; since that time the growth of external com- 
merce, with the resultant better cultivation of some of the 
provinces, such as Batangas and Pampanga, has led to great 
improvement in the ways of communication in these places, due 
both to the civil authorities and to some degree of initiative 
on the part of the mestizo plantation-owners. In the main, 
however, the Philippines are even now a country without roads. 
There is no detraction from the really great accomplish- 
ments of the conquest period in the statement of facts. But 
constantly, in a discussion of the merits and demerits of the 
early conquerors, we are seemingly drawn into the modern 
friar controversy. This is so, simply because the early friar 
chroniclers claimed everything for the missionaries in general 
and for their respective orders in particular ; and their more 
modern imitators have gone far beyond them, in the heat of 
controversy, until even the barest recital in a nonpartisan way 
of the general features of early Philippine history inevitably 
involves more or less of a categorical denial of the false state- 
ments upon which recent exaggerations are based. The friar 
missionaries did not bring about the first settlements and con- 
quests under Legaspi ; they did not blaze the way in wilder- 
nesses and plant the flag of Spain in outlying posts long in 
advance of the soldiers, the latter profiting by their moral- 
suasion conquests to annex great territories for their own 
plunder ; they did not find bloodthirsty savages, wholly sunk 
in degradation, and in the twinkling of an eye convert them 
to Christianity, sobriety, and decency, solely by some magical 
influence of their sacred garb and holy mission ; they did not 
teach wandering bands of huntsmen or fishermen how to Hve 
peacefully in orderly settlements, how to cultivate the soil, 


erect buildings (except the stone churches), and did not bind 
these villages together by the sort of roads and bridges which 
we have to-day, though they had considerable share in this 
work, especially in later times ; they did not find a squalid 
population of 400,000 to 750,000 in the archipelago, and 
wholly by the revolution wrought by them in ways of life 
make it possible for that population to increase by ten or 
twenty times in three centuries. 

The soldier conquerors at the outset preceded the mission- 
aries into practically every corner of the archipelago, and this 
continued to be true up to the very close of Spanish domina- 
tion, with regard to the Moros and hill-tribes. If the military 
conquest of these divided Malay settlements proved to be as 
easy as their religious conversion by the wholesale, whenever 
their more or less absolute petty rulers led the way, we may 
dispense with the plea of the miraculous and reasonably con- 
clude that Spain's way was made easy by the Malay lack of 
cohesiveness on one side and by native docility on the other. 
That men of peace, who came in the garb of charity and in 
the name of a new and better rehgion, were more important 
in such a conquest than rough soldiers with arms in their 
hands, is beyond dispute. And justice to the aims of Spain in 
this conquest demands a recognition of the fact that always 
and everywhere, in official plans and proclamations, the con- 
version of the natives was put in the foreground as the work 
of prime necessity and to which everything else and everybody 
else should be subordinated.^ Spain always aimed at a peace- 
ful conquest, after the early adventures in Mexico and Peru, 

' See RecopilaciAn de Leyes de Indias, book vi, title x, law i (repeating the will left 
hj laabella the Catholic as to the treatment of the Indians) ; book ii, title ii, law 
VIII, and book i, title i (entire). In general, careless writers who have been wont 
to paM harsh criticisms upon the Spanish colonial regime, both as to aims and 
methods from first to last, would do well to read this ponderous collection of laws 
dMigned to safeguard the rights of the natives. Their counterpart is not to be 
found in the records of the British Parliament nor in the Revised Statutes of the 
United States, except in detached provisions here and there. That the laws of the 
Indies were not enforced is, indeed, as true as it is unfortunato. 


and, in the main, she achieved it ; in the Philippines her task 
was rendered easy by the condition and the characteristics of 
the inhabitants. And yet, both because of a lack of mission- 
aries and because of the eagerness of those who had been sent 
to Manila to leave those islands for the more alluring and ad- 
venturesome fields in Japan and China, we find the soldiers 
and tribute collectors outstripping the friars in most parts of 
Luzon, in Leite, Samar, Bohol, Negros, Mindanau, and other 
islands, in portions of Sebii (the first island occupied) and 
Panai, as well as in the smaller populated islands, by from one 
year to a quarter-century.^ The first Bishop, a Dominican 
friar, was complaining bitterly, in 1594, that the encomende- 
ros ^ had in some places been collecting tribute for twenty 
years of natives who had as yet heard no word of the Christian 
rehgion nor seen a f rocked Spaniard. It is precisely for this 
reason that the earliest baptismal and parish records of the 
Church do not afford a very reliable index of the size of the 
population at the time of the conquest, whereas by 1700 they 
do. We may place the pre-conquest population of the whole 
archipelago anywhere from one million to two and a half 
millions, though perhaps nearer the former than the latter 

Quite enough was accomplished by the early friars, as well 
as by some few civilian administrators and soldiers (who were 
often seriously handicapped in their efforts by the opposition 

^ See documents in vols, vn, vm, and IX of The Philippine Islands^ U9S-1898, 
edited by Blair and Robertson. This important series of translations of Philippine 
historical docimients is more fully mentioned in the Bibliography. The volumes 
here cited also contain much information bearing upon the question of the number 
of inhabitants at the time of the conquest. 

2 Encomenderos, lay conquerors, who were, in consequence of services in the ex- 
tension of Spanish rule, given an encomienda, or " charge," of territory, with power 
to collect tribute from the natives dwelling therein, turning the royal portion into 
the treasury and retaining the rest, out of which they were required by law, though 
this was frequently a dead letter, to provide for the religious instruction of the 
natives. The system led to great abuses, was in fact a wretched piece of " spoils 
politics," on a par with the early colonial monopolies on the economic side ; it sur- 
vived the conquest period, but was eventually merged into a civil organization of 


of the ecclesiastics in high position to everything which they 
could interpret as interfering with their very wide preroga- 
tives), to excuse even Spanish boastfulness. By 1700 about 
three fourths of a million souls were baptized and settled in 
orderly communities, clothed in a modified European style, 
familiarized with the catechism and with various religious exer- 
cises printed for them in their native dialects, and were attend- 
ing mass and hearing sermons in those dialects in stone struc- 
tures wherein Europe seems for the moment to be transplanted 
into the Far East. The principles of that great body of law 
with which the name of Justinian is identified only as a sort 
of intermediary landmark, had in some degree been put into 
practice in this detached portion of the non-individualistic 
Orient. Some few ways of commerce had been marked out ; 
navigation between the islands had become a common thing 
and was conducted in the then modern boats, while Manila 
was a great depot for the European and American trade with 
China and the " spice islands " which was beginning to draw 
the Oriental out of his shell. Ways of agriculture were being 
improved, and new plants brought from Mexico and elsewhere, 
with some resultant diversification of products. Charity and 
education (though the latter was confined mainly to religious 
matters) were works which went hand in hand from the 
first ; Manila had its hospitals (though established primarily 
for Spaniards) nearly half a century before the Pilgrims came 
to Plymouth, and there had been a college founded there at 
the very opening of the seventeenth century.^ The first print- 
ing-press in the Philippines was at work before the founding 
of Jamestown, and little pamphlets of religious instruction in 
the dialects, as well as more weighty publications in Spanish, 

^ Both this foundation of the Jesuits and the college opened soon after by the 
Dominicans and made a " Royal University " in 1645 (the University of St. 
Thomas of Manila), were at first for the education of Spanish or half-caste boys ; 
bat the Government had aided with lands and money, and it compelled the open- 
ing of their doors to natives before 1700. Set Montero y Vidal, HUtoria de Filu 
pmas (Madrid, 1887), vol. I. 


were multiplied during the succeeding century ; we cannot to- 
day call these works of the friars scholarly, but, considering 
their times and their purposes, they are not the less notable. 
Woman occupies a higher position in the Philippines than she 
ever did in any other Oriental country, and, indeed, there are 
few places in the world where she plays a more prominent 
and independent part, not only in the affairs of the family, 
but also in the life of the community, and even in many in- 
stances in business; a glance at the Moro and pagan com- 
munities and at the other peoples of the Orient compels the 
belief that this is due to the introduction of Christianity into 
this segregated portion of the East.^ Yet it would not do to 
overlook the signs of ability, capacity, and initiative in the 
Filipino women themselves. In similar manner, we may give 
due credit to the early missionaries for a general improve- 
ment in the morals of the Filipinos along with the better- 
ment of their material condition, without going to the extreme 
of claiming that their habits were completely revolutionized. 
If the natives have been, by force of teaching and influence, 
made so conspicuously temperate as they are to-day, a grave 
responsibility rests upon their mentors for not having simi- 
larly reformed them as regards the very serious habit of 
gambling, their passion for which amounts to a vice. Failure 
to reform them in this particular makes us suspect that 
there has been exaggeration of the drunkenness and licentious- 
ness ascribed to them at the time of the conquest, that their 
abuse of appetite could not have been so bad as painted. 

Enough of good there was about this period of conquest 
and settlement to justify its being called the " golden age," 
the glorious era of missionary work (wherein, however, the 
comparatively few Spanish laymen in the islands, aside from 

1 In matters of religion, woman is the great conservative as well as the great 
zealot ; inevitably, it has been through her that the friars achieved their greatest 
results, as well as through her that thej longest retained their hold upon the 


the direct representatives of the Crown and its generally benef- 
icent intentions, played a role often only less ignoble than 
their fellow-adventurers on the continent of America, and, 
moreover, the natives were sometimes abused and exploited by 
the friars themselves). But already before we enter upon the 
eighteenth century, not only had the scepter of power passed 
from Spain, but with it also preeminence in exploration and 
her claim to leadership in civilization. The new economic 
regime was not yet fully outhned, but the European peoples 
farther north who were eventually to be identified with it had 
already come into control in the councils of the nations and 
on the ways of that world-commerce which of itself was to 
prove a civilizer superior to dogma and ritual. The remain- 
ing two centuries might well be called one long prelude to the 
final crash. Patriotic, sometimes also intelligent, efforts were 
made to avert it, and the nineteenth century in particular was 
in Spain a drawn-out wrestling bout between the blind power 
of the old giant of mediaevalism and reaction and the spas- 
modic and nervous exertions of the young man of Spanish Lib- 
eralism, re-aroused at intervals to the movements of scientific 
and political progress in the outside world. Generous in dis- 
position, democratic of manner if not of government, but 
proud and self-contained and sensitive, Spain was unable to 
free herself from the iron bands which bound her stationary 
to a past in whose glories she came more and more to live. 
How much less was she able sympathetically to interpret or 
intelligently to direct a never less than alien and an Oriental 
people (whose eyes she had herself first turned toward Occi- 
dentalism), bringing them into a fuller understanding and a 
closer contact with that developing civilization itself ! 


It is difficult to recognize any general trend in the events 
of the eighteenth century in the Philippine Islands. There 
were, however, certain events and movements of general sig- 


nificance. The perennial strife between civil and ecclesiastical 
authorities saw various new and some exciting phases. This 
was due in great measure to the arrival from time to time, as 
during the first century and a half of occupation also, of 
more vigorous and capable governor-generals. The post had 
too often been held by civilians who were merely figureheads, 
also for intervals by the Archbishop of Manila ; and the re- 
hgious orders, which had grown to look upon the archipelago 
as really their private territory ^ under the division which they 
had before 1700 made of the various provinces, regarded any 
action taken by the civil authorities in matters of general 
policy, without their advice or against their consent, as con- 
stituting a sort of infringement upon vested rights. Having 
accomplished in large part their work of baptism and their or- 
ganization of the parishes, they refused to give way to secular 
priests ; in fact, their original willingness to see Spanish secu- 
lar priests sent out to occupy cathedral offices or minister to 
purely Spanish parishes, in Manila, for instance, disappeared 
as a campaign for secularization gradually outlined itself and 
was pushed at intervals in Spain or in the islands themselves. 
It was in part this jealous watchfulness of their own interests 
which led them to adopt a policy adverse to the ordination in 
numbers of native priests, who might in time, as in other 
countries, be expected to supplant the missionary priests ; it 
made them desirous of keeping within their own ranks the 
appointments to the bishoprics, metropolitan and suffragan ; '^ 

* This was wholly natural, in view of the declared aims of the Spanish kings in 
taking and holding the territory (especially after Philip III was persuaded, early 
in the seventeenth century, not to abandon his then costly possessions in the Orient, 
partly through the arguments of the friars that he should hold them as a trust 
upon the royal conscience, his predecessors having undertaken to Christianize 
them), and in view of the labor already expended by the orders in the islands. 
The four orders of friars which had taken part in the missionary work (Augustin- 
ians, Franciscans, Dominicans, and Recollects) and the Jesuits, also early on the 
scene, had divided the provinces among themselves, and considered themselves to 
have the right of appointment to all curacies within their respective territories. 

* The bishopric of Manila was created in 1578, and was raised to a metropolitan 
see in 1595, when the dioceses of Nueva Segovia and Nueva C^eres in Luzon and 



made them oppose the attempts of certain bishops coming 
from the secular clergy to enforce episcopal visitation and in- 
spection of parishes, on the ground that members of the regu- 
lar clergy could be held subject only to the superiors of their 
own orders, that the parishes should be held to be preferences 
of the orders themselves and the nominations and transfers of 
their curates made only by the said superiors ; and it made 
them also insistent upon retaining in their own hands the con- 
trol of all means of education. Thus the " friar controversy," 
which has to so large an extent made up the history of the 
islands, beginning in the earlier years chiefly in the friction 
between the rival civil and ecclesiastical aspirants for power, 
gradually broadened to include also a Philippine phase of the 
world-wide contest within the Roman Catholic Church between 
the regular and the secular clergy, between the regulars and 
the ordinary jurisdiction.^ 

The organization of a seminary to train natives for the 
priesthood was decreed in 1702, but the Philippine ecclesi- 

that of Sebd in the Bisajas were also created. The last was divided and the ad- 
ditional diocese of Jaro created in 1865. This is the ecclesiastical organization as 
it exists to-day. In 1902, Pope Leo XIII, in his bull on the Philippine Church 
(Q^<E mari nnico), provided for the division of the archipelago into seven dioceses, 
but this plan, with the promise of the appointment of one or more native priests 
as bishops, seems to have been abandoned. 

* For some evidence of the importance assumed at times by this contest in the 
Philippines even before the eighteenth century, see Montero y Vidal, op. cit., vol. i, 
chaps, xni, xv, xxiii, xxv, xxvu, xxix, xxx, xxxi, xxxin. The first bishop to 
attempt to visit and inspect the curacies of the friars was Serrano, in 1621 ; and, 
when they refused him entrance and threatened to abandon their parishes, he 
yielded, and the question was submitted to Rome and Madrid. (The Spanish ar- 
chives are heavy with the controversial documents submitted at this time, but the 
question wtui to live for a century and a half yet.) In 1653, Archbishop Poblete 
tried to carry out Urban YIII's bull regarding secnlarization, but failed ; and in 
1097, Archbishop Camacho revived the question of episcopal visitation. The oon- 
tMts of Governor-General Corcuera with the clergy (1635-40); the sending of 
Governor-General Salcedo to Mexico in chains for trial before the Inquisition as a 
heretic, he cheating his ecclesiastical enemies by dying on the way (1669) ; and the 
stormy scenes centering around the exile of Archbishop Pardo (1683) and his snb- 
sequent retnm to power and excommmiieation of the Audiencia judges, are simply 
the most striking phases of the perennial strife between the civil and ecclesiastical 
•tetet, •pitodes which lessen our surprise at the ■mniinition of a governor-general 
is tbt cigbteenth century. 


astical authorities prevented the opening of the institution 
until 1772, when Governor-General Anda and Archbishop 
Santa Justa y Rufina were in accord on it.^ The King decreed 
in 1714 a secular university, beginning with courses in law 
and theology ; and in 1719, Manuel de Bustamante, the gov- 
ernor-general charged with carrying out this plan, was, as a 
result of various strifes with the orders, slain in the govern- 
mental palace in Manila by mutineers organized and led by the 
friars and Jesuits, the palace guard fleeing before the cruci- 
fixes of the fathers.^ 

Highly significant also were the agrarian disturbances in the 
neighborhood of the friar estates, in large degree prototypes 
of the revolts of 1872 and 1896. In 1743, the people around 
Balayan, Batangas, in protest against what they considered to 
be usurpation of their lands by the Jesuits, who then had an 
estate there, led a revolt which spread over a large part of 
Batangas and cost the Spanish army (mostly natives from Pam- 
panga) a number of lives.^ At the same time, there were repeated 
and serious disturbances about those Tagalog towns in Cavite, 
Manila, and Bulak^n provinces, where the principal friar estates 
lay until their recent purchase by the American Government. 
The royal commissioner appointed to investigate and pacify 
the people seems to have found much evidence of the truth of 
their charges that their own land had been usurped, that their 
liberties to fish, cut wood, and pasture their animals had been 
wrongly curtailed, and that there had been fraudulent extension 
of the boundaries of the friar estates through the collusion of 
a high official of the Government. The latter was suspended and 
heavily fined, and the old boundaries were ordered restored.'* 

1 The friars had already trained natives to serve as coadjutors to some extent in 
their early monastery schools; some few (or, at any rate, mestizos) seem to have 
been admitted to the orders, and several of the bishops of the seventeenth century 
are said to have had native blood in their veins. 

2 Montero y Vidal, op. ciL, vol. i, p. 413. The Spanish archives are literally 
burdened with material about this episode. 

8 Ut supra, p. 478. 

* The royal cedula of November 7, 1751, which summarizes this whole investiga- 


Perhaps the most striking events of the eighteenth century 
center about the English occupation of Manila in 1762-63 and 
the figure of Simon de Anda, the vigorous lawyer-soldier, who, 
anathematized by the archbishop-governor and deserted by 
most of the Spanish elements in the islands, yet succeeded, 
with the aid of his loyal Pampangan soldiers, in confining the 
invaders to Manila, and thus probably saved the archipelago for 
Spain at the making of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The city 
was surrendered practically without defense by Archbishop 
Rojo (thereafter, no archbishop served as governor-general).^ 
The Jesuits in pursuit of their general policy, promptly raised 
the English flag over their monastery and went bodily over to 
the supposed new sovereignty.^ To some extent the other orders 

tion and recites the decision may be found in La Democraciat Manila, November 25, 
1901. This same controversy had arisen a half-century before under Archbishop 
Camacho. When he arrived in Manila in 1697, a royal official appointed to settle 
titles to land had demanded that the friars show their titles to the estates they 
held; they had refused, and the Audiencia had embargoed the estates. Camacho 
at first sided with the friars and denied the jurisdiction of the lay court; but 
he himself found the orders in rebellion against him when he undertook to visit 
and inspect the parishes, and he thereupon made common cause with the Audi- 
encia. For some of the data of this resounding controversy, which dragged 
along through years, to end with the friars remaining where they were, see T. H. 
Pardo de Tavera's Biblioteca Filipina (Washington, 1903), pp. 77-78, under the 
heading "Camacho "; also Montero y Vidal, op. cit.y vol. i, chap. xxxi. 

* To untangle the various conflicting accounts of the capture and occupation of 
Manila by the English, especially those of religious writers, will be the work of 
the future historian of the Philippines. Some data regarding the " siege " of twelve 
days and the entrance of the English through a breach in the walls may be ob- 
tained from a monograph on the " Walls of Manila and its Capture by the Eng- 
lish," prepared by Major J. C. Bush and Captain A. C. Macomb for Major-General 
A. W. Davis (Reports of War Departmentt 1903^ vol. ni, appendix ix). For a re- 
view of many important documents bearing on this period (as also upon Anda's 
career), see Sinibaldo de Mas, Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinos en 18^ 
(Madrid, 1843), vol. i, first section, pp. 122-201. 

' This was one reason assigned for their expulsion in 1768, though that followed 
the general order of 1767 for their expulsion from all Spanish dominions, one phase 
of the campaign at that time conducted against them in Catholic Europe. Any of 
the collections of Spanish legislation which contains the decrees of Charles III and 
Charles IV may be consulted for the numerous provisions designed to carry this 
order into effect, as well as also to restrict to a considerable extent the activities and 
the very extensive powers that had been secured by monastic organizations in gen- 
eral. All the provisions regarding the Jesuits were published in a work of five parts 
at Madrid in 1769-90 entitled CoUcdSn general de las providencias . . . sobre el 


in the city furnished Anda with financial assistance, and the 
friars outside aided him in other ways, but there was much 
division of loyalty among them, since he had proclaimed him- 
self the representative of Spanish authority in the islands and 
was denounced as a usurper by the archbishop. The antipathy 
engendered by this and other causes was cherished by Anda 
when later he became governor-general, and he aroused bitter 
opposition from the Augustinians and Dominicans, especially 
by his support of the efforts of Archbishop Santa Justa y 
Rufina to visit and inspect the friars* parishes and to install 
secular priests.^ 

Santa Justa y Rufina was one of the comparatively few secu- 
lar clergymen who have served as Archbishop of Manila. One 
of the foremost assistants of Charles III in enforcing the ex- 
pulsion of the Jesuits from Spain, he was sent to the Philip- 
pines for the purpose of checking the regulars in their usurpa- 
tion of absolute ecclesiastical control. Not unnaturally, when 
Anda followed him out there as governor-general, the two lent 
each other mutual support. The opening of the seminary for 
native priests has already been remarked. Anda also urged on 
the home Government the secularization of all educational in- 

extranamiento de los regulares de la Compania, etc. A recent contribution to history 
covering this same ground is: F. Rousseau, Expulsion des Jesuitesen Espagne. De- 
marches de Charles III pour lew Secularisation {Revue des Questions HistoriqueSf 
January, 1904). 

1 The falsehoods that have been printed and reprinted about the episodes of 
Anda's career in the Philippines are almost inextricably interwoven with the truth 
about those times. Anda himself was far from being meek and without spite. The 
fairest account from the friar standpoint, also nearly contemporary, is that of 
Father Joaqufn Martinez de Ziiniga, an Augustinian, who wrote his Esiadismo de 
las Mas Filipinos (published by Retana, Madrid, 1893) from 1803 to 1806. Anda's 
own statement of his ideas about the friars is one of the most interesting docu- 
ments of all Philippine history, yet one will search for it in vain in the histories 
which pretend to be complete. It is contained in a memorial to Charles III written 
in 1768, while he was in Madrid, before*, his appointment as governor-general. It 
details " thirty-seven abuses or disorders that have grown up in the Philippine 
Islands under the cloak of religion and at the expense of the royal treasury." 
This memorial was published with notes by Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera at Manila 
in 1899. See also a translation into English in Blair and Robertson's The Phil- 
ippine IslandSf 1493-1898. 


stitutions, beginning with the Dominican university and second- 
ary school. The archbishop promulgated a schedule of fees to 
be charged for baptisms, weddings, funerals, etc.^ The storm 
raged principally, however, about his efforts to enforce episco- 
pal visitation and inspection of the parishes in his diocese. Anda 
at times used troops to aid him, and the Augustinians had been 
forcibly removed from Pampanga and their provincial deported 
to Spain before the orders yielded, the Dominicans leading the 
way. The contest was too violent and acrimonious not to be 
attended by extreme and reckless measures on both sides. In 
his haste to secularize the clergy and his zeal for the advance- 
ment of the natives, the archbishop caused Filipino priests, too 
often fitted neither by general education nor by ecclesiastical 
training, to be hurriedly ordained and put in the places of 
many of the friars. Quite naturally, most, though not all, failed 
to come up to the mark ; and the archbishop later was compelled 
sadly and reluctantly to admit that he had made a mistake. He 
and Anda were both ahead of their times in liberal measures. 
Without discussing the merits and demerits of the Filipino 
priesthood, it is certain that this overhasty attempt to install it 
resulted in a reaction which enabled the friars to strengthen 
themselves in control of the parishes for years to come.^ 

Not less vigorous, but less pugnacious, than Anda, Gov- 
ernor-General Basco y Vargas strove to rouse the country from 

* That this was afterwards generally disregarded, formed one of the complaints 
of the revolutionists of 1896. That there were already abuses in this respect in 1591 
ii set forth in a statement by the Jesuits on the question of the tributes, trans- 
lated in volume vn of Blair and Robertson's The Philippine hlandSf lJ^S-1898f 
p. 317. 

* Quite full bibliographical data on the busy times of Archbishop Santa Justa y 
Rufina are given under his name in Pardo de Tavera's Biblioteca Filipina, pp. 383- 
88. In ibid., pp. 110, 140, and 208, are listed documents on these questions repub- 
lished in 1863 aud brought down to date in the anti-friar campaign beginning in 
that year. See also Mas*s Informey vol. ii, ^ction on Estado ecUsidstico and Re- 
tana's Archivo del bibliSfilo Jilipino, vol. I, Papeles interesantes para los regulares, etc., 
for a r^um^ of the official measures regarding secularization in the eighteenth 
century, and an indication of how Santa Justa's efforts were nullified between 
178.5 and 1825. Anda himself became less zealoui for secularization, as some of 
the archbishop's failures became apparent. 


its lethargy and state of industrial unprogressiveness. He in 
large part deserves the credit for the foundation in 1781 of 
the "Economic Society of Friends of the Country," composed 
of Government of&cials, merchants, and owners of estates. 
The society had a spasmodic existence until 1890 (most of 
the time slumbering in quietude), and a catalogue of the 
things it tried to do is enlightening. It sought to promote the 
cultivation of cotton (not so widely grown then as at the time 
of the conquest, owing to the greater importation of Chinese 
fabrics, and to-day virtually confined to two or three pro- 
vinces), of the cinnamon tree (native of Mindanau, found there 
by Magellan, but never developed), of pepper and silkworms ; 
and to improve dyestuffs and methods of dyeing; it published 
the first periodical of commerce ; it became patron of the first 
course of agriculture in the friar schools of Manila in 1821, 
and established a school of design ; studied unsuccessfully to 
destroy the ravaging locusts; labored for the removal of the 
export duties on rice; preached improvement of the breed of 
horses, etc. In the main, however, not only did such an organ- 
ization have to struggle with the lethargy or active opposition 
of Government officials and of the propertied classes, pure 
Spanish, half-caste or native, who might have been expected 
to cooperate vigorously, but also, and more important, it could 
make little headway against the retroactive economic policy 
which prevailed in the mother-country during most of the time 
when these distant possessions were not left in careless aban- 
donment. The informing spirit of this policy is revealed in the 
following argument before the Council of State of Spain in 
1607: — 

The preservation of the Indies consists in this, that, through their 
need of articles which are not produced there, they may always de- 
pend upon this country ; and it would be the means of losing them 
if their wants could be supplied elsewhere. 

The restrictive measures by which Philippine trade was 
hedged about during the early part of the eighteenth century 


were nothing new; the controversy waged then between the 
conflicting interests was simply noisier than it had ever been 
before, because of the greater power of the silk manufacturers 
and some of the trading societies of Spain, and because of the 
extraordinary riches being reaped for the time from the trade 
through Manila, " the Pearl of the Orient/' this trade and the 
commercial importance of Manila being then at its height. To 
save the trade of the Americas in the main for the manufac- 
tures of Spain; to prevent too great an outflow of the silver 
of Mexico and South America to the Orient, where it was 
then, as it still is, in great measure mysteriously swallowed 
up; and to limit the trade of Manila to an amount the imposts 
on which would merely yield the cost of maintaining the 
Spanish establishment in the archipelago, without bringing too 
much of the cheaper goods of the Orient into competition with 
those of Spain, seem to have been the main motives of Spain's 
economic poHcy. But it is difficult at times to recognize any 
policy at all in the measures adopted, and the hand of pater- 
nalism was laid so heavily over every circumstance bearing 
either directly or indirectly upon commerce that private enter- 
prise was throttled on one side while monopoly and privilege 
were fostered on the other, and the trammels devised were 
sometimes futile of anything but the accomplishment of evil.^ 

1 Both documentary and printed material on the economic measures of Spain 
abound in the Spanish language, coming down to the closing hours of that nation's 
colonial rule. Judging by the published volumes and the prospectus, the Blair and 
Robertson historical series already cited will contain a quite complete array of 
material regarding trade monopolies, tariff restrictions, shipping regnLations, etc. 
See also the bibliography of the Library of Congfress entitled Books on the Philip- 
pine Islands (Washington, 1903). For the controversy of the early eighteenth 
century over Philippine trade, see the T^Bum6 with some bibliographical data, 
also the description of the galleons and their voyages, in Montero y Vidal, op. cit.f 
Tol. I, chap. XXXVIII (erroneously numbered xxviii in the text of the volume). 
A review of the Spanish colonial system is contained in the chapter under that 
bead in Wilhelm Roscher's Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Austvanderung (3d ed., 
Leipzig, 1885), an English translation of which has been issued in pamphlet form 
by Edward G. Bourne, under the title The Spanish Colonial System (New York, 
1904). It is especially valuable on economic measures, though very incomplete; 
for the rest, the author hat relied too much upon musty authorities, and the chap- 
ter nnells of the library more than of real Spanish colouial life. It is scarcely 


Maintaining a Government monopoly of shipping and means 
of communication with the Philippine Islands during the first 
two centuries when that trade was most remunerative (in- 
deed, retaining a virtual monopoly of shipping until the second 
decade of the nineteenth century), Spain did not then turn to 
free and unrestricted shipping as the remedy for her waning 
commerce and for a remaking of her colonial trade along the 
new lines which private competition in shipping over the world 
in general had laid down ; instead, she sought for some years 
to bolster up a private shipping monopoly under her authority, 
an enterprise which, born toward the close of the eighteenth 
century, dragged its name and its threat of stifling private 
enterprise (under a many-headed charter of privilege) well 
into the nineteenth century. The Government had more or 
less effectually monopolized various articles of commerce from 
the earliest years ; and, though the tobacco monopoly was not 
formed until 1781, when comprehensive measures for raising 
revenue had to be undertaken, it survived until 1884. Those 
who find a praiseworthy institution in the former culture sys- 
tem of Java may make out a fair case for the old " company 
systems " as stimulating in early times the agricultural devel- 
opment of tropical Eastern countries ; certain it is that the 
rich valley of the Kagayan in northern Luzon lies to-day a 
one-crop and wretchedly undeveloped area, while the mass of 
the people in it are perhaps the nearest to ignorant serfdom 
of all the Christian populations of the archipelago.^ 

Yet it should be said that the shipping monopoly of the 
" Company of the Philippines," which virtually came to naught, 
the tobacco monopoly and the other measures of Charles III 

necessary to remark that Spain was not, especially in the earlier periods, the sole 
offender among the colonial powers in the matter of trade restrictions. 

1 A good deal of careless information has been given out with regard to the 
working of the cultare system in Java, much of it originating with those interested 
in the continuance of the system. A new book, which all but demolishes these ar- 
guments, is Professor Clive Day's The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in 
Java (London, 1904). 



coincided with the formation of the economic society above 
described, and were intended, all together, to stimulate the 
development of the archipelago. But it remained for the first 
Cortes (1811) to abolish the voyages of the time-honored gal- 
leons between Manila and Acapulco, and to pave the way for 
private, though afterward subsidized, shipping. Thus the Phil- 
ippines were released from dependency as a province upon the 
viceroyalty of Mexico (at the moment engaged in the struggle 
for her independence). Direct communication with Spain by 
the passage of saihng vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, 
begun in the preceding century, was continued until the cut- 
ting of the Suez Canal almost coincided with the opening of 
a new era for the Philippines. 

Spain had herself been engaged from the very opening of 
the nineteenth century in domestic and foreign wars, in every 
step of which there was involved, in one way or another, the 
contest between liberalism and reaction. It is not strange that 
the various phases of the contest — now Spanish nationality 
against the Napoleonic invasion, now the new-found constitu- 
tionalism against the old-fashioned absolutism, again Spanish 
liberalism against the outside dictation of the Holy Alliance, 
or constitutional monarchy against Carlist-clerical attempts to 
restore the old regime — should awaken from time to time 
some echo in the Philippine Islands. The strange thing is that 
those islands, governed in rapid succession by men first of one 
Spanish faction and then of another, and which had been much 
less closely in touch with Spain than with Spanish- America — 
now in the throes of the contest going on in the home coun- 
try, a contest which on American soil soon became a struggle 
for complete independence — should have remained so quiet. 
There were some few uprisings in the Philippines, which might 
be called mere mutinies, not popular rebellions; there were 
bitter partisan contests, but mostly over office and the use of 
the powers of office. In the main, the significant thing is that, 


practically throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, 
the Philippines were, if not oblivious to what was going on 
elsewhere under the Spanish flag, at least surprisingly little 
disturbed or moved by it. They were on the other side of the 
world from Spain, and were reached only by slow-going sail- 
ing vessels, while the quarrel over the trading monopoly of 
the "Company of the Philippines " was still under way, and the 
result of the contradictory provisions made about it by the 
rival governments in Spain was that neither did the company 
itself take steps to make good its privileges nor did other Span- 
ish shippers come forward to stimulate it by competition. The 
old trade in silks, etc., from China, artificially diverted through 
the Philippines and hemmed about by restrictions, had dwin- 
dled considerably before connection with Mexico was severed. 
The Government tobacco monopoly was developing very slowly 
a new trade with the home country, though probably it would 
have developed more rapidly if left to follow its natural course. 
Neither abaca nor sugar had become as yet articles of foreign 
commerce worthy of mention, nor were to do so until Spain 
should let down the bars whereby she kept outside of her pos- 
sessions foreigners who wished to come to develop their re- 
sources or to engage in commerce in them. Virtually, the 
islands had no foreign trade, except as Manila still served 
as a depot for the exchange of Chinese and Indian goods for 
silver, at the beginning of the nineteenth century.^ There were 
during the first half of this century only from 2000 to 5000 
Spaniards in the islands, and scarcely any other Europeans at 
all. The mestizo population was to some extent identified with 
the European element in aims and interests. The great mass 
of the people, however, slumbered in what the friars of to-day 
assert was an Arcadia, " nurtured and protected by fatherly 
religious mentors and paternal laws, undisturbed by dreams 

^ According to Sinibaldo de Mas (op. cit., vol. n, section on Comercio exterior, 
p. 2) : " During the years 1780 and immediately following, the exportation of 
sugar, the only article of exportation of any importance at that time, did not ex- 
ceed 30,000 piculs [about 2000 tons]." 



of imaginary rights, unvexed by the duties imposed upon them 
later by laws they did not understand, leading simple and con- 
tented lives and ready to get out of the road respectfully when- 
ever they met a white face." 

To be sure, the Philippines were represented in the Cortes 
of 1810-14 and again in those of 1820-23, and were at first 
expected to send representatives to the Cortes when it reas- 
sembled in 1836. This representation, however, was more nom- 
inal than real, and was brought about not by any demand from 
the islands, but by the sentimental attempt of the always vision- 
ary Spanish liberals to realize a great " representative empire," 
wherein all the lands under the Spanish flag should gather for 
a proportionate share in the work of constitutional reconstruc- 
tion. In order to realize this dream, which, as events proved, 
was altogether impracticable as applied to the Spanish- Ameri- 
can countries, and which was necessarily still more impractica- 
ble as regards the more distant and much less advanced 
Philippines, they appointed " substitute deputies " at the open- 
ing of these Cortes for the distant provinces which had not 
been able to elect. In 1811, however, a Spaniard arrived from 
Manila as that city's elected representative in the Cortes. He 
himself it was who, in 1812, when it was proposed to extend 
the provisions of the constitution in their full force to the 
Philippine Islands, pointed out to his fellow-deputies that the 
people of those islands were not prepared to enjoy the full 
privileges nor to assume the duties of citizens under such a 
constitution, being in the vast majority uneducated and dis- 
tant six thousand leagues by sea from the home country. He 
reminded them that, at the ratio of one deputy to every 70,000 
inhabitants, the Philippine Islands would have to elect over 
twenty-five representatives to the Cortes, and that expense alone 
forbade this.* Besides discussing this question, the first Cortes 
gave very little attention to the Philippine Islands. When 

' See Diario de las Cortes (official edition, royal press, Cadiz, 1812), vol. xiii, 
pp. 264-67. 


they reassembled in 1820, two " substitute deputies " were re- 
ligiously named in Spain to represent the Philippines, and 
later four representatives were duly elected in Manila; but 
again the subject of their credentials was about all that was 
ever discussed. In 1836, the question of elections to the Cortes 
to be held in the Philippines was again threshed over, but in 
the following year it seems to have dawned upon these amateur 
legislators that the assimilation of this archipelago of the Ex- 
treme East to a not yet well-established constitutional legisla- 
tive regime was not practicable, and the right of representation 
was withdrawn from the Philippines and the Spanish Antilles, 
and it was decided that they should be ruled by special laws.^ 
From the very first, reform movements in Spain have gone so 
by action and reaction that there has rarely been any states- 
manlike adjustment of liberal measures to the actual conditions 
to be met in the Philippines. Instead of making a place in the 
new national legislature for one to four delegates from the 
Philippines who might on occasion speak for the interests of 
the islands and represent them before committees, the early 
Spanish Liberals botched the whole matter of administering 
colonies under their sort of a constitutional government by 
attempting to make the Cortes a real " imperial legislature " ; 
and, failing in that, as they were bound to do under the con- 
ditions, they abandoned in disgust the attempt to introduce 
a liberal colonial regime, even abdicating to the executive di 
partment of the colonies which was later introduced into the 
government that measure of control over the laws for the foreign 
possessions of Spain which they should have retained for them- 
selves. So we find, even to the close of Spanish rule, despite 
the reassumption by the Cortes of considerable power after the 
revolution of 1868, that laws for the Philippines were promul- 
gated by the Minister for the Colonies in the form of royal 

The FiHpinos themselves seem to have given their Spanish 

1 See Montero y Vidal, op. cii., vol. n, pp. 563-69. 


rulers less trouble during the first part of the nineteenth century 
than during any preceding period since the conquest. As already 
noted, conquest itself was accomplished almost with ridiculous 
ease. There was, however, hardly a decade for over two cen- 
turies during which the conqueror's authority was not more 
or less vigorously disputed in some small or large area of the 
archipelago — speaking now of the Christianized population, 
and not of the Moros and hill-pagans. If conquest was easier 
in the early days, collection of tribute sometimes became dif- 
ficult, owing primarily, there is plenty of evidence to show, to 
the abuses of the Spanish encomenderos. In the seventeenth 
century, we find that quite frequently the friars, too, are in- 
cluded in the list of those proscribed by the native rebels, 
because they were most actively identified with the use of 
forced labor for building ships and equipping their crews for 
expeditions against the Moro pirates, as well as for putting 
up churches and parish-houses. One such revolt, which began 
in S^mar in 1649 with the murder of a Jesuit who was not 
such a shepherd as he should have been,^ spread over the cen- 
tral islands and to Luzon and Mindanau. There was a similar 
rising against a Jesuit in Bohol in 1750,^^ and that island was 
for some years thereafter abandoned ground for the mission- 
aries. The nearly coincident uprisings near Manila have already 
been remarked as agrarian in character, and it is to be said 
that all the revolts of the Tagalog provinces have been pri- 
marily of that sort. Spanish authority was so shattered after 
the withdrawal of the English in 1763 that Pangasinan, the 
Dokan provinces, and the people of the Kagayan Valley gave 
more or less constant trouble for the rest of the eighteenth 
century and into the nineteenth century. In the latter revolts, 
it was plain that the Ilokans were fighting against the arbi- 
trary restrictions of the Government tobacco monopoly, requir- 
ing each family to plant so much, consume only so much, and 

1 See F. Jajfor, Reiten in den Pkiltppinen (Berlin, 1873), p. 188. 
* Montero y Vidal, op. cit., toI. i, p. 478. 


sell at official prices, the betel-nut and other plants being also 
for a time included in the Government control. It is claimed 
that nearly three hundred thousand natives were killed during 
these successive risings in the Ilokan provinces. 

In the main, however, the disturbances of the first half of 
the nineteenth century are not to be traced, as were those 
which preceded them, to dissatisfaction among the Filipino 
masses. There was considerable excitement worked up around 
Manila relative to the taking oath to the Constitution of 1812, 
which, it was reported, was to exempt the masses from the 
payment of tribute ; and there was a corresponding disturb- 
ance when, shortly afterward, it was revoked, but nothing 
noteworthy occurred. In 1820, the foreigners, including the 
Chinese, in Manila were mobbed and some killed by the lower 
classes of the city, it being rumored about that the epidemic 
of cholera then raging had been caused by the foreigners poi- 
soning the water.^ In 1823, when constitutional government 
was revoked by Ferdinand VII, a rather formidable conspiracy 
among the troops in Manila developed into mutiny on the part 
of some eight hundred of them, led by Captain Novales and 
other Spanish- Americans, who were in sympathy with " the 
Reform." So again, a decade and a half later, the Spanish 
Liberals in Manila, claiming to believe that Governor Salazar 
was in league with the Carlists at home and would not pro- 
claim the Constitution of 1837, threatened an uprising, which 
was headed off by the governor's conciliatory attitude, and 
which seems to have been more a scheming for office than 

^ Much confasion reigns in the accounts of this affair. Some of the historians 
charge Governor-General Folgueras with lack of energy in putting down the mob 
before it became dangerous, sacking all the business section of Binondo as it did. 
The governor-general himself, in a proclamation to the people, virtually accuses the 
friar priests of having not merely consented to the story that the foreigners were 
poisoning the water, but also of having spread it among their ignorant parishioners. 
The entire document is reproduced in Pardo de Tavera's Bihlioteca Filipina, pp. 
45^7. M. Th. Aube, an officer of the French marines, writing about Manila in 
the Revue des Deux Mondes for May 1, 1848, declares that this was one way which 
the friars took to get rid of the foreigners then beginning to come to the islands. 
Montero y Vidal (op. cit.f vol. m, pp. 96-97) indignantly denies this as a calumny. 


anything else. Plainly, such movements as these did not touch 
the masses, and cannot be said to have significance from the 
Filipino point of view. The great bulk of the population must 
be somewhat shaken out of its shell of indifference, and the 
provinces must begin to acquire some interests in common, 
before either the Liberal campaign then going on in Spain 
could affect the sympathies of more than a few mestizos, or 
the various tribes could unite in anything more than a merely 
local outburst of banditry or outlawry in protest against the 
abuses of their rulers. Such fanatic religious movements as 
that which upset the entire province of Tayabas and part of 
Batangas in 1841, when hordes of people took up bolos and 
followed a self-proclaimed "God," have been and still are 
common occurrences, on a smaller scale, in the Philippines, 
and are mainly significant as showing the ignorant condition 
of the masses. 

Two facts of general application have been made more or 
less clear by the foregoing outline of events and conditions up 
to about 1860, facts which have also a direct bearing upon the 
more strenuous period succeeding 1860. First, it seems fairly 
evident that Liberalism in Spain had as yet neither the power 
as a movement nor the ability within its ranks to reconstruct 
on new and progressive lines this old monarchy's colonial sys- 
tem. Neither before nor since then, indeed, has it been able 
to establish effectually in the mother country itself modern 
ideas in government, in education, in land-tenure, or in political 
and religious tolerance in their full scope. Second, had it been 
possible to keep the archipelago forever as commercially in- 
comunicado as it was up to forty years ago, the religious and 
political disturbances of Spain would not have disrupted the 
peace of the Philippines, so soon seriously to be threatened by 
a real clamor for modern ideas and modern institutions. The 
friars and their defenders of to-day who lament the old regime 
as really the happier should bring the indictment for breaking 
up their Arcadia not so much against the Liberals of Spain 


as against all the forces which modern commerce and modern 
science represent, which brought to the islands in so rapid 
sequence foreigners keen for the development of their idle 
resources, a direct pathway to Europe by the Suez Canal, mod- 
ern steamships, ocean cables, the telegraph, and all the things 
that in a short span of years were to alter in no inconsiderable 
degree the life of the people in quite a number of provinces. 
Feodor Jagor, the keen-eyed German who traveled through 
the islands just before 1860, found much to praise in the old 
paternal regime of the friars, and added : — 

The old situation is no longer possible of maintenance, with the 
social change which the times have brought. The colony cannot longer 
be excluded from the general concert of peoples. Every facility in 
communications opens a breach in the ancient system and establishes 
a motive for reforms of a liberal character. The more that foreign 
brains penetrate there, the more they increase prosperity, education 
and self-esteem, making the existing evils the more intolerable.^ 

^ F. Jagor, op. cit., p. 287. Of the French, English, and German travelers, 
scientists, business men, and soldiers, who have given us an insight into the condi- 
tions in the islands from 1775 to 1860, Jagor, the last of the list, was the keenest 
observer and has left the most valuable book. He it was who clearly foresaw the 
inevitable loss of the Philippines to Spain, and, with prophetic insight into the 
expansion of the Pacific commerce of the United States, predicted almost in so 
many words the occupation of the Philippines by the United States. He closed his 
book with these paragraphs : — 

" The influence of North America in the Spanish provinces beyond the seas will 
make itself felt, and especially in the Philippines, as the commerce of its western 
coast develops. The Americans seem to have the mission of reviving the germ of 
the Spanish seed. As conquerors of the modern age, as representatives of posi- 
tivism in opposition to the romanticism of cavalierly enterprises, they follow their 
way with the axe and the plow of the colonist, just as the Spaniards went bearing 
the cross and flashing the sword. 

" A great part of Spanish America already belongs to the United States, and 
has already attained since the change an importance it had not even suspected it 
possessed while under the rule of Spain, and less still in the anarchic period that 
followed its emancipation. 

" The Spanish system, in the long rim, cannot prevail against the American. 
While the former exploits the colonies directly in benefit of privileged classes, the 
latter draws from the metropolis its best forces to sustain them. In spite of its 
population being so scanty, America attracts the most advantageous elements of 
all the countries, which, there set free from embarrassing subjections and handicaps, 
progress with unceasing activity, extending continually their power and their influ- 
ence. The Philippmes will not be able to evade the influence of the two great 



There had been an English house established in Manila in 
1809 by special permission. This privilege was extended to all 
foreigners at the time of the general European peace in 1814, 
and most of the foreigners killed in the cholera riots of 1820 
were Frenchmen ; but these were only trading representatives 
whose activities were confined to the capital and who were 
looked upon with no little displeasure by the Spaniards them- 
selves. We find an earlier edict of the insular Government 
repeated in 1828 and again in 1840, forbidding foreigners, in 
much the same way as the Chinese were specifically "regulated," 
to sell at retail or to enter the provinces to carry on business 
of any kind. ^ In 1842 there were in Manila thirty-nine Spanish 
shipping and commercial houses, and about a dozen foreign 
houses, of which seven or eight were English, two were Ameri- 
can, one was French, and another Danish, while consuls of 
France, the United States, Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium re- 
sided there.^ Jagor gives credit to these two American houses 

neighboring powers, so mnch the less since neither in the islands themselves nor 
in their metropolis is there a situation of stability and equilibrium. 

** It is to be hoped, for the sake of the natives, that the preceding hypotheses 
be not speedily converted into facts, for their present education has not prepared 
them sufiBciently to sustain the strife with those peoples [the British and American], 
tireless creators and little given to humanitarian considerations." 

Compare with this remarkable prediction of 1873 a somewhat similar warning 
that Spain would not be able to retain the Philippines, made by Sinibaldo de Mas, 
Minister of Spain to China, in 1843, in a third part of his In/orme sobre el estado 
de las IsUu Filipinos en 184^, this part being privately published and seen only by a 
few friends, only a few copies of it being now in existence. In this secret expression 
of opinion, Mas advised the creation of a legislative assembly in the Philippines at 
M early a date in the future as the status of the inhabitants would permit, this and 
Oliier concessions of a character tending toward self-government being made with 
a Tiew to granting to the Filipinos, eventually, their independence ; otherwise, 
thought Mas, they are sure to grow out of the ancient moulds in which they have 
been kept, and Spain will make herself their enemy, instead of a perpetual friend, 
if the endeavors to check this development. See the reproduction of a portion of 
thie secret memorial in the final number of La PolUica de Espafla en Filipintu 
(Madrid, fortnightly), vol. vin, no. 187 (December, 1898). 

* Montero y Vidal, op. cU., vol. m, p. 31. 

* This statement is made on the authority of the Diccionario geogrdfico, estadis- 
tico, kistSrico de las Islat FUipincu, of Manuel fiuzeta and Felipe Bravo (Madrid, 


for the development of the ahaka into an important article of 
export, in spite of the fact that the natives were using the fiber 
for the weaving of their common cloths when the Spaniards 
came. These American houses in the first years sunk large 
sums of money in advance loans, and were only able to get the 
business on a paying basis when, in 1863, they were permitted 
to establish warehouses and presses in the provinces at the prin- 
cipal points where the crop was produced, and to deal directly 
with the producers. The situation that had in general previ- 
ously prevailed is thus described by Jagor : — 

All former attempts were foiled by the opposition of the Spaniards 
of the Peninsula and of the Philippines, because the latter consider 
the inter-island commerce and shipping as belonging exclusively to 
them. They are very envious of the interference of the foreigners, 
" who enrich themselves at their cost." If it were left to these fel- 
lows, they would compel all foreigners to leave the country and only 
keep the Chinese as coolies.^ 

It was this sort of jealous opposition which caused seven 
new ports opened in 1830 to be closed a year afterward, so 
that the two Bisayan ports, Iloilo and Sebii, now date respec- 
tively from 1855 to 1863.^ Even after these latter years the 

1850-51), a book useful for reference for a period about which data are not easy 
to find, though its priestly compilers borrowed most recklessly from the works of 
others, especially of foreigners, and g^ve no credit. 

1 Jagor, op. cit.f pp. 251-52. 

2 The port of Manila had for the first time been opened to foreign vessels in 
1789 (though Europeans had conducted some clandestine traffic there, under 
cover of the permission to Chinese and Moros to enter and trade), but they 
were long held under hampering restrictions. In 1841, despite paying as a rule 
double port and customs dues, ships under other flags than the Spanish were doing 
four fifths of the external carrying-trade of the Philippines, among them being 
many " tramp vessels " from the United States plying between China and the 
Philippines. See S. de Mas, op. cit.^ section on Comercio exterior^ especially pp. 3-^ 
et seq.f for tables showing exports and imports, entries and clearances, 1835-41, as 
compared with 1810 and 1816. Mas gives great credit to the foreign business men 
and ships for the rapid increase in trade during this period, and argues for the 
removal of the restrictions upon them. His tables show how the prophecies of 
those interested in the old galleon-route between Acapulco and Manila, that the 
abolition of this business would ruin the Philippines, had been belied. Mas says 
the exportation of products of the Philippines had increased by seven times be- 
tween 1816, the date of the return of the last galleon from Acapulco, and 1842. 



Spaniards would rather have seen them closed than invaded 
by the English and other merchants, whose operations speedily 
developed sugar into an article of export worth considering.^ 
When the foreigners could acquire land in the country, they 
settled themselves still more solidly. Around their shipping 
operations, with steamers of Hght and medium draft, around 
their hemp- and sugar-buying operations in southern Luzon 
and the central islands, around their sugar- an drice-miUs, and 
later still the small line of railroad to Dagupan, there gradu- 
ally began to be developed a class of more independent and 
capable natives, something approaching, indeed, a Filipino 
middle class. This was much more noticeable in Manila and 
its environs, the center of the new commerce, both because it 
was the commercial center and because it had been socially 
the most advanced part of the archipelago when the Spaniards 
came and had naturally not lost that preeminence afterward. 

But if, anticipating the events of the last part of the nine- 
teenth century, we interpret the partial awakening to self- 
consciousness of the Filipino people as being the result pri- 
marily of the entrance of foreign commerce, we must still not 
overlook the fact that there was progress made by Spain in 
her dealings with the colony. In 1863 the Minister for the 
Colonies (Ultramar) first took his seat in the Cabinet, after the 

His figures for 1810 show a total of entrances and clearances from Manila of 
11,025,000 pesos, of which 5,400,000 were silver, gold, and other metals and cur- 
rency trans-shipped between America and China and India through Manila, and 
nearly 4,000,000 were goods of China and India trans-shipped through Manila to 
America and thence Europe. Of all the foreign goods entered in 1810, the Philip- 
ptuM had taken only 900,000 pesos for their own consumption, and in return had 
■old less than 500,000 pesos in sugar, tobacco, and other products. Says Mas: 
*'The gains from that trafBc, for which Manila was only a port of exchange, 
were divided between the merchants who had the monopoly of the galleon, but 
the colony in general received but small advantages from it." By comparison with 
1810, he shows that in 1839 the Philippines exported 2,675,000 pesos of their own 
products and imported 2,150,000 pesos of foreign goods (apparently exclusive of 

^ Jagor says (p. 242) that in 1857 there was not a single iron sugar-mill in the 
ialaods, and that the archaic wooden afTairs lost 30 per cent and upward of the 
juice in the cane, as in many places in the Philippines the cmde sugar-mills in use 


semi-constitutional government of those times had blundered 
about for over ten years with various cumbersome substitutes 
for the old Council of the Indies, which had dealt with the 
affairs of the colonies in previous centuries.^ Projects of colo- 
nial reform, with majority and minority reports, multiplied until 
they became confusion worse confounded in the years which 
followed, particularly as no government either in Madrid or in 
Manila was ever stable or lasting enough really to give any 
one of them a fair trial. Nevertheless, in the years from 1863 
to 1896, there was some net progress. That progress we can 
here trace only in outline. 

The Peninsula itself was in the throes of educational re- 
form (a reform to-day woefully incomplete there), and it was 
proposed to apply the system of primary education there 
adopted to the Philippine communities. A decree of 1863 pro- 
vided for the same course of study as in Spain, and for secular 
school-teachers drawn from a competitive list, which was in 
time to be supplied by normal schools for both sexes. These 
normal schools were put under the Jesuits.'^ The new system 
was, however, left under the supervision of the friars: the 
curate of each town was to be local inspector, and to have 
full direction of the instruction in religion, which in practice 
commonly resulted in reducing the school boards, then first 
created, to nonentities ; the superior friar official of each prov- 
ince was to be on the provincial board ; and the rector of St. 
Thomas University was, except during brief intervals, a sort 
of superintendent of public instruction for the islands, though 

^ For a summary of the different methods of administering the colonies under 
" constitutional government " and the transitional governments in Spain from 
1814 to 1863, see La PolUica de Espana en Filipinos^ vol. vi (for the year 1896), 
p. 133. 

* The Jesuits had returned to the Philippines in 1859, and thereafter devoted 
themselves to education and to mission work among the Moros and pagan tribes. 
They have been responsible for the introduction of more modem methods — no- 
tably, scientific laboratories — and for much of the educational progress since 1863. 
The Dominicans did not relish seeing the palm taken from them in a matter in 
which they had so long held almost undisputed supremacy. The normal schools 
later opened for women were managed by Sisters of Charity and Augustine nuns. 


having no direct intervention in primary schools. Prior to 
1863, primary education began and ended with daily lessons 
in the catechism and other books of rehgious exercises, and 
there was usually very little else in the middle. The teachers 
were village natives, who could write and cipher to a limited 
extent, but who commonly knew little or no Spanish. They 
were paid whatever the friar curate, who supervised or per- 
sonally conducted the work with the catechism, felt that he 
could allow, and often eked out their living in the fields.^ 
After 1863, and up to the American conquest, the catechism 
still remained the chief feature of daily work in the primary 
school, often relegating all else to an insignificant place — 
much depending on the preparation, at best a scanty one, of 
the teacher. The badly printed and cheap 250-page pocket- 
size textbook prescribed by the Government for the schools 
(the same as used in Spain) was reader, writer, speller, arith- 
metic, geography, history of Spain and the world (Spain over- 
shadowing), Spanish grammar (often not taught, because the 
teacher knew little or nothing of it, or the friar-priest ob- 
jected), and handbook of religious and moral precepts (many 
pages). A glance at this book will reveal how pitifully inade- 
quate was the ordinary Filipino child's schooling at the best; 
for often not even this textbook was in use, no copies being 
available or the teacher using only the dialect. Even those of 
the teachers who had been trained in the normal schools were 
scarcely as thoroughly equipped in the elementary branches 
as an American child at the sixth grade .^ 

* This was the system in general, as described by yarious contemporary wit- 
iMMes; but conditions were better in some parishes, particularly in good-sized 
towni. The schools were just as good or just as poor as the friar-curate made 
them, since everything was left to him. 

» The textbook referred to, El Monitor de los NifioSt devotes ten lines of its 
geography section to the United States. On the cover-page of the Philippine edi- 
tion there is what purports to be a r^um^ of Philippine history, which concludes 
tlms : ** The education, richness, and culture of the Philippine population, espe- 
dally of Luzon, increase in a notable manner, thanks to the assimilation it enjoys 
in all branches of public administration with the laws and institutions ruling in 
Sptin. The statistics of primary education need not envy those of the most ad- 


In the '^ Maura law " of municipal reform in 1893 the newly 
created "municipal councils" (which were not really repre- 
sentative bodies) were in theory made also local school boards. 
By creating these quasi-councils, this law was supposed to 
confer upon the towns a hitherto unprecedented measure of 
autonomy. Yet the padre was an ex-officio member whose vise 
was required for almost everything ; and in promulgating the 
law, Governor-General Blanco took pains to explain that his 
school-inspecting powers were not lessened, at least as regards 
religious instruction, which could easily be stretched to include 
everything. Moreover, it was significant that he instructed the 
municipal councils to employ " the most practical means for 
the diffusion of the Spanish language." A decree of 1863 had 
provided that, after fifteen years, the two principal town offices 
should be held only by those who could speak, read, and write 
Spanish, and that after thirty years no one not possessing 
these qualifications should be exempted from forced labor on 
public works, i.e., be one of the principalia. For the matter 
of that, if one cared to trace the history of unfulfilled laws of 
this sort, he might go back to 1550, when the first decree 
commanding the teaching of Spanish to the Filipinos was 
promulgated, and make a long list of them.^ 

vanced nations of Europe." Many children never g^t beyond the little paper 
pamphlets containing the alphabet, a few simple syllables, the multiplication- 
table, the " explanation of Christian doctrine," miracle-tales, etc. The miracles in 
one of these {Silabario 6 Caton Cristiano para Uso de las Escuelas) are such as 
the following : " St. Roman the Martyr, lacerating his flesh, said to the tyrant 
Asclepiades: *If you do not believe what I say, ask the innocent child, who, as he 
does not know how to talk, does not know how to lie.* It was a babe of a few 
months, at its Christian mother's breast, in the midst of the crowd. Upon the in- 
stant, taking its mouth from the breast, the tender infant turned its face to the 
tyrant and in a clear voice said: 'Jesus Christ is the true God.' And being asked, 
* Who has told you that ? * with a thousand graces the child replied : * To me my 
mother told it, and to her God told it.' The Church which tells us this is our 
mother, and to her God has told all that she teaches us." 

^ See RecopilaciSn de Leyes de Indias for those of early years ; the one of 1550 
is lihro VI, titulo i, ley xvm. Legislative collections covering the Philippines will 
show many provisions on this subject for the years succeeding 1860, during which 
the question was repeatedly brought to the front. Even under the reactionary 
administrations, such provisions were adopted as that all books in the native dia- 


The friars maintained quite complete control of secondary and 
higher instruction till 1898.^ A reaction from the Liberal pro- 
grammes of 1863 to 1870 was stimulated by the appearance of 
a radical party in the Philippines and by an insurrectionary 
movement in Cavite in 1872. The friar party declared these to 
be the natural consequences of " reform," and before King Ama- 
deo's short reign was over they had successfully called halt to 
the onward party at home. The short-Hved republic scarcely 
had its existence proclaimed in the Philippines, and the net 
result of Minister Moret*s decree of 1870 for the seculariza- 
tion of St. Joseph's College (which had come to be administered 
by the Dominicans since the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1768) 
and of St. Thomas University was that in 1875 not only was 
the decree formally revoked (never having really been put into 
effect), but the Dominicans also emerged from the fight with 

leot designed for general circulation should also include a Spanish version of their 
contents. Friar writers take various positions on the subject. A common incon- 
sistency in their attitude is that betrayed in Father Eladio Zamora's Las Corpo- 
raciones Religiosas en las Islas Filipinos (Madrid, 1901), wherein the author first 
asserts that the friars always did their best to spread the Spanish language among 
the Filipinos, then sets out to demonstrate that such effort is both foolish and 
certain of failure. Friar Migfuel Bustamante published in 1885 a fair-sized book 
in Tagalog for the purpose of showing the Tagalogs that they ought not to learn 
Spanish nor seek to adopt European civilization, that in ignorance lay the happi- 
ness of the " Indian. *' The friars later withdrew this book from circulation and 
disowned it. (See Pardo de Tavera's Bihlioteca Filipino, p. 74.) The Filipino peti- 
tion against the friars in 1888 (Marcelo del Pilar's Soberania monacal, p. 69), 
charging the friars with refusing to have Spanish generally taught in order to 
retain their position of mental supremacy, says a pamphlet regarding the con- 
fessional, published in Tagalog, changes the Spanish phraseology, " And you, 
father, I beg to pray to God for me. Amen," into this language in its Tagalog 
translation : " And you, father, since you are the substitute of God on earth, free 
me from my sins and chastise me. Amen, Jesus." 

^ Strictly speaking, of course, the Jesuits' schools could not be called those of 
"the friars" ; however, they were, in the sense here implied under Church con- 
trol. Moreover, the Rector of St. Thomas University had theoretical supervision 
of the Jesuits' secondary school. Much has been said by certain Filipinos of pri- 
vate schools for higher education. Some few of these were started in the more 
advanced provinces after the extension of the Spanish civil code to the Philippines 
in 1889 gave tacit authority for their organization ; but they led a precarious ex- 
istence, in the face of the reactionary campaign for the withdrawal of the right to 
organize such associations, and for other reaeoni exercised very little influence 
open the educational situation prior to 1898. 


more complete control of the valuable estate of St. Joseph's 
College.^ They promised to devote the income of this endow- 
ment to courses in medicine and pharmacy, never before taught 
in the islands. This is the medical college in which bacteriology 
has been introduced since American occupation and is taught 
without microscopes, which has no library worth the name, 
and uses textbooks long antiquated, which has a farcical 
course in dissection, and few graduates of which have ever 
attended a case of confinement or seen a laparotomy. In St. 
Thomas University prior to 1863, besides canon law and a 
fairly good course in civil law (with lay professors), there were 
three courses in Latin grammar, three in philosophy, and six in 
theology, taught in the scholastic manner with the textbooks 
of Spain's friar convents. A Government committee of 1863 
added to the curriculum these subjects, some of which were 
never taught: mathematics, lineal drawing, chemistry, uni- 
versal history, Spanish history, geography, Greek, Hebrew, 
French, English, and bookkeeping. Shortly thereafter an 
English chemist was hired to coach the new "professor of 
chemistry," a friar unacquainted with his branch.'^ When the 
Jesuits began to introduce something like laboratories into 
their secondary school at Manila, governmental and popular 
pressure forced modern science upon St. Thomas's. In 1863 

^ This is the property now in litigation in the Philippine Supreme Court be- 
tween the Philippine Government and the metropolitan see of the Philippines, the 
latter claiming it as Church property, the former maintaining that its original 
donor gave it to the Spanish Government, which merely permitted the Jesuits and 
then the Dominicans to administer it in trust. For the arguments in the case and 
the act of the Philippine Commission conferring special jurisdiction on the Philip- 
pine Supreme Court to decide it, see Act No. 69 of said body, with the resolutions 
of January 5, 1901, reciting the reason for said act and these pamphlets, printed 
at Manila in 1900 : by Felipe G. Calderon, El Colegio de San Jose^ Alegato pre- 
sentado d la Comisi6n^ etc., and Refutacidn de las pretenciones alegadas . . . par el 
Sr. Delegado de S. S. y el Sr. Arzohispo de Manila ; also the " Statements " to the 
Commission by Archbishop Nozaleda and Apostolic Delegate Chapelle. 

2 So Pardo de Tavera (Biblioteca Filipina, p. 281), in listing some addresses of 
Friar Miguel Narro, says he began teaching English in St. Thomas University 
without knowing it, simply repeating to his pupils each day the lesson taught him 
previously in his cell by a Portuguese. 



its rector had offered to establish "a brief medical course, 
suited to the limited intelligence of the natives."^ A short 
time before a predecessor had said : " Medicine and the natural 
sciences are materialistic and impious studies." A Fihpino 
student of the sixties who proposed a thesis on economic rea- 
soning was gravely warned that political economy was a " sci- 
ence of the Devil." And again in 1901, the friar professor 
who delivered the address opening St. Thomas's college year 
paid his respects to modern science in general and to EngHsh 
and German anthropology and biology in particular, wiping 
Darwin, Haeckel, and other such men off the slate with quota- 
tions from the Bible and the saints of the Church. That same 
year, when young Filipinos began coming to the technical 
schools of the United States, the rector of St. Thomas's an- 
nounced a course of " engineering, taught by an English pro- 
fessor" — without laboratory and without mechanical equip- 

Technical education also got little beyond the decree stage in 
the Philippines prior to American occupation. A nautical school, 
for some years successfully opposed by the friars, it is claimed 
because it involved the teaching of higher mathematics, and a 
military school had come to play honorable roles. The trade 
school opened in Manila with such a flourish of governmental 
trumpets in the sixties soon found its way into the hands of 
the Augustinians ; it had no great achievements to catalogue. 
The same is true of the so-called "model farms" and the cen- 
tral agricultural school, a pet idea of the spasmodically flour- 
ishing Liberal ministries of Spain, which inspired some reams 
of official reports. The trade school was in 1891 reopened as 
a Government institution, and the following year the old 
school of drawing, painting, and sculpture was revived.* 

> See Montoro j Yidal, op. cU,, yol. ni, for ibis and other reference! to thii 

' For a review of educational institutions as they existed at the time of the 
American occupation, see lUpt. Phil. Comm. 1900, vol. I. part in, also vol. u, ex- 
hibit VL 




Municipal reorganization was more or less united with edu- 
cational reform, as will have been seen by the references to 
the governmental measures of 1893. In the interim, there had 
been various minor reforms, especially in 1886, in the direc- 
tion of making civil administration of provincial and munici- 
pal affairs more complete; all the more important political 
divisions of Luzon, except Cavite, to the number of nineteen, 
bad been made civil provinces, though all the political divisions 
of the central islands remained "politico-military," the su- 
preme provincial official in each case being a Spanish army 

In 1889, Minister Becerra had declared the municipal meas- 
ure of which he was patron to be a step of preparation for the 
Philippine towns in time to " exercise complete intervention in 
local affairs"; it was, however, only a decree conferring upon 
a few of the larger towns (viz., Sebii, Iloilo, Bigan, Albay, 
Batangas, and Nueva Caceres) the right to organize an ayun- 
tamiento like those of the municipahties of Spain, though the 
Filipinos were not given the right to elect the members of this 
municipal corporation. The other towns of the islands re- 
mained under the gohernadorcillos and cahezas de harangay, 
the former being a sort of honorary chief and figurehead for 
the execution of the directions of the village priest and of the 
Spanish officer of the local garrison of "carbineers" or "rural 
guards," and being assisted by lieutenants and "judges" of 
the planted fields, of police and of cattle. The heads of the 
harangay 8 or harrios were charged chiefly with the collection 
of the taxes in their immediate districts. All the offices were 



compulsory, since the cahezas were pecuniarily responsible for 
whatever part of their district's quota of taxes remained un- 
collected, a feature which resulted not infrequently in the 
mulcting of a well-to-do native and made the office unpopular 
in many places. The elections were held under the direction 
of the chief provincial officer and the local priest, who assem- 
bled the principalia (men belonging to the caste which held 
these local offices), selected from them six ex-gobernadorcillos 
and six ex-cabezas de harangay by lot, these twelve being the 
delegates who chose the officers for the ensuing year by ballot. 
In practice, of course, the Spanish officials, especially the priest, 
dictated the selections. ^ 

The Maura law of 1893 extended the principalia to include 
also the principal taxpayers; renamed the local offices, and 
made their duties and powers somewhat more clear and com- 
prehensive ; provided for elections by ballot, though the prin- 
cipalia were to choose twelve delegates and these delegates in 
turn the five town officers; made a sort of municipal council 
(called the Tribunal) of the five officers, with whom on most im- 
portant questions the twelve delegates must also sit, while the 
parish priest retained the right to intervene on all questions 
and his vise was necessary in most matters of importance. 
The heads of harangay were to be selected by the provin- 
cial governor from a list proposed by the municipal coun- 
cil, were given slightly wider powers, and also a larger share 
of the taxes they collected as their personal perquisites. The 
decree indulged in more or less vague provisions as to the new 
municipal governments having greater control of local finances, 
and, to the end that they might undertake improvements, gave 
them the power to impose for the first time a tax on rural real 

Governor-General Blanco does not seem to have deemed 
the times ripe for the innovation, and the regulations he pro- 

> For the description of an election in a village of Sdmar in 1859, see Jagor, 
op, cU., p. 189. 


mulgated in December, 1893, for putting the new law into ef- 
fect virtually left these clauses a dead letter. For the matter 
of that, the entire municipal reform of 1893, greeted by such 
a blare of trumpets as it was at the time, remained very much 
a dead letter. For lack of time, ostensibly at least, Blanco 
nominated all the new officers who were to take seats January 
1, 1894, and inaugurate the new law ; and long before the four 
years came around when there should be quasi-elections under 
the law, it had been set aside by Blanco himself, under the 
exigencies of rebellion, while still more rigid provisions of 
martial law than he invoked were in force under his successors. 
Much the same fate befell the provincial boards which were, 
by the Maura law, created to supervise the new municipal 
governments and advise the provincial governor, they being 
made up mainly of Spanish civil and ecclesiastical authorities 
of the province, serving ex officio, and of four residents of the 
capital, chosen for six years by the presidents of all the towns 
in the province. Nor, when the troubles of 1896 came on, had 
anything practical been realized from the provision of the 
1893 law that divided Luzon and the Bisayas into three dis- 
tricts each, the provincial boards of these districts to choose, 
in turn of provinces, one citizen from each of these districts 
to act as an adviser to the Council of Administration of the 
central government at Manila. The Maura law remained, like 
too many other reforms of Spain, mostly promise.^ 

Other notable administrative reforms were, in 1884, the re- 

^ For a rdsum^ of the whole govemmental system of Spain in the Philippine 
Islands, see Rept. Phil. Comm. 1900, vol. i, part iv. The reader is, however, in 
danger of being misled if he does not understand that the organization as there 
outlined was, in considerable degree, only a paper organization, showing the 
governmental scheme as modified by recent laws, some of which had not at all, op 
had but lately, taken effect. A more adequate idea of the old Spanish system of 
internal administration is afforded by the appendix to volume xvii of The Philip- 
pine Islands, lJf93-1898, in the translations from Mas's Informe of 1843 and Mou- 
tero y Vidal's Archipielago flipino oi 1886. A comprehensive manual on the Maura 
law reform, with the texts of the decrees, regulations made by Blanco, municipal 
blank forms, etc., is Comentarios alReglamento Provisional de las Juntas Provinciales, 
by Felix M. Roxas (ManUa, 1894). 


duction from forty to fifteen of the number of days' labor on 
public works that each native must contribute without pay, 
and the suppression of the old "tribute," or head-tax (estabhshed 
under Legaspi), as such, with the substitution for it of the 
cedula personal, virtually a poll-tax, though ostensibly a fee 
for a document of identification. The principalia and all 
whites had always been exempted from forced labor {prestadSn 
personal), but under the new law all became theoretically sub- 
ject to it ; actually, all European residents paid for the cidula 
of a class high enough to exempt them from labor, while na- 
tives who paid for one of the lower grades of cedulas and 
wished to commute their labor-tax in money could do so at a 
certain rate. The mass of the people paid from one to three 
dollars Mexican for a cedula, including both men and women 
between twenty-five and sixty, where only the men had formerly 
paid the tribute of one peso to one peso and a half. The re- 
duction in the number of days of forced labor was a great re- 
lief to the masses, but the system itself had been subject to 
abuse from the days of the conquest and remained so to the 
end. It was one of the ways in which the slavery of the masses 
to their *' caciques," existent as a system upon the arrival of 
the Spaniards, has continued to this day. Instead of taxing 
the propertied classes for public improvements, and paying the 
workmen their daily wage, the Spanish system was to put the 
burden on the poor. And even then, except for the churches 
and convents, the improvements that were needed, especially 
roads, remained in most provinces unmade ; the Spanish officials 
or native "caciques" hired out the public labor to private 
parties and pocketed the proceeds.* 

In economic administration, the most notable thing of re- 

^ 8e« Retana's edition of Father Zti Riga's Estaditmo de Uu Islcu FHipinan 
(Madrid, 1893), Appendix H, Polistat. For a keen observer's testimony as to the 
abasM of the politta system fifty years before, see Mas's Informer sections on 
Estado ecclesuutico and ContrtbucioneM. In former times, each tributary paid also 
an extra real (one eighth of a dollar) which was supposed to go into the Tillage 
treasury for use on local improyements. 


cent years was the abolition of the Government monopoly of 
tobacco, which was decreed in 1881 but not fully effected till 
1884. This monopoly had been instituted in 1781, and had 
been followed by monopolies on other products throughout the 
archipelago, soon giving a revenue of half a million pesos ; for 
some years before the final abandonment of the system, it had 
been limited to tobacco alone and to the valley of the Kagayan 
River in Luzon, but nevertheless produced the Government 
from four to six millions annually.^ An attempt was made 
during the seventies and eighties to put the archipelago on 
the gold standard; it was persisted in with admirable inten- 
tions, and with the Spaniard's full confidence in the powers 
of royal decrees, but scarcely with good judgment, since the 
promoters of the plan continued to fly in the face of the work- 
ings of the " Gresham Law."^ Similarly, the attempts to reg- 
ulate the immigration, the habitat, and the occupation of the 
Chinese were not any more successful during the last genera- 
tion than during the preceding years of Spanish rule; when 

1 Monopolies of a minor character, on playing-cards, etc., had existed from the early 
years of Spanish rule, in accordance with general colonial legislation. Under Basco 
y Vargas, the example already set in the Spanish Antilles of a monopoly on tobacco 
was followed in the Philippines, and similar revenue projects were soon after ex- 
tended to alcoholic products, powder, etc. (the betel-nut having previously been 
monopolized to a certain degree). See Montero y Vidal, op. cit., vol. ii. pp. 
295, 314, 316. The Library of Congress Bibliography and Pardo de Tavera*s Bib- 
lioteca cite various sources on Philippine monopolies, especially tobacco, but there 
is no work comprehensively covering the subject. Mas's Informe (vol. ii, section 
on Contribuciones) shows that the receipts from the tobacco monopoly had increased 
by steady growth to 1,280,000 pesos, and that the gross revenues from the mono- 
poly on native wine and liquor (vino and nipa) were 690,000 pesos in 1835. Jagor 
says, op. cit., p. 267 : " During my stay there, the state factories could not manu- 
facture as many cigars as there was demand for, the strange case arising of higher 
prices being paid for large quantities than what they bought at retail in the de- 
positories. To prevent dealers making their purchases in the depositories, a maxi- 
mum was fixed and an odious and expensive police surveillance set up to watch 
the sales and prevent a single person making various purchases in different agen- 
cies. The penalty was confiscation of all the purchaser had. Any one could buy 
cigars at the depository for his own consumption, bnt not dispose of a single box 
to another person, even at the same price he himself had paid." 

^ See the contributions on the subject in La Politica de Espana en Filipinos for 
the years 1893 to 1896, evincing most amazing ignorance of fundamental economic 
principles on the part of official projectors as well as unofficial contributora. 



the laws and restrictions became too troublesome to avoid or 
disregard, the Chinese " saw " the officers in charge. 

The Laws of the Indies provided that, in so far as practicable, 
the rights and duties of the laws of Spain should be made 
applicable to her colonial subjects. Special exemptions were, 
however, gradually given to them, whereby (the intent was) 
their prosecution in the courts was to be simplified and their 
financial responsibility before the law was quite narrowly limited. 
It was inevitable that, in the hands of bad or careless admin- 
istrators, these very exemptions, designed for protection, shoidd 
become instruments of oppression. Moreover, in the nineteenth 
century, as the Filipinos came more in touch with the outside 
world, their more prominent individuals were bound to clamor 
for full equality before the law. Hence, we find that the penal 
code of Spain was finally extended to the Philippine Islands 
in 1887, and the civil code and the law of commerce in 1889. 
Important exceptions were speedily introduced into the decrees 
establishing the civil code ; these were the provisions retaining 
the old censorship of the press and withdrawing from the 
Philippines civil marriage and registration, after a bitter con- 
test waged by the religious orders. The reform of judicial pro- 
cedure to a considerable extent either preceded or accompanied 
the alteration of the organic law. Justice of the peace courts, 
presided over by natives, were introduced in 1886. Before 
that, the simpler old form of provincial administration, whereby 
the Spanish alcalde discharged both the functions of civil 
governor and judge,^ and justice in minor cases was adminis- 

^ It was not till 1844 that the provincial alcaldes^ who were at once governors 
and jadges, were forbidden to engage also in trade in their provinces ; and abuses 
of this sort were common thereafter. See Mas's Informe (vol. ii, section on Ad' 
mini$tr€LCx6n dejusticia) for a good picture of the early regime in the provinces, 
whan the Laws of the Indies, the antiquated Siete PartidaSj etc., still governed, 
and oonld be twisted to suit the administrator-judge's desires. Mas recommends 
■p«cial codes for the Philippines, and that the alcaldes-mayores be themselves law- 
yers, be forbidden to trade, and receive better salaries. He also quotes Tom^ de 
Coroyn (Estado de Uu Islas Filipintu en 1810, Madrid, 1820, another of the few 
nally invaluable Philippine works, of which an English edition was published in 
in 1821), who described the same abases as existing in 1810, namely, the 


tered in the towns by the local executive chiefs, had been done 
away with by the separation of the executive and judiciary in 
the provinces.^ A great amount of really judicial power re- 
mained vested in the person of the governor-general, and in 
actual practice the archipelago was only too readily converted 
at his will into territory subject to martial law, its inhabitants 
at the summary disposition of the very comprehensive military 
tribunals which he could call into being. 

The Philippine archipelago has an area of approximately 
75,000,000 acres, comprised mostly in some thirty islands 
of size and importance. Of the total area, not 6,000,000 
acres have ever been brought under cultivation.^ Perhaps 
25,000,000 acres, owing to rocky character, climate, nature of 
the forest, etc., will never, or only in the very remote future, 
be cultivated. Even under this estimate, less than one eighth 
of the land area that is susceptible to agriculture has yet been 

alcaldes making 40,000 pesos or more per year in trade; money at a high rate of 
interest, with internal commerce thus officially monopolized; the offices of alcalde 
lacking the prestige they should have ; leniency and slackness in the administration 
of official duties, resulting in ladronism, even in Manila's outskirts ; the alcaldes 
manipulating the gobemadorcillos to their own ends, and the latter the people, thus 
riveting the evils of caciquism even more firmly upon the masses, who were kept 
enslaved by debt. 

1 This pretended separation of the executive and judicial branches of the 
government was, however, even then by no means complete. The Bisayan provinces 
remained under military government till the close of Spanish rule, and their ad- 
ministrators possessed not only executive and judicial authority, but also quite ar- 
bitrary military powers. Until 1861, the governor-general of the islands was presi- 
dent of the Audiencia, and he afterward retained particularly through the courts 
of special jurisdiction (these courts being military, " contentious," etc., as well as 
ecclesiastical), virtually judicial powers. No better r^sum^ of the law in force in 
the Philippines to 1898 and of the rather intricate system of courts can be found 
than in a monograph on the subject by Cayetano S. Arellano, now Chief Justice 
of the Philippine Supreme Court, which monograph is Appendix J to Report of 
Taft Philippine Commission, 1900. The forthcoming Philippine census reports 
will contain a more elaborate review of the subject by Florentino Torres, a judge 
of the Philippine Supreme Court. 

2 A. de la Cavada, Historia Geografica, GeolSgica y Estadistica de Filipinos 
(Manila, 1876), vol. n, pp. 391 and 398, gives 2,280,421 hectares (5,700,000 acres) 
under cultivation, and approximately 52,000,000 acres as tropical forest. More 
recent estimates of the area under cultiyation have generally been smaller than 
Cavada's figures. 


redeemed from forest or morass. And perhaps 1,000,000 acres 
of the area now cultivated are occupied by squatters, owing 
to the defective registry system of Spain. By the Treaty of 
Paris, therefore, the United States secured title over 90 per 
cent of all the land in the islands, including practically all the 
timber land, most of the area of mineral deposits, and perhaps 
15,000,000 acres of land which comparatively soon can be re- 
deemed for agriculture. These figures themselves afford the 
most graphic comment that can be made upon the record of 
Spanish rule as regards the development of the resources of 
the archipelago. In recent years, when commerce, as we have 
seen, began pressing on the outside for the development of 
those resources, there were efforts, more or less sustained and 
intelligent, to throw open the great area of waste land to occu- 
pation and improvement, as well as to lead the settlers on im- 
proved land to perfect their titles. Foreigners were, after 1870, 
as already noted, allowed to acquire real estate. Beginning with 
1880, there was promulgated a series of comprehensive royal de- 
crees aimed to make it easier for occupants of land to perfect their 
titles ; the administrative machinery provided was, however, so 
compUcated and unwieldy that only a fair proportion of the 
large proprietors and very few squatters on small tracts availed 
themselves of the privileges extended in that year and by the 
subsequent decrees of 1883, 1884, 1888, and 1894. By the 
decree of 1894, foreign corporations were expressly denied 
the privilege of acquiring Philippine land.^ There were also 
some intelligent efforts made on the part of a few of the more 
progressive Spanish officials and of other Spanish laymen to study 
and display not only to the commercial but also to the scientific 
world the wealth of the virgin material whicff had remained 
almost unexplored for three centuries. Prior to these years, 
what little had really been accomplished in these lines was 

> See the War Department document, Spanish Public Land Latps in the Philip^ 
pine hlandi and their History to August 13, 1898, compiled by Ahern and Ban 
(Wathington, 1901). 


owing notably to the inexpert and generally unscientific labors 
of a few diligent friars. And in spite of the newly kindled in- 
terest in the Philippines of recent years, it remains true that, 
for the scientific world, they are to this day almost an unex- 
plored field. In botany, there is the monumental, though not 
strictly reliable, work of the Augustinian, Father Manuel 
Blanco,^ and some monographs of the Spanish forestry officials 
of late years, notably of Sebastian Vidal y Soler. In geology, 
three Spanish officials, Abella y Casariego, Centeno, and Jor- 
dana, published treatises of value. The work of the Jesuits in 
meteorology since 1865 is authoritative, and to a small degree 
their work in other scientific lines is acceptable. In general, 
however, the student who desires to know about the Philip- 
pines in any field of science will find, first, that scarcely more 
than the preliminary investigations have been made, and, 
second, that he can very speedily exhaust the works of im- 
portance in Spanish and must turn to German, English, and 
French works.^ 

As may be inferred from even this hasty summary of gov- 
ernmental measures of the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
Spain was unquestionably making progress in the Philippine 
Islands. It is not at all difficult, indeed, for apologetic Spanish 
writers of recent years to make out a very excellent defense 
for their Government — on paper. But if we dismiss from con- 
sideration altogether the rising wave of Filipino opposition 
to the persistence in their villages of frocked ecclesiastical 
masters, we shall still find several important obstacles to giv- 

1 Mora de FilipinaSy Manila, 1877-80, first published in an inadequate form fortj^i 
years earlier. 

2 Perhaps in no other line does Spanish incompetence and lack of interest come 
out so clearly as in that of ethnology. In general, anything that a Spanish writer 
says about Philippine ethnology is ipso facto suspicious, and very often ridiculous. 
Thus far one must depend mainly upon German writers upon Philippine ethnology. 
Of these, Blumentritt is the one who has written by far the most voluminously, and, 
on the whole, most informatively. Yet Blumentritt was never in the Philippine 
Islands at all ! Mistakes, of a comprehensive character as well as of detail, abound 
in his treatises. 


ing the Spanish lay government in the islands a clean record. 
In the first place, the constant political changes in Spain itself 
interfered seriously with the movement in the islands toward 
a freer economic regime and a more liberal political adminis- 
tration. Back in 1873 we find the much-quoted Jagor saying 
as to the tobacco monopoly : " The circumstance which in a 
country economically well administered would have great influ- 
ence in favor of setting this industry free, but which with 
Spain, on the contrary, tends to preserve the monopoly, is the 
number of employees which it requires. Every ministry needs 
to dispose of those places to content its numberless claimants, 
and it cannot lose the opportunity of giving fat jobs to its 
creatures, nor that of sending in honor to the antipodes the 
persons who are in its way in Spain. The cost of the trip is 
at the expense of the Philippine treasury. Those who go are 
so numerous that at times it is necessary to create posts in 
which to place the newcomers." ^ He goes on to point out that 

* Jagor, op. cit.t p. 267. Montero y Vidal, op. cit.^ vol. in, p. 490, charges this 
** coiinterdance of employees, which has made thousands and thousands of Span- 
iards pass through the Philippines as trains pass through a tunnel," upon the Lib- 
erals, who resorted to it after the revolution and dethronement of Isabella II in 
1868. He fails to take into account that it was a practice of long standing and that 
the Liberals simply returned to it in upsetting the imperfect rules of 1866 for a 
civil service based on merit, though perhaps they made a cleaner sweep of subor- 
dinate employees than was ever made before and thus set the example followed 
until 1898. An idea of the confusion and expense incident to changes of govern- 
ment and of plans is afforded in ihid.f p. 478, where Montero y Vidal speaks of the 
*' hall of accounts " for the colonies established in Madrid in 1867, and says : 
** Later . . . the courts of accounts in the colonies themselves were reestablished, 
and once again they were suppressed and the [bureaus at Madrid] restored, and 
yet, with all the coming and going of boats laden with accounts, no other result 
has been obtained than the expending of thousands of good dollars, while the ac- 
oonnts are still waiting for some pious soul to examine them." Evidence of the 
continuance of such evils to the close of the Spanish rule may be found in recom- 
mendations like these, made by Governor-General Primo de Rivera to the Madrid 
Government in July, 1897: "At least a reasonable degree of stability [for Gov- 
ernment employees] and a rate of pay not so inadequate are conditions absolutely 
necessary in order to require work, competency, and morality. ... So long as 
there come to the colonies, for no other purpose but to make money, the wild 
jonth, the ruined nobleman, the cacique who bae spent his property in politics, etc., 
. . . the administration will not be bettered nor can territories like this be peace- 
fully governed, especially after convulsions such as has just been experienced.'* 


from December, 1853, to November, 1854, the Philippines had 
four governor-generals, two regularly appointed and two act- 
ing temporarily ; and tells a story of a judge of the Audiencia 
who arrived in Manila in 1850 with his family, having gone 
out by the way of Good Hope, only to find himself out of a 
place and his successor already on the ground, arrived by the 
way of the Isthmus of Suez. It is worth remarking that, from 
1834 to 1862, Spain had 4 constitutions, 28 parliaments, 47 
presidents of the Council of Ministers, and 529 ministers with 
portfolios, and during the next twenty years, with other revo- 
lutions and a republic, the changes came more frequently still. 
From 1835 to 1897 inclusive, the Philippines had fifty gover- 
nor-generals, each serving an average of one year and three 
months. That a civil service under such conditions would be 
inefficient, if not corrupt, might be deemed a foregone conclu- 
sion ; and corruption was doubly assured, one almost feels like 
saying, by the low scale of salaries paid, a scale that practi- 
cally became lower in recent years, as it was based on silver 
and silver was steadily falling. That there were honest, con- 
scientious men in the Spanish civil administration, is somewhat 
worthy of note ; but there was very much about the whole 
situation to lend plausibility to the friars' claim that it was 
this horde of civilians fattening on the FiHpinos which roused 
them against the mother country. It remains only to be added 
that the corruption notoriously extended on occasions to the 
governor-generals themselves ; certain there were of them who 
paid well for their appointments, and saw to it that the bargain 
was not a losing one for themselves. 

Moreover, there are vital objections to be urged against th 

(See Primo do Rivera, Memoria al Senado, Madrid, 1898, p. 161.) The same poin' 
is insisted upon in connection with his complaint that the already over-powerful 
governor-generals " have little or no share in the making of the laws," when he 
says {ibid.j p. 9) : " There is imposed upon them a personnel in all the branches of 
administration in the choice of which no other consideration or guaranties have 
governed than favoritism, intrigue, and, sometimes, even lower motives." (Some 
well-posted critics consider that Primo de Rivera was well qualified to speak on 
corruption in the Philippine Government.) 




Spanish governmental system in the islands as a system, even 
with the reform patchwork of recent years upon it. Both econ- 
omically and politically, it remained to the last paternalistic ; 
paternalism is still highly necessary in those islands, but a 
paternalistic regime to be successful must be untiring and 
energetic, and Spain's paternalism remained to the end nine 
parts plan and promise and one part fulfillment. When all 
other defects of her administration have been discounted, it 
must still be said that she milked into her central treasury the 
comparatively mild taxes she laid upon her subjects, this being 
done ostensibly for the better administration and more intelli- 
gent expenditure of the fiscal resources, but actually to the de- 
triment of local and general improvements. The insular budget 
for 1894-95 shows a total expenditure of $13,280,139.41:^ 
of this sum, $6,495,237.51 went for the army and navy; 
$2,220,120.98 for internal administration ; $1,687,108.88 for 
the church and the courts, $460,315.24 being spent on the 
courts, while $1,045,540 of the amount spent for ecclesias- 
tical maintenance went for salaries to the bishops and priests 
and for supplies for the parish churches; $1,360,506.53 on 
general standing expenses of Spain charged against this col- 
ony, among them over $60,000 for the maintenance of Spain's 
diplomatic and consular service in the Orient, $118,000 on 
the colonial department at Madrid, $70,000 on the colony of 
Fernando Po on the African coast, and $718,000 on pensions 
and retiring allowances ; $823,261.95 on the fiscal adminis- 
tration, centralized for the archipelago, of which sum nearly 
$450,000 went for salaries ; and lastly, $628,752.46 for spe- 
cial educational institutions and pubhc works, over 60 per 
cent of the $110fiOO spent for what might he called public 
improvements going for salaries. 

The estimated revenue for the same year was $13,579,000, as 

^ These tams, u all tarns of money for the closing jears of Spanish rule, are 
givM in the value of the Philippine peso, which may, for practical purposes, be 
WNHUUnd the equivalent of the Mexican dollar. 


follows : from the direct taxes, $6,659,450, this item including 
$4,586,250 from cedulas, $482,800 from the special head-tax 
on the Chinese, $1,323,000 from the industrial tax, $110,000 
from the tax on urban property, and $155,000 from surtaxes 
on various of the industrial and urban taxes ; from customs, 
$4,565,000 including $430,000 in export duties ; from the 
opium monopoly, $602,300 ; from the Government lottery, 
$873,000 ; from internal revenue stamps and stamped paper, 
$510,500; from Government dues on timber cut, $122,000; 
from sale of public lands, $45,000 ; the rest, miscellaneous.^ 

Under this system, the burdens of government rested to an 
extraordinary degree on the shoulders of the poor. The cedula 
tax, to be sure, could not be called excessive ; but there is 
obviously something wrong about a governmental system 
which derives its chief source of income not from an impost 
w^on property but upon heads. Of the indirect tax, the ex- 
port duties on tobacco, sugar, copra, and indigo and the im- 
port duty on rice bore eventually upon the masses, and less 

1 An analysis of the budget for 1894-95 will be found in the Rept. Phil. Comm. 
1900, vol. I, pp. 79-81. The budget for 1896-97, the last complete year, is con- 
tained in Senate Document 62, 55th Congress, 3d Session, pp. 409-11, and in the 
appendix to F. H. Sawyer's The Inhabitants of the Philippines (London and New 
York, 1900). A detailed summary of the actual receipts of the Philippine Gov- 
ernment, 1890 to 1897 inclusive, drawn up under American military government, 
is furnished on pp. 32-34 of the Report of the Military Governor of the Philippine 
Islands on Civil Affairs, 1900 (Rept. War Dept. 1900, vol. i, part 10 ; also Manila 
edition of MacArthur's report of 1900, vol. ii, appendix AA, exhibit A). It shows 
the actual receipts from direct and indirect taxes for 1894 and 1895 to have ex- 
ceeded the estimates above. Receipts and expenditures were by 1896 over 
$17,000,000 silver each. It should be noted that they had been steadily growing 
since the latter part of the eighteenth century, when the tobacco monopoly was 
established, prior to which time they were in the neighborhood of half a million 
each. They increased most rapidly after the abolition of the monopoly and the 
adoption of more comprehensive schemes of taxation in the early eighties. Cus- 
toms receipts grew from $800,000 in 1865 steadily to their average of over 
$4,000,000 from 1890-95. For the budgets of 1889-90 and 1893-94, and also for 
the figures on revenues and expenditures in earlier years in general, see Retana's 
edition of Ziiniga's Estadismo de las Islas Filipinos, appendix H, Rentas e Ini' 
puestos del Estado ; chapter xiv of The Philippine Islands, by John Foreman 
(London and New York, 1899) ; and various documents on this subject presented 
in the important series already frequently cited, The Philippine Islands^ IJfiS- 



plainly they were also handicapped by the whole system of 
import duties, which were proportionately light on luxuries 
and heavy on provisions, etc., while the system was prefer- 
ential for Spain. The industrial tax bore most heavily upon 
the proprietors of small retail enterprises and upon salaried 
employees; under it, the proprietor of a sugar estate, for 
example, paid a small tax on his mill, while he went scot-free 
upon his acres of tilled land. The nearest approach to a real- 
estate impost was the urban tax, imposed in 1879, which levied 
five per cent on the rental actually received from dwelHngs in 
the towns, with deductions for those of lighter materials ; and, 
as seen, this tax on the rental value produced in the entire 
archipelago hardly more than $100,000. It is to be remem- 
bered that this budget included not only receipts and expen- 
ditures for the general insular government, but for the pro- 
vincial and departmental government as well ; for the fiscal 
administration was entirely centralized, even down to the small- 
est barrio. As for the municipalities, there was left to them 
what meager revenue they might derive from the sale of privi- 
leges for fisheries, amusements, markets, ferries, from public 
pounds, fines, transfers of cattle, taxes on lights, a surtax of ten 
per cent on the urban tax (the numerous surtaxes being not the 
least vexatious and cumbersome features of the Spanish cus- 
toms and internal revenue assessments), and the fifteen days' 
personal-labor tax. Up to the very last, too, the towns contin- 
ued to lay imposts, in the old Spanish fashion, on products 
brought to their markets from other towns.^ In the average 
Philippine town, the revenue was eaten up principally by the 
police force that it was required by insular regulations to keep. 
There were no funds for salaries to the officers, much less for 

* Thi* old sjstem of alcabaUUf or of ** protective " checks upon internal trade, 
between province and province, town and town, lurvived in Spain itself until 
recent years. It was not abolished in Mexico until 1896, and in his expose of the 
onrrencj reform inaugurated in the latter country in November, 1004, Finance 
Minister Limantonr assigned to this abolition of the alcahnlan chief place as influ- 
encing the development of internal trade and progress generally. 


the sadly needed improvements, such as good schoolhouses, 
cleaner streets, better roads and bridges, and hygienic appli- 
ances and regulations. 

That the Filipino people, and in particular the humble Fili- 
pino, had legitimate grievances against the Spanish administra- 
tion, would appear to be evident from the foregoing recital. 
Even leaving out of consideration the small degree of participa- 
tion in the management of their own affairs that was allowed 
to the Filipinos, it disposes of the paper showing of Spanish 
political apologists. But far from being able to argue there- 
from that it was the blunders of Spain's civil administration 
which cost her the sympathies of her Philippine subjects and 
made them ripe for active revolution when the chance came to 
throw off the yoke, we must, in any fair accounting, find that 
that administration was really making progress toward a better 
regime. How explain, then, that coin ciden tally with this fal- 
tering progress, the Filipinos themselves grew steadily, during 
the last thirty years, more restless and assertive ? The story is 
not told if we pause here and simply bring a general indict- 
ment against the Filipinos as acting the part of ingrates toward 
their benefactors. At Madrid, during those years of Filipino 
renaissance^ the religious orders which had such extensive 
landed and parochial and educational interests in the islands 
were fighting at every step, with secret political power, with the 
superstitious hold their ecclesiastical position gave them upon 
the Spanish people, and with the most up-to-date resources of 
a political party (with newspapers, candidates, propaganda, 
etc.), against every encroachment upon the old regime by the 
Liberal party of Spain. In the Philippine Islands the ecclesias- 
tical hierarchy and the heads of the same orders were using 
all the power of their intrenched position, all their prestige and 
authority, religious and official, and not infrequently all the 
baser weapons at their disposal, to bend the administration of 
the islands to their will. In almost every town of size in those 
islands, there was a friar, ready to assert the ancient preroga- 


tive of fatherly direction, ready to use in the interests of his 
regime all the manifold rights of intervention in local affairs 
which the law gave him, ready to place the heavy hand of 
superstition or of paternalism upon the head of every parish- 
ioner who showed a tendency to think or to do for himself, 
eager and earnest in his determination to maintain the intel- 
lectual status quo. That the friars were honest and sincere in 
this attitude of horror toward modern progress in general, 
toward Liberalism, toward scientific education, did not render 
it any less certain that they were bound eventually to lose in 
their fight to keep the Filipinos in the Middle Ages. For a 
whole generation, the catastrophe was preparing; but it was 
inevitable, from the day when the Philippines were first aroused 
from their dreams of slumbering isolation. 

What differentiated the Cavite revolt of 1872 from any of 
the previous mutinies of native troops was the fact that the 
Spanish authorities, rightly or wrongly, identified with it, and 
made chief victims for punishment, three native priests, one 
of them an old man almost in his dotage. If we accept the 
testimony of Filipinos more or less closely in touch with the 
incidents of that year, the evidence on which those priests 
were convicted, by a secret military tribunal, of instigating 
the mutiny, was manufactured at the prompting of the friars, 
because, encouraged by the anti-clerical campaign waged dur- 
ing the preceding decade in Spain, these Filipino priests, and 
particularly one of them, had been outspoken in asserting the 
rights of the native clergy to serve the parishes of their country 
and in charging the orders with limiting their education, keep- 
ing their number down, and generally reducing them to the 
position of servants of the friars. The official Spanish version 
of the affair is that these priests were the prime instigators of 
a mutiny in the Cavite arsenal, and that, if their plans had 
not been frustrated by the confession of a native woman to a 
friar, all whites in Cavite and Manila might have been put to 
the knife. The natives have never ceased to believe that there 


was a cold-blooded plot on the part of the friars to get rid of 
the few independent native priests who refused to lick their 
hands in servility and spoke out boldly for their own priestly 
rights and their people. Under the circumstances, the action 
of the Spanish authorities in taking bloody vengeance without 
clearly and publicly proving their case must be deemed one of 
the most serious tactical blunders made during the troublous 
times of recent years.^ Governor-General Izquierdo, who was 

1 The Filipino version of the afPair was reflected in the dedication by Jostf 
Rizal of his novel El Filihusterismo (Ghent, 1890) to Fathers Gomez, Burgos, and 
Zamora (executed on the field where Rizal himself was to fall nearly twenty-five 
years later) with the words : " The Church, by refusing to degrade you, has placed 
in doubt the crime imputed to you ; the Government, by surrounding your case with 
mystery and shadows, justifies the belief that there was some error, committed in 
fatal moments ; and the entire Philippine country, by worshiping your memory 
and calling you martyrs, admits your culpability in no respect. Inasmuch, there- 
fore, as your participation in the Cavite disturbance is not clearly proved, and 
as you may have been patriots or not, may or may not have cherished aspirations 
for justice, aspirations for liberty, I have a right to dedicate my work to you 
as victims of the evil I seek to combat. And while we are waiting on Spain to 
rehabilitate you some day, and expect her to refuse the responsibility for your 
death, let these pages serve as a tardy crown of dried leaves placed upon your un- 
known tombs; and let every one who assails your memory without clear proofs 
stain his hands in your blood! " 

A detailed Filipino version of the 1872 affair, which is cited not as a complete 
or wholly reliable account of the uprising, but as showing the sort of stories about 
it which have circulated among the people, is related in the unpublished appeal 
for intervention by the United States in the Philippine Islands made to the United 
States consul-general at Hongkong by certain Filipinos there in January, 1897. 
This document recites that the three condemned priests. Father Josd Burgos and 
Jacinto Zamora, of the chapter of the Manila Cathedral, and Father Mariano 
Gomez, the curate of Bakoor, Cavite, had vigorously opposed the taking of these 
prominent posts from them by Recollect friars, who had some time before left 
Mindanau in accordance with the agreement which restored the island to the Jes- 
uits for missionary work; that special enmity was felt by these friars toward 
Father Burgos, because he had exposed in a newsp.iper of Spain the robbery of 
the rich jewels and the funds of the famous parish church of Antipolo by a Recol- 
lect who had been put in possession of that curacy; that the Recollect provincial 
summoned from Sambales a member of the order very similar to Father 
Burgos and had him unfrock himself and pretend to be Burgos in connection with 
bis efforts to bribe the Cavite garrison to mutiny ; that he accomplished this plan 
through two dissolute Spanish sergeants, who wanted money for gambling; that 
afterward the friars manipulated the torture of the prisoners taken in the mutiny, 
compelling another sergeant, named Saldua, to declare that the mutiny had been 
begun by Burgos' s orders; that this sergeant made this declaration before the 



so energetic in putting down this really insignificant mutiny, 
had been preceded by Governor-General de la Torre, who had 
inaugurated an era of sympathetic assimilation between Span- 
iards and Filipinos, a sort of " policy of attraction " for which 
his recalcitrant fellow-countrymen in the islands could not 
pardon him. The pendulum now swung far in the other direc- 
tion and the two peoples drifted farther and farther apart. The 
policy of the " strong hand " was accepted as necessary even 
by the Liberals in Spain, receiving their information about 
the Philippines from interested sources, and, as already noted. 
Minister Moret's decree for the secularization of education was 
instead turned to the advantage of the friars, while other 
reform projects, some practicable and some not, were shelved 
for the time being. 

The contest in behalf of the native priesthood and of the 
secularization of the parishes had, however, been revived. 

military tribunal, only after the promise that he would be set free for making it, 
but that he was executed along with the three priests so as to have him out of the 
way; that his widow began to denounce the proceeding and to tell in public the 
promises made to her husband, when suddenly she and her children disappeared 
from their house and have never been seen since; finally, that " even in the minds 
of the most humble inhabitants of the Philippines there rests the conviction that 
the tragic end of those victims had been bought with gold." It is a fact that the 
Jesuit-Recollect arrangement had something to do with bringing on the trouble 
of 1872. The Recollect priests who had been replaced by Jesuits in Mindanau 
sought to oust the more prominent native priests from the best posts in and near 
Manila that were not already in the possession of friars, and the three priests executed 
were precisely those who had been most outspoken in behalf of their own rights 
and those of the native clergy in general. A contemporary French account of the 
Cavite mutiny may be found in the Reime des Deux Mondes for May 15, 1877, 
written by E. Plauchut. This account has been vigorously disputed by Spanish 
writers, especially by Philippine friars. A contemporary account of the 1872 affair, 
the Resena of Father Casimiro Herrero (see Pardo de Tavera's Biblioteca for this 
and other data on the revolt), in its chapter on the cause of the revolt (reproduced 
in La Politico de Espaha en FUipincu^ vol. il, pp. 58-61), reveals the general 
eharacter of all the friar writings on the subject in these remarks: "The Cavite 
inionection has the same origin and is the result of the same causes as those of 
Fnuioe, Italy, and Spain, or rather of Europe and America. They are all the fruit 
of the corruption of the intelligence and the heart. Tell man, Ton are free to think 
and to will, because reason recognizes no dependence and will follows reason, and 
yon have put [into action] the principle of disorder and anarchy which so domi- 
uues society." 


More and more every year it became an expression of the 
slowly rising Filipino nationality, a demand for priests from 
among the people, as other countries have. To that extent, at 
least, the friars' defenders are correct in saying that the op- 
position to the friars was opposition to them as Spaniards. 
The seminaries for native priests, though not closed, had fallen 
into decay after the reaction from the campaign for seculari- 
zation of Bishop Santa Justa y Rufina in the eighteenth cen- 
tury. In the early sixties, the Paulist Fathers were put in 
charge of the seminaries at the seat of each of the bishoprics, 
except at Bigan, where the Augustinians presided over the 
seminary ; there was also a second seminary at Manila, under 
the direction of the Jesuits. The Filipinos charge that the 
course of instruction and the number of natives ordained were 
purposely limited, that the orders might always present at 
Rome, as the conclusive argument against secularization of 
the parishes, the fact that there were not enough native priests, 
nor were they yet well enough equipped, to take over the pa- 
rochial administration. In 1870, of the 792 Philippine parishes, 
excluding ten mission parishes of the Jesuits, the friars were 
in charge of 611, and secular priests, nearly all natives, of 
181. The contention that in general only the poorer, less pro- 
ductive parishes were assigned to native priests is borne out 
by the fact that the average number of parishioners in their 
181 parishes was 4500, while in the friars' parishes the aver- 
age was well beyond 6000 ; the Augustinians, the first mis- 
sionaries in the islands, who always held the greatest number 
of important parishes, had an average of nearly 10,000 souls 
to each of their 196 parishes.^ The number of native priests, 

1 A. de la Cavada, op. cit, vol. ii, p. 402. Sinibaldo de Mas (op. cit, vol. ii, sec- 
tion on Estado ecclesidsticOf pp. 36-37) says there were 450 friars and 700 Fili- 
pino priests in 1842. One inclines to believe this an error or a misprint as regards 
the number of seculars, since the seminaries to train them were at the time, and 
had for some years been, neglected, and in 1898, thirty-five years after the reor- 
ganization of the seminaries, the number of ordained Filipino priests fell short 
of 700. Mas, at any rate, lists only 198 parishes in the four dioceses of that time 
as being in charge of seculars, while 288 were administered by friar-curates. Mat 



coadjutors and all, was about 600 in 1898; but the number of 
their parishes did not increase, and they remained to the last 
mainly the coadjutors of the friar priests in the larger parishes.^ 
Nor should they all be identified (at least actively, though 
quite commonly in sentiment) with the opposition to the 
friars ; their very position as underlings made them, with the 
exception of the more independent spirits, bootlicks of their 

There are certain inconsistencies in the books, manifestoes, 
speeches, etc., made in defense of the friars in recent years, 
by themselves, their hirelings in literature, or their creatures 
in the political arena of Spain. They uniformly claim that the 
mass of the Filipinos love them, and that the opposition to 
them is voiced only by a few forward and conceited "Indians," 
put up to it by the Liberals ("freethinkers" and "Free- 
masons," they generally say) of Spain. They as uniformly 
dwell with great emphasis upon the labors of the orders as 
having in a short space of time converted communities of wan- 
dering savages into happy, peaceful, law-abiding Christian 
communities.^ Then, in the bitterness of the campaign against 
the extension of new rights and Hberties to the Filipinos, they 

gives in this section an excellent presentation of the friars' side of the contention 
under the earlier r^g^me and a picture of the friar priests as benevolent adminis- 
trators and pastors, which coincides with that drawn by Tom&s de Comyn still 
earlier in the nineteenth century. Both should be consulted. 

^ According to the Etudes of Elis^e Reclus of July 5, 1898 (quoted in Catholic 
World for August, 1898), the spiritual charges of the regular and secular clergy 
in the Philippines were as follows : 1892, Angustinians, 2,082,131; 1892, Recol- 
lects, 1,175,156; 1892, Franciscans, 1,010,763; 1892, Dominicans, 699,851; 1895, 
Jesuits, 213,065 ; 1896, secular clergy, 967,2M. 

' They are able to quote the very just testimony of foreign travelers like Jagor, 
Mall at, and others, to the better conditions of the Filipinos, so far as regards the 
conditions of livelihood and association with the white rulers, than that of the 
Malays of Java or of the English possessions, where the natives were never Chris- 
tianized. This testimony, however, like that of the competent Spanish observers, 
Comyn and Mas, dates back to the earlier portions of the nineteenth century or to 
other periods before new ideas and aspirations had begun to enter the Philippines, 
and does not take into account the fact that the Spaniards had introduced their 
subjects to the possibilities of a " divine discontent " and must satisfy that discon* 
tent or reckon with it in years to come. 


give such depressing estimates of the natives' ability and launch 
such invectives against the natives' character as belie their 
claims to having done wonders in transforming them. The real 
missionary spirit of earlier years had, in a great measure, been 
lost before ever the eighteenth century began ; but it was not 
until after 1863 that the campaign of depreciation of the na- 
tive became so bitter, was so openly conducted before his face 
and so absolutely regardless of truth or of charity and reck- 
less of consequences. Such incidents as the reciting by a 
Philippine official distinguished for his defense of the friars, at 
public literary exercises of the University of St. Thomas, of 
verses representing the natives, two thousand of whom were 
there as students, as mere animals, building their homes like 
the birds of the air and living like the lowest beasts, became 
more and more common. It was of these verses that a friar 
very prominent in one of the orders said, in an open letter to 
Minister Moret in 1897 : — 

They brilliantly set forth the savage instincts and the bestial incli- 
nations of those faithful imitators of apes. ... As neither Spain 
nor the friars can change the ethnological character of the race, so 
inferior to ours, it will be idle to desire to apply to them the same 
laws as to us. . . . The only liberty the Indians want is the liberty 
of savages. Leave them to their cock-fighting and their indolence, 
and they will thank you more than if you load them down with old 
and new rights. ^ 

The Dominican newspaper of Manila not infrequently refers 
to the people as chongos (Philippine colloquial for " monkeys " ). 
If there is a spark of spirit or of independence in a people at 
all, they will rise against that sort of treatment, even when 

^ The whole letter and discussion connected therewith may be found in La Po- 
litica de Espana en Filipinos, vol. vii, pp. 35-37. A typical book in defense of 
the friars is Las Corporaciones Religiosas en Filipinas, by Father Eladio Zamora 
(Madrid, 1901). Father Zamora was a Philippine Augustinian. The book pre- 
sents the side of the friars in the Philippines very well, but its author is as reck- 
less of facts and ignorant of Philippine history as some of the less ambitious 
pamphleteers among his fellows. His book forms the basis of the alleged history 
contained in Stephen Bonsai's article on '* The Friars in the Philippines" in the 
North American Review for October, 1902, though Mr. Bonsai failed to give credit 



the masters who so depreciate them govern them with absolute 
justice. If the defense of the record of the friars is to be con- 
sistent, it must either elect to regard the Filipinos as in the 
mass hopeless of complete regeneration, or it must cease to 
harp on the wonders wrought by the friars. If the Fihpinos 
are to-day totally incapable, the tradition of miracles having 
been wrought by the missionaries must be abandoned ; if they 
have been raised to a state approaching in some degree that 
of European peoples, they cannot legitimately be denied the 
opportunity to advance the rest of the way. 


The real question here involved is, Did the Filipinos them- 
selves demand such an opportunity ? The best answer to that 
question is not found in the incidents of the so-called Revolu- 
tion of 1896, actively participated in only by sections of the 
archipelago, and by certain classes to the very considerable 
exclusion of others, inspired, moreover, by various mixed mo- 
tives, among which were not wanting the baser ones of per- 
sonal revenge and race hatred. The best proof of the rising 
Filipino sentiment of nationality is found in the campaign 
carried on in the eighties and nineties by the more progressive 
element of young Filipinos, a two-sided campaign, waged in 
Spain for the extension to the Philippines of freer govern- 
mental institutions, for an honest administration, and for the 
speedy replacement of the friars by FiHpino priests, and waged 
in the islands themselves for the improvement of educational 
facilities, a removal of the espionage upon the press and pub- 
lic opinion, and, above all, for an awakening of the lethargic 
masses. There were only a chosen few who comprehended in 
their campaign this full breadth of purpose, and there were 
actively laboring with them, in partial comprehension of the 
far-reaching scope of what they were trying to do, compara- 
tively but a handful of less capable prosely ters ; but they had 
made their influence felt in every little village where their 


educated compatriots dwelt, and even the consciousness of the 
docile masses had perhaps been touched with something like 
an ideal of progress. 

This campaign was, first of all, a foreign propaganda, be- 
cause it was stimulated into activity by the deportations of 
prominent Filipinos following the Cavite mutiny of 1872. 
They gradually found their way from the criminal colonies of 
Spain to Hongkong and Singapore in the Orient, but more 
particularly to Paris and London, and, as their real or sup- 
posed offenses were blurred by time, to Madrid itself. For the 
succeeding twenty years, deportations were more or less com- 
mon at intervals, depending upon whether the regime at Ma- 
nila was representative of Liberals or Clerical-Conservatives in 
Spain. The friars, who were becoming all the time more and 
more anxious to repress all the new tendencies of the Philip- 
pine times and more and more rabid against the natives, played 
no small part in urging forward this policy of deporting every 
man who became too independent, or, as they called it, too 
anti-Spanish, in his local community. Eventually, no doubt, 
they got credit for more deportations than were really inspired 
by them. Nevertheless, they cannot complain that their repu- 
tation in this respect was not fairly earned. Their recommen- 
dations were quite commonly final in all local affairs, and, in 
most of these cases, if they did not actually set the machinery 
of denunciation going for the removal of a troublesome man, 
a word from them would at least have left him in peaceful 
possession of his property and the enjoyment of his family 
and home. The whole policy of deportations was at least of 
questionable value. But, if indorsed as a policy, the way in 
which it came to be carried out made it not only ineffectual 
as a means for the repression of plotting, but a very potent 
instrument for widening the breach between Spaniards and 
Filipinos. Secret service denunciations, with full discretion to 
act upon them vested in the governor-general,^ who only in 

* Marcelo del Pilar (Za Soberania monacal^ p. 9) says this discretionary power of 


very conspicuous cases seemed to feel called upon to bring 
even the summary proceedings of a military court to bear, 
were plainly open to great abuse; and business or personal 
jealousies played no small part in bringing about deportations. 
The speedy result was the creation in most of the towns of a 
well-defined class of sycophants of the friars or other Spanish 
authorities, most of them Spanish half-castes, who, through 
fear, religious superstition, personal animosities, or because 
born with that nature, became a set of despicable spies upon 
their more independent fellows. Spain was, therefore, rapidly 
losing the affections and sympathies of the better sort among 
its educated, property-holding subjects, and was in many prov- 
inces allying herself, through the village priests, through the 
local and military representatives, or through the higher pro- 
vincial officers, with the least desirable element of the popula- 
tion, the fellows who wished not to consider themselves Fili- 
pinos but Spaniards, and who would lick the boots of the white 
man to be accorded a halfway recognition by him. Meanwhile, 
wider trade and commerce and the new industrial and agricul- 
tural institutions, mostly the work of foreigners, were, as has 
been shown, calHng into existence the beginnings of a " mid- 
dle class." At first, only the wealthy and educated men had 
been marked for deportation. Later, rumors of local discon- 
tent were enough to bring the officers of the law down upon 
the less conspicuous natives, even sometimes upon the humble 
workmen of the lower classes ; these were mostly removed to 
some other part of the archipelago, generally upon the fringes 
of the Moro country.^ 

the goyernoF-general was based upon a decree of 1588 (Leyes de Indias, lib. m, 
tit. IV, ley vn), and points out that the chapter in which it appears deals with 
matters of war, hence, aside from its antiquity, is not properly applicable to or- 
dinarj peaceful times. 

* An instance of personal knowledge is that of a bright, self-educated machin- 
ist of Pampanga, who, with only a riUage-school education, had mastered many 
of the principles of mechanics in the sugar- and rice-mills of an English firm, who 
had pursued the subject with books and with the foreigners' help, who had ceased 
to kiss the local friar's hand because of the intellectual self-esteem thus aroused. 


All this record of deportations might indicate an active 
campaign against Spain in the islands, and that is what the 
officers who ordered them and the friar writers would have us 
believe was going on. If it was, however, these authorities have 
lost the moral argument they might have employed by failing 
to produce in public the proofs of it. There was, undoubtedly, 
an undercurrent of opposition to Spain, directed particularly 
against the friars, and, very naturally under the circumstances, 
it steadily became stronger. But it had no chance for public 
expression, even in the intervals of freer speech under Lib- 
eral administrations, and not much chance for secret propa- 
ganda until the closing years of Spanish rule. The propa- 
ganda naturally began abroad, first because of the deportes 
who began to form colonies in various places, and next be- 
cause the Filipinos of position who were in sympathy with the 
yet undefined movement were sending their sons abroad in 
greater numbers every year, and these young men almost in- 
evitably became, with their expanded opportunities and broad- 
ened vision, advocates of the new regime. 

The campaign did not outline itself clearly until the latter 
part of the eighties. It is significant that the young men who 
finally gave form and force to this movement were representa- 
tives for the most part of the rising middle class in the islands, 
so far as such a class was being created by wider educational 
facilities. This is a comment on how things had progressed in 
the Philippines, a comment that should be completed by the 
further significant remark that the radicals of eight and ten 
years later, the men who forced the issue for revolution in 
1896, came in turn from the lower classes of the population. 
The whole movement began with the more independent mesti' 
zos ; but it grew too rapidly for the most of them to keep up 
with it, and eventually became, to a notable degree, a move- 
ment from below. It was Graciano Lopez Jaena, a pure-blooded 

and who was deported as a dangerous citizen shortly after the friar found that he 
was a subscriber to the Scientific American, 


Bisayan from the Kapis province of Panai (which province to- 
day feels and shows the influence of his semi-socialistic preach- 
ings among its notable element of middle-class natives of 
some degree of education), who founded in Barcelona in 1888 
the first organ of the propaganda, " La Solidaridad." Marcelo 
del Pilar, a Tagalog from Bulak^n, without social prominence, 
but who had obtained a legal training in Manila and who had 
started a Tagalog daily there to instruct the masses, went to 
Spain the next year virtually as the agent of Filipinos of means 
at home, who proposed through him to conduct a propaganda, 
and he acquired this publication as one of his first steps. Next 
to Jose Rizal, he was its most notable Filipino collaborator; 
the Bohemian teacher and friend of Rizal, Ferdinand Blumen- 
tritt, and various Spanish Liberals were also regular contribu- 
tors. Its circulation was of course principally in the Philippines, 
where it had to be introduced surreptitiously. Already in 
1887 Rizal's first poUtical novel, " Noli Me Tangere," had be- 
gun to be read in the Philippines ; printed in Berlin, copies were 
introduced into the islands in one way or another, and were 
read behind closed windows. Rizal himself was the son of 
parents of pure Tagalog ancestry, in moderate circumstances, 
residents of Kalamba, Laguna province, and occupants of land 
claimed as belonging to one of the largest and oldest friar 
estates, and he had been schooled in boyhood by a very capa- 
ble Filipino priest. For lack of a real understanding on the 
part of outsiders, especially Americans, of the events of the 
Filipino campaign for freedom, and through his own people's 
tendency to carry hero-worship to the point of religious 
frenzy, he has been canonized as a sort of Filipino miracle, the 
one genius the Malay race has produced ; he is in many re- 
spects their greatest man, but he is really a thoroughly typical 
product of his times and of his exceptional opportunities.* 

^ Sir Hugh Clifford has carried this view of Rizal as an abnormal Malay to the 
•xtreme in his appreciative article upon him in Blachoood*8 Magazine for Novem- 
ber, 1903. What almost invariably vitiates for us the well-meant advice of English- 
who have beeu colonial adminiftraton in the Orient is that they proceed 


There cooperated with this circle of, so to speak, " young 
men of the people," almost the entire colony of Filipinos 
abroad ; composed for the most part, of course, of the sons of 
the wealthy mestizos. In the main, however, the more capable 
among the scions of the propertied families of the Philippines 
were moved to be cautious about their expressions in public, 
for fear of involving their families at home, however freely 
they might join with these propagandists in secret. Moreover, 
a very large element of these mestizos were of a class which 
can only be described by dubbing them " Superficials." Fil- 
ipinos of this sort have been so numerous, and have made 
themselves so prominent as self-elected spokesmen for their 
people, both before and since 1898, that it has been easy for 
the opponents of a more liberal regime in the Philippines to 
cast ridicule upon the whole movement, and hard at times for 
outside sympathizers to feel that the whole campaign was not 
hopeless, or at least premature. It is this class which carried 
the talk about " assimilation " (of the Philippines with Spain) 
to ridiculous extremes ; which, when a very proper effort was 
begun to point out the failure of Philippine history as gen- 

upon the assumption that an Oriental is essentially, if not utterly, different from 
the white man, and never seem to understand that Spain converted the Filipinos 
to a sort of Christianity and started them part way toward European life and Eu- 
ropean ideals, and that, to that extent at least, we have a different problem from 
theirs in dealing with Mohammedan peoples whose ways of life and thought have 
^not been more or less arbitrarily changed in the mass. The best discussion of Ri- 
aal's personality, written by an intimate friend, is that of Ferdinand Blumentritt 
in the Internationales Archiv fur Ethnographic (Bd. X, Heft ii), a translated ab- 
stract of which appeared in the Popular Science Monthly for July, 1902. The sig- 
nificant features of his career to bear in mind are that, having drained dry the founts 
of education at Manila when scarcely past twenty, he found the means to go to 
Europe for medical study ; that he almost immediately broke loose from the back- 
ward scientific school of Spain, and made his way to Paris and then to Germany, 
studying at Heidelberg, Leipzig, and Berlin. What it meant, that this full-blooded 
Malay of undoubted native ability was thus brought into contact with modem 
science (political as well as physical), as taught by some of the masters of the "re- ^ 
search method," may readily be guessed. Had he, like Mabini, been confined by ■ 
circumstances to the Philippine Islands, and forced to whet his appetite for broader ' 
culture and a wider knowledge of the outside world with stray books and pam- 
phlets of the old school of French socialists, he would very likely have become what 
Mabini became, a socialist-idealist and dreamer of the school of 1789. 



erally written to deal fairly and scientifically with the primi- 
tive natives and their descendants, well-nigh made a laughing- 
stock of every FiHpino or Spaniard who identified himself 
with this effort by burdening Spanish presses with asinine 
treatises designed to show that the pre-conquest Filipinos had 
a religion equal or superior to Christianity and Hved in a sort 
of elysium of patriarchal justice and of fraternal love ; this 
class, in short, which, bred up in the narrow and scholastic 
training of the friars' schools at Manila, and continuing in the 
same grooves of education in Spain, was only blindly aware of 
the real nature of the aims of such a young prophet as Rizal, 
yet insisted on floundering around after him and producing 
imitations of modern scientific treatises.* 

There was exaggeration enough about the campaign of the 
more intelligent, sensible Filipinos. Their clamor for assimila- 
tion with the home Government of Spain, with an organization 
like that of any one of the provinces of Spain, was a clamor 
for something impracticable and undesirable either for the 
Philippines or for Spain.^ It was mostly sentimental and never 
well reasoned out. Back of it were the real and the reasonable 
aspirations of the Philippine Liberals, namely, for representa- 
tion in the Cortes of Spain, for some share, that is, in the gov- 
ernment which ought to pass upon only their more general 
interests ; and for a much greater measure of home rule, to- 
gether with the liberties of press and of association. This sec- 
ond and more far-reaching aspiration carried with it as a log- 

1 It would be profitless, besides consuming space, to attempt a catalogue of this 
class of Filipinos ; they have made themselves conspicuotis enough so that anj one 
who studies the literature of their coimtry's recent history will meet with them 
only too frequently. The people of the United States have had some experience 
with them within their own borders since 1898. 

* The Federal Party's plank declaring for statehood in the American Union, put 
forth in 1900, but virtually dropped in 1903, was a revival of the *' assimilation 
campaign," adapted to the conditions of the new sovereignty. Both because of the 
state of culture of their inhabitants snd because of their geographical location, the 
Philippines need, from every standpoint, a government on the spot and a govern- 
ment especially adapted to them. 


ical consequence the removal of the friar priests ; in fact, it 
began with and grew from that demand. 

The significant thing after all, even when we have restated in 
more reasonable and practical form, as well as more accurately, 
what were the real aspirations of the Filipino reform party, is 
that the campaign stopped short of being a separatist campaign. 
This statement impugns the reiterated charge of the friars and 
of their Spanish supporters that, from the very outset, the op- 
position to them was due only to a desire to oust Spain from 
the islands. It is nevertheless the inevitable conclusion to be 
drawn from the whole record of the propaganda of 1886 to 
1896. Before setting out for Spain in 1888, Marcelo del Pilar, 
one of the bitterest critics of the existing regime, wrote in the 
prologue to the Spanish-Tagalog dictionary of a schoolmaster 
friend: "His aspirations will be fully realized, and our satis- 
faction immense, if the work should contribute to the diffusion 
of Castilian speech in this archipelago, which, being a piece of 
Spain, ought to be Spanish in its language, Spanish in its re- 
ligion, in its sentiments, in its habits and in its aspirations." * 
It would be easy to multiply such quotations. It is also easy 
to present apparent proof that independence was the real aim 
from the first by assorting quotations from " La Solidaridad," 

1 Prologue to Pedro Serrano Laktaw's Diccionario Hispano-Tagalog (Manila, 
1889). And, after reaching Spain, Del Pilar said, in his first pamphlet published 
under the guarantee of liberty of the press in the home country (Za Soherania mo- 
nacaZ, Barcelona, 1888; Manila edition, 1898, p. 11): "There is no serious evidence of a 
proposal on the part of the Philippines to separate from Spain. . . . The little disturb- 
ances that have occurred in Luzon have never been popular in character . . . they 
have always been put down by these same sons of Spain themselves [the Filipinos in 
the Spanish army]. To emancipate itself from Spain is to go counter to the rising 
progress of the Filipino people. The archipelago being spread out in numerous 
islands, it needs a bond of union to fortify all the elements of its prosperity and 
welfare ; without such a bond, division is imminent; from division to internal war- 
fare, and from such strife to international strife is only a step. The Filipinos are 
by no means ignorant of this. Surrounded by countries with which they have not 
the least commimity of principles, and exposed constantly to foreign avarice, . . . 
to think of their emancipation under such circumstances would be suicidal." Tliis 
is almost the same language as that of the Manila petition of 1888 for the expul- 
sion of the friars fto be mentioned below) ; Del Pilar and Doroteo Cortes were its 



and particularly from RizaFs writings. Feeling ran high on 
both sides, and the truth is not to be obtained from detached 
selections, but from a careful survey of the whole literature of 
the times. We find Rizal in 1891 calmly weighing the possi- 
bilities of the Phihppines being seized by any foreign power 
in case they should ever achieve their independence from Spain.* 
His first novel, "Noli Me Tangere," published in 1886, was 
the passionate cry of a Malay, who felt himself the equal of 
any white man, had so proved himself in the halls of learning, 
and was so received by the scholars whom he met in Germany, 
for a fair chance for his race. It was, as he said, an attempt 
to expose to the world the ills of his people, as the ancients 
" exposed on the steps of the temple their sick, that everyone 
who came to invoke the Divinity might propose them a remedy." 
What wonder, then, that indignation at the abuses his people 
suffered, when he had compared their backward state with 
that of other peoples, made this young crusader (then only 
twenty-five years old) set forth the Spaniards, friars, military 
men, and all, with somewhat of the bitterness of the zealot ? 
Even then, " Noli Me Tangere " is most notable for its photo- 
graphic reproductions of one phase after another of the life 
of the Filipinos, shown with all their weaknesses and their 
vices as well as from more agreeable viewpoints ; in the same 

* It is significant, however, that the article, which appeared in La Solidaridad 
for September 30, 1891, was entitled " The Philippines Within a Hundred Years." 
It may be of interest to know that, after presenting reasons why the colonizing 
nations of Europe would be fully occupied with Africa and would leave the Phil- 
ippines to go their own coarse, he weighs the possibility of the United States in- 
terfering, and says : " Perhaps the great American Republic, whose interests are 
in the Pacific [Rizal had recently returned from a visit to the Philippines, going 
back to Europe via Japan and the United States], and which has no share in the 
spoils of Africa, may sometime think of possessions beyond the seas. It is not im- 
possible, for the example is contagious, covetousness and ambition are vices of 
the strong, and Harrison showed something of this disposition during the Samoan 
question. But the Panama Canal is not opened, nor have the States a plethora of 
inhabitants in their own territory; and, supposing they should openly make the 
attempt, the European powers, knowing well that the appetite is stimulated by the 
first monthfuls, would not leave them free to pursue this course. North America 
would be a too troublesome rival, if it once took up the career. Besides, it is 
against her traditions." 


prologue, he had said : " I will lift part of the veil that covers 
the sore, sacrificing everything to truth, even self-love itself, 
for, as a son of thine, I suffer also from thy defects and weak- 
nesses." ^ And " El Filibusterismo," published in Ghent in 
1891 (written in Biarritz, Paris, Brussels, and Ghent), much 
the stronger of his two novels as a piece of political writing, 
though not equal to " Noli Me Tangere " as a piece of liter- 
ature, is less vindictive against Spanish institutions, and shows 
the maturer judgment of the author as to the necessity for his 
people to remain yet awhile in leading-strings. This is, in fact, 
the theme of the story. And in general, in everything that 
Rizal wrote there stands out preeminently the preacher to his 
people, seeking to arouse them to an appreciation of their 
shortcomings and defects. He saw that there must be self-re- 
liance on the part of the individual before there could be inde- 
pendence for the nation. Again and again do such thoughts 
as these come out : " The Filipinos seem not to know that tri- 
umph is born of strife, that happiness is the flower of many 
sufferings and privations, and that every redemption presup- 
poses martyrdom and sacrifices ; they think that, with lament- 
ing, with folding the arms and letting things take their course, 
they have fulfilled their duty. ... As for the fatherland, 
every Filipino thinks : Let it take care of itself, let it save it- 
self, let it protest, let it strive ; I do not have to trouble myself, 
it does not depend on me to arrange affairs ; I have enough to 
do with my own interests, my passions and my caprices ; let 
others pull the chestnut out of the fire, then it will be time 
for us all to eat it."^ 

1 The title Noli Me Tangere, translated from the Latin as " Don't touch me," 
ha8 been given various meanings in the United States, generally being supposed 
to refer to the attitude of the friars. In Spanish, however, nolimetangere, written 
as one word, signifies a malignant ulcer ; this meaning, taken together with the 
above quotation from its prologue, shows that Rizal had in mind his own people's 
condition as the subject about which his book was primarily written. 

2 An " adaptation " of Noli Me Tangere, reduced to more than half, probably 
translated from the French version (which, apparently, is all Sir Hugh Clifford 
ever saw), and with even the name changed to Tlie Eaglets Flight, was brought 
out in New York in 1901. Its garbling of this exposition of the Filipino cause 


It was late in the history of the propaganda before it was 
actively carried on in the Philippines. Everything published in 
Spain or elsewhere reached the islands and circulated secretly, 
but many things that could be said or printed in Spain would 
not have been tolerated in the islands. In 1888, during an in- 
terregnum in government before the arrival of Weyler, and 
while Jose Centeno, the Liberal official whose work in geology 
has been noted, was acting civil governor of Manila, there was 
a public demonstration against the friars, an indiscriminate 
gathering of natives marching to Centeno's residence and pre- 
senting a petition addressed to the governor-general and ask- 
ing the removal of the friars and the secularization of the cura- 
cies, also attacking directly Archbishop Pedro Paya, who had 
recently clashed with the Liberals then in the chief executive 
posts on several matters of administration. Some eight hundred 
signers were obtained, nearly all obscure or ignorant persons; 
the men of standing and education who were back of it were 
afraid to affix their names for fear of proscription, and the 
very man who wrote most of it, a wealthy mestizo^ after- 
ward deported under an order also confiscating his property, 
did not sign it. The hue and cry raised over this incident, and 
the scandal that was made of it by the friars, show how rare 
and dangerous a thing it was felt to be.^ 

almost amounts to sacrilege. Still stronger words are to be used about a " transla- 
tion " of the novel put forth under the name of Henry Gannett in 1900. Reprints 
of these novels in the Spanish, the first, by the way, ever issued in the Philippines, 
were brought out in Manila after American occupation beg^n, Noli Me Tangere 
in 1899 and El Filibusterismo in 1900. Several editions of the former have appeared 
in Spain. Miscellaneous poetical, political, historical, and scientific writings of 
Rizal, some of them still in manuscript, have yet to be collected and published to- 
gether. Nearly everything he wrote is worthy of reproduction to-day. 

^ This petition (possibly with some changes) was printed in a pamphlet entitled 
** Long live Spain ! Long live the Queen I Long live the Army f Away with the 
friars 1 " brought out by the propagandists at Hongkong the same year (see nos. 
1697 and 2807 of Pardo de Tavera's Biblioteca Filipino). The document as printed 
in that pamphlet is reproduced in Marcelo del Pilar's Soberania monacal (Manila 
edition, pp. 54-63), which pamphlet is made up mostly of the various episodes 
occurring just prior to Del Pilar's removal to Spain and leading up to the petition 
and public demonstration. These were, principally: an enrlier protest of various 
Filipino local officials against Archbishop Paya for failing to attend the funeral 


In 1891, differences having arisen among the propagandists, 
the factions grouping more particularly about Del Pilar and 
Rizal, — the weakness of every Filipino movement, good or 

services for Alfonso XII, presumably on account of their being organized by the 
Liberal officials; the archbishop's action in limiting the 1888 celebration of St. An- 
drew's Day (anniversary of the defeat of the Chinese pirate Li-Ma-Hong in 1574) 
to the Spanish walled town, connected also with the trouble over the celebration 
of La fiesta naval in Binondo and the manifestation by Filipino officers of certain 
barrios of Manila of hostility toward the friars ; the refusal of the officers of cer- 
tain Bulakdn towns to submit to the dictation of the friar curates in matters of local 
administration; the demonstrations of Laguna tenants of the Dominicans against 
the raising of rents, etc. These almost unprecedented instances of defiance of the 
friars and the display of a new spirit of independence in some few of the Filipino 
communities were charged by the religious orders and their organs to the openly 
anti-friar attitude of Centeno, and particularly of his immediate superior, Quiroga 
Ballesteros, director-general of civil administration. It had all come to a head in 
the order of the latter forbidding the exposure of corpses in the churches (a prolific 
source of burial fees), ostensibly upon sanitary grounds alone. The archbishop, in a 
circular to the parish priests of October 28, 1887, virtually set at naught the order of 
the civil authorities, though in form pretending compliance with the instructions of 
Quiroga. Again, the latter took measures to have the proposed orphan asylum and 
trade school near Manila become a Government institution purely, the Augustinians 
rejecting the conditions imposed upon them for the trust. A speedy change of 
administration, bringing General Weyler as governor-general, resulted in the 
downfall of Quiroga, Centeno, and other officials non gratos to the friars. An analy- 
sis of the petition of 1888 and of its signers, with a diatribe against the whole 
anti-friar movement, comprises the second part of W. E. Retana's Avisos y pro- 
fecias (Madrid, 1892). Retana was an industrious and fairly accurate Philippine 
bibliographer, but as a political writer he was, as a Filipino has put it, a " veri- 
table calamity." Other Filipinos, and Spaniards as well, do not treat him so chari- 
tably, but openly charge him with having been a hireling of the friars, during the 
latter part of his stay in the Philippines (when he had special favors from the or- 
ders), during his term as deputy to the Cortes (as a representative of one of the 
districts of Cuba, under the administration of Weyler, to whose influence he owed 
his selection for this post, and whose defender and " press-agent " he was during 
the last few years prior to the war between the United States and Spain), and 
during his editorship of La Politica de Espana en Filipinas, the organ of the ancien 
regime, published at Madrid from 1891 to 1898. Retana is now writing on another 
tack, is reported to have severed all connection with the orders, and seems to 
have lost his old sympathy for them. His chief associate on La Politica was Pablo 
Feced, who under the pseudonym of " Quioquiap " wrote any amount of contribu- 
tions to the press of Manila and Spain, and a number of pamphlets, during the 
closing years of Spanish rule in the Philippines, always treating the Filipinos as 
a race essentially and permanently inferior, and sometimes displaying great bitter- 
ness toward them. He, even more than Retana, deserves credit for having sowed 
the seeds of discord between the two peoples ; yet his writings, mainly economical 
(and displaying great ignorance of economic principles, as well as of the things about 
which he wrote), and devoted especially to his chief hobby, the colonization of 
Mindanau by Spaniards, are entirely unimportant. 


bad, lies in the jealousies that invariably arise between its 
leaders, — the latter set out for Hongkong, where he organized 
the first branch of his lAga Filipina, and projected a return 
to his home.^ He seems to have had a fleeting notion of getting 
together a colony of family and friends and emigrating with 
them to English territory in North Borneo. The governor- 
general in Manila at the time, however, was Don Emilio Des- 
pujols, a military man of an old family, but with democratic 
tendencies and personally very popular with the Filipinos. 
Through the Spanish consul-general at Hongkong, he had re- 
plied in a friendly way to RizaFs letters offering his services in 
aid of the Spanish Government in the islands, as well as sug- 
gesting the colonization project ; and Rizal decided to return 
to the islands in June, 1892. The troubles upon the Kalamba 
friar estate were then acute, and various of Rizal's relatives and 
friends had been deported, while his father and three sisters 
were under sentence of deportation ; and the result of Rizal's 
first interview with Despujols was a pardon for them.^ The mili- 

' He had been home in 1887-88, but Weyler was just then coming into power 
and trouble was brewing on the friar estates where his parents and neiglibors 
lived, so he was thought to be putting himself in jeopardy. It was then that he 
had gone to London, via Japan and America, and undertaken as his first work 
the editing of a new Spanish edition of Antonio de Morga's Sucesos de las Islas 
FUtpinaSf published in Mexico in 1609, of which an English edition had appeared 
in London in 1868 (Haklujt Society, translation of Henry £. J. Stanley), but 
which was almost unknown to Spaniards and Filipinos. In annotating this work, 
Rizal himself went to extremes in virtually claiming that the Filipinos had under 
the Spanish rule retrograded from their state in Morga's times. 

* For the protest of the Kalamba tenants of the Dominicans in 1887-88, see La 
Soberania monacal^ pp. 64-66. These demonstrations of a more independent spirit 
in Kalamba were ascribed by the friars to Rizal's influence, just as Marcelo del 
Pilar was felt to have been chiefly instrumental in the similar manifestations of his 
neighbors of Malolos — doubtless correctly in both cases. For a one-sided account 
of the popular disturbances on the Kalamba friar estate in 1891 (for which Weyler 
deported twenty-five natives), see La Politica de Espaha en FilipinaSt supplement to 
isfue of February 16, 1892. A letter from Rizal to his parents, written from 
Hongkong on June 20, just before sailing for Manila, shows that he had no illu- 
•ioDi as to the risk he was taking : ** The love I have always had and professed 
for you was what led me to take this step, which only the future can say is or is not 
wise. ... I know I have made you suffer much, but I do not repent of what I 
haTe done ; if I had to l>ogin over, I should do just what I have done ; for it 
if my duty. I set out gladly to expose myself to danger, not as if in expiation of 


tary police, the ostentatiously " patriotic " Spanish newspapers, 
and the friar circles of Manila had been in a turmoil of indigna- 
tion from the moment it was announced that Rizal was to re- 
turn ; and the enthusiastic greeting he received from his fellow- 
countrymen added fuel to the fire. A few days after arriving, 
Rizal assembled a large crowd of Filipinos of nearly all condi- 
tions of life at the house of a prominent Chinese half-caste 
merchant, for the purpose of organizing the Liga Filipina on 
native soil. No particular pains were taken to surround the 
meeting with secrecy, and the aims of the league, as pre- 
sented in writing by Rizal, were to conduct a campaign, through 
papers, pamphlets, etc., for the advancement and increase in 
culture of the people, for more liberal political institutions and 
improved educational facilities, and, as one of the specific 
means to securing all these ends, to organize cooperative Fili- 
pino commercial associations, establish foundries, machine- 
shops, etc., and in general endeavor to capture for the native 
element a more respectable share in the increasing commerce 
and industry of the archipelago.^ Governor-General Despujols, 

my faults (as in this respect, I do not tbiuk I have committed any), but to crown 
my work and to testify with my example to what I have always preached. A man 
should die for his duty and his convictions. I sustain all the ideas I have expressed 
relative to the present state and the future of my country, and I will gladly die 
for it, and even more in order to obtain for you justice and tranquillity. . . . Who 
am I ? A man alone, almost without family, sufficiently undeceived as to life. I 
have suffered many deceptions, and the future is dark, and will be very dark, if not 
illumined by the light, the aurora of my native land, while there are many beings 
who, full of hopes and dreams, may perchance be allowed to live happily after my 
death ; for I expect that then my enemies will be satisfied and will no longer pursue 
so many innocent people. ... If fate is adverse to me, know all that I shall die 
happy, feeling that with my death I am to obtain for them the cessation of all their 
bitternesses." A copy of this letter is in the writer's possession. This and other 
data as to Rizal's career may be obtained from the special numbers of the Manila 
newspapers El Renacimiento and La Democracia of December 30, 1901, the occa- 
sion of the first formal celebration in Manila of his death. 

1 The connection of the Chinese-Filipinos, who are almost the only element of 
native origin and associations which has successfully made a showing in the modern 
commercial expansion of the Philippines, was of course inevitable. The aims of the 
Liga have been made public almost exclusively by Spanish writers, officials or 
others, who desired to make it out as a direct assault upon the sovereignty of 
Spain. To this end the testimony taken from those charged with complicity in the 


suspicious of Rizal from the first, through the Spaniard's exag- 
gerated resentment toward any one who speaks in a way at all 
derogatory of his country, let his good faith be easily imposed 
upon by those who were interested in seeing Rizal removed, or 
else seized the opportunity to ingratiate himself with the Span- 
ish element which had been so harshly criticizing his efforts at 
conciliation of the Filipinos as a " policy of weakness." On 
July 7, when Rizal had been in the city scarcely ten days, he 
ordered him and a dozen of his intimates deported to the 
southern islands, Rizal being sent to Dapitan, a scantily popu- 
lated district of Bisayans on the northwest coast of Mindanau/ 

revolt of 1896 was directed so far as possible; the means employed involved some- 
times the torture of the accused by the secret police, and sometimes, it is to be 
feared, manipulation of the records. Unquestionably, the aims above outlined 
looked for the fitting of the country for possible independence, and unquestionably 
many Filipinos cherished that ideal, not a few of them hoping to see it realized 
much earlier than did Rizal. But that the Liga Filipina was organized as a direct 
campaign for independence is a charge brought forward afterward, with a very 
definite purpose, by Rizal's enemies. 

^ The decree of deportation was published in the Gaceta de Manila (the ofiBcial 
gazette) on July 7, 1892. See also La Politica de Espana en FilipinaSf vol. n, pp. 
223-24, for the full text (and following pages for extracts from the contem- 
porary press of Manila and Spain on the episode and accounts of Rizal's move- 
ments during his few days of liberty in the Philippines). Apparently, it was not 
desired to try the issue of Rizal's alleged violation of law in the civil courts, or 
even in a summary military court, and the governor-general resorted to his discre- 
tionary power. The charges made against Rizal in this decree are: (1) That his 
baggage on arrival was foimd to contain leaflets, entitled " Poor Friars," satirizing 
the humility of the Filipino and attacking the religious orders; (2) that his novel 
El FilibusterismOf just beginning to circulate, was dedicated to the priests executed 
in 1872, and that on the title-page he had made his own a statement by Blumentritt 
that there was no salvation for the Filipinos except in separation from Spain [this 
was an outright distortion of Blumentritt's meaning] ; (3) that he had attacked 
the Pope and the friars, and was plainly seeking to rob the Filipinos of their tra- 
ditional religion; (4) that he bad, by his proceedings since arrival, shown ingrati- 
tude for the lenient treatment of his father and his sisters, and had, when accused 
of bringing in the leaflets, sought to throw the blame on bis sister. The decree is 
significant, first, for its absolute identification of the Government, even under the 
Inm regime of Despujols (who was persona non grata to the friars), with the cause 
of the religious orders, and, second, because it makes no mention of the organiza- 
tion of the Liga Filipina^ which was the handle his enemies had used in getting him 
deported, and which was afterward alleged to be sole and sufficient cause. As for 
the leaflets in his baggage, they were, at most, only seditious if an attack on the 
(riart was deemed sedition. Moreover, the whole matter pertaining to them is 
throoded in much mystery. Despujols took pains to say, as very likely be was led 


The Liga Filipina died almost at its birth, though revived 
secretly during the following year ; but the cause it represented 
could not be smothered in such fashion, and Rizal's exile only 
served to excite the Filipinos to greater bitterness. After a 
lingering existence in secret for a year, the Liga was formally 
dissolved, and prominent and wealthy natives, principally 
Chinese half-castes and Tagalogs, but also a few Ilokans, Pam- 
pangans, Bikols, and Bisayans, pledged themselves to make 
stated contributions to carry on the contest (the Co^njyromi- 
sarios). Almost at the same time, the Filipino agitation entered 
upon a new phase with the organization of a new secret society, 
in many respects distinct in membership and methods, and to 
a considerable degree distinct in its aims, from anything that 
had preceded it. This was the Katipunan. 

to believe, that these leaflets were found on Rizal's arrival. The charge, however, 
was not brought forward till some few days afterward ; some Spanish writers who 
were then officially connected with affairs, say they were found in his baggage as 
he was setting out for Dapitan. The Filipinos always have believed that these 
leaflets were put in his baggage at the instigation of the friars, in the same way 
they claim that evidence was forged against Father Burgos in 1872. 

The additional clauses of Despujols' decree of deportation deserve citation. 
They are: "(2) There is prohibited, if this had not already been done, the intro- 
duction and circulation in the archipelago of the works of the said author, as well 
as every proclamation or leaflet in whicli directly or indirectly the CathoHc reli- 
gion or the national unity is attacked ; (3) There is conceded a period of three 
days, beginning with the publication of this decree, in the provinces of Manila, Ba- 
tangas, Bulak^n, Cavite, Laguna, Pampanga, Pangasinan, and Tarlak; of eight 
days in the other provinces of Luzon, and of fifteen days in the remaining islands, 
within which persons who have in their possession said books or proclamations may 
deliver them up to the local authorities. After said period, every one in whose pos- 
session any copy is found will be considered as disaffected, and treated as such." 



Before discussing the Katipunan/ about which more ridicu- 
lous, exaggerated, and often willfully false things have been 
written than about any other feature even of Philippine his- 
tory, it is necessary to go back a little. First, it should be said 
that the Katipunan was not a Masonic organization, while yet 
Freemasonry, of a modified Spanish sort, prepared the way in 
the Philippines for the Katipunan. The Spanish grand lodges 
of Freemasons had installed branches in the Philippines as far 
back as the sixties. For twenty-five years those lodges were 
few in number and were organized in the commercial centers, 
numbering only Spaniards and other Europeans, with here and 
there a Spanish mestizo of prominence. At about the time the 
assimilation propaganda hitherto described had become well 
outlined, pressure was brought to bear upon the grand lodges 
of Spain to permit the organization of distinctively native 
lodges of masons in the islands. There was already a very close 
connection between the Freemasons of Spain and the Filipino 
propaganda.^ The membership of the Spanish-Philippine Asso- 
ciation of Madrid and of Barcelona, and of the Filipino club 
which had headquarters where " La Solidaridad " was printed, 

* The full name of this society was Ang Kataastaasan Kagalanggdlang Katipunan 
nang mafiga Anak nang Bayarif represented by the initials K. K. K. N. M. A. N. B. 
and meaning " The Supreme Worshipful Association (or Junta) of the Sons of 
the People." 

* No one at all familiar with the history of Freemasonry in France and Spain 
from the beginnings of the French Revolution, needs to be told that, if not anti- 
Catholic, it has at least steadily conducted a propaganda in opposition to the asser- 
tion of secular power on the part of the Papacy and in opposition to the monastic 
orders. Freemasonry bat been in those ooantriei consistently and aggressively 



was practically identical with that of certain Masonic lodges. 
The Spaniard at the head of a grand lodge of Madrid called 
the Oriente Espanol, Miguel Morayta, a Spanish Liberal, suc- 
ceeded Del Pilar as editor of " La Solidaridad." There can be 
little doubt that the propagandists, the Spanish law of asso- 
ciations not having been extended to the Philippines, deliber- 
ately adopted the system of Masonic secret lodges as a means 
of carrying on their work in the islands. A " Grand Regional 
Lodge " was organized in Manila, and its workers were author- 
ized to create subordinate lodges throughout the archipelago. 
One of these workers claimed to have organized such lodges of 
Filipinos from the Kagayan Valley on the north to the Span- 
ish town of Jol(5 on the south. There were a number of lodges 
in the Bisayas, and they were scattered all over Luzon, though 
the two hundred or more organized between 1890 and 1896 
were mostly in the Tagalog provinces.^ 

^ Viriato Diaz-Perez, the son of a Spanish Liberal (a Philippine office-holder, 
who wrote various contributions to the press of Spain combating the pretensions 
of the friars), in his pamphlet Los frailes de FUipinas (Madrid, 1904), pp. 18-21, 
defends Masonry from having had any connection with the separatist or revolu- 
tionary programme in Spain, producing figures to show that just prior to the out- 
break of the trouble in the islands the Masonic lodges there numbered 1214 
Spaniards and 32 other Europeans as against 890 Filipinos, mostly half-castes, 
and that among the Spaniards and half-castes were many officials of the army who 
fought against the revolutionists. The figures here given referred mainly to the 
lodges organized in the Philippines as tributary to the " Grand Lodge of Spain," 
taking very little account of the more recent labors of the so-called Oriente Es- 
panol under Morayta and the Filipinos who cooperated with him in Spain and in 
the Philippines. Some published articles by Spanish Masons seem to indicate that 
the " Grand Lodge of Spain " claimed to have the only authority to represent in 
Spain and the Spanish possessions the Freemasonry of England and Scotland and 
that the other grand lodge was deemed spurious, perhaps an offshoot merely of 
French Masonry. Both these grand lodges had opened the way for the entrance 
of Filipinos into the lodges in the Philippine archipelago from 1884 on ; but it 
was only the organization under the Oriente Espanol which had connection, indi- 
rectly at least, with the political propaganda from about 1890 to 1895. The statis- 
tics given by V. Diaz-Perez are taken from an article contributed by Nicolas 
Diaz-Perez, his father, to La J^pocQf Madrid, August 15, 1896, and vigorously 
combated at the time by the friar press, which, however, afterward tacitly ac- 
knowledged the non-complicity of the Grand Lodge of Madrid with the political 
agitation in the Philippines. From the friar point of view, the final chapter of 
Friar Edouardo Navarro's FUipinas: Estudios de algunos asuntos de actualidad 
(Madrid, 1897) presents an arraignment of Masonry for all the ills of Spain dur- 
ing the nineteenth century. 


Only slight familiarity with Filipino character and history 
is needed to comprehend how such a secret organization, with 
its signs, symbols, mysteries of initiation, etc., would, even were 
its special aims not at the time constantly in the minds of the 
Filipino leaders, spread with exceeding facility. It called into 
play certain characteristics and propensities for secret, one 
might almost say backhanded, procedure in which the Filipinos 
sometimes seem to revel. It may as readily be seen how the 
Katipunan, organized on similar lines, would spread among 
the masses, hitherto but little reached by the propaganda, with 
as great facility as Masonry had spread among the priiicipalia. 
If allowed to work unhindered with the instruments of secrecy, 
mystery, and superstition, any fanatic or impostor can to-day 
speedily enroll half a province under his banner and levy con- 
tributions upon them. When one adds that, in the communi- 
ties where the Katipunan was chiefly organized, the masses of 
the people were intensely aroused over the assertion of the 
friar administrators' right to collect rent from them and over 
the constant abuses of the civil guard, it is easily understood 
that the idea of a popular secret society on similar lines, so far 
as many of its forms were concerned, to the Masonic organi- 
zation, and in which the initiates were made to understand 
that in some way they were to achieve their rights in opposi- 
tion to the Spaniards, and in particular to the friars, was, to 
say the least, a practicable one. Whether, judged by the re- 
sults, this method of organizing the masses and working them 
up to the pitch of frenzy, is to be deemed wholly timely, hence 
commendable and patriotic, is not a question for consideration 

The idea was primarily, it is said, that of Marcelo del Pilar, 
with whose plans Rizal had to some extent disagreed.^ Of these 

1 It is asserted also that there was a falb'ng-oat at Madrid over the administra- 
tion of the funds sent from the Philippines by the committee of propaganda first 
organized. Financial difficulties and charges of dishonesty in this respect have been 
a close second to personal jealousies in disrupting all, or nearly all, distinctively 
Filipino movements. 


two men, Del Pilar was somewhat the older and more matter- 
of-fact, if less brilliant and enthusiastic, and in general less 
impetuous and radical of utterance. Yet in this case, whether 
or no their differences arose from personal jealousy, when, as 
the more sane and far-seeing of the active propagandists, they 
should naturally have worked together, Del Pilar virtually put 
himself with the more intemperate and reckless agitators in 
proposing a "popular society," partly at least in opposition to 
the conservative proposals of the Liga Filipina. The charge 
that the whole propaganda from the first was a separatist 
movement has been much strengthened by the sayings and 
writings of some of these men, who were perhaps somewhat 
jealous of the prestige Kizal had gained in Europe as well as 
at home, and some of whom could not resign themselves to 
going as slowly as he felt was necessary, could not sow the 
seed and patiently wait for it to germinate. The Supreme 
Council of the Katipunan was organized in Manila in 1892, 
some say on the very day Rizal was deported. Middle-class 
natives of the capital figured in it, and the first president was 
a brother-in-law of Del Pilar. From the first, however, the 
most energetic spirit in it was Andres Bonifacio, who was em- 
ployed as porter of the warehouse of a German firm in the 
Binondo district, and who, with a little education and reading, 
had become a sort of socialist, with a vague understanding of 
European anarchists' methods of propaganda. He gradually 
undermined the first president, and, finding the man he had 
substituted also not energetic enough to suit him, he put him- 
self at the head of the organization by a sort of dictator's coup. 
In 1894 and 1895 the society took on, under his leadership, 
greatly renewed activity, and there are indications that its 
plans were altered to suit his more radical inclinations ; at any 
rate, it was not, as a society, merely carried along by the cur- 
rent which was now bearing the Filipinos to a crisis. It is dif- 
ficult to be precise as to the original aims of the Katipunan. 
The published writings on it, and the testimony before the 


Spanish courts-martial of 1896, are to be viewed with great 
suspicion. It is perhaps safe to say that, as originally organized, 
the Katipunan was to carry on much the same sort of propa- 
ganda among the masses as the Liga Filipina had intended to 
conduct among the more intelligent classes. That the very con- 
dition of the Tagalog friar-hating masses, aroused by an agra- 
rian grievance, was bound to lead such a society to more radical 
means and measures, even without a Bonifacio, is evident. And 
this is what had happened by 1895, aside from the fact that the 
upper classes of Filipinos, too, had by then been organized 
long enough to feel an impatience for definite accomplishments 
and a straining toward more radical action. It is charged, by 
rabid Spaniards, that the Katipunan was organized at the out- 
set to stir the masses up to exterminate all whites in the islands, 
and that Rizal and such men as he were in sympathy with this 
programme, if not the inspirers of it. The latter accusation 
needs no refutation. There are stray bits of evidence that ex- 
termination had by 1895 come to be the preaching of the 
more bloodthirsty leaders like Bonifacio, imbued with the notion 
of repeating the scenes of the French Commune and achieving 
" liberty " at one stroke. With a populace like that which they 
set out to work upon, the more responsible leaders might have 
foreseen such an outcome from the start. 

Rizal had at first lent his support to the organization, the 
prestige of his name in association with it as a silent sympa- 
thizer contributing to its extension, while letters from him 
and circulars over his nom deplume were secretly distributed 
in its behalf, though, so far as has appeared, there was nothing 
which indicated his having any direct connection with the so- 
ciety. But when Bonifacio sent an emissary to Dapitan to ob- 
tain his formal sanction to the idea of armed revolt, Kizal 
promptly stated that he could have nothing to do with any 
such project, that such a movement was premature ; in short, 
that the path to follow, for the present at least, was that of 
evolution, not of revolution. Bonifacio was so enraged at this 


direct blow to his plans that he suppressed Rizal's reply, and 
even represented him as being heart and soul with the idea of 

1 Pio Valenzuela, a tool of Bonifacio in various enterprises, was sent to Dapi- 
tan with two women ostensibly in need of Rizal's professional advice as an oculist. 
Though the Manila secret police got most anything out of him they desired to 
have him say in their various examinations he underwent after his arrest for com- 
plicity in the revolt of 1896, he declared, in one of the first of these examina- 
tions, that Rizal opposed the idea of Bonifacio to raise the people in revolt "so 
tenaciously, with so ill humor and with words so indicative of displeasure " that 
he came back to Manila the following day, instead of remaining in Dapitan a month 
as intended (this in May, 1896). In a later examination, one of the objects of 
which apparently was to get evidence against Rizal, Valenzuela's testimony was 
that Rizal replied when he had broached the plan: "No, no, no, a thousand times 
no!" citing some "philosophic principle to show him that what it was proposed 
to do was not advisable, for it would result to the prejudice of the Filipino people, 
with other reasons upon which he based his negative." (See Retana's Archivo del 
lihliSfilo JiUpinOf vol. ill, pp. 226, 349.) It is said that steps were even taken by 
the plotters to secure a steamer at Singapore, to steal Rizal from Dapitan and 
carry him to Japan, where variotis Filipino propagandists had established them- 
selves after Japan's defeat of China, partly in the hope of inducing Japan, as the 
rising representative of Oriental independence, to take up their cause. (Marcelo del 
Pilar was on the point of leaving Spain and going to join the committee in Yokohama 
when he died at Barcelona in 1896, just as premature death was claiming in an- 
other part of Spain Graciano Lopez Jaena, the chief Bisayan representative among 
the propagandists.) From Japan some few arms were secretly introduced into the 
Philippines in early 1896. The Filipinos in Japan claimed, in letters to their com- 
panions in Manila, to have obtained audiences with high officials of the Mikado's 
Empire; but there is not a scrap of evidence worthy of serious consideration going 
to show that the Japanese Government violated its obligations of neutrality to- 
ward Spain, or even indulged the thought of doing so. The excitement worked up 
over the matter in Spain, just following Japan's emergence into view as a na- 
val power to be reckoned with, and again when the irresponsible talk of some of ! 
the more reckless Filipino plotters became known, seems ridiculous, when the 
stories sift down to a casual meeting in a Japanese bazaar in Manila between sev- 
eral officers of a Japanese cruiser and a few almost unknown Filipinos, who were I 
later courteously thanked by the Japanese for the present of a few melons. It I 
recalls the previous stories that the Germans were preparing to seize the Philip- j 
pine archipelago, based on the troubles over Protestant missionaries in the Caroline j 
Islands in 1885 and on the further fact that Rizal and other Filipinos had found] 
a congenial atmosphere and friends in Germany; one finds also talk of the same 
sort as in 1904 about the " yellow peril " involved in Japan's career of martial his- 
tory. The organ of the Katipunan, i4 n^ Kalayaan (Tagalog for "liberty "), which 
printed one or perhaps two numbers in Tagalog at the beginning of 1896, bore 
on its date-line the address Yokohama, but was probably printed secretly in Ma- 
nila. Part of the contents of the first number, translated into Spanish, are repro- 
duced in iUd.y vol. ni, pp. 134-48. The announcement of the editors contains the 
plain statement that the day for the "a«?similation campaign" is past, is openly 
anti-Spanish in fact : " The expression < Mother Spain ' is no longer anything bat 


Unquestionably some of the more responsible and intelligent 
leaders of the propaganda were by this time imbued with the 
idea that the hour had come to rouse the people. Though this 
class had practically no active share in the management of the 
Katipunan organization, yet there were many wealthy half- 
castes, especially Chinese-Filipinos, who were contributing to 
the funds, aside from the real (one eighth of a peso) which 
each member of the popular branches was supposed to give. 
The number of lodges virtually corresponded with the number 
of towns in the Tagalog provinces of Manila, Morong, Cavite, 
Laguna, Batangas, Bulakan, and Nueva Ecija, and in addition 
there were in some of the more populous barrios of towns in 
the environs of Manila lodges in which the male population 
of these barrios was mostly enrolled (also some few female 
lodges of " coadjutors," just as a few female Masonic lodges 
had formerly been organized). In the city of Manila itself, the 
native districts of Tondo, Trozo, Binondo, Kiapo, Santa Cruz, 
and Malate were quite effectively organized. The Katipunan 
itself remained throughout Spanish rule quite purely Tagalog, 
and may have numbered anywhere from 100,000 to 400,000 
members, though probably nearer the former than the latter 
figure. Its organization was not yet completed in 1896, nor had 
its initiates in the mass been really enlightened as to just what 
their association was for, except perhaps in the older and more 
carefully established lodges, mostly inside the city of Manila 
or near it. Naturally, all sorts of rumors prevailed among these 
initiates, and, even had torture and threats not been resorted 
to, it would probably have been just as easy to elicit proofs of 
one sort and another that these ignorant members expected 
massacre, or supposed that when the signal was given, they 

« bit of adulation . . . there is no such mother, and no snch son; there is only a 
race that robs, a people that fattens on what is not its own . . . ; there is hope in 
nothing but our own forces and the defense of onrseWes." Yet the manifesto of 
''Dimas-alang" (Rizal), though presenting in allegory the awakening of his peo- 
ple by ** Liberty/* preaches mainly the need for an independence of spirit and a 
self-reliance on the part of the people themselves, and most be distorted to find 
anything countenancing immediate revolt. 


-were to cut the throats of every friar and of every Spaniard, 
man, woman, or child. Herein lay precisely the danger of such 
an organization, and it is small wonder if Spaniards in Ma- 
nila and outlying towns, as rumors began to multiply of plots 
against them (the friars being busy at work extracting them 
from the women in the confessional), became uneasy and 
anxious, and the wildest sort of tales were afloat.^ 

Rumors there were in plenty during all of 1896 up to the 
final coup in August. At one time they centered in Batangas 
province, where there were well-defined tales of secret gather- 
ings and of cargoes of rifles to be landed from Yokohama and 
Hongkong.'^ Blanco, whom the friar organs excitedly accused 
of being a Mason, and who undoubtedly sympathized to some 
extent with the legitimate Filipino demands for reform, hesi- 
tated to take the harsh measures that were urged upon him ; 
and he might well do so, for many of the Spanish military and 
other officials about him were not only as bloodthirsty as the 

^ The initiation rites of the Katipunan were various, but in all forms were 
calculated to be thoroughly awe-inspiring to the ordinary ignorant laborer. An 
invariable feature was the pacto de sangre^ or blood -pact, wherein the blood was 
drawn from the initiate's arm and a certain scar made upon it. It was a revival of 
the old Malay custom, which Magellan had honored on arriving at Sebd, of two 
chiefs establishing a friendship by drawing blood from each other's arms, mixing 
it and drinking it. The initiation into the Liga Filipina had included the kissing 
of a skull as a part of the oath-ceremony. The oath of the Katipunan, it is to be 
noted, like the various other similar forms of it which have come to light both 
earlier and later, gives considerable weight to the accusation that the Katipunan 
was primarily an assassination-society. Its history shows that it unquestionably 
lent itself at times to such purposes. But the fact that the oath, which was in 
every sense calculated to bind the humble Filipino to awestruck obedience, pro- 
vided for assassination, if required as a test of loyalty, does not necessarily 
prove that such was the prime purpose of the organization, nor does it authorize 
the charge that the society was bent on the extermination of Spaniards. We must 
judge the Katipunan, both when used against the Spaniards and against the Ameri- 
cans, by its deeds. They are bad enough, but do not warrant the sweeping charges 
that have been made against it. 

2 Governor-General Blanco ordered the deportation of some of the leading men 
of Batangas in April, 1896. Felipe Agoncillo, afterward representative of the 
Filipino revolutionary government in the United States, was one of them, but had 
friends in power in Manila, who gave him telegraphic warning in cipher, and he 
escaped to Japan, hidden, it is said, in the coal bunk of a Japanese steamer, and 
carrying 80,000 pesos collected in Batangas for the propaganda. 


worst Katipuneros whom their imaginings depicted, but they 
were also in a state of nervousness and excitement which lent 
itself to denunciations upon the nearest rumor or upon imagin- 
ings. Some of the friars were not behind them in this respect, 
and seemed to think their chief function at the time was to de- 
populate their respective towns of about all the prominent and 
respected individuals of native blood who were in them. In 
the main, the principal activities of this sort were, for obvious 
reasons, in the environs of Manila;^ but there were friar de- 
nunciations among the Bikols of Nueva Caceres, the Ilokans 
of Union and North and South Ilokos provinces, the Pampan- 
gans, and in Sebii, Leite, Negros, Iloilo, Kapis and elsewhere 
in the Bisayas.^ There were gross abuses in this connection, 
while at the same time it is not to be doubted that the old 
Masonic organizations in all these provinces were to some extent 
in touch with the new Katipunan organization in the Tagalog 

^ Malolos in Bulak^n (Del Pilar's old home) continued to hold its place as a 
storm-center, the open independence with which the leading native residents defied 
the friar curates sent there between 1887 and 1896 being something new in Phil- 
ippine history. In the fall of 1895, Blanco had been induced to deport to Min- 
danau its principal citizens, including the entire municipal council. He had done 
the same thing with the councilmen of Taal, Batangas, early in 1896. See Arch- 
bishop Bernardino Nozaleda's Defensa oUigada (Madrid, 1904), appendices 5, 6, 
and 7 for denunciations of the " work of Masonry " in BulakAn, Batangas, and 
Pampanga, addressed by the archbishop to Blanco between March, 1895, and April, 
1896, and appendix 8 for a denunciation of the Katipunan propaganda in Manila's 
outskirts by one of his priests in June, 1896. The archbishop claims that the fact 
that the Roman Catholic is the established church in the Philippines requires the 
suppression of the " Masonic " propaganda, also insinuates that Blanco is a Mason. 

^ In the Ilokan provinces, the trouble was almost purely over the friar question; 
certain independent-minded native priests of that district were obnoxious to the 
bishop and the friars, and they were quite ready to believe them filibusters or 
anything else, only so they could g^t rid of them and of the wealthier natives who 
Ijmpatbized and worked with them. In Nueva C^eres the most conspicuous native 
of the Camarines was dragged into jail, later on, charged with plotting to intro- 
duce arms there, the principal evidence against him being a confession by a fellow- 
conspirator alleged to have been made on board the steamer that bore prisoners from 
the Camarines to Manila, taken in irregular form before the vessel's crew, and under 
other suspicions circumstances (see no. 42 of Documentor polUicos de actualidad in 
Retana's ArchivOt vol. m); it is significant that he had refused to knuckle to the 
friars in small ways, and that one of the Spaniards who denotinced him got him- 
self appointed administrator of his estate after he was shot, and, it is said, enriched 
himself from it. 


provinces. When it is estimated that the deportations under 
Blanco before the actual revolt began in August were in the 
neighborhood of four hundred, it may be imagined how busy 
the friars would have kept such a man as Weyler. 

Whatever might have been the outcome, had things been 
allowed to drift longer in Manila, it is certain that the more 
radical of the Katipunan leaders were preparing to break the 
peace simultaneously at different points, when more arms had 
been obtained. Just how far they had planned out the future, 
in case of success, it is very difficult to say ; though some 
among them had drawn up the list of men who were to form 
the "Ministry of the Philippine Kepublic." There was some 
indefinite talk of being able to obtain a protectorate from 
Japan, or even from Spain ; but these half-formed projects 
only served to bring out the confused state of Filipino aspira- 
tions at the time. The Tagalog masses were imbued with the 
notion of getting rid of the friars, whereupon some sort of 
millennium might be expected to succeed, how it mattered not. 
Their legitimate leaders were divided in a dozen camps, some 
listening to the voice of caution that dictated doing nothing to 
endanger their personal safety, some over-consumed with ambi- 
tion and ready to let the radicals of lower social status but 
with popular influence stir up the embers of conflagration, 
some merely waiting like the pure opportunists they were 
by instinct and training, some few urging patience and the 
necessity for the development of the people, while most of the 
distinctive conservatives among the Filipinos were not well 
aware of what was actually going on. 

Conservative and radical alike were, however, soon to find 
themselves in the midst of the turmoil which followed upon the 
publication of the Katipunan plot discovered by Father Ma- 
riano Gil, the Augustinian curate of the Tondo parish of 
Manila. Working in conjunction with the civil guard of that 
district, the friar had been bringing the favorite instrument of 
the confessional to bear since early in August, with the result 


that on the 19th he came out with the confession of one of 
Bonifacio's humbler co-workers, and with a most bloodthirsty 
tale of assassinations soon to have been perpetrated.^ This was 
just when Blanco was being urged by the secret police and 
friars to take more active and radical measures of repression 
in Batangas. The case worked up by Father Gil was so sub- 
stantiated by particulars that, although Blanco seems to have 
believed, both before and after this, that the proper way to 
deal with the critical situation was to minimize it, and that to 
take radical measures would unify the people, he felt himself 
obliged to yield to the pressure upon him. He telegraphed 
the home Government on August 21 : — 

Vast organization secret societies discovered, with anti-national 
tendencies. Twenty-two persons apprehended, including the Grand 
Orient. . . . Special judge will be designated for greater activity in 

The last sentence contains a hint of the summary methods 
that were to be adopted in running down and deahng with the 
conspirators, through extraordinary military courts. These 
were organized immediately after the issuance of Blanco's de- 
cree of August 30 declaring a state of war to exist in Manila, 
Bulak^n, Pampanga, Nueva ficija, Tarlak, Laguna, Cavite, and 
Batangas provinces. Still, the governor-general coupled this 
declaration with the concession of forty-eight hours during 

^ The clue was said to have been obtained through the sister of this workman, 
a pupil at the time in one of the sisterhood schools. With her help, all the forces 
of religions superstition (and it may be forces of a more material sort) were brought 
to bear for several days to make the workman tell on his fellows and save himself. 
He was an employee in one of the Spanish printing-offices of Manila, where was 
found the lithographing-stone used to print Katipunan receipts, concealed by the 
workmen who were in the organization. It was claimed that many valuable and in- 
eriminating documents were found here and in the warehouse where Bonifacio 
worked, as well as in the private houses searched. If so, few of them have ever 
been made public. See the affidavit of Father Gil in December, 1896, no. 24, of 
Documentos politicos de actualidad (Archivo dd hihli/)filo JilipinOf vol. lu). See also 
La PolUica de Espafia en Filipinas, vol. vi, pp. 275-308. 

* For this and the subsequent messages and reports of Blanco and his suoces- 
tort throughout the revolution, also Spanish press dispatches and comments, see 
La PolUica de Egpafia en FilipiruUf September 15, 1896, and succeeding numbers 
of 1896 and 1897. 


which rebels who presented themselves to the authorities might 
secure a free pardon, except the chiefs, who should have a 
lesser degree of punishment in consequence of surrender. 
This decree shows how rapidly events had moved. Warned by 
friends, the Katipunan leaders had fled from Manila to the 
suburb of Kalookan (Bulak^n province) early on August 22. 
In spite of the premature disclosure of their plans, Bonifacio 
insisted on armed resistance to the authorities, although some 
pointed out the folly of such an attempt with the few firearms 
they had yet obtained. He carried his point, it is said, in an 
assemblage of some hundreds in a barrio of Kalookan, and 
here, on the morning of August 26, was sounded the " cry of 
Balintawak," and a little band of native troops of the civil 
guard, under a Spanish lieutenant and two Spanish noncom- 
missioned officers, were nearly captured by the masses of na- 
tives who surrounded them, armed almost exclusively with 
bolos.^ It was late in the day before the little band, which had 
expended the last cartridge, had forced its way into Kalookan. 
The revolution was on. Word had been sent out by the lead- 
ers to raise the people simultaneously in the Tagalog provinces 
on August 30. In the mean time, a nimiber of the hated Chinese 
were waylaid in the outskirts of Manila and assassinated. On 
the 30th, there were disturbances all around Manila. The 
waterworks were captured, but abandoned; an attempt was 
made to force entrance into the Sampalok suburb of Manila, 
but was frustrated by a detachment of the civil guard ; on the 
south side of the river, the suburb of Pandakan rose almost en 
massCy and, the forces at the disposal of the authorities in the 
city being scanty, there was rioting there all day ; across from 
Pandakan, on the north side, in a stubborn contest near San 
Juan del Monte about one hundred Filipinos were killed, and 
in hand-to-hand fighting twice that many prisoners were taken, 

1 According to the later testimony of one of Bonifacio's companions, they had 
only four revolvers and two disabled shotguns, to which they added later ten 
revolvers {Archivo^ vol. in, p. 206). 


of whom four leaders were summarily tried and condemned to 
be shot, fifty-three of their followers being executed with 
them the following day. The bands around Manila worked 
their way up the Pasig, and two thousand bolomen, with some 
few rifles among them, nearly captured the civil guard and 
Spanish authorities of the town of Pasig, besieging them in 
the tower of the church. Nearly all the towns of Cavite province 
rose on August 31, and, after more or less resistance, and with 
the more or less speedy desertion of the native troops of the 
civil guard's detachments, the petty officers of these detach- 
ments, the friars and the other Spaniards resident in the towns 
were in the hands of the rebels, everywhere outside the port 
of Cavite and its immediate environs. The Nueva Ecija rising 
began on September 3, when the important town of San Isi- 
dro was attacked and besieged, its little garrison of native 
troops and the Spaniards therein being nearly captured before 
help arrived from Pampanga. Lesser disturbances happened 
in the towns of Laguna and Batangas, and the authorities 
asked themselves where next there would be call for troops. 

It soon became evident, however, that, while there might 
be much sympathy with the revolutionary idea, also some 
active plotting, outside of the Tagalog provinces, there was 
nowhere else either the arms or the organization to make much 
trouble. Much was later to be made of the alleged plot to 
slaughter all Spaniards in the Camarines, but it was certainly 
magnified by the desires of the friars in Nueva C^ceres to get 
rid of several independent native priests and of other Span- 
iards to get rid of troublesome native rivals in business. The 
reign of terror and torture inaugurated in some of the Ilokan 
provinces, and the sending of leading men of Bigan to Manila 
in chains in November, had a good deal of the same element 
of ecclesiastical and business jealousy about it; the headquar- 
ters of tortures in Bigan was the seminary of the native 
priests, in charge of the Augustinians. Great alarm was 
caused in September by an outbreak in Passi, near Iloilo, 


•which was, however, put down by a small garrison of the 
civil guard. Nevertheless, Filipinos made prisoners under 
friar or military denunciation arrived at Manila at intervals 
during the next three months from Panai, Sebu, and Leite, 
and even from backward Bohol and Samar. A small garrison of 
native troops in Mindanau and another in Jolo, where a Kati- 
punan lodge had been installed among the Tagalog deportes 
and troops, mutinied; but these were detached incidents.^ It 
soon became evident that Cavite, whither Bonifacio had gone 
early in the campaign, and where several determined and ener- 
getic leaders like Aguinaldo had the people well organized, 
was the head and front of the rebellion. To the north of Ma- 
nila, another energetic leader, Mariano Llanera, operating from 
Nueva Ecija, kept the mountainous district where that prov- 
ince corners on Pampanga and Bulak^n in his possession, 
and was capable of stirring up the towns far and wide when- 
ever an opportunity presented itself. Farther east and on the 
north side of the Pasig, the difficult mountainous country of 
Morong and Manila provinces afforded excellent retreats for 
the small bands recruited from the towns of Manila's neigh- 
borhood, whose people were almost unanimously with the 
rebels. The masses had not been so well prepared in Laguna 
and Batangas, and geographical conditions gave them less 
opportunity for concerted action than they had in Cavite. 
Still, this whole country needed thorough policing, and many 
more troops, and some of the towns bordering on Cavite were 
in the insurgents' possession. Tayabas, also Tagalog, though 
somewhat removed, was disposed to revolt, and it was later 
found necessary to disarm the civil guard of the whole prov- 
ince. Bataan and Sambales, the former pure Tagalog, the 
latter partly so, were keen against the friars, and might pro- 

1 The troubles in Panai and Negros from October, 1896, to March, 1897, are 
reviewed in a pamphlet (Comandancia general de Panay y Negros. Alteraciones de 
Srden publico, etc.) published at Iloilo in 1897 by General Ricardo Monet, the 
Spanish o£Bcer in command there at the time. He magnifies their seriousness so 
as to enhance his own importance. 


voke trouble at any time. Pampanga was, except in the north- 
east, quiet, and Tarlak, though ripe for trouble, was a little 
too far away from active operations to begin it alone. 

Everywhere natives of position hastened to assure the Span- 
ish authorities of their loyalty, this being almost as true in 
the Tagalog towns outside of Cavite as elsewhere in the 
islands. Some of these were mere sycophants, some (particu- 
larly in Pangasinan, Pampanga, Union, North Ilokos, and the 
Kagayan Valley) really meant it, and all without exception 
felt such a step to be necessary for their own safety, even 
where, in some few cases, the civil provincial governors were 
deservedly popular men. And, while it is beyond question 
that there was a general and a natural race-feeling of sym- 
pathy for the insurgents, it is also true that there was a very 
general feeling on the part of the more conservative and 
capable Filipinos, of practically all the educated men who 
ought in any national movement to be the leaders, that the 
revolt was wholly premature.^ 

^ Apolinario Mabini was, by disposition and the training of ciroamstances, aa 
well as by his self-education, anything but a conservative. He was one of those 
arrested in the Manila police " reign of terror," being known to have been a Liga 
Filipina officer, and was avowedly spared deportation only on account of his pa- 
ralysis. Yet Mabini wrote in his posthumously published memoirs: "I never had 
sufficient valor to disturb my countrymen so long as they preferred to live in tran- 
quillity. I was an enthusiastic worker by the side of Rizal, Marcelo del Filar, and 
others, who, after having opposed the evils which a discretionary and arbitrary 
administration imposed upon the Filipinos, asked of the Spanish Government 
that the Filipinos be made politically the same as a province of the Spanish 
Peninsula, for the very purpose of preventing it coming to pass that many Fil- 
ipinos should seek in separation the remedy for those evils, through the organiza- 
tion of such a society as the Katipunan and an uprising like that in 1896. Know- 
ing the calamities and miseries which always arise from the disturbance of public 
order, I was not a member of the Katipunan nor did I take part in the uprising. 
But when in 1898 I observed everywhere the unrest and indignation produced by 
the blind obstinacy of the Spanish Government and the cruelties with which it 
repaid the services of those who had shown it the dangers of bad administration of 
the Philippines and had offered plans for doing away with these, I saw the popu- 
lar will clearly manifested and deemed it my duty to take up the revolutionary 
eaose. ..." The last sentence is significant as to the effect upon Filipinos of 
even the abortive revolt of 1896-97; it carried them far beyond any former posi- 
tion. The above is taken from a portion of the posthumous manuscript of Mabini, 
published after hit death by El Comercio, Manila, July 29 and 30, 1903. 


Whether Blanco's "policy of attraction" might have suc- 
ceeded in consolidating the conservative and the cautious suf- 
ficiently to confine the revolt to certain well-defined places, 
then end it therein, as previous mutinies had been disposed of, 
or whether the time had gone by for unifying the Filipinos 
under Spain, can never be known of a certainty. Even had 
the Government not recalled him, the rabid savagery of the 
Spanish " patriots " in the islands, especially at Manila, where 
they controlled the newspaper press, and where the ecclesiasti- 
cal hierarchy and the religious orders were heart and soul 
with them in the clamor against Blanco, would have frustrated 
his efforts. A few days after the revolt broke out, he asked 
for a thousand more troops from Spain. The Government sent 
two thousand, and, at the constant cry from the islands that 
Blanco underrated the gravity of the situation, it kept sending 
troops for four months.^ When the trouble broke out, there 
were in Manila only about three hundred Spanish soldiers 
(artillerymen) and about 2500 native troops, whose loyalty 
was under suspicion from the outset. There were in all the 

As for the unfortunately too small element of really capable and patriotic con- 
servatives (men aspiring, as a rule, to eventual independence), it need not be said 
that, however much they might sympathize with their fellow-comitrymen, they 
did not believe in the rebellion. The attitude of such men is well indicated in this 
extract from the personal letter of one of the most mature-minded and capable 
Filipinos, occupying one of the foremost positions, and who, it is to be said, has 
no personal grievance against the Spanish administration, which recognized and '] 
honored him : " I know and confess the many defects from which we Filipinos 
suffer, the effect in part of the wretched social education we have received. We 
have vegetated in a medium hardly propitious for the development of men of 
character and sincerity. . . . The remarkable thing is that, surrounded by an at- 
mosphere both negative and lethal, some have succeeded in emerging with a de- 
cided aspiration to progress and culture, demonstrating in a certain degree that 
the race is susceptible of education and advancement." And even this Filipino, 
copservative and careful of speech, says of the friars that they " covered them- 
selves with discredit and shame by their infamous and criminal acts, saving rare 
exceptions, and were the principal cause of the Filipinos rebelling against Spanish 
power, being hated and rejected by the immense majority of the country." 

^ When the first news of the outbreak came to Madrid, the "Spanish-Philip- 
pine Circle " was closed and its papers seized. Morayta and other Spaniards were 
for a time under arrest, but there was no case against them as instigators of 
rebellion in the islands. 


archipelago hardly more than 1500 Spanish troops, several 
hundred being within comparatively easy reach of Manila, 
while the others were at posts in the Moro country and at the 
military government headquarters in the Bisayas. By January 
of 1897, about 26,000 troops, officers and men, most of the 
latter being stripling volunteers, enrolled as scouts, had been 
sent out from Spain/ There were upon the outbreak of the 
trouble about 14,000 native troops, regularly officered and 
incorporated into the army establishment of Spain ; and there 
were over 4000 natives in the civil guard, the constabulary 
force, scattered throughout the provinces. The latter deserted 
or remained loyal, according to the stand taken by their com- 
munities ; the early suspicion as to the loyalty of the native 
regiments was for a time laid at rest by their quite general 
steadfastness, and especially by the bravery of the 73d and 
74th Regiments,^ which bore the brunt of the fighting inCavite. 
Blanco's request to organize Spanish volunteers in Manila had 
been favorably answered at the outset, and he was urged to 
follow it up elsewhere. The Makabebes of Pampanga were 
among the first provincial volunteers. The civil governors of 
the provinces in which martial law had been established were 
soon vying with each other as to which could send the largest 
contingent of half-caste and native volunteers, of contributions 
to purchase medical supplies, etc., and of horses to mount the 
" guerrillas," as they were called. Of course, this opportunity 
to demonstrate loyalty to Spain and relieve themselves of fear 
was hurriedly accepted by well-to-do natives everywhere, while 

* See La Political etc., vol. vi, p. 307 (figures from El Imparcial, Madrid, Au- 
gust 25, 1896), and vol. vu, p. 26 (figures from La revista tecnica de Infanteria y 
Caballeria of December 15, 1896), the latter citation showing some 1500 Spaniards 
out of a total force of 19,000, including the civil guard, under arms at the time of 
the outbreak. Spain's military resources were at the time strained almost to their 
limit by the demands upon them from Cuba, and the raw recruits sent out to the 
distant Philippines were certainly no better equipped nor supplied, especially ai 
regards medical and hospital facilities, than those sent to Cuba. 

* During the ''assimilation" campaign the native regiments of the Philippines 
were renumbered to oorrespond with their theoretical incorporation into the 
Peninsular army. 


also there is no doubt that the provincial governors abused 
the chance circumstances gave them to wring contributions 
from the unwilling. Volunteers were supplied eventually from 
the Kagayan, the Ilokan, the Pangasinan, the Pampangan, 
and the Bikol provinces of Luzon. They principally guarded 
the lines around Manila, while the Spanish guerrillas of Manila, 
mounted on native ponies that were donated, made scouts into 
the outlying districts and policed the suburbs of Manila. No 
one might question the patriotism of these Spaniards, many of 
them of prominent position; but their organizations did a 
great deal of harm by their untempered zeal, their arrests and 
their vicious treatment of the natives, right and left. When 
the first troops arrived from Spain in October, their reception 
was Hterally delirious ; and each subsequent expedition was 
given the extravagant sort of greeting in which Spanish pa- 
triotism revels, the ecclesiastics, from the archbishop down, 
taking a prominent part. One who saw how little was actually 
being accomplished outside, in spite of all this turmoil inside 
the city, might readily have assumed that the Spaniards pro- 
posed to frighten the Tagalogs to death with their street 
parades, pompous drills, banquets and bloodthirsty speeches.* 
The religious orders vied with each other and with the Spanish 
Casino and newspapers in feasting each succeeding consign- 
ment of troops in a way that must have seemed cruelty to 
them later, during the ill-fed days of their actual campaign- 
ing in the tropics. 

Blanco sought to curtail Spanish excesses as well as to check 
the propaganda the Cavite leaders were continually conduct- 
ing on the outside. The latter had circulated the report that 
the cedilla tax was to be greatly increased and other burdens 
laid on the Filipino masses, and Blanco enjoined the provincial 

^ Blanco himself, like every Spaniard in high official position, had the manifesto 
habit. For the rabid speech of Rafael Comenge, president of the Spanish Casino, 
in which he called on the newly arrived troops to " Destroy ! Kill ! No pardon f 
. . . Wild beasts should be exterminated ; weeds should be exterminated ! " — 
see Foreman's The Philippine Islands^ p. 649. 


officials in a special circular to take pains to publish the false- 
hood of these charges, assuring the people that Spain would 
continue " her noble conduct of treating with affection her 
loyal sons." In another circular of October 11, he outlined his 
" policy of attraction." He considered the insurrection entirely 
localized, and that measures of rigor should give way to moder- 
ation in order to calm the disturbed people. Hence, he said to 
the provincial governors, " you will take care particularly not 
to order imprisonments unless they are justified by serious com- 
plication in the events now taking place or may lead to bring- 
ing out the causes of these events," in order to impress upon 
the people Spain's desire to be just and lenient with all not 
" actively or seriously implicated in the rebellion," and will 
employ all means possible to restore normal conditions and 
tranquillity.^ Blanco's close friend. General Aquirre, was sent 
with newly arrived troops through the towns of Laguna and 
Batangas, not only to reassert Spanish authority in them, but 
to hold a series of banquets and balls, in which sentiments of 
friendship and accord were exchanged between Spaniards and 
Filipinos. The press censor made the Manila newspapers call 
the insurgents " bandits," and several " patriotic " demonstra- 
tions started by the press, including one for Father Gil, were 
suppressed. The feehng against Blanco waxed the stronger 
for these efforts at restraint.^ It was complained that, instead 

* This circular may be found in the ArchivOt vol. in, pp. 367-69, and on p. 117 
of La InsurrecciSn en Filipinos y Guerra Hispano- Americana (Madrid, 1901), by 
Mannel Sastrdn, for some years a subordinate official of Spain in the islands. This 
book is the most complete record of the insurrection and the war with the United 
States in the Philippines that has yet been issued in Spanish. It is, however, a 
mere string of chronicles excerpted from the newspapers of the time, together 
with various personal recollections of the garrulous author, who wastes many 
pages in supposedly patriotic outbursts and pro-friar screeds. 

* Blanco refers to his critics when he says (Memoria . . . dingida al Senado 
aeerea de los ultimas sucesos ocurridos en la isla de LuzoUt Madrid, 1897, p. 68) : 
" For certain people, the proofs of character and energy are afforded by executions 
to right and left, to the taste of the public, which is generally aroused by passion, 
when exactly the contrary is true : energy is shown by opposing all sorts of im- 
potitions and that one above all others. It if easy to order men shot ; the difficult 
thing is to refrain from it" 


of allowing the full penalty of confiscation of the property of 
rebels, as written into the Spanish civil law, to prevail, he had 
only ordered the property of those under condemnation by 
the mihtary court to be seized and held by the Government 
and merely the revenues of such property to be confiscated. 
He had done this by military orders of embargo in September, 
organizing a board of administration of the property so seized.* 
High officials of the central Government were connected with 
this board, and not a few scandals were bruited about after- 
ward with relation to the profits some of them derived from 
their position. So also very definite tales were told about this 
or that provincial official, or court-martial officer, who enriched 
himself during the pursuit that was conducted of nearly all 
the prominent wealthy half-castes. The scandal connected with 
the shooting of one of two brothers, prominent mestizos of 
Manila, while the other brother, who had been arrested first 
and had been repeatedly charged by those conducting the 
secret pohce investigations with having been back of the 
Katipunan plot to introduce arms, managed to get his release 
from Manila to go to Spain (leaving the boat at Singapore on 
the way), and was afterward warmly defended in the Cortes 
at Madrid. 

From the moment it was announced in October that Gen- 
eral Polavieja was coming out to assume command of the 
troops, it was assumed in the islands that, owing to Polavieja's 
high rank in the army, this meant Blanco's recall from the 
governor-generalship. That the latter did not really check the 
denunciations and deportations may be judged from the fact 
that nearly 1000 natives had, before he left, been shipped 
away to the Marianne Islands, and to the Spanish penal col- 
onies near Africa, as many as 300 going in one boatload. A 
contingent sent to the Marianne Islands mutinied, and 100 of 

^ See T. H. Pardo de Tavera*s bibliographic note on the decrees relative to 
embargo of property in his Bihlioteca FilipinOt p. 129. The property of fifty-two 
Filipinos had been embargoed up to November 25 {La Politico, vol. vn, pp. 36-37). 


them were shot down in cold blood. The military prisons of 
Manila were crowded to suffocation, at one time over 4000 
prisoners being held for trial as conspirators. In the mediaeval 
dungeons of Fort Santiago and in other dungeons under the 
walls, into which the filthy water of the moat was brought by 
the tides, men died and were borne away almost by the cart- 
loads. There came a time in Manila, shortly after Polavieja 
took charge, when executions on the Luneta had grown so 
numerous and were felt, even by Polavieja, to be so demoral- 
izing (though he assigned as his reason the desirability of 
having suspects tried in the provinces where the offenses were 
said to have been committed), that he put forth a special de- 
cree authorizing courts-martial under the brigade commanders. 
Before the military courts had got under way in Manila in 
September, thirteen men had been summarily arraigned, con- 
demned, and executed in the town of Cavite (mostly middle- 
class natives, though two were wealthy proprietors), primarily 
upon the testimony furnished to the wife of the provincial 
governor by a Tagalog woman serving in her kitchen. Besides 
the 57 men captured in revolt and summarily executed on Au- 
gust 31, fully 500 arrests were made in Manila and its suburbs 
alone, following upon the denunciations of Father Gil.^ 
It becomes important to know how far this retaliation by a 

^ This statement is found in an official report to the governor-general in Oc- 
tober, 1898, by Olegario Diaz, a captain of the civil guard of Manila, having 
charge of the secret police investigations. This document is an interesting, though 
frequently inaccurate, statement of the whole history of Filipino propaganda down 
to the discovery of the Katipunan. It is reproduced in the Archivot vol. iii, pp. 
412-41. An English version may be found in a cheap little pamphlet published in 
Manila in 1902, entitled TJie Katipunan^ or the Rise and Fall of the Filipino Com- 
mune. It purports to be by one Arthur St. Clair ; if such a person really exists, he 
is apparently one of the Englishmen and Americans of uncertain antecedents who 
liATe since 1898 been employed by the Spanish friars in Manila to conduct a prop- 
aganda in their behalf among the American colony and to present their version of 
Philippine history. " St. Clair " employs 275 ont of the 335 pages of his pamphlet 
in abuse of the Filipinos and misinformation as to recent history ; his so-called 
" annotations from Spanish state documents " are interesting mainly aa showing 
bow cheap an estimate the friars have put upon the intellect and judgment of the 
American people, when they seek to influence them by such balderdash. 


supposedly highly civilized people upon a people whom they 
called downright savages was justified, if it could be justified 
at all, by Filipino barbarism. As stated, the first revelations 
as to the Katipunan plot in Manila had charged that it was a 
plot to assassinate all Spaniards, regardless of sex. Much tes- 
timony to support this charge was brought out during the mil- 
itary trials. The torture of witnesses and the whole conduct of 
these trials would, however, place under suspicion all evidence 
brought out therein. Probably it is fair to say that, for rea- 
sons hitherto outlined, a great many of the Katipunan rank 
and file had come to believe that the purpose of the organi- 
zation was extermination of Spaniards, and it would seem that 
a few of the more radical leaders were at least willing to have 
this idea disseminated. It is also to be said for the Spaniards 
in the islands that, almost without exception, they believed 
that themselves, their wives and children, as well as the friars, 
had been marked for slaughter with more or less barbarous and 
outrageous accompaniments. But, as time went by, and after 
the supposed plot for extermination was frustrated and the 
revolt assumed the form of a half -organized rebellion within 
fairly well-defined limits, both justice and common sense de* 
manded that it be judged by its deeds rather than by rumors 
about its plans. Even then, there was enough about it to keep 
the Spaniards on their guard and to subject the so-called pop- 
ular movement to the very severe censure of civilized men. 

Aside from the repeated bits of testimony extracted during 
the trials to the effect that indiscriminate slaughter was planned, 
various documents are quoted to the same effect. The most 
quoted, and by far the most significant, if it is to be accepted 
as valid, is an alleged order of the Supreme Council of the 
Katipunan, dated June 12, 1896, from which this clause is 
taken : " When once the signal of H. 2 Sep. is given, every 
brother will fulfill the duty which this Grand Regional Lodge 
[G. R. Log.] has imposed upon him, assassinating all the 
Spaniards, their wives and sons, without considerations of any 


sort, whether relationship, friendship, gratitude, etc." Other 
clauses prescribe that, following the attack first upon the gov- 
ernor-general and others, the convents will be assaulted and 
their inmates beheaded, but the wealth in them is to be re- 
spected and taken charge of by committees ; the following day 
the bodies are to be heaped up and buried in Bagumbayan 
field, and a monument in memory of independence will later 
be raised over them ; the bodies of the friars shall not, however, 
be given sepulture, but shall be burned for their felonies ; 
those who shrink from the tasks laid upon them "already 
know the tremendous punishment they will incur for disobe- 
dience and disloyalty." This document purports to be signed 
on the date stated, " in the first year of the much-desired inde- 
pendence of the Philippines," by Bolivar, President of the Ex- 
ecutive Committee ; Giordano Bruno, Grand Master, Adj. ; and 
Galileo, the Grand Secretary. The very wording of this docu- 
ment is suspiciously like that of one that might be made up 
at the time to prod a court-martial, if not the Government at 
home, to severity. It has continually been cited in official 
documents and in private writings, but nowhere have its source 
and authority been given.^ 

In general, the record of the revolutionists hardly bears out 
the declaration that, had not the plot been discovered in time, 
they would have sought to kill every Spaniard, if not every 
white, in Manila. The record is bad enough, to be sure. The 

^ It is given in full in Nozaleda's Defensa ohligaday appendix 9, as being taken 
** from newspapers," and in A rchivo, vol. in, no. 19, of Documentos politicos de ao 
tucUidad. (Other suspicious documents of this collection are nos. 16, 17, and 18, 
the source of which Retana does not give, as he does for other documents. Such 
a postscript as this reads as if inserted by some Spanish military prosecutor : 
" Be extremely careful, and, in case of surprise, make a thousand protests of loy- 
alty to Spain : supreme hypocrisy, a great thing in these affairs.") It is given in 
part by M. Sastrdn, op. cit.t p. 54 ;also in English, as an appendix to the pamphlet 
on The Katipunarit above cited, the author apparently obtaining this version from 
El Katipxinan 6 el Filibusterismo en FilipinaSt by Josd M. del Castillo y Jimenez 
(Madrid, 1897), a book which, though much quoted as authority, contains no sig- 
ni6eant data not found elsewhere, and is virtually wortbleM because of its inacou- 
neies and Spanish rabidity. 


Chinese, against whom a traditional hatred was directed, were 
slaughtered by several mobs in Bulakan. Here, too, in the first 
days of the revolt, several Europeans, including an English- 
man who innocently strolled out to take photographs, were 
slaughtered in cold blood by the irresponsible and almost 
leaderless crowds. Again, during the first outbreaks in Cavite, 
the wrath of the bolo-bearing mobs was directed against the 
friar priests rather than against the subordinate officers of the 
civil guard who were captured by them, although there were 
two or three cases of massacre or outrage of lay Spaniards, 
men and women. Thirteen Recollects, seven of whom were 
lay-brothers managing the order's estates near Imus, were made 
away with ; four of the number were parish priests who took 
refuge on the estate, which was the center of the popular out- 
break in that part of Cavite, and there were two also who were 
killed at their posts in other parts of Cavite. Torture and bar- 
barous treatment probably accompanied their deaths,^ as also 
later the death of a Dominican, Father Piernavieja, who had 
a very bad record in Bulakan before he was transferred to 
Cavite to quiet the scandal, and who was forced by the rebels 
to set himself up as a mock-bishop of the revolution, but was 
afterward executed, charged with having communicated with 
Manila. Later on, when the Bataan mob was aroused, two 
priests were massacred there as the first actual sign of out- 
break, and one was slain at the altar in Morong in December. 
Undoubtedly, a number of friars in Sambales only saved their 
lives by opportune flight. In the main, mistreatment of other 
Spaniards was confined to minor outrages, and in most cases 
they were simply detained as prisoners and forced to work on 

^ But the statement of Foreman, op. cit.y p. 419, that they were cut up piece- 
meal, burned or spitted in oil, etc., is not authenticated. These stories, and the re- 
ports of Father Piernavieja's death tied to a post, bareheaded, in the sun, and of 
the cutting off of Father David's head in Bataan province (see La Politica, vol. 
vn, pp. 70-71) were rehearsed in great detail in the Manila correspondence of vari- 
ous newspapers of Spain. Later, they were admitted to have been exaggerations 
or falsehoods, Retana himself retracting them, along with his charge that a certain 
wealthy Filipino was president of the Katipunan (ut supra f pp. 280-64). 



roads, trenches, etc., in the sun, a proceeding which highly 
dehghted the sense of humor of the Tagalog masses (for reasons 
not altogether unapparent, in connection with the old forced- 
labor tax). As the rebel camps in Cavite approached more 
nearly something of an organized form, there was, so far at 
least as some of the leaders, and notably Aguinaldo, were con- 
cerned, a definite policy enjoined of treating the captured 
Spaniards more nearly as prisoners of war would be treated 
by a civilized power. On the whole, considering the feeling of 
the Tagalogs as to past grievances and the reports that came 
to them of the tortures and executions in Manila and of the 
indiscriminate slaughters and the abuses of the volunteer 
Spanish troops on their scouting trips, the record they made, 
except at the outset, in the treatment of their prisoners was 
rather better than it might have been expected to be. Their 
treatment of their own fellow-citizens, coercing the peaceful 
into revolt, forcing from them contributions far in excess of 
what they had ever paid to Spain, and condemning them to 
death right and left on the charge of treason, upon the sentences 
of summary military courts set up in imitation of the Spanish 
methods, was far more to be criticized, considering the aims 
which they alleged were theirs. 

The military record of the Spaniards up to the time of 
Blanco's departure is neither extended nor notable. He had 
only troops enough to quell the first outbreaks around Manila 
and to the northward, and thereafter for several months to in- 
dulge in forays against the little guerrilla bands which kept 
the mountainous districts of Bulak^n and Morong stirred up, 
besides dealing with more or less disorder in other Tagalog 
provinces. Cavite was, from the outset, lost to the Spaniards, 
except for the narrow peninsula on which lay the town of 
Cavite and the naval arsenal; on either side of this neck of 
ground, the rebels held territory well within the range of the 
navy's guns, including the home of the Aguinaldo family 
(Kawit, as the Tagalogs called it, Old Cavite, in Spanish 


phraseology). Five expeditions, with 6000 troops, had arrived 
before November 7, on which day Blanco went in person to 
Cavite, to direct a double-column assault on the nearest rebel 
positions, whence they threatened the garrison in Cavite it- 
self. The objective points were Binakayan to the east and 
Noveleta to the west of Old Cavite, both near the shore of the 
bay and approached from opposite sides of the Cavite penin- 
sula. The column directed against Binakayan was composed 
of 1600 men, half of them natives, and, after the little navy 
gunboats had played at shelling the insurgent trenches, not 
dislodging the hordes hidden within them, a frontal attack 
was made. Spanish troops cannot be accused of lack of bravery, 
but this was poor warfare, and the taking of these trenches 
against hardly more than 100 riflemen and an indefinite number 
of bolomen cost the attacking army 70 officers and men. The 
mountain-guns supposed to have been ordered were not there, 
and the one old antiquated piece of artillery was almost as 
ridiculous as the native's bamboo cannon. The next day's ad- 
vance on Old Cavite was a failure. The Filipinos are said to 
have shot nails, wire, etc., when they lacked proper ammuni- 
tion for their miscellaneous arms. All the officers of the at- 
tacking column (which again went direct upon the intrench- 
ments) and two thirds of one company of native troops were 
killed. Before the close of the day the Spaniards had to retreat 
in confusion upon Binakayan. Meanwhile, the movement on 
Noveleta had resulted even more ingloriously. Here more 
troops than at Binakayan, under the command of no less than 
a general of infantry and a colonel of marines, went in frontal 
attack against trenches flanked on one side by a deep creek, 
their approach proceeding up a narrow alley lined by impas- 
sable mangrove swamps and filled with pitfalls, when they 
might have flanked the rebel positions by marching or being 
ferried along the sandy beach. They lost 100 men in the am- 
buscade and were out of ammunition by ten in the morning, 
losing another 100 men during their forced retreat to the 


peDinsala. The Spanish reports give the casualties in these two 
engagements as more than 500, which is probably a very con- 
siderable underestimate. Greater than the military effect of 
the failure to take Old Cavite and render the hold of the 
Spaniards upon the peninsula more secure was the moral ef- 
fect of such a real victory upon the revolutionary masses. 
The young Aguinaldo, once merely a local Katipunan 
organizer, who had been steadily gaining in prestige since 
the outbreak in Cavite because of his activity as a local 
leader, was henceforth of wider reputation as the "great 
Tagalog general." ^ 

Camilo G. de Polavieja, a lieutenant-general of long stand- 
ing in the Spanish army, who, besides military service in the 
Peninsula and in Africa, had put down the uprising in Cuba in 
1890, arrived at the beginning of December. The Government 
expected Blanco to take the hint and resign, and a few days 
later it "authorized" him to return to Spain. He would not 
resign in the face of the enemy, and, after the bitter criticism 
to which he had been subjected, he undoubtedly desired to end 
the revolt on his own lines. But on December 9 the Queen 
Regent herself sent a cablegram saying : " I have just ap- 

^ Aguinaldo was, in 1896, but 27 years of ag^, fairly to be regarded as belong- 
ing to the small middle class which has been conspicuous for independent ideas in 
the Tagalog provinces. His father, a pure-blood Tagalog, had acquired some little 
real property, had been many times gohemadorcillo of Old Cavite, and seems, as 
far back as 1872, to have fallen under suspicion of the friars for his ideas, being 
under arrest then for a time. The mother of Aguinaldo is said to have some Chinese 
blood. There were four sons and several daughters. The family patrimony was 
not sufficient to keep Aguinaldo in the Jesuits' secondary school in Manila more 
than a short time, and to this day his writing of Spanish is very defective and his 
speech in it not easy. He had been chosen municipal captain of Old Cavite under 
the Maura law at a very early age, as such offices usually went in the Philippine 
towns. He was active in the Katipunan organization from the first, though not out- 
side of his immediate locality. The civil guard were already under way to make 
arrests of suspects in Cavite, when, on August 31, 1896, he hastily gathered his 
followers, armed only with bolos, and captured and disarmed a little detachment 
of the native gtiards, in command of a Spanish sergeant. As in most oases in Ca- 
vite, probably the followers of the sergeant were ready to desert him ; but the 
news that a native had "defeated and captured a Spanish officer" traveled far 
and rapidly in the province. 



pointed you chief of my military household." ^ Before he 
left on the 20th, he was given the pompous ceremonials of 
banquets, processions, etc., in which the Spaniard delights ; but 
he departed a disappointed man, and left behind him an un- 
settled country, its jangling elements apprehensive of what 
was to come. Manila was like a huge Inquisition. Blanco had 
vowed the jeweled sword given him by the Ayuntamiento of 
Manila for his victories in the Moro regions of Mindanau in 
1895 to the famous shrine of the Virgin of Peace and Good 
Voyage at Antipolo, a little town in the hills of Morong, less 
than ten miles from the town of Pasig on the river above Ma- 
nila ; but he could not at the time safely carry it there himself, 
and left it in the capital. Only a short time before Llanera's 
men had derailed a train bearing Spanish troops on the rail- 
road twenty miles north of Manila. 

Polavieja had taken charge on December 13, with the cus- 
tomary " allocutions," in this case stern addresses to the army 
and the people, in which he frankly identified himself with the 
religious orders. He promptly introduced the Cuban idea of 
reconcentration in the seven provinces surrounding the city of 
Manila, including Bataan (Bataan and Sambales had been put 
under martial law by Blanco before he left). In all the prov- 
inces under martial law, elections to fill the third part of the 
municipal councils under the Maura law were suspended, and 
the civil governors were instructed to appoint to the vacancies, 
" upon the recommendation of the parish priests." 


The one step that did more to alienate the Filipinos forever 
from Spain than perhaps all other circumstances united was to 

^ The active part taken by the religious orders in the agitation, both in Spain 
and the Philippines, for the removal of Blanco, is shown in this cablegram sent to 
Madrid for publication : " Hongkong, October 31. — Dominicans, Madrid : situa- 
tion grows more grave. Revolt is spreading. Apathy of Blanco inexplicable. To 
remove the danger, an urgent necessity is the appointment of a chief. Opinion 
unanimous. — The Archbishop and Provincials." (La Political vol. vi, p. 430.) 


mark the very beginning of Polavieja's command. Jos^ Rizal, 
who had started for Cuba to serve as a volunteer surgeon in 
the Spanish army, and who had been returned from Barcelona 
as a prisoner, upon the urgent representations of the military 
prosecutors, reached Manila on November 3, and had remained 
in prison since. Blanco was on record in a declaration of Ri- 
zaFs innocence of complicity in the revolt, and could not con- 
sistently have pushed the charge of conspiracy against him, 
even had he been so disposed.^ Under Polavieja, a military 

^ Data as to Blanco's relations with Rizal were contained in the special number 
of the Filipino newspaper La Independencia of December 30, 1898, in honor of 
Rizal, in the form of two letters from Rizal to Blumentritt, who sent copies of 
them to the Malolos journal. In the first, Rizal states that the idea of offering his 
serTices as a surgeon in Cuba had been suggested to him by a letter from Blumen- 
tritt himself, received at Dapitan in 1895, stating that there was a great lack of 
surgeons in Cuba; that he at once offered his services, but that months passed 
with no reply, and he had made other plans for work on a little hospital at Dapi- 
tan, when on July 30, 1896, he received a letter from General Blanco, which he 
quotes, and which states that the Government at Madrid " found no objection to 
his lending his services to the army " as a surgeon, and that, if he still desired to 
do so, the authorities at Dapitan were to give him a pass to Manila. He decided 
at once to change all his plans and go, " fearing they might attribute my refusal 
to another cause." (One wonders if, having been told of the plans of the Katipu- 
nan leaders for a rebellion, and understanding well its futility and inopportuneness, 
Rizal had not found in this knowledge an additional reason for desiring to demon- 
strate to the Spanish Government his opposition to armed rebellion and for wish- 
ing to leave the Philippines at this time.) He arrived at Manila the 6th of August, 
just before the outbreak, and when things were much stirred up and the secret 
police busy. He says that, as the monthly mail-steamer had just left for Spain, he 
sent word to Blanco that he desired to isolate himself on board the steamer on 
which he came and to see only his family. Blanco sent him on the cruiser Castilla, 
off Cavite, where he was incomunicado when the outbreak came. His words are 
worth quoting : 

" At this moment there occur the serious disturbances in Manila, disturbances 
which I lament, but which serve to demonstrate that I am not the one who is upset- 
ting things, for my absolute innocence has been shown, as is seen in the two letters 
the general has given me for the Ministers of War and the Colonies, ... as well 
as in the one to me." 

The letters written by Blanco to Rizal and to Minister Azcdrraga are quoted 
also by Foreman, op. cit., p. 533. In the letter to Azcdrraga, a duplicate of the one 
to the Minister to the Colonies, Blanco says : " His conduct daring the four years 
he has been a ddport^ at Dapitan has been exemplary ; and he is, in my judg- 
ment, BO much the more worthy of pardon and benevolent treatment, in that he 
is in no way complicated in the attempt which we are just now deploring, neither 
in conspiracy nor in any of the secret societies that they have been getting up." 

So, Rizal continoes, he left Manila on September 3 " to win a name and put an 


court was quickly convened on December 26 for the final 
hearing in the trial of Kizal on the charges of " rebellion, se- 
dition, and illicit associations/' the trial having thus far been 
conducted in secret, according to Spanish methods. The pro- 
ceedings of this court, which was in session but a few hours, 
have never been promulgated, with the reasons of its members 
for the decision reached. The argument of the military advo- 
cate for the prosecution was the principal feature of the session. 
Spanish law does not provide for the confrontation of an accused 
with the witnesses against him, with opportunity for cross- 
examination, etc.; hence, allowing for the summary methods 
of every military court, Rizal may be said to have been tried in 
due legal form, though the manner of his conviction must be 
repugnant to the sense of justice of every American, accus- 
tomed to public trials, with a procedure open to objection and 
contest on the part of the accused at every stage. The nearest 
approach to verbal testimony in open court was when Rizal 
was allowed to say a few words in his own behalf. The prose- 
cutor had put upon the records of the court a declaration taken 
according to Spanish legal requirements from Rizal himself, in 
the course of the sumario, or summary procedure preliminary 
to his arraignment on a formal charge ; like all other bits of 
testimony in this and the other mihtary trials, it was not a ver- 
batim report, question and answer, but the examiner's minutes 
of the declaration of the prisoner, with the corresponding 
amount of garbling which such evidence regularly got in these 
trials. Rizal had denied forming the Liga Filipma for the 

end to calumnies." The steamer stopped at several English ports en route, and he 
might have escaped, at least at Singapore. Before it had passed Suez, the elements 
in the Philippines which were determined on having his blood seem to have reached 
the authorities at Madrid, and the people on the boat knew that he was to be ar- 
rested on arrival at Barcelona, for Rizal states, writing to Blumentritt in the 
Mediterranean on September 28, that a passenger has told him so. In a burst of 
indignation, he thinks Blanco deceived him, and applies an epithet to the general, 
saying : " I am innocent and have no participation in the disorders, and I can swear 
it ; and now, in pay, they send me to prison. ... I cannot believe it; Spain cannot 
bear herself so infamously; but so they assure me on board." 


purpose of achieving separation from Spain ; it was, he said, 
originally designed as a society to promote Filipino develop- 
ment, social and economical. From the time of his deportation 
in 1892, he declared, he had had nothing to do with this or- 
ganization, nor had he been connected with the Katipunan, 
nor in any way cooperated with labors looking toward separa- 
tion from Spain. To combat this declaration of Rizal's, itself 
stated in the most unfavorable way for the prisoner, the pros- 
ecutor produced the minutes of other declarations, made by 
prisoners directly implicated in the August revolt. Even tak- 
ing these at their face value, they do not prove, at the worst, 
more than an assumed acquiescence by Rizal in the revolution- 
ary propaganda subsequently to 1892, while they only point 
to the belief on the part of some witnesses that the Liga Fill- 
pina had been from its inception a revolutionary organiza- 
tion, not directly proving (at least, according to proper rules 
of evidences) that it was in fact a revolutionary organization. 
But, as has already been hinted, there are good reasons for 
not accepting such declarations, taken secretly in prison, al- 
most certainly under threat of torture or after its actual appli- 
cation. In every case, too, the declarations of real significance 
as " proof " (according to Spanish legal requirements) were 
obtained from ignorant or pliable witnesses, willing to stretch 
a point here and there, perhaps, if there seemed a chance of 
saving their own lives or mitigating their punishments.* In 

^ Any impartial judge, reading these declarations, without the least knowledge 
as to the circumstances under which they were taken, would hesitate over accept- 
ing a single line of them. The possibility that these records were doctored in order 
to make the Katipunan's plans appear more barbarous even than they were, is one 
of which, as already seen, we may well have suspicions. There is also apparent, 
running through all those declarations that have been published, a persistent effort 
on the part of the military officers conducting the examinations to involve Rizal 
with the propaganda subsequent to 1892 and to implicate certain wealthy Filipinos 
whose property was under embargo with the Katipunan. Note especially, among 
Documentos pditicas de actualidad, in the ArchivOt vols, iii and iv, the declarations 
of Villaruel, the tailor (no. 26) ; of a Spanish secret-police officer, allowed to tes- 
tify, though he could not know it of his own knowledge, that the object of the 
Katipunan was to " assassinate all Spaniards " ; of a Filipino who at first denied 
all Imowledge of the conspiraoy, but two days later, being " better counseled/' 


this manner, it was " proved " that the Liga Filipina had as 
its chief object the gathering of money to buy arms for a re- 
bellion to secure independence ; that the Katipunan was only 
an offshoot of the League, a means whereby the educated men 
of the League prepared the masses for rebellion ; and that the 
aim of the Katipunan, which was thus held to be only one 
phase of a unified secret-society campaign, was to " assassinate 
all Spaniards " and proclaim independence. The links of clouded 
evidence and purely hearsay testimony were bound together 
by insinuations of the prosecutor — insinuations that were appar- 
ently given the full weight of established facts — into a chain 
of proof that Kizal had been a consistent rebel against Spain 
from the time of reading his first schoolboy's poem about a 
Filipino ^' fatherland " in literary exercises in the Jesuit acad- 
emy of Manila until the day of the Katipunan outbreak, which 
was pictured as the result of his advice and his labors. The 
statement of one witness to the effect that Rizal had written 
from Hongkong in 1892 that the League was to " raise the arts 
and commerce, because the people, when rich and united, 
might obtain its liberty and even its independence," — hearsay 
evidence at most, and, under any fair interpretation, corrobo- 
rating Rizal's own declaration — was held to prove the insin- 
cerity of his aims as avowed. More flagrant yet was the 
distortion of Rizal's position at Dapitan in counseling against 
Bonifacio's plan of revolt ; that he had discouraged revolt was 
not admitted to his credit at all, his culpability being held to 
be increased by his having said that the Filipinos were not 
ready and had not the resources for a successful rebellion.^ So 

said a certain wealthy Filipino was to equip the rebels with arms, " according to what 
a woman in Ermita had told him " (no. 27) ; and the later declarations of Valenzu- 
ela, who had been a weakminded tool of Bonifacio. 

^ See the Archivo, vol. iv, pp. 226-27 (Document no. 92). Rizal's testimony, as 
presented in the words of the Spanish inquisitor, was that he told Bonifacio's emis- 
sary that " The time was not propitious, because the various elements of the Phil- 
ippines were not united, and they had not arms, ships, money, education, and the 
elements essential for resistance; and that they ought to study the example of Cuba, 
where, notwithstanding that the insurgents had great means and the support of a 


ako, the very proclamation which he had written and offered 
to publish just as Polavieja came into power, strongly con- 
demning the rebellion then under way and asking his fellow- 
countrymen in the Tagalog provinces to lay down their arms, 
was turned against him. Polavieja had pigeonholed it, upon 
the advice of a Spanish official of unpleasant memory in the 
Philippines, because it did not condemn for all future time 
the idea of independence from Spain; similarly, its phrases 
were twisted before the trial court into a declaration to the 
people : " Wait ; be quiet now ; and, when the time comes, I 
myself will lead you against Spain." ^ A great deal was made 

great power, and were veterans in war, they were g^ing to accomplish nothing." 
The prosecutor used this, it would appear from the Spanish press reports, as an 
argument aggravating Hizal's offense, because he had not protested against even 
the idea of revolt, but merely against revolt at that time as inopportune. In other 
words, in the case of a man on trial for the specific ofPense of inciting to rebellion, 
he was held not to be exculpated at all for having, as was admitted, advised 
■trongly against this particular rebellion, but on the contrary to be additionally 
culpable for not having discountenanced the idea of revolt and of independence 
for all future time. This is a sufficient commentary upon Spanish fair play, and 
illustrates how the frankness and outspokenness of a man who did not hide his 
aims were turned against him. Rizal was really condemned for having dared to 
think and talk of a time, even in the indefinite future, when his countrymen might 
have an independent nationality. 

* See Archivo, vol. IV, pp. 266-69 (Document no. 102) for this proclamation, 
signed by Rizal in his prison on December 15, 1897, and for Auditor Peiia's recom- 
mendation adverse to its publication. Rizal said : — 

Manifesto to Certain Filipinos. 

Countrymen : — Upon my return from Spain, I have come to know that my 
name had been used among some who were in arms as a battle-cry. The news came 
to me as an unhappy surprise ; but, thinking everything already over, I kept silent 
before a circumstance I regarded as impossible of setting right. Now I hear ru- 
mors that the disturbances continue ; and, in case there are some who still continue 
to employ my name, either in bad or good faith, in order to remedy this abuse and 
undeceive the unwary I hasten to address you these lines, that the truth may be 
known. From the first that I had news of what was being planned, I opposed it, I 
fought against it, and I showed its absolute impossibility. This is the truth, and 
there still live the witnesses to what I say. I was convinced that the idea was in 
the highest degree absurd, and, what is worse, disastrous for us. I did more. 
When later on, in spite of my advice, the outbreak occurred, I spontaneously offered, 
not only my services, but my life, and my name as well, to be used in the manner 
they thought best for the purpose of stifling the rebellion ; for, convinced of the 
evils that it was going to bring upon us, I considered myself fortunate if by means 
of any sort of sacrifice I might prevent such useless misfortunes. This also stands 


of the fact, as connecting Rizal in a guilty way with the Katipu- 
nan, that his portrait had been given the place of honor in its 
halls. The officer appointed mihtary advocate for Rizal went 
through the forms of Spanish oratory in his behalf, but this 
speech did neither any good nor any harm, and probably was 
not intended to have any great effect. Nor, in the language of 
a Spanish correspondent, did the words of Rizal himself (who 
spoke with perfect composure, his arms still tied, as if the au- 
thorities obtained some childish pleasure from presenting him 
manacled) "have any effect whatever." He pointed out that the 
letters of his which had been presented were all prior to 1892 ; 
that he had planned a colonization of territory near Dapitan 
by his family and friends; that he might easily have escaped 
from Dapitan, or later from the steamer at Singapore, when 
on his way to Spain ; cited his efforts to serve as a volunteer 
with the Spanish army in Cuba, and his attempts to employ 
his influence to prevent, and later to quell, the uprising in the 
Philippines ; suggested the unwisdom of applying the same 

Countrymen : — I have given proof, as much as has any, of desiring liberties for 
our country, and I continue to desire them. But I set down as the premise the 
education of the people, so that, through instruction and labor, it might come to 
possess its own personality, and might be worthy of those liberties. In ray writ- 
ings I have recommended study, and the civic virtues, without which there is no 
redemption. I have also written (and my words have been repeated) that reforms, 
to be fruitful, must come from above, and that those coming from below were only 
to be obtained i» a manner such as would make them irregular and uncertain. Nour- 
ished upon these ideas, I cannot less than condemn, and I do condemn, that ab- 
surd and savage outbreak, plotted behind my back, which dishonors us Filipinos 
and discredits those who may speak in our behalf. I abominate its criminal pro- 
ceedings, and I disown any sort of participation in it, deploring with all the 
sorrow of my heart the ignorant victims of deception. Return, then, to your houses, 
and may God pardon those who have acted in bad faith. 

In the indorsement of Auditor Pena it is said : " With Rizal, the question is one 
of opportuneness, not of principles nor of purposes. His manifesto might be con- 
densed into these words : * In the face of the evidences of your defeat, lay down 
your arms, countrymen ; afterward, I will lead you to the promised land.' It is of 
no benefit in behalf of peace, and it might nourish in future the spirit of rebellion; 
and on that account its publication is to be advised against. Instead, it might be 
well to forbid its publication and to send these records to the judge-advocate of 
the case being prosecuted against Rizal, to be added to those proceedings." 


harsh treatment to those who desire to preserve Spanish sover- 
eignty in the islands, though with administrative reforms, as to 
those who are out-and-out separatists ; explicitly denied being 
guilty of any of the charges against him, or of having conspired 
against the Spanish Government ; but recognized that the ver- 
dict was made up, and the die had been cast against him, when 
he said : " A victim is sought, and I am the one who is chosen 
to receive the whole blame." The members of the court reached 
their verdict in an hour and a half .^ 

Word soon went about the city that Rizal was to die. The Jes- 
uits, who had been his early teachers, and for whose efforts in 
behalf of education in the Philippines he had given them much 
praise in his writings, went to see him, finally induced him to have 
the sacraments administered, and, under the influence of the hour, 
obtained from him a statement which has been announced to be a 
retraction of all that he ever wrote.^ He was shot at seven o'clock 

* The more important of the Spanish press reports of the trial, reports badly 
garbled as well as abbreviated, are reproduced in the Archivo, vol. iv, pp. 218-47. 
Documents 90 to 105 inclusive are all Rizal documents, covering also the incidents 
connected with his execution, with several articles from friar-inspired sources on 
his life. 

^ This document, as subsequently given to the public, reads : " I declare myself 
Catholic, and in this Religion, in which I was born and reared, I wish to live and 
die. I retract with all my heart whatsoever there has been in my words, writings, 
publications, and conduct contrary to my quality as a sou of the Catholic Church. 
I believe and profess what it teaches, and submit to what it commands. I abomi- 
nate Masonry, as hostile to the Church and a society prohibited by the Church. The 
diocesan prelate, as the superior ecclesiastical authority, may make public this vol- 
untary statement of mine, to repair the scandal my deeds may have caused, and 
that Grod and men may pardon me." (SeeArchivot vol. iv, p. 342.) The document is 
really a revelation of how strong a hold the teachings and influence of childhood, 
more than ever in a land like the Philippines, have even upon a man with the 
mentality and the experience in life of Rizal, rather than a reliable indication that 
Rizai repented the general tendency of his writings as a whole. Unquestionably, too, 
AS be grew older he felt that he had been unduly rabid in his youth, and became 
stronger in the belief that evolution, not revolution, was the proper pathway for 
his people. His letter to the archbishop in connection with this retraction (Noza- 
leda's De/erua obUgada^ appendix 12) shows that there was no real retraction of his 
matnrer sentiments, on political matters, at least. The Jesuit fathers had sur- 
rounded him from the moment of his death sentence, working with him all through 
the night and into the following day, also running back and forth between the 
prison and the palace of the archbishop. For other retractions, especially thos^ of 
the Lnna brothers, see the ArchivOf vol. iv, Documents nos. 106 to 116, and No- 


on the morning of December 30, 1896, on the large field next 
the Luneta, before a gay crowd of Spanish army officers and 
civilians and their wives, and, not least conspicuous of all, of 
chattering, laughing friars. The night before, he had been 
married to his Irish sweetheart, had composed a poem of fare- 
well in his cell, and had written thus to his " dearest friend,'' 
Ferdinand Blumentritt : " I am innocent of the crime of rebel- 
lion. I am going to die with a tranquil conscience." 

This was not the first nor the last of such executions, but it 
was the beginning of the end of Spanish rule in the islands. 
Rizal represented all the poetry and imagination in the dawn- 
ing national aspirations of a poetical people of the imaginative 
Orient. He was, besides, chief spokesman of the sterner judg- 
ment of the saner element among the people ; and, variously 
as his ideas and aims were distorted among the masses, often 
to suit the purposes of leaders of a very different type, his 
name was a fetish among them. The shots, which he insisted 
upon meeting upon his feet, not kneeling, reverberated around 
the archipelago. Spain had almost unified the people against 
herself, and she would sooner or later have had to reckon with 
a very different sort of rebellion than the localized affair of 


Polavieja's plan at the outset of 1897 was first to quiet the 
insurgents in the Bulakan-Nueva Ecija border on the north and 
the Laguna-Batangas mountains on the south, before opening 
directly on Cavite. His frequent movements against Llanera 
only succeeded in driving the northern rebels farther into the 
mountains, but surrenders in the Bulakan towns were frequent 

zaleda, (^. cit.f appendix 11, for Antonio Luna's letter to the archbishop. In view 
of the subsequent revolutionary record of Antonio Luna, as well as his declarations 
on political and religious matters both before and after this period of imprison- 
ment, his attitude of abjectness and the plain hypocrisy of his retraction, with a 
view to pardon, which he and his brother secured, are of considerable interest in 
a personal way. 


and Llanera felt called upon to threaten with the pain of death 
all who thus presented themselves. Aguinaldo, however, had 
himself taken the field on the east border of Cavite, and the 4000 
men with him were only prevented by active work on the part 
of General Galbis from effecting a junction with Llanera, who 
simultaneously sought to capture Pasig, burning part of it; 
this effort, if successful, would promptly have raised the lake 
region against Spain, while the insurgents could have closed 
the river route above Manila. A group from Cavite also suc- 
ceeded in arousing Sambales in February. 

Early in February, Polavieja reorganized his troops. A di- 
vision of three brigades under General Lachambre covered 
Laguna and Batangas and the borders of Cavite, with an in- 
dependent brigade under Galbis scouting on the south of the 
river Pasig. General Zappino had a brigade, mostly of natives, 
constantly working over the mountains of Manila and Morong 
to the north and east of the city, to deal with Llanera and 
Torres. Polavieja himself took the field the middle of the 
month, initiating the campaign from the borders of the lake 
south westward to Cavite, while Jaramillo, in command of the 
brigade to the southeast, was at work thence from Batangas 
into Cavite. The Spanish forces met with stubborn resistance. 
By this time the insurgents had north and east Cavite dug up 
with intrenchments as gophers burrow an alfalfa field. Primo 
de Rivera subsequently declared their intrenchments to be 
badly constructed, though well placed ; ^ but at any rate they 
served to check the Spaniards more than once, when defended 
by a handful of rifles, though by mobs of men and boys. 
Time after time, the Spanish troops were sent against these 
series of trenches without any effort being made to reconnoiter 
or to flank them, until it seemed as if they had abandoned the 
most elemental principles of warfare to show contempt for 

* They had been constructed in large part under the direction of a mestizo named 
Erangelista, who had studied engineering in Belgiuoi and was called "Greneral of 


their opponents. Polavieja's campaign was, however, much 
better conducted than the short and disastrous one of Blanco. 
His troops sometimes did flank, and they had, and used to 
more or less effect, a few pieces of artillery, mostly defective 
and cumbersome.^ Lachambre directed in person the advance 
on the chief insurgent positions, beginning with Silang, where 
five hundred natives were slain. Aguinaldo himself opposed 
the Spanish general at the coveted post of Dasmarinas, with 
5000 men under him.'^ Meanwhile, the troops from the lake 
and river southwestward had met really desperate resistance in 
obtaining control of the whole east bank of the Sapote River 
down to Manila Bay, having three captains and over 40 sol- 
diers killed in one little engagement, which became a hand-to- 
hand fight. After he took Dasmarinas, reinforcements were 
brought up to Lachambre, and with some 15,000 men at his 
disposal, over half of them natives and volunteers, he captured 
the insurgents' chief stronghold, Imus, losing 100 men killed 
at the first set of trenches taken by the bayonet, and 150 in the 

^ Much of the Spaniards' cannonading, including that from the little gunboats 
used to batter the towns on the north shore of Cavite, was as ineffective (if not as 
noisy) as that of the mock guns the insurgents had made from iron pipes, and even 
from large pieces of bamboo wound with wire or iron bands. 

* It is to be borne in mind, when insurgent numbers are given, that only a small 
fraction of them had practical firearms, most of them being armed with bolos, while 
ten men were ready to take up the rifle of one who fell. Primo de Rivera after- 
ward declared that the total number of portable firearms they possessed had at no 
time exceeded 1500. This was an underestimate, as Primo de Rivera continually 
depreciated the insurrection in his reports to the home Government ; but at any 
rate, Foreman's estimate of 7000 rifles is a great exaggeration, for that total could 
not be reached, if parlor rifles, shotguns, revolvers, and nondescript arms of all 
sorts were taken into account. Moreover, comparatively few new rifles were ob- 
tained from Japan or Hongkong before the insurrection beg^n or during its con- 
tinuance. La Independencia, November 16, 1898, contains a story about a shipment 
of rifles from Japan being landed at Naik in October, 1896. The Katipunan leaders, 
to encourage the Cavite masses to rise, circulated a proclamation that 40,000 arms 
had just been obtained. The Spanish in Manila, where the steamer crew were 
tried, thought that there were SCKX) so landed. Most of the arms of the insurgents 
were at first in Cavite, and were obtained in large part by the desertions and cap- 
tures of natives of the civil guard. The assortment thus obtained was nondescript, 
was patched out everywhere by the defective and archaic guns and revolvers which 
had been from time beyond reckoning in the hands of the ladrones who infested 
all the mountainous regions, and the ammunition was in large part home-made. 


series of trenches just beyond, where 400 dead insurgents were 
left, among them Crispulo Aguinaldo, a brother of Emilio and 
a high officer in the insurgent organization. The town itself 
and its powder magazine were then fired by the insurgents 
and deserted. Lachambre sent men around to the west of the 
peninsula to take Noveleta, intending to move from both sides 
on Old Cavite. Bakoor was taken after a skirmish, but the 
troops on the left had some warm work around Santa Cruz and 
Noveleta. The latter taken. Old Cavite and Binakayan were 
occupied without resistance. The north line of the province 
was in Spanish possession, as well as the east, and, after seven 
months' rule from the military headquarters of Imus and Old 
Cavite, Aguinaldo had been ousted. He and nearly all the mem- 
bers of the Katipunan cabinet^ had withdrawn to the southward 
to San Francisco de Malabon ; but this place was already 
threatened by the advanced Spanish position and fell on April 
6, after a brief but vigorous resistance in the last well-intrenched 
insurgent stronghold, the Spanish troops slaughtering 300 or 
400 natives, most of them in cold blood with the bayonet. 
The remaining towns near by were promptly occupied without 

General Polavieja had been cabling the Government for more 
soldiers to use in garrisoning thoroughly the disturbed country, 
desiring, it is said, as many as 15,000 fresh troops. The Gov- 
ernment was fully engaged in Cuba, and had to refuse ; and 
almost immediately thereafter Polavieja's request to come home 
because of a tropical liver (which had compelled his return 
from the field to Manila some time before), supported by the 
diagnoses of physicians, was granted. He left on April 15, and, 
during the ten days before the arrival of his successor, General 
Lachambre was governor-sfeneral.^ In the four months of 

^ Paciano Rizal, brother of Job6, and the latter'i wife, the former Miss Bracken, 
were also in the rebel camp, having worked through the Spanish lines shortly 
after the execntion of Jos^, and served to stimulate the masses. 

■ Lachambre is the one Spanish officer of rank who emerged from the ITiilip- 
pine campaign with credit The campaign under him has been described by F. de 


Polavieja's rule, the Spanish forces had lost in killed 20 officers 
(including one general) and over 300 soldiers, and in wounded 
80 officers and 1200 men. ^Apparently, with the loss of its 
chief positions in Cavite, the insurrection was all but over; 
but Polavieja's demand for more troops, to supply the losses 
by sickness, etc., and to garrison the points widely separated, 
indicated that he regarded the attitude of the populace as 
still more than suspicious. With the taking of Imus, he had 
extended amnesty for a short space ; and in Bulak^n, Batan- 
gas, Laguna, and the occupied parts of Cavite the presentations 
soon mounted to 25,000. Scare-stories about uprisings in 
Manila ceased to circulate, though as late as February 25 there 
had been a mutiny of carabineers near the Bridge of Spain. 
The people around Kahbo, on the north coast of Panai, had 
recently effected an organization similar to the Katipunan, and 
had given the neighboring commands of the civil guard some 
trouble to suppress them; but this seemed to be a detached 

There were evidences from the outside that the insurrection 
had entered upon an agonic period. Bonifacio had, before the 
outbreak, shown himself to be a rule-or-ruin leader. As Agui- 
naldo's prestige and influence increased, Bonifacio's jealousy 
of him became that of a spoiled child. It was not lessened 
by his own failures as a military man, while Aguinaldo for 
some time seemed, to the uncritical populace, to be achiev- 
ing wonders. Bonifacio, too, might well have found legiti- 

Monteverde y Sedeno in La DivisiSn Lachambre (Madrid, 1898). This is a record 
of the Polavieja regime in general, rather more to be relied upon than the personal 
records by Blanco and Primo de Rivera (in each case a Memoriae addressed to the 
Senate of Spain, published in Madrid in 1897 and 1898 respectively). In Major- 
General G. W. Davis's report on the division of the Philippines (Reports of the War 
Department, 1903y vol. m) is the only reasonably satisfactory abstract there is in 
English of the military operations of the Philippine insurrection during 1896-98, 
prepared by Major John S. Mallory. He depended to some extent on Monteverde 
y Sedeno, but principally on Sastrdn, and had not seen the memorias of Blanco and 
Primo de Rivera ; his errors are the errors of the Spanish writers, above all in 
their exaggeration of insurgent resources in order to excuse the Spanish blunders 
and incompetency. 


mate cause for complaint in Aguinaldo's always noticeable 
disposition to put his own relatives and friends to the front.^ 
Until some of the active participants come forward to tell 
the story accurately and fairly, it is impossible to say just 
what was the organization of the insurrection after the Kati- 
punan headquarters were set up in Cavite in September, 1896. 
It was, at any rate, only a piece of provisional patchwork. 
Very soon, the Katipunan seems to have had two headquarters 
whence it issued commands of a mihtary nature and also orders 
having to do with the civil organization of the towns occupied 
in Cavite. The Sangunian Magdalo had its seat at Imus, where 
Aguinaldo was supreme, and the Magdiwang at San Francisco 
de Malabon, where Bonifacio estabhshed himself. Part of the 
time each seems to have had a more or less complete cabinet. 
Cavite was divided into five military " zones " and the more 
distant parts of the province were recognized as practically 
under the dictatorship of appointed leaders, while Llanera 
and Torres operated quite independently to the north of Ma- 
nila, though recognizing the authority of the Cavite councils.^ 
Gradually, the military side of the organization became the 
stronger, as was inevitable under the circumstances. Agui- 
naldo came, almost by common consent, to be recognized as 
supreme in this respect, under the title of " Generalissimo." 
The jealousies between him and Bonifacio became more than 
ever acute when defeat followed defeat in March and April of 
1897. At Aguinaldo's instigation, Bonifacio was seized, and 

^ The tax administration and three of the leading military positions in Cavite 
were at one time in the hands of the Aguinaldo family, aside from the position of 
** Generalissimo " itself and the other posts held by close friends and supporters 
of Aguinaldo. 

* The chiefs of the rather cumbersome civil organization, so called, which was 
made up somewhat in imitation of the central government at Manila, were virtu- 
ally figtire-heads, especially when the military organization came to be better de- 
fined. They were, practically without exception, as were the military leaders, from 
the rising middle class which was being created by educational and commercial 
opportunities. The information about the insurgent organization of 1896-97 con- 
tained in Sawyer, Foreman, and the Spanish writers on the period is unreliable and 


later seems to have been tried and sentenced to death by one 
of the summary military courts he himself had been fond of 
employing. He disappeared on April 23, when the insurgents 
still remaining in ranks were seeking to strengthen themselves 
in southern Cavite.^ 

The new governor-general, Don Fernando Primo de Rivera 
y Sobremonte, Marques de Estella, arrived on April 25, 1897. 
He was received with the usual great parade, the Te Deum in 
the cathedral, and the other stately formalities, coming down 
from mediaeval times, which survived to the last in Manila. 
One of his first acts was the revival of Polavieja's amnesty, 
extending it to May 17, the King's birthday. He was after- 
wards to be harshly criticized both for underestimating the 
rebellion's strength and for undue leniency. The rebels also 
claimed later to have placed their hopes for reform upon his 
assumed attitude as well as his more or less definite promises. 
What his attitude really was, he himself has said, in his cable 
message to the Government at Madrid on November 27, 

. . . There must be much thought given to the political and eco- 
nomic reforms, which should tend to assure the well-being of the na- 
tive, or to guarantee him against abuses and clerical exactions, but at 
the same time to separate him from modern currents and principles, 
which, if they are the essential life of European societies, are the virus 

^ More or less mystery has surronnded his death, from the unwillingness of those 
who know the circumstances to talk about it, precisely as was the case in 1899, 
when Aguinaldo's rival in the opposition to the United States was assassinated. 
The Spanish version given by Sastr<5n, op. cit., p. 274, is that Aguinaldo arrested 
Bonifacio in the midst of the personal rivalries between them, and, after he at- 
tempted to escape, organized a council of war to try him on various charges, one 
being his having executed on his own responsibility the friars Piernavieja (the 
whilom " bishop ") and three Recollects, one of whom had been on very friendly 
terms with Aguinaldo. The manner of Bonifacio's death is also in doubt ; some 
say he was thrown over a cliflP. Apolinario Mabini, who was intimate with Agui- 
naldo's disposition and conduct, in 1898 and 1899 at least, wrote these words in the 
chapter of his posthumous memoirs which deals with Aguinaldo and Luna : " The 
death of Andres Bonifacio had plainly revealed the existence in Aguinaldo of an 
unrestrained ambition for power, and the personal enemies of Luna, by means of 
artful intrigues, exploited this weakness to ruin him [Luna]." (^El ComerciOf Ma- 
nila, July 23, 1903.) 


that is inoculated in colonies for the growth of ideas of separatism 
and ambition which revolutions originate.^ 

The new captain-general (the ex-offido rank held in the 
Spanish army by the Philippine governor-general) took the 
field in person the first of May. He claims the credit of orig- 
inating an " envolving " campaign which was to surround and 
crush the insurgents ; but Polavieja had, before his departure, 
reorganized the army in separate brigades, with the apparent 
purpose of hemming in the enemy in the south and center of 
Cavite. At any rate, the plan was not a complete success. The 
insurgents fought briefly, then melted from sight, most of 
them returning to their homes under instructions to take ad- 
vantage of the amnesty, the better-armed taking to more inac- 
cessible regions. With the cooperation of the gunboats, the 
start was made at Naik, near the coast of West Cavite, where 
Aguinaldo himself put up a vigorous resistance, and most of 
the 400 insurgents killed were bayoneted.^ The troops oper- 
ating from the east were rapidly taking the southern towns of 
Cavite, meeting with considerable resistance at Indang. The 
troops immediately under the captain-general suffered nearly 
150 casualties in taking Maragondon in a hand-to-hand fight 
with Aguinaldo and his men. But thereafter the insurgents 
promptly abandoned the three minor towns they still held, and 
the opposition seemed to have faded from sight. Primo de 
Rivera returned to Manila, and on May 17 extended the am- 
nesty, which was producing surrenders in Cavite. Most of the 
garrisons in Cavite were abandoned almost as soon as estab- 
lished, and a few military centers were set up. It was the plan 

^ Quoted in his Memoria dxrigida al Senado (Madrid, 1898), p. 87. He was 
then speaking to the Liberal Miniatry, which had succeeded the Conservative Grov- 
ernment under which he was sent out. The agreement of Biak-na-bat<S, to nego- 
tiate which the new ministry had asked him to remain, was about to be concluded. 

* The 73d Regiment of natives was, as quite commonly, in the forefront of the 
Spanish attack. Primo de Rivera, op. cit.^ p. 50, says : "This body has taken a 
most important part in all the combats during the war. In many, it has decided 
the result. They go into danger happily, as if death were not threatening ; and 
when it arrives, they see it come without uttering a complaint, however great the 
•offerings that torment them." 


to leave but a few soldiers from the Peninsula in the province, 
and the rest were being drawn rapidly to Manila. Circum- 
stances combined to start an epidemic of desertions among 
the native regiments, which had fought so bravely, but were 
dissatisfied with their scant recognition and with their treat- 
ment. The Spanish staff organization and supply was wretch- 
edly defective. Chinese cooUes and the native polistas (men 
working out the labor-tax) had been employed to bear the 
provisions, for lack of wagon- or pack-trains ; and at one time 
over 1000 native soldiers had been disarmed and set to pack- 
ing provisions on their backs over a rough trail. It was neces- 
sary, unless the army supply should break down completely, 
even with the reduced number of posts, to connect them with 
military roads, Cavite being in large part without highways or 
anything but poor trails. When the native soldiers were set at 
roadmaking, they promptly began to desert in small parties, 
taking with them their rifles, to insure them a welcome among 
the insurgent bands operating as guerrillas on the Cavite- 
Batangas-Laguna mountainous border. 

Guerrilla bands were also quite active in various portions of 
the provinces to the north and west of Manila, and actions in 
them and on the south were not infrequent during May and 
June, the most notable being the retaking of Tahsay in Batan- 
gas, which the insurgent Malvar had held. Before he left, 
Polavieja had said : " Cavite is the scandal, but Bulak^n is the 
danger." Though hemmed in and a fugitive, Aguinaldo was 
now absolutely supreme in command, but must make some 
stroke to retain his prestige ; he decided to effect a juncture 
with Llanera and transfer the center of operations to Bulak^n. 
On June 10, he crossed the Pasig River, less than ten miles 
from the walled city and perhaps in sight of the suburbs, join- 
ing the rebel band on Purai Mountain, in Manila province, 
though not, as supposed, taking part in the fight here four 
days later.^ This was an ill-concerted action initiated by sub- 

1 Frimo de Kivera says Aguinaldo had but a half-dozen companions. The for- 


ordinate Spanish officers, one column failing to support the 
other, which in consequence went directly against unflanked 
trenches up a mountain-side and was compelled to retreat with 
serious loss. Aguinaldo now began to be called " President of 
the Revolutionary Government,*' but was virtually dictator. 
He deposed three members of the former cabinet, and appointed 
his close associate, Mariano Trias, " Vice-President," with com- 
mand south of the Pasig. The Katipunan was kept up, at least 
in form, wherever it could serve a useful purpose, and a native 
priest was made president of it.^ 

Primo de Rivera apparently believed in May and June that 
the final collapse had come, and his telegrams gave this im- 
pression in Spain. He extended absolute pardon to all minor 
offenders on June 18. Many of the deportes were being 
brought back, and on July 15 the embargo on their property 
was removed. Criticism of these measures by the Spaniards in 
Manila was as open as it dared to be. Before this, however, 
Primo de Rivera had checked his optimism, noting, as he re- 
marks in a sort of bewildered fashion, that men surrendered 
for a time in numbers, but never brought arms with them. On 
July 2, he issued a proclamation of sterner tenor, strictly lim- 
iting the amnesty to July 10, and reviving the old custom of 
passports between towns and harrios? Only 4000 presented 
themselves during July, practically all in one district. The 
new revolutionary organization in Bulak^n had pulled itself 
together, and was sending out orders right and left. The 
rainy season had come on, and the young Spanish recruits, 

mer's critics published in Spain the charge that Aguinaldo had 2000 armed men 
with him. Sastrdn, op. cit., p. 280, says there were 500 followers. They were doubt- 
leas few, as the main force with rifles, which it was desired to transfer to Bulak4n, 
inarched around the lake through Laguna and Morong provinces. 

1 In Cavite, the year before, the insurrection had had its " Chaplain of Forces,'* 
and one native priest for a time bore the title of " Philippine Bishop," it is said. 
The native priests took a much more prominent part in the revolutionary organ- 
ization of 1898-1900. 

' Considerable annoyance was constantly caused to the native tillers of the soil 
ontKide the towns by this system, and minor officers in local authority very com- 
monly took advantage of it to collect bribes for their issuance of passports. 


who had long before begun to collapse from their poor nour- 
ishment and lack of proper care while campaigning under a 
tropical sun, were dropping out all the time and having to be 
sent home. The strain on Spain's resources in Cuba was most 
severe, and, upon the authorization of the Cortes, a royal de- 
cree of June 28 announced the issuance of bonds to the amount 
of 40,000,000 Philippine dollars, at six per cent interest, pay- 
able in forty years, " with the special guarantee of the Philip- 
pine customs and the general guarantee of the nation." ^ 

To meet the changed conditions to the north of Manila, the 
Spanish forces there were reorganized and somewhat rein- 
forced. By October, Primo de Rivera was feeling quite seri- 
ously the need for more troops. After what he had reported 
to Spain, he could not consistently ask that they be sent from 
there. His repeated requests for authority to enlist more na- 
tive troops, mixing them into the regiments with the Spaniards 
to hold them more loyal, had not been granted, partly owing 
to the changes of administration going on in Spain. Hence 
he resorted to a new enlistment of volunteers in all parts of 
the archipelago, so-called local volunteers being recruited for 
police duty in and about their towns, the design being to release 
more regular troops for operations, while the " mobilized vol- 
unteers " were recruited to serve as auxiliaries for such opera- 
tions. There seemed to be little trouble in obtaining such 
volunteers ; of ttimes they were most easily secured in the towns 
nearest the rebel operations, as the people were beginning to 
feel seriously the strain and losses of constant guerrilla warfare 
in their territory, since they had to support and pay both sides 
all the time and frequently lose their crops as well. Attacks on 
the towns or outlying barrios were frequent; three times San 

* This was, strictly speaking, the first Philippine public debt. (An effort to nego- 
tiate a Philippine loan of 3850,000 thirty years before had failed.) It afterward 
figured in the discussions of the peace commissions which negotiated the Treaty 
of Paris, and had an influence in connection with the payment of 320,000,000 by 
the United States to Spain which has been generally overlooked in the discussions 
of the matter in the former coimtry. 


Rafael, in Bulakan, was attacked desperately and once nearly 
captured with the small garrison in it, while Aliaga, an im- 
portant town in Nueva Ecija, was barely saved by the arrival of 
reinforcements, after some of the Spaniards there had been 
captured and the little force driven into the church and con- 
vent. Guerrilla operations extended on the south into Tayabas, 
and on the north and west into Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan and 
Sambales. On September 10, another alleged plot for a rising 
in Manila was uncovered, and a heliograph with which it was 
said the insurgents inside were communicating with Biak-na- 
batd was captured. As many as 1500 men were at times en- 
gaged in these attacks on towns. San Pablo, Batangas, was 
only saved to the Spaniards by hand-to-hand fighting in the 
streets, as was Nerzagaray, Bulak^n. In September, too, the 
almost isolated town of Baler, on the Pacific coast of Luzon, 
rose in mutiny, and the Spaniards there were only saved by the 
cooperation of men from two gunboats, who relieved the gar- 
risons besieged in the church. Still, the principal nucleus of 
insurgents in the corners of Bulak^n, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, 
and Tarlak provinces was gradually being driven from post to 
post in the mountains and hemmed in where it must make a 
final stand. The troops under General Monet were overworked, 
but quite generally successful from October on, though there 
was occasional encouragement to the insurgents from such a 
fiasco as that of the assault on Mount Kamansi (in the cor^ 
ners of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and Tarlak) on November 28. 
The Spaniards did not reconnoiter, one column abandoned its 
flanking movement, and the other attempted to capture 
trenches by frontal assaults up a steep trail. After six re- 
pulses with severe loss, they brought up some artillery the next 
day and took the position, a little force of Makabebe volun- 
teers distinguishing themselves. The insurgents were now 
confined practically to the mountains of northern Bulak^n. 
They were driven from Mount Minuyan, and Aguinaldo joined 
the main contingent now left in the ^' impregnable " position of 


Biak-na-bat(5. This was their last mountain stronghold, and 
their desperate efforts of a few preceding months to store this 
and the other posts with supplies from raids on the chief 
grain depots of the agricultural valleys had not been very suc- 
cessful. Primo de Rivera was planning a trocha, another fea- 
ture adopted from Cuban warfare, to hem them in completely 
before the final attacks were made ; ^ and Archbishop Noza- 
leda, bringing pressure to bear through the friar priests of the 
Bulakan towns, promised him 20,000 natives to act as bearers 
of provisions for the final operations, as it was believed, of the 
campaign. But the blockhouses were never built, and General 
Monet was, to his great bewilderment, ordered on December 
13 to cease all active operations. A new phase of the revolu- 
tion was about to develop itself — the much-discussed "Peace 
of Biak-na-bato." 


No end of contradictory statements have been made about 
this curious agreement, sometimes called the " Treaty of Biak- 
na-bat(5," both in Spain and in the Philippines ; but it is prin- 
cipally in the United States that unwarranted deductions have 
been made with regard to it, based upon equally unauthorized 
premises. Some mystery does, indeed, surround its negotiation 
and, in minor particulars, its actual terms ; but data have been 
all the time quite readily accessible wheref rom the more im- 
portant facts about it could be derived. In the first place, it is 
to be said that no " treaty " was ever signed, and indeed that 
so far as regarded the chief Spanish authority concerned in 
the negotiation, he scarcely signed anything besides the checks 
to be given to the insurgents. In the second place, this repre- 
sentative deliberately and definitely refused to negotiate at all 
upon the basis of the demands for governmental reforms which 

1 For Primo de Rivera's proclamation of November, 1897, establishing a form 
of " reconcentration " in the Tagalog provinces, to begin from December 14, see 
La PolUicay vol. vm, pp. 4-5. 


were at first outKned by the insurgents, and they, or at any 
rate their representative, acquiesced in this. Finally, it is im- 
possible to say how far Primo de Rivera, who allowed it to be 
written down that the insurgents " confidently expect " that 
"Spain will satisfy the desires of the Filipino people" may 
have given warrant for the belief that certain reforms would 
be adopted, and above all, it is impossible to say how far the 
negotiator, Pedro A. Paterno, may have encouraged this belief 
in his representations to the insurgents. We are not able, on 
evidence now available, to give the Ke direct to Aguinaldo, 
when he states that he and his associates were promised re- 
forms. What may be affirmed without possibility of doubt, 
however, is that no formal engagement to this end was ever 
made, as he and they must have known ; and the probabilities 
are that the whole arrangement was simply for the payment of 
a large sum of money by Spain to secure the absence from the 
islands of the disturbing leaders and the surrender of their 

According to a letter of General Primo de Rivera to the 
then President of the Spanish Cabinet, Seiior C^novas on Au- 
gust 4, 1897, the idea of procuring peace and tranquillity in 

^ The data wherebj the story of the Biak-na-bat6 affair may be constructed 
with some approach to completeness are to be found in the following documents : 
The Memoria of Primo de Rivera, already cited, pp. 121-58 ; Manuel Sastrdn, La 
IruurrecciSn en Filipinos y Guerra Hispano-Americana^ edition already cited, chap- 
ters V and VI ; captured documents of Aguinaldo relating to this ag^ement, now in 
the possession of the War Department at Washington, translation of which appeared 
in the Congressional Record, vol. 36, part 6, pp. 6092-94 ; a brief statement by 
Aguinaldo in his Resefia veridica de la revoluci6n filipina (Nneva Ciiceres, Philip- 
pines, 1899), a translated version of which appears in the Congressional Record, 
pp. 440-45 of the appendix to vol. 35 ; and La Politico de Espofio en FUipiruu, vol. 
vn., pp. 552-56, and vol. vni, pp. 7, 21-23, 45-49, 101-02. Foreman, op. cii.^ 
pp. 557-^, gives the ridiculous letter which Paterno afterward wrote to Primo de 
BLivera plaintively demanding his " compensation," but Foreman apparently had not 
taken the trouble to read the Memoria of Primo de Rivera, in which this document is 
given, or he would not have made so many mistakes about the whole affair. The 
document which he quotes on pages 546-47 as the text of the agreement signed 
WM read in the Spanish Cortes in Jane, 1898, by critics of Primo de Rivera, but 
is not the agreement as to the surrender that was finally signed, nor are its terms 
correct as to the money payments. 


the islands by paying the insurgent leaders a round sum to 
surrender their arms and depart for Japan or Chinese ports 
had just been broached to him by Pater no. ^ The latter spoke 
ostensibly for himself alone, but had apparently felt his way 
with the insurgents on the matter, and probably, besides his 
strong desire to "figure," was inspired by some discussion 
among the various wealthy half-caste natives, of the desirability 
of inducing the more irreconcilable native element to abandon 
a useless struggle and use this action as a lever to obtain re- 
forms from Spain. Before this letter reached Spain, Canpvas 
had been slain by an assassin, and the provisional cabinet, during 
its month or so of existence, did not reply to Primo de Rivera's 
recommendation that this way of ending the rebellion offered 
great economic advantages to Spain in the saving of troops 
and military operations. Meanwhile, Paterno was going back 
and forth between Manila and the rebel camp in Bulak^n. The 
first reply which he brought from the insurgents on August 
13 was a very great increase in the amount of money Paterno 
had named as necessary to procure peace, and also contained 
specific clauses as to reforms; namely : Expulsion of the friars; 
representation in the Cortes ; equal rights under the laws for 
natives with Peninsulars; a share for the native in higher ad- 
ministration; tax-reform in their behalf; in connection with the 
secularization of the parishes, recognition of the native priests ; 
individual rights, the right of association and the liberty of 
the press being named. ^ Primo de Rivera states, and thedocu- 

* There had been some informal talk of peace negotiations under Polavieja. See 
La PoliticGy vol. vn, pp. 326-28, and vol. vni, pp. 43-44. First, the Franciscans 
broached the matter to Aguinaldo, then the superior of the Jesuits. Aguinaldo 
said later that Polavieja failed to send his emissary to the place agreed upon (jbid.f 
p. 47) ; it does not appear, however, that Polavieja was directly concerned in the 

* These are the clauses which it has been repeatedly affirmed in the United 
States constituted the terms of the " Treaty of Biak-na-bat6." They may be found 
complete in translated form in the Congressional Record, vol. 35, part 6, p. 6093 ; 
they are there inclosed in brackets, to indicate where Paterno crossed them out at 
the direction of Primo de Rivera, Paterno also making other changes calculated to 
eliminate from the document everything that might lend support to the charge 


ments bear him out, that he absolutely refused to consider 
these demands ; that he declared that Spain could never admit 
anything " which might affect her honor or her sovereignty, or 
involve compromises for the future " ; that they would have to 
trust to the magnanimity of the Government, and that he could 
only employ his good offices to indicate such reforms as he 
thought were needed. There ensued a lull in the negotiations, 
but Paterno was actively traveling about between the rebel 
headquarters and Manila, going also to Cavite to interview 
leaders there, and holding gatherings in his house in the capi- 
tal. He finally came again to the governor-general, and, the 
latter says, stated that the terms of the previous document repre- 
sented " an aspiration which the rebels wished the government 
to take into account; that they understood that the country 
was not sufficiently prepared for the transformation they de- 
sired.*^ Primo de Rivera continues : "Pardon for the masses, 
the chiefs to depart in safety, and money, are what they de- 
sired, as Paterno repeatedly stated, and in return the factions 
were all to surrender their arms.* 

On October 4, the provisional ministry was succeeded by a 
Liberal Cabinet, with Sagasta as President and Moret as Min- 
ister for the Colonies.^ Primo de Rivera, who had tendered 

that its being received and discussed by the governor-general constituted to that 
extent an obligation upon his government. Primo de Rivera, op cit.y p. 130, gives 
a summary of the same demands. 

* Primo de Rivera, op. cit.^ p. 131. The italics are those of the text. 

* This was the administration which it was for a time hoped would bring about 
a peaceful settlement of the issues in Cuba, and under which the well-known 
autonomy programme for the latter island was adopted at the outset of 1898. 
The Filipinos had especial reasons for hoping to obtain concessions through Moret, 
as he had been a pronounced Liberal, had associated considerably with a certain 
class of Filipino propagandists in Madrid, notably Isabelo de los Reyes and Pas- 
cnal Poblete, whom be now gave posts under the Government. As already seen in 
this chapter, he bad, as far back as 1870, projected the secularization of education 
in the Philippines. Primo de Rivera had earned the reputation of being liberally 
disposed toward the Filipinos, but he had obtained his appointment at the hands 
of the Conservative party, which at once implied that he would be turned out by 
the Liberals ; moreover, be had been harshly criticized in speeches by Seiior 
Sngasta. There is some evidence that the War Department documents relative to 
Biak-na-bat(5 had somewhere been " doctored " to throw the entire onus of the 
Biak-na-batd agreement upon the Liberal Government In the copy of Patemo'f 



his resigDation on the 5th, cabled at length to the new Gov- 
ernment on the 7th, announcing that a definite agreement for 
closing with the insurgents on a money basis had been ob- 
tained. He presented the advantages of the plan as being : 
The saving of money; the saving of lives (the annual loss 
through deaths and sickness being 40 per cent, or 10,000 
men) ; and that it would destroy the prestige of the chiefs 
who sold out a7id emigrated. There was danger all the time, 
too, that the rebels would secure more arms by smuggling. 
On the other hand, he presented his plans for military con- 
quest, which he was certain of obtaining, if he could be au- 
thorized to organize more volunteers, mixing the native troops 
with the Peninsular in battalions ; and he urged a speedy re- 
solution, as with December would come the dry season and 
the time for operating. He concluded : " To offer reforms to- 
day would be useless; they are fighting for independence; 
after conquering them in one way or another, there may be 
conceded or imposed the reforms that are suitable." ^ The new 
ministry, fully occupied with Cuba, seems to have seized upon 
his suggestions ; and, after asking further details as to the 
manner of paying the money and as to what other officials 
indorsed the plan,^ gave him authority to carry it out, only 
enjoining upon him to do it speedily. 

first letter to Aguinaldo, there is a reference to Moret's saccession to the Ministry 
for the Colonies as being calculated to insure reforms in the Philippines. The 
letter is dated August 9, 1897 ; and Moret did not become Minister for the Col- 
onies until the following October. One of the first acts of the new Liberal Ministry 
was to cancel the so-called " decree of Philippine reform " adopted by the con- 
servative provisional ministry on September 15, 1897. This decree virtually nul- 
lified the autonomy conceded by the Maura law, restored the rights of inspecting 
schools, intervening in local government, etc., to the friars, provided specifically 
against secret societies, and in general reintroduced the discretionary powers of 
the old regime and strengthened the power of the friars. See La PolUica, vol. vn, 
pp. 427-34, 465. 

^ Primo de Rivera, op. cit.f pp. 125-27. 

* Primo de Rivera replied that the archbishop, the chief of staff, the auditor- 
general, the director of the Spanish-Philippine Bank, the alcalde of Manila, the 
secretary-general, and the civil governor of Manila province were the only ones 
taken into his confidencei and they enthusiastically approved the plan. (Tbid.f 
p. 128.) 


New difficulties arose, however. Other chiefs had been com- 
ing to the front in the guerrilla operations outside of the im- 
mediate direction of the three or four leaders in Bulak^n. 
They feared they would not be recognized in the transaction, 
and there was also a radical party among the insurgents and 
among the propagandists at Hongkong which opposed the 
surrender. This party seems to have imposed its will upon the 
assembly of revolutionists at Biak-na-bat(5 during the last days 
of October. Aguinaldo's leadership was not seriously ques- 
tioned, but he was in effect given notice that he and a chosen 
few intimates could not dictate the action of other chiefs unless 
they took consultation with them.^ More potent, however, than 
personal ambitions and jealousies or the sentiment for con- 
tinuing the warfare was, it is to be feared, the suspicion that 
there would not be a " fair deal " in the distribution of the 
largesse of Spain which Primo de Rivera was only waiting to 
bestow. There was more than a little anxiety about this in 
the guerrilla camps of Cavite and Batangas, in Manila and 
Hongkong, and even in the circles of the " Assembly " at 
Biak-na-bat<5. Meanwhile, Primo de Rivera was cabling the 
Government, after an examination of the provinces along the 

^ It is strange, indeed, to note that, at the very moment when the insurrection 
as an orgauized movement was well-uigh crushed, it made in some ways greater 
pretensions to a " national " organization than in the days of its greatest ascend- 
ancy in Cavite. The " Revolutionary Assembly " of the closing months in Bulakin 
seems, however, to have left control of affairs to the " Supreme Council," consist- 
ing of the President, Vice-President and secretaries of Foreign Affairs, War, 
Internal Government, and the Treasury. According to Sastr<5n, op. cit.y p. 315, 
the " Provisional Constitution," which was to last until the " Philippine Republic " 
should be established, gave to the " Supreme Council " the general control of 
government, and, among others, the special powers of levying and collecting taxes, 
contracting loans at home or abroad, issuing paper money and coining money, inter- 
vening to bring about an agreement in suits at lawp making alliances, and of harmon^ 
izing with Spain for the purpose of securing peace in the islands. Sastrdn dates this 
document November 1, 1896, which is a mistake for 1897. As given in full in La 
Political vol. vin, pp. 8-9, it proclaims definitely as the aim of the revolution a 
complete separation from Spain, and provides simply for a " treaty of peace." 
Tagalog is the declared " official language of the Republic," and universal suf- 
frage is to be the method of electing representatives of the provinces in the 
** Assembly," which if only given the power to elect the officers. 


railroad, that he could get volunteers enough to end the dis- 
order very speedily. However, the industrious Paterno ^ had 
presented himself at Malakanang on November 15 with a new 
power of attorney from the insurgents, in which Baldomero 
Aguinaldo (cousin of the chief) appeared also as the more 
direct representative of Cavite interests. There was then drawn 
up a document which contained the bases that were accepted 
and signed by Primo de Rivera as one party and by Paterno 
on behalf of the insurgents.^ These bases were : The three 
leaders who have empowered Paterno will surrender themselves 
and all the arms under them, and obligate themselves to secure 
the surrender of such commanders as actually follow them ; a 
general and complete amnesty will be proclaimed, but Span- 
iards and other non-natives in the insurgent ranks will be ex- 
pelled from the army and Filipino deserters from the Spanish 
army must return and serve out their time ; bands not recog- 
nizing Aguinaldo's authority may surrender under these pro- 
visions, but, if they do not do so, will be treated simply as 
outlaws ; the governor-general will negotiate only with Agui- 
naldo relative to providing " the means to support the lives " 
of those who surrender, this aid being given " in view of the 
desperate situation to which the war has reduced them." 
Lastly, Paterno is permitted to state, " in the name of those 
whom he represents," that they "confidently expect that, on 
account of the foresight of the Government of His Majesty, 
it will take into consideration and satisfy the desire of the 
Filipino people, in order to assure them the peace and well- 

^ In the famous letter already referred to (pp. 155-58 of Primo de Rivera's 
Memoria, and pp. 557-60 of Foreman), in which Paterno, who styles himself the 
" Maguino," or Prince, of Luzon and the " Arbiter of the Destinies " of the insur- 
gents, modestly requests to be made a Spanish grandee of the first class, preferably 
a prince or a duke, with a right to represent his people in the Senate ; he also 
claims that he spent his resources abundantly, including " values both pecuniary 
and of a non-material sort," to " win over the minds " of the insurgents to peace. 
(Primo de Rivera says this remarkable document was left unsigned on his desk.) 

* Primo de Rivera had been given express authority from Madrid to sign a 
" contract." The document referred to is given in the Cong. Record, 57th Cong., 
Ist Sess., p. 6094. 


being which they deserve." The only other document officially 
signed was the contract of December 14, containing the stip- 
ulations as to how the surrender of arms and the payments 
of money were to be made.^ The delay of one month in actu- 
ally carrying out the agreement apparently reached on No- 
vember 15 was caused by Primo de Kivera's objection to the 
small number of arms it was proposed to surrender, by the 
claim of Aguinaldo that he could not control more than a 
fraction of his reputed followers, by the demand of Aguinaldo 
to receive the full amount of money at once even though sur- 
rendering but a fraction of the arms that were being used 
against Spain, and by the activity which General Monet's cam- 
paign took on at the close of November. The insurrection had 
been driven from all sides upon Biak-na-bat(5 and was well 
surrounded when, on December 12, the fifteen days Primo de 
Rivera had conceded for the surrender of arms expired. That 
day, a committee from the insurgent camp appeared, ready to 
surrender, as Primo de Rivera cabled Madrid, " without pre- 
tensions to reforms." He expressed his confidence of being 
able to capture Biak-na-bat(5 at once, but was not sure the 
insurgent chiefs would fall into his hands. The Liberal Gov- 
ernment had repeatedly urged him to close the negotiation on 
the money basis, and promptly gave the authority to sign the 
agreement of December 14 as to money payments.'^ 

1 See Cong. Record, 57th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 6093. 

* The money payments agreed upon were to be made thus : 8400,000 (Mexican) 
in a letter upon a Hongkong bank, to be given to Aguinaldo before his departure^ 
payable upon telegraphic notification that the arms at Biak-na-bato had been sur- 
rendered in accordance with the inventory ; two checks for $200,000 each to be 
delivered to Paterno as soon as the arms surrendered should amount to 700, to 
be payable after the Te Deum is sung and the general amnesty proclaimed. When 
be presented himself to Primo de Rivera in August, Paterno had estimated the 
amount necessary to buy peace as 8500,000. When he returned from Aguinaldo 
on August 13, he bore a demand for 83,000,000, in addition to the reforms 
outlined above. Primo de Rivera "split the difference," asking and securing au- 
thority from the new ministry, at the outset of October, to pay 81,700,000. 
When Paterno presented himself with the new power of attorney on November 
15, he had written down 8800,000, explaining the difference by saying that the 
ins urgents did not " renoonoe " the remaining 8000,000, but they were to " in- 


Lieutenant-Colonel Primo de Rivera, a nephew of the gov- 
ernor-general, vrent in person to Biak-na-bato to secure the 
signing of the agreement ; this was done by Aguinaldo only 
after the " Assembly " had ratified it and the " Supreme Coun- 
cil " had given its approval. Aguinaldo required that the gen- 
eral's nephew should accompany him to Hongkong, as security 
for the payment of the check, and that Generals Monet and 
Tejeiro, the latter the chief of staff, should not only preside 
at the surrender of the arms at Biak-na-bat(5 but also remain 
there as hostages until he cabled to Artemio Ricarte that he 
had received payment of the $400,000 for which he bore a 
check to Hongkong. On December 27, Aguinaldo and twenty- 
seven companions embarked for Hongkong at the port of Sual 
on the west coast of Luzon near Dagupan.^ After the arms 

demnify the unarmed," hence did not figure in writing. Primo de Rivera (op. ct<., 
p. 134), says he " did not think it prudent " to make any further queries about the 
matter at the time. 

^ The scenes connected with the surrender at Biak-na-bat5 and the departure 
of the insurgent chiefs are described in letters and telegrams to the Spanish press, 
reproduced in La PoliticOf vol. vii, pp. 552-56, and vol. viii, pp. 21-23, 45-49. 
There were receptions, banquets, proclamations, and hurrahs from Biak-na-bat6, 
through Bulakdn, Pampanga, Tarlak, and Pangasinan, to Sual, Aguinaldo himself 
being every where prominent with "Vivas " and toasts to Spain. In his correspond- 
ence with Franciscan and Jesuit fathers early in 1897 regarding the possibility of 
peace (ibid.f vol. vii, pp. 326-28, and vol. viii, pp. 43-44), Aguinaldo (whose let- 
ter to the Franciscan father is written in his own peculiar and bad Spanish) had 
declared separation from Spain to be the object, and had condemned the Spanish 
administration without appearing hostile to the friars. (There are, indeed, many 
reasons for thinking Aguinaldo was never so anti-friar as nearly all his revolution- 
ary compatriots.) In the " Constitution of Biak-na-bat6," as seen, separation from 
Spain had been pronounced to be the prime object of the insurrection. Yet in his 
interviews, proclamations, etc., before leaving for Hongkong, Aguinaldo appears 
as repudiating hostility to Spain itself or the idea of independence. Perhaps his 
oaths to " die before taking up arms against Spain," of being willing to fight for 
the " incomparable motherland," etc., may be ascribed in part to the Spanish cor- 
respondents taking some of his poor Spanish too enthusiastically. But, on leaving 
Biak-na-bat6, he published over his own signature a proclamation (ibid., vol. vin, 
pp. 101-02) to the " Maniolos " (an idea borrowed, no doubt, from Paterno, who 
wished to connect the Filipinos with the people of some unknown island described 
by the ancient Egyptian geographer Ptolemy as " Maniolos "), in which he said; 
*' I leave, because, behind the back of the personal immunity conceded to me by 
the laws, pledges and nobility of Spain, the exalted passion of hatred or some 
other outburst of oppressive policy may raise its suicidal hand and make victims, 
causing once more disturbances and interruptions in the life and progress of our 


were secured at Biak-na-bat(5, the Spanish generals who had 
remained there were assisted in securing surrenders elsewhere 
by Baldomero Aguinaldo and Ricarte in Cavite, Paciano Rizal 
in Laguna, and Malvar in Batangas. Just how many were so sur- 
rendered, was never officially given forth. Aguinaldo claims^ 
that they exceeded 1000. Even so, the Spanish authorities 
might well shrink from publishing the number of arms for 
which they had paid such a fat price ; and it is probable that 
the number did not reach 1000. The insurgents had offered 
in November to surrender only 587, and the number stipulated 
in the agreement of December 14 to be surrendered at Biak- 
na-bat(5 itself was 225, besides some 2000 cartridges and 20 
pieces of ordnance (mostly bamboo cannon, wrapped with 
wire, etc).^ 

If there was disappointment in the Spanish headquarters 
at the number of arms secured, there was no less dissatisfac- 
tion among the insurgents as to the distribution of the money. 
Two days after Aguinaldo left, there was a gathering at Biak- 
na-bat<5, presided over by Secretary of the Interior Isabelo 
Artacho, which drew up a protest to Primo de Rivera against 
the rest of the money being sent to Aguinaldo, asking that 
at least half of the second payment, or $100,000, be distrib- 
uted among the " insurgents in most need." ^ They apparently 

land. Long live Spain I Long live the Philippines I " And Aguinaldo and all his 
companions signed this teleg^m to Primo de Rivera on leaving Sual :" . . . We 
all tmst to Spain to grant reforms without blood or warfare, following the 
path of right and justice. ... To the paternal policy of Your Excellency those 
who to-day loyally offer themselves to Spain entrust the true harmonization of 
liberties and rights. May God bless and make lasting this peace, for the glorious 
future of our loved home, the Philippines, and for the prosperity and greatness of 
the Spanish fatherland." See also ibid., vol. vin, nos. 180 and 186, for the doings 
of the insurgent colony in Hongkong between December, 1897, and March, 1898. 
1 Resefia veridica de la revoluci/in Jilipina. 

* On January 6, Primo de Rivera cabled to Madrid that 516 " firearms " had 
been surrendered at Biak-na-baUS (La PoliticOf vol. yin, p. 7)> but this might mean 
revolvers, shotguns, etc., as well as rifles. 

* This document reads : "The undersigned, principals of the Insurrection, who 
have stayed behind in Biak-na-bat<S for the express purpose of rendering effective 
the fulfillment of the bases established in the agreement of harmonization and 
pacification celebrated between the Government of Spain and the Proyisional Got- 


had the same idea as to how the money was to have been used 
as did Primo de Rivera, who declares, though citing no docu- 
ment in which this appears, that it was " for the men in arms, 

emment of the Republic of the Philippines, represented respectively hj the Most 
Excellent Senor Marquis of Estella, Don Fernando Primo de Rivera y Sobremonte, 
and by the Most Excellent Senor Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno as arbiter ; being 
gathered by previous call on this date, the 29th of December, 1897, in the said 
place of Biak-na-bat6, under the chairmanship of Don Isabelo Artacho as principal 
and first representative of the Supreme Council of the Government of the Re- 
public, to deliberate with regard to the form or manner of executing the said 
obligation, the undersigned, the session begun, and after lengthy discussion, agreed 
unanimously : (1) That Don Jos^ Salvador Natividad be sent to Don Pedro Ale- 
jandro Paterno, to set forth that the insurgents really injured in their persons, 
families and interests, who first of all should have been the object of consideration 
and attentions on the part of the Government of the Republic, in the way of alle- 
viating, succoring or indemnifying them, at least in some degree, in their losses, 
are unfortunately those who least have enjoyed or will enjoy the benefits of the 
pacification, since up to the present there has not been designated for them any 
sum nor has anything at all been given them, because the small amount of money 
left behind in the Philippines in the possession of the Secretary of the Treasury, 
Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, of which sum the undersigned have no certain or offi- 
cial knowledge, scarcely suffices, according to said Secretary, to pay some of the 
military officers and other officials stationed in Biak-na-bat<5 and Cavite ; (2) that 
there exists a certain discontent on the part of various factions and principal offi- 
cers, in consequence of this disregard of them, aside from the natural efiEects also 
of discontented feelings produced in the mind of many who, though having more 
right to the benefits of pacification, have nevertheless been left in complete aban- 
donment in these Islands, while, on the contrary, others, of better fortune, though 
with less merit or fitness, have embarked for foreign ports whither they have been 
taken to be' maintained with the so-called treasury of the Insurrection ; (3) that, 
on account of the foregoing, the undersigned foresee certain obstacles to the car- 
rying to complete fulfillment what has been agreed upon, unless there is some 
remedy for this desperate situation in which insurgents and officers disseminated 
about Luzon have been placed ; (4) that, as an efficacious, just and equitable rem- 
edy, they propose that the amount of one-half of the second installment, or $100,- 
000 (one hundred thousand dollars), be distributed among the insurgents in most 
need, this sum to be g^ven to Don Jos^ Salvador Natividad, who is formally dele- 
gated by these presents to eflPect the distribution. — Biak-na-bat6, December 29, 
1897. — (Signed) Isabelo Artacho. Josd Salvador Natividad. Artemio Ricarte 
Vibora. Pantaleon Garcia. Isidore Torres. Francisco M. Soliman (Makabulos)." 
[ A seal with : " Republic of the Philippines. Presidency."] There follows a power 
of attorney from J. Salvador Natividad to Paciano Rizal, to act in the place of the 
former. This is probably the document presented by Rizal to Primo de Rivera in 
Manila, which the latter cites on p. 140 (op. cit.)^ similar in tenor to the foregoing. 
The original as above translated is taken from a copy in the possession of the 
late Clemente J. Zulueta, of Manila. A very poor translation of it, wherein also 
the entire 8400,000 yet to be paid was demanded by Artacho and his associates, 
is given in Senate Document 208, 66th Cong, 1st Sess., part 2, pp. 2-3. 


and to aid the families which had been ruined by the war ; 
for the widows ; for those who suffered an embargo of prop- 
erty." Artacho afterward went to Hongkong and began suit 
against Aguinaldo for the division of the money, and it was 
in order to avoid attachment that the latter made a sudden 
trip to Singapore. This suit was afterward compromised, the 
sum paid to Artacho being, it is said, $5000. There is noth- 
ing positive to disprove the assertion of Aguinaldo that the 
money was to be kept undivided and used to renew the war 
against Spain if the desired reforms were not granted. There 
are, however, some indications that Aguinaldo was planning 
to go to Europe when the war between Spain and the United 
States broke out ; and his positive claim that the friars were 
to be expelled and political reforms granted, this being Primo 
de Rivera's verbal promise, " upon his honor as a gentleman 
and a soldier," is to be termed a deliberate misstatement, un- 
less Paterno led Aguinaldo to believe this, in order to close 
the negotiations.^ Some mystery seems to surround the ques- 
tion of how much money actually was paid over. Primo de 
Rivera says that he gave $200,000 to Paterno and the chiefs 
who made the protest, and that the rest was turned over to 
his successor. General Augustin. Suit was brought in Hong- 
kong on the claim that Aguinaldo had received all the money 
that was ever paid over. As one Filipino has wittily put it : 
" Some one has forgotten that he had $200,000 in his pocket." 
The whole transaction was a demoralizing one, from beginning 
to end. 

The Spanish jubilation was not less than as if some great 
triumph had been recorded. Regattas, horse-races, bicycle- 
races, open-air theatrical performances, fireworks, a great ball 
given by the city government, the formal presentation of a 

' These statements are to be found at the beginning of the Resefia veridical 
already cited. At the close of this docament, Aguinaldo states that the truth 
thereof rests upon his word. It is not, howerer, written by him ; and if there are 
not very many positive misstatements in it, there is certainly a great lack of can- 
dor in some of its representations. 


flag blessed by the archbishop to the 73d Regiment of native 
troops, and similar celebrations, lasted for over a month. Janu- 
ary 23 was the day of the official declaration of peace, and the 
singing of the Te Deum in the royal chapel in Madrid took 
place on February 24. Primo de Rivera, who complained that 
his repeated recommendation of his pet idea of mixed bat- 
talions of native and Peninsular troops had been answered 
by the ministry " with many words but no solution," at last 
received authority to proceed to carry out this plan, only he 
must treat natives and Peninsulars on an equal basis as to 
pay and rations. It was planned to send one of these mixed 
battalions to Spain in May. Primo de Rivera himself was deco- 
rated by Spain with the Grand Cross of St. Ferdinand, and a 
subscription was raised in Manila to buy him the cross. Another 
subscription was opened to present him with a " testimonial " 
before his departure for home, he having again presented his 
resignation. The amount raised was $60,000; but, before 
General Augustin arrived to relieve him in April, he refused 
the sum, because of the criticisms made, and because, moreover, 
disorder was already breaking out in place after place. 


Bandit operations to the north of Manila had not stopped 
at any time, as, indeed, they had been a feature of the entire 
Spanish regime.* More serious and significant, however, were 
the disorders which began almost simultaneously in Sambales 
and southern Pangasinan. New chiefs had there taken up the 
fight, and almost of a sudden possessed themselves of several 
important towns, assassinating several friars, besides holding 
other Spaniards for some time as prisoners. The movement 
was really, however, rather anti-friar than anti-Spanish, as 
the events showed, and had originated in opposition to the 

^ Primo de Rivera's recommendations for the organization of a corps of native 
guides and for a better military information system were fully justified. Spain 
never had good maps of the provinces, and had never systematically gone to work 
to exterminate the bands of ladroues. 


" Guards of Honor," which had been organized by some of 
the friar priests among their more fanatic and ignorant parish- 
ioners, partly in order to spy upon and combat the portion 
of the populace which was recalcitrant. The Sambales rebels 
seized the land telegraph line between Manila and Bolinau, 
the landing-place of the cable to Hongkong, and besieged the 
cable station, where for a week a sergeant was the only Spanish 
officer in the Philippines who could communicate with the 
Minister of the Colonies. Bulakdn was again reorganized by 
Isidoro Torres, who claimed to have a nomination as provin- 
cial governor from the " Revolutionary Government." He had 
two encampments near Malolos. The Augustinian priest of the 
latter town was cut to pieces with bolos on his way to the rail- 
road station. Makabulos was inaugurating operations again 
also in Pampanga, Tarlak, and Nueva Ecija. At Guagua, in 
Pampanga, a Spanish physician and his wife were assassinated. 
On March 25, a thousand Ilokans of Uni(5n and South Ilokos, 
provinces hitherto peaceful, seized the town of Kandon, on 
the west coast of Luzon, and, dragging three friars from their 
hiding-place in the church, bore them to the hills, where their 
bodies were afterwards found; a fourth friar they carried 
through the mountains into Lepanto, finally releasing him. A 
rising at Daet, in the Camarines, was quelled by the civil guard. 
The latter organization had inaugurated a reign of terror in 
Manila upon the first provocation. Raiding a house in Camba 
Street, where a Katipunan meeting was said to be in progress, 
they killed ten or more of the assembly outright, and the re- 
maining threescore were imprisoned for summary trial. ^ Most 

1 The other sixty were shot the following morning, according to the report of 
United States Consul Oscar F. Williams, in a dispatch to the State Department 
dated March 27, 1898 (see Senate Document 62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 321). The 
information which precedes this, with regard to the desertion of the entire 74th 
Regiment of natives when ordered to proceed against insurgents in Cavite, after 
eight of their corporals had been shot for disobedience, is not authenticated, and 
the Spanish newspaper reports examined for this chapter do not confirm the 
consul's reports as to the shooting of the sixty men or in Tarions other particulars. 
For Spanish press reports on the recnidescence of rebellion in early 1898, see La 
Politica, vol. vm, nos. 181 to 1^5, especially pp. 102-03, 121-22, 146-48, 165-60, 
for the Bolinau afiEair and the trouble in Pangasinan-Sambales. 


of the number were Bisayan sailors, and their culpability has 
never been established. On April 3, Holy Thursday, 6000 or 
more natives suddenly rose in revolt in the city of Sebil. They 
had few firearms, but there were only 40 Spanish soldiers in the 
town, and they, with the friars, including Bishop Alcocer, and 
the Spanish residents, speedily shut themselves up in the little 
fort on the beach near where Magellan landed. The natives 
sacked the convents and burned portions of the business sec- 
tion. The revolt rapidly spread over the island, and eight 
friars were captured, of whom three were assassinated. Three 
Spaniards were also assassinated, one of them the husband of 
a native woman. A telegram brought marines and a gunboat 
from Iloilo, and troops immediately came down from Manila 
under General Tejeiro. They had to capture the principal 
towns of Sebii before Tejeiro returned to Manila on April 22, 
and also to send a little expedition to Bohol, where trouble 
threatened. The aspect of affairs on Panai became so alarm- 
ing, particularly in the province of Antike, that all the friars 
and other Spaniards were concentrated in the provincial capi- 
tals. The new provincial governors for Luzon whom the Liberal 
Government had insisted on sending out, though Primo de 
Rivera urged the undesirability of making a change at such a 
critical time, arrived in March, but only a few were permitted 
to proceed to their provinces, on account of the danger to 
their lives. 

On April 10, 1898, Lieutenant-General Basilio Augustin suc- 
ceeded General Primo de Rivera in the post of governor-general. 
The latter had offered to remain if war was expected to take 
place between Spain and the United States ; but he had been 
associated with the frantic preparations for such an event in 
Manila, and was well aware of the scanty resources for defense, 
hence was doubtless quite satisfied to turn the jumble of affairs 
over to the well-meaning, amiable, but rather dunderheaded 
old soldier whom the Liberals had sent out to take his place. 
In his farewell speech he lectured the Spanish residents for 


their bitter attitude toward the natives. There was also plenty 
of suppressed sarcasm among this element over the " allocu- 
tion" in which General Augustin frankly identifiei himself 
with the reformists. 

War with the United States very speedily put a new aspect 
upon affairs in the Philippine Islands. Upon promulgation of 
the news, it was significant that there distinctly ensued a lull 
in the guerrilla operations that had been growing more and 
more active, and that various of the chiefs who had not gone 
to Hongkong, among them Trias, Kicarte, and Pio del Pilar, 
were announced as having offered their services to the Spanish 
Government in the islands. Great hopes were built upon this 
as to Spanish-Filipino cooperation in the defense of the archi- 
pelago ; but subsequent events were to prove that the leaders 
did not consider that they had bartered away their liberty to 
act according to circumstances and that the masses, so far as 
they knew what was going on, were simply waiting for the 
word from above telling them what to do. 


It is fruitless to speculate upon what would have been the 
outcome had Dewey's fleet not been sent to Manila Bay. It is, 
however, of some importance to take into account the Philip- 
pine situation at the time, especially as to what were the Fili- 
jHno aspirations and what means they were prepared to take 
to attain them. So many theoretical views as to the questions 
here involved, based upon the purest of a priori reasoning, 
have been and still are being promulgated that it is safest to 
confine ourselves to established facts or well-substantiated 
opinions. Very much as to the aims of the revolutionists will 
have been revealed in the preceding pages. There is no ground 
whatever for asserting that the idea of independence was never 
dreamed of prior to 1898. We have found it in the minds of 
the more intellectual propagandists as far back as 1890, and 
it was really older than that ; yet the most gifted of these 


leaders, Jose Rizal, was to grow steadily, until the last, stronger 
in the belief that evolution along the lines of education and 
commercial opportunity was to be the chosen route by which 
his people should reach their ultimate destiny, whether inde- 
pendence or a freer internal regime under the protection of 
the banner of Spain or of some other nation. We have seen 
that the more rabid leaders of the middle class forced the is- 
sue of revolt in certain provinces, and that they were aided in 
holding up their losing cause, with the tremendous sacrifices 
it imposed upon the masses, by the over-zealous — to put it 
no stronger — attitude of Spanish " patriots " in the islands, 
and by the abuses of the armed forces of Spain. We have seen 
the way in which the Spanish mihtary courts proceeded from 
first to last upon the assumption that a deliberate campaign 
for the extermination of whites and for irresponsible indepen- 
dence was planned by the Katipunan, and we have seen with 
what injustice and gross misjudgment, to put it mildly, Jose 
Rizal was railroaded to his death without a real trial. The evi- 
dence to support the charge that extermination was planned, 
we have been unable to find, too many things pointing to the 
contrary. As for national independence, that was undoubtedly 
in the minds of many, but there is nowhere to be found even an 
approach to a well-defined programme for achieving it or for 
sustaining it when achieved ; nothing, that is, beyond the half- 
blind resistance of the towns of certain provinces to Spanish 
force, and a crazy effort to win assistance from Japan (later 
also from the United States). The addition to the Cavite or- 
ganization of such dependent subdivisions of territory as the 
" Viceroyalty of Silang," and the putting forth by local officers 
of towns, temporarily in power without the friar at their right 
hand, of "royal decrees," etc., have no significance, beyond 
showing how the insurgent " government " was not really or- 
ganized but simply copied in the main the forms and methods 
used by Spain. Had the Spanish Government in the islands 
collapsed or disappeared by some miracle, we cannot imagine 



the nondescript quasi-military organization of the insurgents 
of 1896-97 stepping quietly into its place and fulfilling its 
functions throughout the archipelago. And yet we must re- 
spect the facts and find that many among these (very generally) 
less educated leaders aspired, in some dim fashion, to inde- 
pendence.^ And we must realize that a year and a half of seri- 
ous resistance to Spain, in which she had been required to 
strain to the utmost her available resources, aside from the 
continual talk about Cuban success in attaining a freer adminis- 
tration, or about United States interference there, had caused 
the sentiment of downright opposition to grow and gain some 
degree of confidence. Beyond doubt, a great proportion, almost 
certainly the very great majority, of better^ducated and prop- 
ertied Filipinos sympathized with the revolution, not alone 
among the Tagalog communities, but very generally through- 
out the archipelago; but they had given no sign that they 
would actively take a hand in it. As for the great mass of the 
people, the American reader unfamiliar with the Philippines 
often assumes the existence of a public opinion such as that to 
which he is accustomed. The masses of the Philippines were, 
at the beginning of 1898, ready to be led by the nose by their 
traditional " caciques," or, in the absence temporarily of these, 
by any self -constituted military leader with shoulder-straps and 
a revolver. This was only less true among the rather more ad- 
vanced Tagalog towns than elsewhere ; among the other prov- 
inces of Luzon than among the generally docile, apparently 
stolid, Bisayans. Only in degree, as between different sections, 

1 Such documents as the " manifesto of Malabar [probably Malvar]/' which Fore- 
man cites (op. cit.f 542) as significant of insurgent aims in Julj, 1897, and which 
President Schurmann employed to bolster up his remarkable statement in the 
Report of the Philippine Commission that the idea of independence first arose in 
August, 1898, and Aguinaldo's manifesto (Foreman, p. 543), in which the word 
** independence " is rather carelessly used, are of small value when not considered 
in connection with the entire history of the anti-Spanish movement and with the 
subsequent conduct of the same leaders. Viewing the Biak-na-baUS afifair in the 
most favorable light for Aguinaldo, he was ready to treat on the basis of a very 
▼ague and indefinite prospect that certain reforms would be granted. Yet this 
does not exclude him from aspiring to independence, as did others. 


should any exception be made to the statement that the masses 
were like driven sheep. 

Reforms in the Philippine administration were expected at 
the opening of 1898, even by the recalcitrant Spaniards in the 
islands, and doubly so by the Filipinos of every class. The 
rumors about the Biak-na-bato negotiation, the half-known 
recommendations of Primo de Rivera, and the change to an 
outright Liberal administration in the islands, were sufficient 
basis for this expectation. Undoubtedly also, expectancy cen- 
tered chiefly about the action to be taken with regard to the 
friar-regime in the islands. In February, a number of Filipinos 
in Madrid had signed a manifesto to the Liberal ministry, de- 
claring that the revolt in the islands had in no sense been 
directed against the sovereignty of Spain, but against the dom- 
inance of the religious orders.^ The action of the orders them- 
selves showed that they appreciated the trend of affairs. Just 
before the outbreak of war with the United States, they ad- 
dressed themselves to the Spanish Government with an offer of 
"all they possessed" for the purpose of conducting this war, 
if it should come on. They followed this patriotic demonstra- 
tion almost immediately with a defiant cablegram, expressing 
their determination, with the consent of the Holy See, to aban- 
don the Philippines entirely, if the Government should adopt 
a programme of secularization of the parishes and disentail of the 
friar lands. On April 21, the very day upon which war became 
a certainty, the provincials of the Dominicans, Augustinians, 
Franciscans, and Recollects and the superior of the Jesuits 

^ As has been shown, this statement was not exactly candid, though in spirit it 
presented the truth. No mention has been made above of the episode, so much dis- 
cussed in the after-fury of war talk in Spain, of the arrest of a Spanish editor in 
Manila and the suspension of his paper by Primo de Rivera in February, for pub- 
lishing a demand for " autonomy." The incident has little if any significance, as 
revealing Filipino aspirations. The editor in question is a rather clever writer, now 
on this side, now on that, who has consistently since 1898 sought to nurture bad 
feeling between Americans and Filipinos. His demand for " autonomy " had refer- 
ence to greater political initiative for Spaniards in the islands, rather than to 
political liberties for the Filipinos. For Primo de Rivera's version of the affair, 
see his Memoriae pp. 143-M. 


signed in Manila a lengthy manifesto to the Minister of the 
Colonies, in which they set forth their view of the events which 
had been happening and of the programme which should in fu- 
ture be followed.^ They declared their certainty that the masses 
of the people still loved them, and that the saner and more 
cultured leaders had held aloof from the movement against 
them ; they proclaimed flatly that secularization of the parishes 
or discipline of the friars by the bishops would not be toler- 
ated ; and they declared plainly for a full return to the old re- 
gime in existence before any of the reform measures of modern 
times had been adopted. The defiant attitude of the orders, 
coupled with their well-known power in the political adminis- 
tration of Spain, and such incidents as the appointment of two 
more friars as bishops in the islands in early 1898, did not tend 
to quiet the apprehensions of those who hoped a new religious 
regime might now begin. Primo de Rivera, who, though asso- 
ciated with the conservative administration, recommended curb- 
ing very considerably the powers of the orders, had, while ad- 
vising the new Liberal and supposedly anti-friar ministry that 
he did not believe the friars could be replaced, if they could 
be made to do " as they ought," yet recommended that full 
episcopal authority over them be asserted when they acted as 
parish priests, that all rights of interference in local adminis- 
tration be taken from them, that their abuses in the imposition 
of fees be curbed, and that the native priests should cease to 
be their servants, stating in conclusion " that the settlement 
of the problem of the friars carries with it the preservation or 
the loss of the country." He said, moreover, that the hatred 
for the friars had produced the hatred for other Spaniards in 
genera], and that the Tagalog outbreak was due to the fact 

^ This docmncnt, of which only ten copies for each order were printed, scarcely 
ever saw the light of day. The succeeding events in Madrid and Manila buried it 
from sight. The orders had secured representatives to take up their cause in the 
Spanish Cortes in June, but, when advised of the resistance they would meet, they 
desisted. This manifesto is a complete and authoritative sctting-forth of the friars' 
petition, and at the same time well confirms the statements of their saner critici. 


that there had been more abuses by the friars, and they had 
greater possessions of land, in the territory of the Tagalogs.^ 
Here lay the real issue at the bottom of the whole mass of 
difficulties. Spain, even though in the midst of bitter disaster, 
had the good fortune to shove this problem, along with the 
minor matters complicating it, over upon the inexperienced 
Government of the United States, which was a long time dis- 
covering just what it had on its hands. 

^ These statements will be found in a letter of General Primo de Rivera to the 
Spanish Ministry in December, 1897, cited by him on pp. 169-76 of his Memoria. 
(It is also curious to note his recommendations, not only for reform in the Spanish 
personnel in the islands, but also, in connection with educational matters, the in- 
troduction of manual training and the bringing of school-teachers from Spain.) His 
statements about the friars as above given do not tally very well with the senti- 
ments quoted as being his by Stephen Bonsai in his article on the friars in the 
North American Review for November, 1892, already referred to. Mr. Bonsai fell 
into the same trap in this case as in many others, where he takes his data blindly 
from Las Ordenes Religiosas en las Islas Filipinos by Father Zamora, the Augus- 
tinian. Father Zamora culled to suit himself from the reports of governors-general, 
and Mr. Bonsai sometimes made even Zamora's selections in favor of the friars a 
little stronger in translation. A very frank exposition of the real attitude of prac- 
tically all the friars is that of Father Eduardo Navarro, procurator of the Augus- 
tinians in the Philippines, in his Estudios de algunos asuntos de actualidad, already 
cited. He says (p. 276) : " It is not only advisable, but absolutely and peremptorily 
necessary, to take a prudent and safe step backward, in the firm conviction that 
this will be to gain, not to lose, will mean advancement and progress." 




Both to foreigners and to Filipinos, the idea that the United 
States might be drawn westward from the Pacific to take some 
direct interest in affairs in the Philippines was not entirely a 
new thing in 1898. But neither Jagor's prediction of 1873 as 
to that country being destined in its commercial expansion to 
become the territorial successor of Spain/ nor Rizal's half- 
fearful notion of 1891 that it might follow on from Samoa to 
other Pacific islands,^ would, if known to the American people, 
have excited anything but ridicule from them, absorbed as they 
were in the development of their own continent, no notion 
more remote from their minds than that of holding colonies. 
As the prospects for American intervention in Cuba became 
better, some of the Filipino propagandists, especially those in 
Hongkong, seem to have turned from their idle dream of 
Japanese recognition of their revolution, and to have sought 
to direct the attention of America to the Spanish colonies in 
the Orient also. Their offer, made through Consul-General 
Rounseville Wildman, of Hongkong, in November, 1897, of 
an "offensive and defensive alliance" in case of war with 
Spain, was, of course, promptly declined, and the consul-gen- 
eral was instructed to refuse to be the medium for any more 
such offers.' Although there is no published record of it, a 
more elaborate appeal for the intervention and protection of 
the United States had been presented to Mr. Wildman 's pre- 
decessor in January of the same year, signed by a committee 
of three Filipino deportee in Hongkong, but drawn and pre- 
sented with the cognizance and approval of other Filipinos 

* See footnote, pp. 32-33, above. * See footnote, p. 71, above. 

• See SencUe Document 62, 55th Cong., lit Seas., part 1, pp. 333-34. 


there and elsewhere.^ There is nothing to show that this doc- 
ument ever reached Washington, or that the Government there 
ever gave any further thought to the Philippines or to the 
Fihpinos prior to May, 1898, than to choose Commodore 
Dewey to take command of the Eastern squadron, assemble it 
and make it ready to destroy the naval equipment of Spain in 
the Orient, in case war should break out. 


That the selection of Commodore Dewey was made because 
it was, in the fall of 1897, deemed wise to have a man " who 
could go into Manila if necessary," has been testified by the then 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Koosevelt,^ who, it 
is generally believed, had something to do with the choice of 
the man. Dewey, who took command at Yokohama in January, 
1898, was that month given cable orders to keep all enlisted 

' This document, which consists of some two thousand words, sets forth the 
grievances against the friars, of course, charging against them the deportations 
and the policy of confiscating property, and giving in detjiil the Filipino account of 
the execution of the native priests and the " revolution " of 1872. (See footnote 1, 
p. 58, above.) It is curious to note, however, how the phraseology and almost 
the entire contents of this appeal are based upon the Spanish, and in general the 
Continental, view of Americans, as being inspired only by "practical" motives. 
The principal accusations against Spain are, not only that she taxes the Filipinos 
for pensions to Columbus's descendants and others, for the support of penal 
colonies in Africa and of the diplomatic and consular corps in the Orient, but 
also that the Spaniards are well known to be " little given to work " and much 
given to office-holding, living off the Filipinos in consequence, and, above all, that 
they have done little to develop the mineral or agricultural interests of the country, 
while foreigners have done all that has been done in these lines and that of shipping. 
The bait is held out — one can imagine how cleverly these Filipinos felt it to be 
— that there are great riches remaining undeveloped. The Cuban example is re- 
ferred to, and America is asked to extend the same aid that Emperor Napoleon 
{sic) gave to the American colonies in their struggle for independence. For the pe- 
titioners ask protection and recognition, "with the right to govern their own coun- 
try" and help "in the expulsion of the Spaniards by means of force"; they will 
pay back the expenses incurred when independence is gained, and will grant fran- 
chises in further recompense. This document was signed by Doroteo Cortes, Jos^ 
Ma Basa, and A. G. Medina, prominent deportes, at Hongkong on January 29, 1897. 
A copy of one of the Spanish originals is in the possession of the writer, but the 
petition was presented in English. 

2 See his article in McClure^s Magazine for October, 1899. 




sailors of the Asiatic squadron whose terms had expired. Af- 
ter the blowing-up of the Maine in February had come to 
strain still more seriously the relations between the United 
States and Spain, precautionary orders preparatory for war 
were more numerous. First there was the familiar order of 
February 25 cabled by Assistant Secretary Roosevelt to Com- 
modore Dewey, directing him to assemble the squadron at once 
at Hongkong and to "keep full of coal," as, in case of war, 
"your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not 
leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the 
Philippine Islands." Secretary Long the next day instructed 
Dewey, in common with all squadron commanders, to "keep 
full of coal, the best that can be had." It had been decided 
to keep on the Atlantic station the Helena, which had started 
for the Asiatic station by the eastern route in January; but 
the orders for the return to the United States of the cruiser 
Olympia were canceled in the above dispatch of Assistant 
Secretary Roosevelt, and, on March 3, Secretary Long ordered 
the Mohican from San Francisco to Honolulu, to replace there 
the cruiser Baltimore, the latter proceeding at once to Hong- 
kong with a supply of ammunition for the squadron. During 
April, Dewey was authorized by cable to stock up fully with 
provisions and to purchase two British steamers at Hongkong 
for supply- and coal-ships, and was told to land from his ves- 
sels all woodwork and stores not needed in operations; and he 
then secured five months* supplies in advance. In a letter to the 
Secretary of the Navy on March 31, Commodore Dewey says 
that the five vessels of his squadron were all assembled at 
Hongkong by the first week in March, and that they "have 
been kept full of the best coal obtainable, provisioned and ready 
to move at twenty-four hours' notice." ' The vessels referred 

* See Sen. Doc. 73, 66th Cong., Ist Sew. For a full record of the precautionary 
orders to Dewey and other commanders prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities, 
sea Appendix to Report of Chief of Bureau of Navigation {Reports of Navy Depart- 
ment, 1898), pp. 21-26 and 65-66. This document forms vol. iv of The Message of 
the President for 1898 and Accompanying Documents, and was also issued separately 


to, including the Baltimore, which reached Hongkong on 
April 22, were: The Olympia, flagship, 5870 tons; the Balti- 
more, 4413 tons; the Raleigh, 3213 tons, and the Boston, 3000 
tons, all these being protected cruisers ; and the Petrel, a gun- 
boat of 892 tons. The revenue cutter McCulloch, being on a 
trip to the Orient, was detached for naval service and added 
to the squadron at Hongkong as a dispatch boat. The supply- 
ships purchased were the Nanshan and the Zafiro. 

The information which the commodore had obtained with 
regard to the Spanish fleet and the defenses of Manila Bay, 
principally through his own private sources, was quite accurate, 
though not entirely complete. As this information is outlined 
in the letter just referred to, it shows an omission to take into 
account the Isla de Cuba (called a cruiser by the Spaniards, 
though really this and the Isla de Luzon were only first-class 
gunboats), or the Don Antonio de Ulloa and the Velasco, 
gunboats of over 1000 tons, while among the boats mentioned 
as "armed tugs and launches for river service" were several 
small gunboats, effectively built and armed with small guns 
for inter-island service. Dewey was perhaps aware, however, 
that the Ulloa was careened on its side for repairs, and the 
Velasco in dry dock, although he does not mention this nor 
the rumors of the times about torpedoes and about submarine 
mines at the entrance to the bay. He felt sufficiently sure of 
his own resources to say : " I believe I am not overconfident 
in stating that with the squadron now under my command the 
vessels could be taken and the defenses of Manila reduced in 
a day"; and his information led him to believe that the state 
of opposition to Spain in the islands was such that the capture 
of Manila virtually meant that the whole archipelago would 
fall into the possession of the conquering power or of the 

as House of Representatives Document 3, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. Only cable instruc- 
tions to Dewey are given therein ; whatever verbal or mailed instructions, if any, 
he had with regard to engagements in the Orient, are not on record. (This Appen- 
dix will hereafter be cited simply under the title Bureau of Navigation.) 


Had the American commander been fully cognizant of the 
real state of affairs, and of the confusion reigning at the head- 
quarters of Spanish power in the Orient, he would probably 
have been still more confident of an easy victory. In the first 
"junta" of high authorities held at Manila to discuss plans for 
defense, in view of the telegram from Madrid on March 12 
that war was imminent and of the reports to the governor- 
general and to Admiral Montojo from Hongkong that 
Dewey's fleet was preparing for a descent upon the Philip- 
pines, Admiral Montojo had made a comparison of the two 
fleets, showing that in case of a meeting between them, a 
Spanish defeat was fully to be expected.^ Indeed, in Spanish 
official circles, defeat on the sea by the Americans seems 
to have been accepted from the first with a resignation that 
would appear more heroic had it not been accompanied by 
so many outward demonstrations of bravado and rhetoric, nor 
covered up by such a multiplicity of plans, "juntas" and 
paper-propositions for victory. The chief care from the first 
seems to have been directed to preventing a descent of insur- 
gents upon the city of Manila, and the most intelligent efforts 
for defense were exerted toward this end. As for the prepara- 
tions made to meet Dewey, one might think in reading them over 
that he was in some comic-opera kingdom of the sea, were it 
not evident how seriously the numerous actors took their parts, 
and were we not in the presence of a real tragedy for the once 
great empire of Spain. From first to last, in all the meetings, 
inspections, and reports which were spread so at large upon 
the records, the idea of the Spaniards seems to have been not 
80 much how best to make use of their really wretched re- 

^ See Primo de Rivera's Memoria (cited in a preceding^ chapter), p. 181. He 
•aji that Montojo " set forth in detail the data regarding the boats of the two 
squadrons, it being shown that the American boats were superior in guns, in armor- 
protection and in speed, and therefore in very superior condition to ours, not only 
for accepting or not an attack in the place and manner they thought opportune, 
but also, when once this were begun, the logical result ought to be the defeat of 
our squadron. On this account, the idea of a fight to prevent the arrival at Manila 
of the American ships was abandoned." 


sources for defense as how most convincingly to make it ap- 
pear on paper, after the inevitable crash should come, that in 
each and every case the individual upon whom fell any respon- 
sibility for meeting the situation had done all that it was pos- 
sible to do. Undoubtedly, the antiquated military code of 
Spain, under which defeat or surrender almost inevitably im- 
plies the court-martial even of a commander who has no other 
resource, had much to do in the Spanish-American War with 
the frequent cases of what looked to outsiders like a curious 
combination of incompetence and imprevision with boast and 

Montojo claims to have asked reinforcements from Spain as 
far back as January. A board of Philippine naval officers had, 
a year before, recommended that all the vessels of the squadron 
be sent to Hongkong for a thorough overhauling in dry dock ; 
no such authorization was received, and the little dry dock at 
Cavite was being used to clean up the smaller boats. The 
meeting of March 16 decided that the squadron should go to 
Subig Bay, endeavoring to fortify the island at its entrance 
and to close the narrow channel with torpedoes. For nearly 
forty years, plans for the fortification and defense of Manila 
and Subig Bays and the erection of a naval station in the lat- 
ter bay had been pending. One elaborate plan drawn up under 
Primo de Rivera in 1881, during his first term as governor- 
general, was now hauled forth from the archives, and it was 
seriously proposed to follow it. In accordance with this plan, 
and also with recommendations of subordinate naval and en- 
gineer officers, the wider of the two mouths of Manila Bay 
{Boca Grande) was to be shut "if possible," and the means 
of defense centered upon the narrower entrance [Boca Chica) 
between Corregidor Island and Mariveles. This was subse- 
quently modified to a double line of batteries to defend both 
mouths of the bay, with a central line of torpedoes. 

On paper, this reads as if serious obstacles would be opposed 
to Dewey's entrance. But almost without exception, the guns 


were old, and such newer guns as were taken from the disabled 
vessels for hasty mounting on Corregidor, or on the Cavite 
side of the entrance, were necessarily light pieces. The really 
humorous feature of the defense lay in the placing of the tor- 
pedo-mines. Fourteen or fifteen seem actually to have been 
dropped into the water at the entrance to the bay, without 
connected fuses and it may be also without charges to be set 
off had there been proper fuses. The same was the case with 
the equal number of torpedoes sent up to Subig Bay with the 
committee which first went up there to " study " a plan of de- 
fense. In private conversation, the members of this naval com- 
mittee had stated that it was impossible to accomplish anything 
in the short time and with the scanty resources at their dis- 
posal. Nevertheless, they went busily about making their " re- 
port." The English ship which was laying the Philippine end of 
the Hongkong cable from Bolinau to Manila was requisitioned 
to supply insulated wire, etc., with which to connect the mines 
in Subig Bay, as the Spanish navy's equipment was old and 
useless. Five of the mines were actually thus placed, though 
without charges really expected to explode or fuses really ex- 
pected to work ! ^ 

The biggest guns available for coast defense (themselves 
hardly entitled to be called coast artillery) were four 24-centi- 
meter Krupp rifles, placed in front of the walls at Manila, and 
not yet properly mounted to secure more than half the range 
they should have had. The guns on the walls and in the fort 
of Manila were nearly all antiquated smoothbores or muzzle- 
loading rifles. Nevertheless, it was decided to remove hastily 
to Subig Bay, for the purpose of fortifying its entrance, four 
Ordonez rifles of 15-centimeter caliber, which, with the Krupp 
g^ns, offered to Manila itself its only practical means of de- 

* Fop the torpedo and mine epinode see Santrdn, op. cit.f pp. 374-380, also Joseph 
L. Stickney's article in Harp€r*a Magazintf February, 1899, p. 481. La Politico de 
Etpaha en FUipinas^ vol. viii, p. 180, says the Spanish naval authorities in the 
Philippines had destroyed all the gun-cotton they had, because it was old and there 
waa danger of its exploding. 


fense against naval vessels. When Admiral Montojo, upon 
receipt of the news that war had actually come, took his fleet 
up to Subig Bay on April 25, these guns lay useless on the '' 
sandy shore of Isla Grande, and the engineers who had under- 
taken to place them informed him that it would be twenty 
days before they could be properly mounted. It was then that 
Montojo (first being careful to hold a "junta " of officers to jus- 
tify his action) decided at once to return and await the Amer- 
icans off Cavite, rather than give battle in the deep waters of 
Subig Bay, where, if the vessels were sunk, their crews would 
be lost. The other two Ordonez rifles, which had been lying 
at Manila unmounted, were set up on Point Sangley, Cavite. 

Madrid kept cabling contradictory information as to the 
prospect of war. Before Primo de Kivera left, the circle of 
confidential advisers upon means of defense had been enlarged 
by the addition of a "junta" of civilians, composed of the 
archbishop, who was chairman, the mayor of Manila, the gov- 
ernor of Manila province and the secretary of the governor- 
general. This organization constantly clashed with the already 
existing "junta of authorities," a governmental advisory board. 
As the days of actual conflict approached, plans and mani- 
festoes multiplied proportionately. When a cable message an- 
nouncing the war was received on April 22, a newspaper and 
the governing body of the city organized a great demonstration 
which paraded before Governor-General Augustin's residence. 
He issued a decree pronouncing the service of arms compulsory 
upon all Peninsular Spaniards in the islands and upon all pub- 
lic functionaries under fifty years of age, and opening a vol- 
unteer enlistment to natives and also to foreigners, except 
Americans. The laws of war were also stiffened by the process 
of a decree, and treason was made to include " those who cir- 
culated news or tales tending to discourage the defenders of 
the country." But the real energy of the governor-general was 
put forth in the " allocution " which he addressed to his peo- 
ple in the " Official Gazette " of April 23, saying : — 



The North American people, made up of all social excrescences, 
have exhausted our patience and have provoked a war by their per- 
fidious machinations. . . . The struggle will be short and decisive. 
The God of victories will grant unto us one that is brilliant and 
complete, as reason and justice of our cause demand. ... A fleet, 
manned by foreigners without instruction and discipline, is about to 
come to this archipelago, with the wild purpose of taking away from 
you all that implies life, honor, and liberty. . . . They appear to 
look upon, as a feasible enterprise, the substitution of the Catholic 
religion, which you possess, by that of Protestantism ; ... to pos- 
sess themselves of your riches as if the right of ownership were un- 
known among you. . . . The aggressors shall not profane the tombs 
of your fathers ; they shall not satisfy their impure passions at the 
cost of the honor of your wives and daughters ; they shall not seize 
the property that your self-denial had accumulated to maintain your 
lives ; . . . your valor and your patriotism suffice to frighten and 
overwhelm these people, who . . . have resorted to the extermina- 
tion of the aborigines of North America without making the effort to 
bring them to civilization. . . . 

Archbishop Nozaleda was not to be left behind in this effort 
to appeal to religious and race prejudice and to turn to advan- 
tage the ignorance of the Filipinos as to the people of the 
United States, at a time when the plans for obtaining Filipino 
volunteers were under way. He addressed his " beloved sons" 
to inform them that, if victorious, this " heterodox people, pos- 
sessed by the blackest rancor and all the abject passions that 
heresy engenders," would raze their temples, profane the altars 
of the true God, rob them of their religion and treat them as 
slaves ; he, however, assured them that God was with the Span- 
iard in the coming battle, and that the enemy would therefore 
find it of no avail to rest his assurance in his fleet.* With that 
blissful, half-religious optimism and that cheerful delight in 

^ For these allocutions and similar publications in the Manila newspapers of the 
time, see Report of Philippine Commission^ 1901, part 1, pp. 1G8-72, especially the 
allocution of Nozaleda following the destruction of the Spanish fleet, wherein he 
elaborates to the Filipinos still more completely all the horrors that will come to 
them if they do not join with Spain in repelling the invaders. The same dreadful 
warnings, in even more rabid form, were preached to the pe(»plo from the friar 
pulpits of Manila all during May, June, and July. For the Spanish text of Noza- 
leda's pastorals, see his De/ensa obligadOf appendices 3 and 4. 


wild and improbable tales and prophecy to their own advantage 
which characterize the Spaniards in general, many of those in 
Manila who were not on confidential terms with the facts were 
exchanging expressions of commiseration for the poor Ameri- 
cans upon the wretched fate which awaited them, and were cir- 
culating stories that desertions at Hongkong were so numerous 
that Dewey was in danger of being left without men. Others, 
on the outskirts of official life or private citizens, but of saner 
judgment and better posted, had been hustling their families 
out of Manila (some refugees having gone to Spain on the 
boat which took Primo de Rivera, and others moving to the 
country along the railroad), and among this element there was 
whispered talk about the folly of the authorities in not sepa- 
rating the vessels of the fleet and scattering them among 
various out-of-the-way harbors of the archipelago. The naval 
officers could not object to this plan that it left Manila de- 
fenseless, for several plans put forward by them had done the 
same ; but there was the very potent fact that not to stand and 
fight meant almost certain courtrmartial in Spain. 


Commodore Dewey, awaiting final orders at Hongkong, on 
April 24 received this message from Secretary Long : — 

War has commenced between United States and Spain. Proceed 
at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particu- 
larly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. 
Use utmost endeavors.^ 

Dewey, however, waited a few days for the arrival of Con- 
sul Williams from Manila, who was alleged to have infor- 
mation worth while, and in the mean time, at the request of 
the governor of Hongkong, that he leave the neutral waters of 
that British bay, he went to Mirs Bay on the China coast. On 

^ See Bureau of Navigation^ p. 67. It has been humorously remarked on the 
floor of the United States Senate that " the Secretary of War was a humane man, 
and therefore gave Dewey an option as to what to do with the Spanish ships." 


April 27, the consul appeared and Dewey's vessels at once set 
sail. He arrived off Cape Bolinau, western Luzon, on the morn- 
ing of April 30, and early in the afternoon passed by the mouth 
of Subig Bay. The Boston and Concord had been sent ahead 
to reconnoiter it, but could see no signs of life, although the 
officers left with the guns of which Manila had been so use- 
lessly deprived saw them and threw the breech-blocks of the 
guns into the water. For a week all the navigation lights on 
the coast had been out, by Spanish orders. For three nights, a 
big bonfire had been kindled by natives on little Karabau 
Island, close to the Cavite shore on the right of the wider 
entrance to the bay. Whether or no the pilot whom Dewey 
had on board the Olympia, who was perfectly familiar with 
the entrance to the bay and with its waters, used or needed 
to use this light, it was toward Karabau Island that the 
American ships were directly headed when the Spaniards, who 
had been on the lookout for them, caught sight of them just 
after 11 o'clock.^ Suddenly changing her direction from 
southeast to east, the Olympia started for the center of the 
larger channel, passing between the little island El Fraile (The 
Friar) and Pulo Caballo (next to Corregidor), followed by 
the whole fleet in column formation, except the supply-ships, 
which passed through nearer to the Cavite shore. The vessels 
went in at a speed of eight knots, and, as a Spanish writer has 
put it, " as if they owned those waters." They were over a 
mile from the small guns on El Fraile and perhaps two miles 
from those on Pulo Caballo ; and, as soon as it was well past 
the line between the two islets, each ship, following the Olym- 
piads lead, swiftly turned to the northward, flanking the bat- 
teries. The Spaniards derived some satisfaction from saying 
that a shot from El Fraile passed four fingers' length above 
the head of the commander of the Raleigh (!). Three shots 
were fired as the Raleigh and the Petrel, fourth and fifth in 
line, came abreast of El Fraile, and were answered by those 

1 Sastrdn, op. cU.f p. 385. 


two vessels and the Boston, and one of those shots passed 
over the Concord and between her masts.^ Tbe " torpedoes," 
for reasons which the reader will understand, but which were 
at the time entirely unknown to Commodore Dewey and his 
men, were not heard ; but the American vessels used their 
searchlights energetically to sweep the waters and the islands 
and unmask possible batteries or obstacles of any sort. The 
nine vessels were all inside and out of the range of the guns 
by 2 A.M., and, forming anew, proceeded slowly across the 
bay in a northeasterly direction to where, in the gray and 
misty dawn of Sunday morning. May 1, they were seen, well 
off the mouth of the Pasig River, by the anxious watchers on 
the walls of Manila, and shortly afterward by their still more 
anxious countrymen who had in the night been called to 
quarters on the vessels off Cavite peninsula and in the arsenal 
of that place. Both sides had been ready for action, for some 
hours ; the Americans since their arrival off the shores of 
Luzon (since they left Hongkong, in fact), the Spaniards 
since shortly after Montojo received telegraphic word at two 
in the morning of the entrance of the enemy's vessels unhurt.'^ 
Admiral Montojo had brought his vessels limping back to 
Cavite on the afternoon of April 29, and had at once disposed 
them in the array in which they finally gave battle, in a line 
across the mouth of shallow Caiiacao Bay, which lies be- 
tween the two points of the Cavite peninsula. The Don Juan 
de Austria, a gunboat of 1159 tons, recently overhauled, was 
stationed farthest to the north and west, just off the little 

^ Bureau of Navigation^ pp. 75, 77, and 80. The little McCuUoch, too, cour- 
ageously set her guns to barking. 

2 Joseph L. Stickney, op. cit., p. 477, thinks Dewey did not lay before his cap- 
tains in the conference held on the Olympia at 5 p.m., after Subig Bay was found 
to be empty, the question of entering Manila Bay at night, but decided of himself 
to do so, because, he arg^ued from a general knowledge of Spanish character, the 
Spaniards would not be looking for him to enter at night. This judgment was 
quite correct; Spanish officers and Spanish writers have exclaimed about the mat- 
ter since, almost in a tone that would seem to say it was " very ungentlemanly " 
for the Americans to come in at night, when they were not expected. 


shore battery on Point Sangley. Behind her, in the shallower 
water, still careened partly to one side in the process of clean- 
ing her machinery, and anchored tight, was the gunboat Don 
Antonio de Ulloa, of 1160 tons, all but two of her guns of 
any size having been taken to strengthen the shore batteries. 
Next the Austria, up on the line of battle, was the Castilla, 
of 3260 tons, an unprotected cruiser with a wooden hull, 
which had made water so rapidly on the trip to Subig Bay 
that her engines were rendered useless, and she was towed 
back and anchored fast in twenty-seven feet of water, broad- 
side on, partly full of water, and with a line of lighters filled 
with sand in front of her, so that her port batteries might be 
brought into use.^ In the center of the line was the Reina 
Cristina, the flagship, an unprotected cruiser of old style, of 
3520 tons displacement ; and ranged to her right, closing the 
line some distance off the Cavite Arsenal, were the so-called 
protected cruisers, Isla de Cuba and Isla de Luzon, each of 
1045 tons, the most modern boats under Montojo, having 
been finished in 1887. The gunboat Marques del Duero was 
stationed behind the flagship as a dispatch-boat. 

It was scarcely light enough for all his vessels to see the 
signal, when Dewey's flagship displayed the order, " Prepare 
for general action," and his ships turned southward toward 
Cavite, leaving on the port side Manila and the few foreign 
merchant vessels anchored in the bay (the inter-island steamers 
and small craft under the Spanish flag having crowded into 
the Pasig River and huddled up under Fort Santiago). The 
two 15-centimeter guns on Point Sangley opened fire first, just 
about five o'clock, and then the gunners behind the 24-centime- 
ter guns on the Luneta followed suit; but the American vessels 
proceeded on their way unheeding, perfecting their battle for- 
mation as they went. The order established and maintained 
throughout the first engagement was: Olympia, Baltimore, 

* See translation of portion of ofiQciftl report of Admiral Montojo, Bureau of 
Navigatumt pp. 89-90. 


Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, and Boston, the McCulloch keeping 
in call of the Olympia, and well within range of the shots that 
passed over the American ships, with a hawser ready to pull 
o£E any vessel that should ground in the shallow waters near 
Cavite. When they were 5000 yards from Point Sangley, the 
Olympia turned to the westward, and, in order named, the ves- 
sels countermarched back and forth in a line approximately 
parallel to the line of the Spanish fleet, three times to the west- 
ward and twice to the eastward, each turn bringing them closer 
in, the range of fire being most of the time from 3000 to 
1800 yards. Captain Gridley of the Olympia did not receive 
until 5.41, when well within range, and after shells had passed 
over them, the order from Commodore Dewey: " You may 
fire when you are ready." The firing at once became general 
on the American side, and continued so for nearly two hours, 
the 5-inch rapid-fire guns on the Olympia and Raleigh, the 
6-inch guns on these and the other boats, and the 8-inch guns 
on the Baltimore, Boston, and Olympia doing steady execution, 
while the smaller guns of the secondary batteries were served 
so rapidly that the American fire was pronounced by the Span- 
iards to be "truly horrible " and to have been sustained "with 
veritable craziness." Admiral Montojo himself has given a 
graphic description of it : — 

There came upon us numberless projectiles, as the three cruisers 
at the head of the line devoted themselves almost entirely to fighting 
the Cristina, my flagship. A short time after the action commenced, 
one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action all those 
who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the forward 
mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieutenant 
Josd Nunez took the wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest 
commendation, steering until the end of the fight. . . . The enemy 
shortened the distance between us, and, rectifying his aim, covered 
us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. At 7.30, one shell completely 
destroyed the steering-gear. I gave orders to steer by hand while the 
rudder was out of action. In the mean time, another shell exploded 
on the poop. Another destroyed the mizzen-masthead, bringing down 
the flag and my ensign, which were replaced immediately. A fresh 


shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, 
destroying the wounded who were being treated there. Another ex- 
ploded in the ammunition-room astern, filling the quarters with smoke 
and preventing the working of the hand steering-gear. Als it was im- 
possible to control the fire, I had to flood the magazine when the 
cartridges were beginning to explode. Amidships, several shells of 
small caliber went through the smokestack, and one of the large ones 
penetrated the fire-room, putting out of action one master-gunner 
and twelve men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the star- 
board bow gun. While the fire astern increased, fire was started for- 
ward by another shell, which went through the hull and exploded on 
the deck. The guns which were not disabled continued firing ; only 
one gunner's mate and one able seaman were left on their feet to 
fire them as they were loaded by the men of the sailing crew, who 
had repeatedly been called on to substitute the men of the gun crews. 
The ship being out of control, the hull, smokestack and mast riddled 
with shot, and the cries of the wounded [adding to] the confusion ; 
half of her crew out of action, among whom were seven officers, I 
gave the order to sink and abandon the ship before the magazines 
should explode, at the same time signaling the Cuba and Luzon to 
assist in saving the crew, which they did, aided by others from the 
Duero and the arsenal.^ 

The fight had been on nearly two hours when the Spanish 
commander transferred his flag to the Isla de Cuba. The 
Cristina received her worst punishment when, at 7 o'clock, 
she desperately pushed forward from the line of battle, as if 
with the intention of ramming the Baltimore or the Oljrmpia. 
That was her final effort, and the work of destruction Montojo 
describes was speedily completed by the concentrated fire of 
the American ships, driving the Spanish flagship back almost 
upon the guns of the arsenal. Yet even if the result were not 
to be regarded as foregone from the moment the American 
ships swung into position and started for Cavite, the battle had 
been on but a short time before it was apparent, even to the 
distant watchers on the walls of Manila and on the roofs of 
Malate and Cavite, who would be the victor.* 

^ Bureau of Namgationtjt. 91; the inistAkes in translation have been corrected 
in the abore quotation from Montojo's official report. 
* Says Sastrdn, op. cU.t p. 389 : " Half an hour after the battle opened, we who 


As the American ships came closer and their gunnery be- 
came more certain, effective opposition to them was less and 
less possible. The Castilla's guns (those that had been left on 
board her) were finally all rendered useless but one, and she 
was both afire and sinking when her crew were given orders 
to abandon her. The Austria had started to her aid, but had 
been driven back behind the secondary line and set on fire. 
Three guns on the Isla de Luzon were dismantled. Back on 
the secondary line, the disabled Ulloa was struck by a shell 
which opened her below the water-line, her commander and 
half her crew had been put out of action, and the rest had to 
escape to Point Sangley. The little Duero's engines and in- 
effective guns were disabled. As the commander of the Cristina, 
Luis Cadarso, was standing on board directing to the last the 
operations of removing the wounded to the hospital on shore, 
he was literally annihilated by a shell which struck him as if 
he had been its target. The Olympia had caught the Cristina 
as she swung about to limp back to her companions and raked 
her fore and aft with a 250-pound shell, which killed or dis- 
abled 60 men besides the commander. 

This was the state of affairs when, at 7.35, a rumor that the 
ammunition for the rapid-fire guns of the Olympia was nearly 
exhausted caused Commodore Dewey to signal the fleet to 
withdraw into the bay for an examination and redistribution 
of ammunition. The actual state of destruction on board the 
Spanish boats was, of course, not known to him, but he must 
have felt quite sure of finishing his prey whenever he chose 
to do so. Hence it was that, finding the report of a shortage 
of ammunition on the flagship incorrect, he signaled the fleet 
on the way back into the bay to " let the people go to break- 
fast," while the commanding officers came aboard the Olym- 
pia to talk things over with him. Equally, it was a conscious 

were witnessing it, and from near or far were following anxionsly its incidents, 
suffered the most mournful impression of seeing how the flames of a fire of im- 
mense proportions had already invaded the Cristina, and how the Castilla and 
Don Juan de Austria were also burning." 


master of the situation who at this juncture sent word to the 
governor-general in Manila that the batteries at the mouth of 
the Pasig, on the Luneta, and at Malate, which had been keep- 
ing up a random and futile fire at his fleet, must cease their 
firing or the city would be shelled. These land batteries promptly 
became silent (as it proved, for all future time).^ 

It was not only a beaten but an almost entirely abandoned 
fleet which awaited the finishing touches of destruction when, 
at 11.16, the American commander ordered the attack to be 
renewed. The Cristina, whose magazine had exploded shortly 
after the first engagement was over, and the water-logged 
Castilla had sunk, wrapped in flames, in their positions off 
the arsenal. The Cuba, Luzon, and Austria had moved around, 
at Montojo's orders, to where the small vessels had been 
sheltered behind the arsenal off Cavite, in Bakoor Bay. The 
instructions were that they were to be sunk and abandoned 
before they should be surrendered. The Baltimore had started 
toward the entrance to the bay to intercept what was at first 
thought to be a Spanish merchant vessel ; but it proved to be 
flying a British flag, and she was recalled and, being nearest 
Cavite, headed the second attack. She proceeded first to silence 
the two-gun battery on Point Sangley, which had escaped at- 
tention in the first engagement. She and the other boats, then 
just coming up, devoted some shots to the Ulloa before it was 
discovered that they were battering an abandoned and sunken 
vessel. The circle of American ships then formed about the 
arsenal, behind which were the remaining Spanish vessels. 
The shots in reply were even fewer and more perfunctory than 
the wretched plight of the Spaniards might have given cause 

^ Joseph L. Stickney's account (op. ct/., pp. 476-77) makes it appear that Dewey 
was actiially afraid he had run out of ammunition without materially damaging 
the Spanish ships. Hence, according to Stickney, the breakfast story was invented 
to cover the real reason for withdrawal. But Dewey had already plainly stated 
the reason to be a mistake about ammunitioni in his official report of May 4. It 
is true that the real state of the destruction wrought among the Spanish ships did 
not become evident until, as the Americans were withdrawing into the bay, the 
Cristina's magazine exploded and the Cutilla burst into flames. 


for expecting. The Cuba, Luzon, and Duero were already 
being abandoned, their valves having been opened to the 
water and the breech-plugs of their guns taken before their 
crews retired to the arsenal. At 12.30, all firing had ceased on 
either side, the white flag having been raised above Cavite 
Arsenal, and Dewey withdrew his ships to the Manila side, 
leaving the Petrel behind to destroy the vessels in Bakoor Bay. 
A whaleboat's crew was sent to set fire to the Cuba, Luzon, 
Austria, and Duero, which had been in the fight, and also the 
disabled Lezo and the Velasco, gunboats which had taken no 
part in it. The little Manila and the small coast-survey vessel 
Argos were not burned where they lay aground with the rest, 
but were later hauled off and made captures. Two gunboats 
and three steam launches were towed off during the afternoon. ^ 
The Concord had meanwhile joined the Petrel in this work 
of unresisted destruction and capture, having completed the 
task assigned her by Dewey during the second engagement of 
destroying a large Spanish merchant vessel, the Isla de Min- 
danau of the Transatlantic Company (the subsidized colonial 
shipping-line of Spain), which had been hovering under the 
shelter of the Spanish fleet since it reached Manila on April 
22, had gone with Montojo to Subig Bay, and, upon its re- 
turn, had been beached off the coast near Las Pifias and its 
compartments flooded to render it useless if captured by the 
Americans. The Concord speedily set fire to it, and its crew 
barely escaped with their lives.'^ 

^ In a letter printed in the Century Magaziney April, 1899, E. P. Wood, com- 
mander of the Petrel, magnifies into heroism in the face of the enemy the burning 
of these ships. The letter is only worthy of note as cumulative evidence of the 
American failure fully to appreciate, even after it was all over, the demoralization 
of their opponents and the actually wretched state of the Spanish naval equip- 

2 The Spaniards have never been able to forgive Dewey for this finishing touch 
to the day's destruction. Says Sastrdn, op. cit. p. 394 : " A most gloomy record will 
always be for the Petrel [a mistake in the boats], the inconceivable fury with which 
it cannonaded the sailors on the Isla de Mindanau, as well when they were rowing 
to gain the beach as when already disembarked on it, at which time they received 
five shots more from the American ship, although in spite of them they came out 


The Spanish loss in killed and wounded, as given by Ad- 
miral Montojo, was 381 officers and men, of whom 167 were 
killed. Of these casualties (10 of which occurred in the arse- 
nal), over one half were on the flagship Cristina, and, when the 
Castilla was abandoned, she had suffered a loss of 23 killed and 
80 wounded.^ When it was said that the casualties on the 
American side were but nine, two of whom were not admitted 
to the hospital, the only two serious cases being those of a man 
who slipped on the Baltimore's deck and fractured his leg and 
of another sailor on the Baltimore with a wounded right f oot,^ 
the question occurs whether the Spanish gunners aimed at any- 
thing or simply fired to make a noise. Outside of the Balti- 
more, the American vessels suffered more damage from the 
concussion of their own guns than from the explosion of the 
Spanish shells, in the smashing of crockery, shaking loose of 
small boats, etc.^ Great comfort was derived in Spain by the 
belief that the 15-centimeter guns on Point Sangley disabled 

nnbarmed." The crew was, of course, in line of the Boston's fire, and her com- 
mander states (Bureau of Navigation^ p. 77) that he continued firing after the 
Mindanaa took fire, in obedience to orders. Dewej says (ibid.^ p. 72) that the 
Mindanaa " was armed and took part in the fight," but this is a mistake, at least 
if meant literally, though a small machine-gun on board may have fired some 
f hots, quite uselessly, early in the first engagement. 

^ In Commodore Dewey's official report already cited, the killed on the Cristina 
were reported as numbering 160. The number as given by Montojo is 130, while she 
bad 220 killed and wounded out of a total force of less than 400 men. (See Notes 
on Spanish- American Wart Office of Naval Intelligence^ part v, p. 13. These Notest 
issued separately during 1898-1900, most of them being translations of Spanish 
documents, shed light upon the general state of unpreparedness of Spain in 1898.) 
The skeletons of some eighty men were found in the old hulk of the Cristina, 
when she was raised in April, 1903. It was easy to float the Isla de Cuba, Isla de 
Luzon, and Don Juan de Austria, and they were added to the American navy in 
November, 1898. 

^ The detailed record of American casualties may be found in Report of the 
Surgeon-General of Navy for 1898 ^ on pp. 1292 and 1302 of vol. n of Message of 
the President and Accompanying Documents for 1898. 

* The Olympia was hit half a dozen times, a hole was made in its frame by • 
6-pound shot, a plate was dented, and its small boats damaged, but no men hurt ; 
the Boston was hit four times, but suffered no damage, though one of her crew 
was bruised by a splinter ; the Raleigh was hit once, a whaleboat sustaining the 
damage ; the Petrel was struck once, with no damage ; and the Concord was not 
■tmok at alL 


the Baltimore and compelled her to withdraw, and the artillery 
lieutenant in command of them was hailed as a hero. The 
Baltimore was struck five times, the only projectile which did 
real damage disabling a 6-inch gun (which was easily repaired 
the next day), and exploding a box of ammunition, which 
wounded two officers and six men, none seriously. It was the 
Baltimore herself which in the second engagement silenced the 
Point Sangley guns. The Spanish fleet was unquestionably 
short of good gunners, but their ammunition was also old and 
defective, and many of their projectiles failed to explode at 
all, or, when they did at rare intervals strike the mark and ex- 
plode, caused no damage worth mention.^ What seemed to be 
two submarine mines exploded in front of Cavite at 5.06 in 
the morning, as the American vessels were starting in that 
direction ; and Commodore Dewey reported that two launches 
put out from the arsenal during the first engagement and fire 
was concentrated upon them in the belief that they were at- 
tempting to use torpedoes on the Olympia. As has already 
been seen, the Spaniards probably had no torpedoes, or at least 
none that could have been expected to do damage.^ 

Not the victory itself, but the workmanlike manner in which 
it was achieved, and the wretched demoralization of the oppos- 
ing foe, are the remarkable features of this day's events. Many 
differing comparisons have been made between the two fleets. 
The United States Court of Claims, in deciding the prize- 
money cases of Admiral Dewey and his men on February 26, 

^ Says Admiral Montojo (Bureau of Navigation, p. 92) : " The inefficiency of 
the vessels which composed my little squadron ; the lack of all classes of the per- 
sonnel, especially master-gunners and seaman-gunners ; the ineptitude of some of 
the provisional machinists ; the scarcity of rapid-fire guns ; the strong crews of 
the enemy, and the unprotected character of the greater part of our vessels, all 
ccmtributed to make more decided the sacrifice which we made for our country and 
to prevent the possibility of the horrors of the bombardment of the city of 
Manila. . . ." 

^ Joseph L. Stickney {op. cit.) and the narrative of the battle by George A. 
Loud (on the McCulloch), Charles P. Kindleberger (junior surgeon on the 
Olympia), and Joel C. Evans (gunner of the Boston), in the Century Magazine, 
August, 1898, make much of these incidents of the mines and torpedoes. 


1900, after extended comparison of the opposing forces, reached 
some very remarkable conclusions, namely, that the number of 
men on board the Spanish vessels was 2973, as compared with 
1836 on the American vessels (and that the number of men 
on board the vessels destroyed was 1914) ; and that, taking 
into consideration the shore batteries at the bay entrance and 
at Manila and Cavite, and the torpedoes and the mines, " the 
enemy's force was superior to the vessels of the United States," 
and, excluding shore batteries and submarine defenses, it was 
inferior. This may be good law as bearing on the question 
whether Dewey and his men were entitled to bounty at the 
rate for the victory over a superior force ; but, for a practical 
comparison between the two forces, it must be disregarded. 
A fair comparison between the two naval forces must leave 
out of account, on the Spanish side, the gunboats which were 
under cover, either in dry dock with their engines out or 
grounded and abandoned, while the situation of the Ulloa, 
careened and anchored, and of the Castilla, moored fast with 
DO steam up, must be borne in mind ; and, on the American 
side, the supply-ships must be disregarded, and also the non- 
combatant McCulloch (as, for the same reason, the dispatch- 
boat Duero*). Taking official figures, as far as available, we 
find that the six American warships had a total tonnage of 
19,098, a total horse-power of 46,177, an average speed of 
17.5 knots at their maximum, and had on board 1709 officers 
and men. The six vessels on the Spanish side (with the gun- 
boat Ulloa) had a total tonnage of 11,271, a total horse-power 
of 13,793 (4123 of this on the Castilla and Ulloa, without steam 
up), an average maximum speed of 14.15 knots (disregarding 
the Castilla and Ulloa), and a total force of 1875 men (as stated 
by Montojo, who probably meant this number to include all 
the men under him on all the vessels and in the arsenal). The 
difference in steaming power and speed is at once noted. 

> The Dnero, howeyer, o&rried one 6.3-mch Pallisser rifle, which may have 
doue tome flring. 


One other highly significant point of comparison remains to 
be made, which is as to the guns of the opposing forces. The 
American fleet had 129 or 130 guns, of which 34 were rapid- 
fire guns (20 of these being 5-inch guns), 10 were 8-inch and 
23 were 6-inch breech-loading rifles. The Spanish ships had 
76 guns (counting 2 on the UUoa), of which 9 were rapid-fire 
guns of small caliber (7 of 2.24 inches and 2 of 1.65 inches), 
while 6 were 16-centimeter (6.3 inch), 4 were 13-centimeter 
(5.12 inch), and 16 were 12-centimeter (4.72 inch) breech- 
loading rifles. Put in another way, the six American ships 
engaged had in their main batteries 53 guns, of which 10 
were 8-inch, 23 were 6-inch, and 20 were 5-inch ; the six 
Spanish ships engaged had in their main batteries 26 guns, of 
which 6 were 6.3-inch and 20 were 5.1-inch or 4.7-inch ; the 
Americans' secondary battery comprised 75 or 76 guns, rang- 
ing from 3-inch rifles down to machine guns or mitrailleuses, 
and the Spaniards' secondary battery comprised 50 guns rang- 
ing from 3.4-inch down. The Court of Claims allowed for the 
17 guns of from 4- to 6-inch caliber that had been placed at 
the entrance to the bay, in range of 9 of which the American 
vessels sailed (though of this number 3 were old muzzle-load- 
ing guns) ; for the 6 guns in the Cavite shore batteries, of 
which only the two 15-centimeter rifles on Point Sangley and 
the single 12-centimeter rifle at the arsenal were modern 
breech-loading pieces; and for 53 guns on the Manila side, 
of which 41 were antique muzzle-loading pieces of 3 to 8.5 
inches in caliber (a dozen or so incapable of being fired), while 
of the more modern guns only the 4 24-centimeter rifles on 
the Luneta and in front of the walls had really to be seriously 
feared from their position and range, and they, as seen, were 
so defectively mounted as not to possess their full range, even 
if well handled. These are all figures that must be taken into 
account in rendering any fair verdict upon the battle as a 
naval performance.^ 

^ Aside from the reports of the opposing commanders, as given in Bureau of 


The American fleet had begun the work of a blockader even 
while the battle was on. From the first, the blockade was ef- 

Navigation, for the above comparison fuller data have been obtained as to the 
American ships from Report of Chief of Ordnance of the Navy, 1898 (pp. 1180-83 
and 1188-91 of vol. n of Message of the President and Accompanying Documents 
for 1898.) It is to be noted that five or six of the small machine-guns on the war- 
vessels had been mounted on the noncombatant McCulIoch, Nanshan, and Zafiro. 
For the Court of Claims decision, see Harper*s History of the War in the Philip- 
pines, pp. 29-37. It allowed ^191,400 as bounty (under an old law, repealed on 
March 3, 1899), or $100 for each of the 1914 men " found " to have been on the 
vessels destroyed (barring the Cuba, Luzon, and Austria, which were raised and 
restored). Prize money was afterward recovered by Dewey and his men for the 
property captured (but not for the property on land, including the Cavite Arsenal, 
appraised at S600,000 in Report of Secretary of Navy, Washington, 1902, pp. 240- 
45), under a decision of the District of Columbia Supreme Court of February 23, 
1903, affirmed by the United States Supreme Court (reported in Sen. Doc. 176, 
67th Cong., 2d Sess.). This amounted to $828,677, of which, after deducting attor- 
neys' fees, etc., the navy pension fund received one half, or $370,366, and Dewey 
and his men received an equal amount. Dewey received 5 per cent of both bounty 
and prize money, or $9570 and $18,500 respectively. The captains of ships each 
received one tenth of his ship's total share, and the officers and men about two 
months* and five months* pay from the bounty and prize awards respectively. (See 
New York Evening Post, August 13, 1904.) For a comparison of the two fleets by 
the Chief Intelligence Officer of the United States Navy, see Cong. Record, vol. 
35, pp. 5374-75. The figures therein given as to the Spanish ships are taken from 
Estado General de la Armada de Espafia for 1898 ; these official figures should be 
checked by reference to Spanish sources of information as to the battle, which 
reveal in part the alterations in armament of some of their ships, remountings of 
guns on land, etc. Sastrdn, op. cit., p. 384, gives the equipment of the Spanish 
vessels engaged, as taken from Spanish official sources. Obviously, vessels in dry 
dock and unmanned, survey vessels, transports, etc., should not be taken into the 
comparison, as has been done, however, in all the American sources here cited. 
The full complement of men for the Spanish ships engaged would have been 
1351. Montojo was short of men all around, and had enlisted merchantmen sailors 
and other volunteers, having more than the usual complement, though his recruits 
were of a rather nondescript sort ; in his total of 1875 men, he undoubtedly 
meant to include all the men under him, at the arsenal and on board the fighting 
vessels, and after most of the crews of the beached gunboats had been added to 
his force (only about 40 men out of 96 being left on the Ulloa, for instance). 
Nevertheless, on his own statement, he had more men engaged than had Dewey ; 
though, to reach its total of 2973, the Court of Claims counted some of his men 
two or three times. There were more than 53 guns in the fortifications of Manila, 
if one counts all the antique bronze pieces, the rusting iron mortars, some guns 
lying in ditches, and others rusting in obscure corners ; a table drawn up from 
the Spanish plans after the city's capture lists 130 pieces in all {Report of War 
Department, 1903, vol. in, p. 444), but shows only 28 rifled cannon, of which only 
8 were breech-loaders. Besides the magazine accounts of the battle that have been 
eit«d, the newspaper correspondence of John F. McCutcheon, correspondent of 
the Chicago Record, also an eyewitness, and the dispatohei of J. L. Stiokney to 


fective, though carried out with considerable leniency.^ The 
American fleet on May 2 definitely took up station in front 
of Cavite. The batteries on Sangley were destroyed by a land- 
ing party that day, and the next the arsenal of Cavite was oc- 
cupied and the Raleigh and the Baltimore went to Corregidor 
to secure the surrender of the Spanish batteries at the bay's 
entrance, paroling the men garrisoned there and destroying 
the guns. In the interval that elapsed before American sailors 
replaced the Spaniards, a horde of Tagalogs sacked the arsenal, 
apparently leaderless, yet with discrimination enough to take 
everything they could find in the way of old firearms, swords, 
etc. Dewey's demand for surrender was also extended to cover 
the town of Cavite, just back of the arsenal on the peninsula, 
the seat of the provincial government, and in possession of 
the Spanish army under General Garcia Pena. The Spaniards 
opposed the claim that the white flag on the arsenal covered 
also the " plaza," but yielded when the American ships covered 
their retreat across the peninsula, though instead of surrender- 
ing they hurriedly withdrew along the narrow peninsula and 
Pena took up his quarters in San Francisco de Malabon, a few 
miles inland. They were not molested during their not exactly 
calm and dignified retreat in plain sight. Neither did Dewey 
occupy the abandoned town, and almost immediately some 
hundreds of natives armed with rifles were busy sacking the 
Government buildings and the houses of Spaniards, from which 

the New York Herald, are of especial interest. On the Spanish side, see also La 
Politica de Espana en Filipinos, vol. viii (1898), nos. 184, 185, and 186, for the 
Spanish press dispatches of April and May regarding Dewey's coming to Manila, 
the battle, and the first stages of the siege of Manila. Sastrdn, op. cit., facing 
p. 388, gives a fairly accurate plan of the battle, especially as regards the posi- 
tions of the Spanish vessels. The similar plan given by Foreman, op. cit., p. 677, 
is entirely incorrect, as are many of the data given by this writer about the battle. 
A very fair defense of Montojo, as the victim of Spanish imprevision, is the pam- 
phlet Ante la opinion y ante la historia (Madrid, 1900). 

^ The Spaniards seemed to feel rather aggrieved because Dewey did not in- 
dulge in proclamations and all the paraphernalia of a formal blockade on paper ; 
they were quite ready to admit, however, that his blockade was effectively en- 


only the money had been removed. The parish priest of Cavite 
was allowed to go in peace, but several other friars there found 
the crowd threatening and took refuge in the military hospital, 
pretending sickness. From here they were the next day trans- 
ferred with the wounded soldiers to Manila (these men having 
in the mean time had the solicitous attention of the American 
surgeons). The natives were, for the time being, left in con- 
trol of Cavite, the town not being formally occupied by the 
Americans until General Anderson arrived with troops ; efforts 
were, however, made to keep the new possessors of the town 
within proper bounds and to have them maintain order, which 
in the main they did, after the first few hours of sacking and 

The authorities and inhabitants of Manila were in momen- 
tary expectation of a bombardment. Their efforts to align the 
Filipinos upon the side of their old sovereign had been crowned 
with some apparent success, in the securing of volunteers and 
protestations of loyalty from numerous native chiefs. For the 
time being the principal thing was to get away from the 
American shells. Four thousand fugitives, among them the 
wife and children of Governor-General Augustin, had gone to 

* The Spaniards were disposed to complain throughout of the lack of " formal- 
ity " on the American side. They claim that the first commander who represented 
Dewey in the conference on shore at Cavite, asked for by them, made them 
understand that Dewey wished only to secure the destruction of the Spanish 
vessels and of the shore batteries at Cavite and the assurance that his vessels 
would not be molested at the entrance of the bay [if they went out again ?] ; but 
that, by subsequent modifications, these demands were enlarged as stated above. 
(Sastrdn, op. cit.y pp. 399-403.) The failure of the Americans to occupy and govern 
the town of Cavite seems to have had some influence later in leading the Spaniards 
to believe that, if Manila was captured or surrendered, the natives' armed forces 
would be left free to pillage and massacre. Dewey, of course, felt that his prime 
concern was with the state of affairs on the water, and, after manning the small 
boftti he captured, and needing others to keep up communication with Hongkong, 
be probably did not see how he could leave more men on land than was necessary 
to take charge of the naval arsenal and do the repairing work which he had on 
hand. He did keep the Olympia at work patrolling the peninsula, as well as could 
be done from the deck of a vessel. His report of May 4, unfortunately, is most 
meager of details, being the merest outline of the battle of May 1 and the inci- 
dents immediately following. 


interior points north on the railroad during the few days be- 
fore the naval engagement. The walled city of Manila was 
now abandoned by almost its entire population, which took 
refuge in the city suburbs farthest inland. The stores were all 
closed. It was said that Dewey had on May 2 demanded the 
surrender of the city, and Augustin had refused in truly 
Spanish formal style, which implied " resisting to the death,'' 
especially with a so-called fortified town. It is certain that the 
foreign consuls, particularly the British, German, and Belgian, 
were soon busily going back and forth between the Olympia 
and the Manila shore, and communications, of a purely informal 
sort on Dewey's part, were conveyed by them. Dewey was 
quite willing, from his own testimony,^ that the authorities in 
the city should be kept in sufficient awe of his guns, and prob- 
ably made virtual threats as to what he would do if the shore 
batteries attempted to injure his fleet. He also intimated, the 
very evening of the battle, the surrender to him of the cable- 
station in Malate; and, this being refused, cut the cable on 
May 2.2 

1 Sen. Doc. SSI, 57ih Cong., Ist Sesa., pp. 2927-28. Admiral Dewey's testimony 
before the Senate Committee in 1902, contained in the foregoing document, as 
well as his dispatch of May 4 to Washington, shows that he never entertained the 
notion of taking the city, until he should be so instructed and troops to occupy it 
should arrive, but only desired to warn the Spaniards that they must not use their 
guns. There were, however, frequent rumors to the contrary in Manila, and the 
inhabitants lived in momentary anticipation of a bombardment. The foreign colo- 
nies in Manila were informed, through their consuls, that they would receive suffi- 
cient notice before bombardment to get on board the vessels of their nations iu 
the harbor, and would, if necessary, be accommodated at Cavite ; and there were 
several times when these foreign vessels, under the eye of the American fleet, 
were crowded with such fugitives, including many Spanish ladies and children. 

* The Spaniards had at times, however, more direct communication with the 
continent of Asia than the Americans. On May 22, Dewey reported that they were 
using the land wires to Bolinau and the cable to Hongkong from there; the in- 
surgents, however, soon cut them off from communication with Bolinau. Later, 
they were reported to have communicated through Iloilo and thence to Borneo 
and Singapore. Long before the city fell, they were dependent for news on the 
mail which Dewey let pass through the foreign war-vessels which communicated 
with Hongkong. For a while, he opened the Spanish mail. 



It is in entire agreement with the record of the times to as- 
sert that the idea of a conquest of the Philippines was, up to 
and even after Dewey*s victory, almost as remote from the 
minds of the authorities at Washington as it was from the 
minds of the American people, who were, when the news came, 
half astonished at calling to mind that Spain had possessions 
in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic. President McKinley 
has stated : " When Dewey sank the ships at Manila, as he 
was ordered to do, it was not to capture the Philippines — it 
was to destroy the Spanish fleet, the fleet of the nation against 
which we were waging war, and we thought that the soonest 
way to end that war was to destroy the power of Spain to make 
war, and so we sent Dewey." ^ Yet there is the statement of 
Secretary of War Alger that it had been decided to send an 
army of occupation to the Philippines before Dewey's victory 
occurred, and orders for the assembling of volunteers at San 
Francisco had been given on May 4.^^ Simple obedience to the 
rules by which war is waged, however, implies that every ef- 
fort shall be made to cripple the enemy, and that every advan- 
tage gained shall be followed up while war lasts ; and this step 
of preparation was all the more natural at that early date, ii 
we suppose that Dewey's letter of March 31, expressing his 
confidence that the Spanish fleet could be taken and the de- 

1 Speech at Youngstown, Ohio, October 18, 1899. (See Republican Campaign 
Textbook, 1900, p. 331.) 

« R. A. Alger, The Spanish-American War (New York, 1901), p. 326. The an- 
ther's statement that the orders of May 4 for the assembling of volunteers at San 
Francisco were g^ven three days before the receipt of Dewey's cablegram announc- 
ing his victory (sent from Hongkong) loses some of its point from the fact that, 
before the cable was cut on May 1, the Spaniards had communicated through 
Hongkong report on the engagement which, though not accurate, established their 
defeat, and President McKinley had on May 3 sent a message of congratulation to 
Dewey at Hongkong. (Sec Bureau of Navigation, p. 68.) On p. 136 of the same 
document is a telegram of May 4 from Secretary Long to the navy yard at Mare 
Island, showing that the City of Peking was already chartered to send ammunition 
and was to be prepared also to carry troops. On p. 176 of Report of the Major- 
Otneral commanding the Army, 1898, will be found a statement that orders for 
Mtembling volunteers at San FranciMO were given on May 3. 


f enses of Manila reduced in one day, had reached Washington 
before the news of the victory came. And in spite of this tes- 
timony, as a foreign critical observer has put it : — 

They seemed to be surprised at Washington by the demand for 
reinforcements from Dewey. No troops were ready to be sent to him, 
there was even discussion for several days in the Department of War 
before the number of reinforcements was decided upon, and the first 
expedition did not leave San Francisco until May 25. It did not 
reach Manila until June 30. The hesitation which the President 
showed in regard to the fate of the Philippines after the defeat of 
Spain, comes to the support of the foregoing facts to prove that the 
American Government had no line of conduct mapped out with re- 
spect to this archipelago at the begifining of the war. The initial ob- 
ject of Dewey's expedition seems, then, simply to have been, apart 
from the destruction of the Spanish fleet, to create for the United 
States rights that would warrant them claiming at the end of the 
war a naval station in this part of the Pacific.^ 

When, on May 7, Commodore Dewey was notified by cable 
that the President had named him acting rear-admiral (which 
was made a regular appointment after a vote of thanks to 
Dewey and his men was passed by Congress on May 10), he 
was informed that troops were being got ready to go on the 
Peking (which was to carry him ammunition and supplies), 
and was asked how many troops ought to be sent. He replied 
on May 13 that he could " take Manila any time," but 5000 
troops were necessary to retain it, and thus, as he thought, to 
" control the Philippine Islands." As seen, orders had been 

^ A. Viallate, " Les pr^iminaircs de la guerre hispano-am^ricaine et rannexion 
des Philippines par les Etats-Unis " (Revue Historique, Juillet-Aout, 1903, pp. 282— 
83). This writer had already (p. 281) refused to believe that the officers and ex- 
ecutive heads of a growing and ambitious navy would have done other than plan 
for the securing of a needed coaliug and naval station in the Orient when war 
brought this possibility to their very door. He says it is reported that the officers 
of the Asiatic squadron of the United States had for a long time back been paying 
particular attention to the study of the Philippine Islands, and he points to the 
securing of naval stations in the Hawaiian and Samoan Islands as evidence of the 
existing tendency to follow Captain Mahan's preachings. His article constitutes a 
very good review, from American and Spanish official publications, of the steps 
leading up to the war and of the treaty negotiations so far as these related to the 


given on May 4 to assemble at San Francisco the volunteers 
being raised, under the call of April 23, in the Western States; 
the first of these troops went into camp there on the 6th, and 
recruiting was hurried forward in those states. In addition to 
the Peking, under navy contract, vessels were hastily chartered 
by the army and fitted up as best they could be for carrying 
troops. The army staff was straining its resources to the ut- 
most limit in the eastern part of the country at the time ; and, 
with all the details as to clothing the volunteers, provisioning 
the ships, and equipping the expeditions in general, three 
weeks elapsed before the expedition sailed. Three merchant 
vessels, the City of Peking, Sydney, and Australia, sailed from 
San Francisco on May 25, bearing almost 2500 men, under 
the command of Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, who 
had come down from Alaska with a detachment of the Four- 
teenth Infantry. Five companies of these regulars and the 
California and Oregon regiments of volunteer infantry, to- 
gether with a detachment of volunteer heavy artillery raised 
in California, constituted the force. At Honolulu they were 
joined by the cruiser Charleston, under orders to proceed to 
Cavite, consorting the troopships and navy supplies on the 
way. This expedition did not, however, reach Cavite until June 
30, having proceeded, under sealed orders to Captain Glass of 
the Charleston, to the little island of Guam, in the Marianne 
Islands. The Charleston entered the harbor of the latter place 
on June 20, and her shots at the tumbling old fort were taken 
by the half-dozen military authorities of this lonesome outpost 
of Spain to be a courteous salute, which the subordinates at 
once put out in a launch to return by a call. The arrival of a 
ship in that part of the world was sufficient occasion for re- 
joicing, in any event ; and^ not having heard from Manila for 
about six months, they knew nothing of the outbreak of war.^ 

* The classic story told to illastrate the fact that, under the Spanish regime, 
appointment to official position on Guam meant exile is that of a military governor 
■OOM years back who boarded a tramp merchantman and made a trip incognito to 
fiowpe, letuniing after a year's absence to be greeted by his secretary with the 


They were apprised of their error and were told to convey 
peremptory orders for surrender to the military governor of 
the group. He sent his inevitable formal protest against " this 
act of violence," when he had been given no information that 
war was on ; but admitted his inability to resist the Charleston 
with his four rusty old cast-iron cannon, unsafe even for salut- 
ing, and acquiesced in the demand for surrender with a " God 
be with you." The next morning Captain Braunersreuther and 
a few marines on the Charleston went on shore and obtained 
the surrender of the Spanish officials and garrison before the 
landing party of Oregon troops which had been got ready had 
reached the shore. That afternoon the little garrison was dis- 
armed, the few native soldiers released, the American flag was 
hoisted, and the six Spanish army and navy officers and fifty- 
four enlisted men were taken on board and carried to Manila.' 
Two more expeditions left for Manila in June, the first under 
Brigadier-General Francis V. Greene, and the second under 
Major-General Wesley E. Merritt, who had been designated 
commander of the new " Department of the Pacific," he being 
followed closely into Manila Bay by a shipload of troops under 
Brigadier-General Arthur MacArthur. The ten ships chartered 
for these expeditions bore over 8000 men, and the total of 
officers and men arriving at Manila up to July 31 was 10,924. 
During the latter part of July, three more ships were dis- 
patched, but of course none arrived until after the fall of 
Manila on August 13. This fourth expedition was under com- 
mand of Major-General Elwell S. Otis, though the ships trav- 
eled some time apart, and its somewhat less than 5000 men 
brought the total of troops sent to the Philippines until late 
October of 1898 up to 15,689, exclusive of a few hundred re- 
cruits and teamsters and other camp-followers sent out on small 

report " Nothing new." The Spanish supply-vessels then went there from Manila 
only once every year and a half. 

^ For the official account of this comic-opera conquest, see Bureau of Navigation^ 
pp. 151-57. A good descriptive account is contained in Henry Cahot Lodge's The 
War with Spain (New York, 1900). 


boats with horses and equipments. Of the 11,000 troops arriv- 
ing before the fall of Manila, only about 2500 were regulars, 
these being two battalions each of the Eighteenth and Twenty- 
third Infantry, five companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, four 
batteries of the Third Artillery (serving as infantry and with- 
out field guns), and detachments of the engineer, hospital, and 
signal corps. The volunteers in these first expeditions com- 
prised one infantry regiment each from California, Oregon, 
Colorado, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Idaho, Wyoming, Minne- 
sota, and North Dakota, volunteer artillerymen from Califor- 
nia, two batteries of Utah light artillery, and the Astor Bat- 
tery of New York. The Montana and South Dakota infantry 
regiments followed them in August, and the regulars in Ma- 
nila were reinforced by five more companies of the Fourteenth 
Infantry, two more batteries of the Third Artillery, and six 
troops of the Fourth Cavalry, the first men of that arm of the 
service to arrive in the islands.^ 

^ The official data as to the number and organizations of the troops in these 
expeditions will be foond in Report of Quartermaster'General of the Army^ 1898 
(accompanying Report of Secretary of War^ vol. I of Message of the President and 
Accompanying Documents^ 1898, p. 460), in Report of the Major-General command' 
ing the Army, 1898, pp. 499-500, and in Major-General Otis's report for 1899 
(Report of War Department, 1899, rol. i, part 4, p. 3). Much previously unpub- 
lished information regarding the sending of the first expeditions to the Philippines 
may be found on pp. 635-782 of vol. ii of Correspondence Relating to the War 
with Spain from April 15, 1898 to July SO^ 1902. (This document published in 1902 
for the use of the War Department, has not been made available for public distri- 
bution. Volume n is entirely devoted to the teleg^phic correspondence regarding 
the Philippine expeditions and subsequent cable messages to and from Manila. 
The cable messages have in some cases been edited, in the way of omissions. This 
document will hereafter be cited as Corr. Rel. War. In these pages may be seen 
how, starting with Dewey's recommendations for 6000 troops, it had, by May 30, 
been decided, largely upon (General Merritt's recommendations, to send 20,000 
men to the Philippines. There was also some clash of opinion between Generals 
Miles and Merritt as to the number and nature of the organization and equipment of 
the troops to be sent, Oeneral Merritt being urgently desirous of having regulars 
for half of the force (though eventually expressing satisfaction with the Western 
volunteers). It is curious to note (pp. 654-56, 665, 675) how much more accurate 
was the information prepared in the War Department (probably from secret serv- 
ice reports from Spain) as to the Spanish forces in the Philippines and general 
military conditions there than that cabled by Admiral Dewey or by Consul Wild- 
man at Hongkong. Other interesting points herein to be noted are President Mo- 



Another element had, however, been added to the situation, 
even before the first expedition sailed from San Francisco. 
What has been brought out in preceding pages, as to the con- 
ditions in Luzon and the central islands from January to April 
of 1898, has made it apparent that, regardless of what attitude 
the exiled insurgent leaders might assume under the new war 
status, the rebellious element of natives in various provinces 
would have to be taken into account. Relying upon the in- 
formation of Consul Williams, Dewey had assumed that the 
native population would at once, regardless of leadership, ally 
itself with the Americans, and was disappointed that thousands 
of them did not at once revolt in Cavite alone, within sight of 
his ships. It is at this date idle to speculate as to what would 
have been the outcome of the Spanish efforts to conciliate the 
native population, had not Aguinaldo and his associates in 
Hongkong returned to organize opposition to Spain with the 
apparent authorization and good wishes of the chief repre- 
sentative of the United States on the scene, though it may be 
recorded as unquestionable that, up to the arrival of Aguinaldo, 
the tardily adopted Spanish "policy of attraction," accom- 
panied by indefinite promises, was making headway among 
the most troublesome natives, the Tagalogs. But Aguinaldo 

Kinley's cautionsness in calling the new department the " Department of the Pa- 
cific " (hence the public impression of the times that the Philippines were to be at- 
tached temporarily, so far as regards military organization, to California, though it 
was from the first intended to be an independent military command, and was on June 
21 made a separate army corps; also the reference, in this connection, to the Pres- 
ident's confidential instructions to General Merritt. (Ibid.f p. 649: " The department 
[of the Pacific] is intended to include Philippine Islands only ; but this fact is not 
mentioned in orders, and will be communicated to you in confidential letter of in- 
structions " — telegram May 16 to Merritt.) The President's written instructions 
of May 19 to General Merritt (ibid.j pp. 676-78) were, for some reason, not in- 
cluded in the formal military reports of that year ; they outline the duties of a 
military occupant of foreign territory, as prescribed by international law, and their 
most essential features were repeated by General Merritt in his proclamation of 
August 14 in Manila. (They are also to be found on p. 85 of Sen. Doc. 208, 66th 
Cong. 1st Sess.) 


arrived, brought by one of Dewey's vessels ; he set up head- 
quarters for himself in Cavite, obtained a few more arms from 
the American commander, besides those which his former fol- 
lowers had already been careful to seize upon the departure 
of the Spaniards, and soon another lot of arms arrived for 
him, bought with the assistance of the American consul at 
Hongkong ; he and his assistants sent the news far and wide 
that they had an " alliance" with the Americans and were going 
to have their independence; they surrounded and captured 
the Spanish armed forces in Cavite, and laid the plans for as 
complete an uprising to the northward of Manila ; and within 
two weeks from the arrival of the insurgent leader of 1897, 
there were actively or secretly associated with him more Fili- 
pinos of prominence, entitled to be considered leaders among 
their people, than ever had been the case in 1896 or 1897, 
and the governor-general's plan of a united resistance of 
the two people to save the sovereignty of the islands to Spain 
had become an illusion and was clearly recognized as such by 
all save a few Spanish optimists. 

There had been some communication between Dewey and 
the insurgents in Hongkong during March and April, sup- 
posedly with regard to the latter accompanying the fleet to 
Manila for the purpose of stimulating the native opposition to 
the Spaniards. Whatever were the propositions then discussed, 
it came to nothing on either side. Dewey did not take the 
" little brown men " very seriously ; and the desire to go with 
the fleet, on the part of Aguinaldo at least, was not strong 
enough to prevent him departing hurriedly and secretly via 
Saigon for Singapore on the 7th of April, in order to escape 
service in the suit that had been brought against him by 
Sen or Artacho for a division of the money received from 
Primo de Rivera.^ His original intention, it has been claimed, 

^ Dewey laji that he himself law some of Agnina1do*s associates two or three 
times, that " they seemed to be all very young, earnest boys," and he did not at- 
tach much importance to what they said, and that, though he later wired Consul 


was to proceed from Singapore to Europe.* But there was in 
Singapore a certain British subject who had resided in the 
Philippines. This Mr. H. W. Bray sought out Aguinaldo im- 
mediately upon his arrival, on April 21, and two days later he 
had arranged for an interview between the insurgent leader 
and Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, consul-general of the United States 
in Singapore. Two (Aguinaldo says three) interviews were 
held with great secrecy and formality between these parties, 
Mr. Bray serving as Spanish interpreter, while one of Agui- 
naldo's Filipino companions understood English a very little. 
Just exactly what passed between the two principals to 
the interviews perhaps only the interpreter could tell, as 
the stories of the principals conflict. Consul-General Pratt 
reported officially at the time, and has always maintained, that 

Pratt at Singapore to have Aguinaldo come on, he did not think of delaying his 
expedition for him, as his information led him to believe that the people would all 
rise against the Spaniards anyway and these few Filipinos at Hongkong would have 
little to do with it (Sen. Doc. SSI, pp. 2927, 2932). Wlien the time came to leave 
for Manila, says Admiral Dewey, none of the Filipinos who had been talking about 
it were " ready " to go with him, one excusing himself " because he did n't have any 
toothbrush." The " little men " kept taking up his time and " bothering " him at a 
period when his hands were full with his preparations to meet the Spaniards. (One 
Filipino, Jos^ Alejandrino, did, however, go with Dewey's fleet to Manila Bay, on 
board of one of the supply-ships ; but he returned to Hongkong without landing at 
Cavite.) Aguinaldo's side of the story, told, it is to be noticed, in 1899, and then 
written by another than himself, is to be found in his Reseha veridica^ already 
cited. He claims that he had personal interviews with the commander of the Pet- 
rel, between March 16 and April 6; that these interviews were sought by the Amer- 
ican officer at the instructions of Dewey; that the Petrel's commander, in answer 
to his express query as to what the United States would concede to the Filipinos, 
said that " the United States were a rich and great nation and did not need colo- 
nies"; that he asked that the "agreement " be put in writing, and the American 
officer promised to lay it before his superior. The Resena veridica is so inaccurate 
and uncandid that it will not do to accept any statement resting on its authority. 
Admiral Dewey may have become in 1902 somewhat inclined to minimize the im- 
portance which he originally placed upon the plan of using the Filipinos at least 
to hold the Spaniards in check. Still, it is plain from his deeds as well as from his 
testimony that he never took the Filipino insurgents very seriously; his attitude 
toward the " little men " who took up his time is too typically Anglo-Saxon. 

^ Sastr6n, op. cit. p. 415-16. This statement has also been made by persons who 
met Aguinaldo at this time in Saigon and Singapore. See also La Politica de Espana 
eti Filipinas, vol. vm, p. 62, for reports coming to Madrid papers to this effect in 
January, 1898. 


he limited himself to endeavoring to secure the cooperation of 
Aguinaldo as a leader of insurgents with the American fleet ; 
that this cooperation was, so far as his negotiations went, to be 
unconditional ; and that he declined to discuss the future policy 
of the United States with regard to the Philippines. Aguinaldo 
claims that he was promised in these interviews that the United 
States "would at least recognize the independence of the 
Philippines under a naval protectorate," and that there was 
no need for putting the agreement in writing, as he asked, 
since " the words of Admiral Dewey and the American consul 
were sacred." The definite outcome of the conferences was 
that, in response to a cablegram of Mr. Pratt on April 24 that 
Aguinaldo was ready to come to Hongkong and arrange for 
" insurgent cooperation," Dewey at once replied : " Tell Agui- 
naldo come as soon as possible." Aguinaldo and his two Fili- 
pino companions left for Hongkong two days later; hence, of 
course, arrived there too late for any conference with Dewey.* 

^ Aguinaldo's authorized version of the Singapore conferences is to be found in 
his Resena veridical in which are made the statements quoted above. Cousul-Geueral 
Pratt's official reports of the conferences and his subsequent correspondence with 
the State Department regarding the whole matter are to be found on pp. 341-58 
of Sen. Doc. 62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess. Disregarding entirely Aguinaldo's ex parte 
statements, it is apparent from Mr. Pratt's own dispatches to the State Depart- 
ment that he plainly enough understood Aguinaldo and his companions to assert 
that independence was their object in mind in cooperating with the Americans. 
Aside from his statement of Aguinaldo's desires contained in his dispatch of April 
30, he sent the Department on May 5 a clipping from the Singapore Free Press of 
May 4, giving an account of the whole Bray-Pratt-Aguinaldo episode, which account 
stated Aguinaldo's policy to embrace the independence of the Philippines, with 
American or European advisers [the chief of them to be Mr. Howard W. Bray ?]. 
On June 8, up to which date Mr. Pratt had continued to be very self-complncent 
over his part in the affair (having, on June 2, in a dispatch to Washington, virtu- 
ally claimed for himself the intimacy with Philippine affairs which Mr. Bray as- 
sumed to possess, and praising himself for having ''assisted the cause of the 
United States by securing Aguinaldo's cooperation "), he sent to Washington an- 
other clipping from the Singapore Free Press of that date, in which Mr. Bray, 
who had constitutecl himself in the columns of that journal an oracle on Philippine 
matters, and who at about the same time addressed President McKinley in behalf 
of Aguinaldo, states that " independence is the only possible solution of the Philippine 
question." On June 9, Mr. Pratt fraternized enthusiastically with the Filipino 
colony in Singapore, exchanging toasts with them in a demonstration made by 
them in his honor, and passing over without protest the statement of their leader 


No word had been left by Dewey as to sending Aguiualdo 
on if he should arrive at Hongkong, and consequently the in- 
surgent chief waited in the latter port sixteen days, until the 
McCuUoch had brought, on her second trip thither, permission 
for him and various of his followers to come to Cavite. Consul- 
General Wildman and Mr. John Barrett (ex-United States 
minister resident and consul-general in Siam, who soon after 
engaged as a newspaper correspondent in the Philippines) put 
Aguinaldo and thirteen companions on board the McCuUoch 
at night, on May 16.^ Meanwhile, Mr. Wildman had had many 

that they came to thank him for bringing about the arrangement whereby their 
people were to have independence under American protection. Indeed, in a con- 
tribution over his own signature in Collier*s Weekly for April 13, 1901, Mr. Pratt 
plainly states that he inferred from his interviews with Aguinaldo that the latter 
was thinking of Filipino independence and only feared that the United States 
forces would abandon them before they could establish it, never dreaming that 
the United States would permanently occupy the islands; the inference is that Mr. 
Pratt himself then felt that no such notion need be entertained. A very fair ac- 
count of the episode from the Spanish side is to be found in Sastrdn, op. cit.f pp. 
415-19. This writer claims that Mr. Bray engineered the whole proceeding; that 
he spent some time in argument with Aguinaldo before he could convince him that 
he was justified in disregarding the pact of Biak-na-bat6 and returning to raise 
insurrection against Spain; that, this accomplished, Mr. Bray was the instrument 
in bringing Messrs. Pratt and Aguinaldo together; and that, in order to pass judg- 
ment upon what occurred between them, one must know what sort of an interpreter 
Mr. Bray was. He says : " What is difficult to explain ... is that Aguinaldo and 
Consul Spencer Pratt were, at the end of the interview, perfectly satisfied : the 
latter, because he believed that Aguinaldo would simply cooperate with the Ameri- 
can forces to put an end to the sovereignty of Spain in the Philippine Islands ; the 
former, because he was convinced that the reward of his cooperation would be 
nothing else but the attainment of independence for his land." Mr. Bray promptly 
gave the news of his achievement to his friend the editor of the Singapore Free 
Press, and the Spanish consul at Singapore entered a protest to the British au- 
thorities of the colony against this violation by the American consul of the pro- 
clamation of neutrality which had just been issued there. Messrs. Pratt and Bray 
later had a disagreement, the former claiming that the Englishman had misrepre- 
sented him. In his testimony at Washington in 1902, Felipe Buencamino said that 
the insurgent treasury was asked to pay S6000 to settle a judgment for libel ob- 
tained by Consul Pratt in a suit against Mr. Bray in Singapore. (See Hearings, 
etc., Committee on Insular Affairs, 1901-03, p. 283.) In his testimony before the 
Peace Commission at Paris, General C. A. Whittier stated that Pratt offered 
Aguinaldo money for his expenses to Hongkong, but the latter refused (Sen. Doc. 
6fS, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 499). 

1 The Republican Campaign Text Book for 1900, quoting from one of Mr. Bar- 
rett's accounts of early relations with Aguinaldo, cites (p. 220) his statement that 


talks with Aguinaldo and his associates, and had put them in 
touch with two Americans in Hongkong who were to act as 
their agents in the purchase of arms and ammunition. Of 
the money paid to the insurgents by the Spaniards the pre- 
ceding December, deposits amounting to $117,000 (Mexi- 
can) were, according to Aguinaldo, made with Mr. Wildman, 
of which the first payment of $50,000 was expended for rifles, 
ammunition, and a small boat, while he claims the subsequent 
payment of $67,000 was embargoed. What is known of a cer- 
tainty is that arms were bought, with the more or less active 
assistance of the consul-general at Hongkong, and that the 
first consignment, amounting to 2000 Mauser rifles and 200,- 
000 cartridges, was allowed to be landed at Cavite, close by the 

Lieutenant Caldwell, of Dewey's staff, who came to Hongkong on the McCulloch, 
was rather averse than otherwise to taking Aguinaldo and his companions to 

^ Consnl-General Wildman, who was drowned in the nnfortnnate accident to 
the steamship Rio de Janeiro in the hay of San Francisco in 1901, seems never to 
have reported his action in regard to securing arms for the insurgents. Indeed, 
outside of cable messages in May, with regard to various Filipino exiles of wealth in 
Hongkong desiring to proclaim their allegiance to the United States after Dewey'g 
victory, he seems to have made no report on his dealings with the insurgents 
until July 18, 1898, when he sent a dispatch assuring the authorities at Washington 
that the Filipinos were " fighting for annexation to the United States first " ; and 
that, if the United States did not keep the islands, it was certain that Spain could 
not again assert her sovereignty. (See Sen. Doc. 62 f pp. 336-38.) This dispatch 
contains several misstatements, and makes it appear that Wildroan's reason for not 
communicating previously his negotiations with the insurgents was the instruction 
he had received the previous December not to hold such negotiations. By July, 
1898, however, various reports were being circulated in the newspapers of Europe 
and the United States as to there having been some secret agreement between 
Aguinaldo and the United States consuls. Aguinaldo's version of his relations with 
the Hongkong consulate will be found in the Resefia veridica. Letters from Mr. 
Wildman to the insurgent chief, not elsewhere published, particularly with refer- 
ence to the endeavors to send arms in June and July, were made public, on be* 
half of Aguinaldo, among the inclosures to an addrens to the Cong^ss of the 
United States, written by Felipe Bnencamino on August 20, 1899, the said letters 
being printed on p. 6180, Cong. Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. In the letter of June 
21 from Mr. Wildman, some rather remarkable advice is given to Aguinaldo as 
to his treatment of the Spanish prisoners he had taken, the consul being therein 
made to say: " Never mind about feeding them three meals a day. Rice and water 
will be a good diet They have been living too high for the past few years." And 


The McCulloch arrived off Cavite on the afternoon of May 
19, and Aguinaldo was at once taken to the Olympia for an 
interview with Admiral Dewey. It is in this interview that 
Aguinaldo claims the American admiral assured him that he 
*' must have no doubt concerning the recognition of Philippine 
independence on the part of the United States " ; that " Amer- 
ica was rich in lands and money and did not need colonies." 
That any such specific declaration was ever made by Admiral 
Dewey rests upon the unsupported testimony of Aguinaldo ; it 
has been many times expressly denied by Admiral Dewey/ 
and all the contributory circumstances support the denial. In 
a cablegram written at Cavite on May 20, which dealt princi- 
pally with the matter of maintaining the blockade and of pre- 
paring to meet a second Spanish fleet, Admiral Dewey reported 
the arrival of Aguinaldo and said he was " organizing forces 
near Cavite, and may render assistance that will be valuable." 
The reply of Secretary Long, under date of May 26, was that 
full discretionary powers were reposed in Admiral Dewey to 
deal with circumstances which Washington could not know, 
but it was added : " It is desirable, as far as possible, and con- 
sistent for your success and safety, not to have political alli- 
ances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that 
would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future." 
Dewey's reply to this, on June 3, was : " Have acted according 
to the spirit of Department's instructions therein from the be- 
ginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insur- 
gents or with any faction. This squadron can reduce the de- 

again : " Let them have a taste of real war. Do not be so tender with them. 
Handle them as they would treat you." The letters with the Buencamino docu- 
ment, relative to the little souvenirs to be sent by Aguinaldo to the consuls at Sin- 
gapore and Hongkong, also shed some light upon the latter gentlemen's person- 
alities. Aguinaldo claims (Resena veridicd) that Mr. Pratt wished to be made 
representative of the Philippines in the United States, and that he promised him a 
high post in the custom-house or something equally good. 

^ Notably in a personal letter to Senator H. C. Lodge, quoted in Cong. Record , 
56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1329, and in a memorandum written by Admiral Dewey 
for the first Philippine Commission, of which he was a member, to be found in its 
Report, voL I, p. 171. See also ibid.y p. 121. 


fenses of Manila at any time, but it is considered useless until 
the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain posses- 
sion." Again, after the authorities at Washington had, on ac- 
count of various newspaper stories emanating from the Orient, 
begun to worry over what assurances or impressions might 
have been given to the insurgents by the consuls at Singapore 
and Hongkong, the Navy Department called for a full report 
from Dewey on his conferences with Aguinaldo. The latter 
replied at length on June 27, reiterating his statement that 
the United States had not been compromised with the insur- 
gents in any way, denying that he had given them direct as- 
sistance, and saying that Aguinaldo was acting independently 
of the squadron. At the same time, he stated that Aguinaldo 
had been allowed to organize his army under the American 
fleet's guns, that he had conferred personally with the insur- 
gent leader, and had "given him to understand that he consid- 
ered the insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common 
enemy," and that he had allowed recruits, arms, and ammuni- 
tion for Aguinaldo to pass the blockade and had let him take 
Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal.^ 

^ Bureau of Navigation^ p. 103. This dispatch contains also the many times 
qaoted remark of Dewey : " In my opinion, these people are far superior in their 
intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I 
am familiar with both races." (The familiarity with the Filipinos does not appear ; 
Dewey had had a very small acquaintance upon which to base any generalization.) 
This opinion is nullified, so far as Admiral Dewey is concerned, by his testimony, 
{Sen. Doc. SSI, 67th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 2983) in 1902 to the effect that he thought 
neither the Cubans nor the Filipinos were capable of self-government. In this last 
document will be found very definite statements by Dewey that he never made 
any pledges to Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo's very suspiciously worded account of the 
first interview with Dewey will be found in the Resena veridica. It is worth noting 
that Aguinaldo could in 1899 show only a few purely informal notes from Dewey 
(see Buencamino's address to Congress, above referred to, Cong. Recordy 57th 
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6180), the latter informing him, on June 16, that his letter to 
President McKinley had been forwarded to Washing^n, and, later in June, at the 
request of the British consul in Manila, asking him for passes through his lines for 
certain British subjects. The harsh judgments upon Aguinaldo passed by Admiral 
Dewey in his testimony before the Senate Committee {Sen, Doc. SSI) seem rather 
testy, and perhaps acquired some of their harshness from the partisan prodding 
which the admiral underwent in the committee. Uo has remained always some- 
what of a Filipino idol. 


The first official mention of Filipino insurgents by the Gov- 
ernment at Washington, after Consul-General Wildman "was 
instructed in December, 1897, to have no dealings with those 
in Hongkong, would appear to have been the cable message 
of May 26 to Admiral Dewey, above quoted. Yet on April 27, 
the same day Dewey cabled his departure from Hongkong for 
Manila, Consul-General Pratt wired to the State Department 
from Singapore : " General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hong- 
kong arrange with Dewey cooperation insurgents Manila." 
Dewey's victory was known in Washington on May 3, and, 
when his own message was sent from Hongkong on the 7th, 
there was already awaiting him there a message of congratu- 
lations from the President, which was borne back to him by 
the McCulloch on her first trip. Hence there had been time to 
instruct Dewey not to ally himself with the insurgents in any 
way. We have never been told whether the question was ever 
considered in the Cabinet at Washington. The matter of prime 
concern at the time was to get direct news from Dewey him- 
self, the news through Spain and Hongkong being both in- 
definite and suspicious. When it was fully assured that he 
commanded the situation, it was nevertheless to be borne in 
mind at Washington that he was a great distance from the 
base of supplies, was unsupported on land, and had to meet a 
situation that might be full of complexities which could only 
be surmised at Washington. Before the message of May 26 
was sent, moreover, it had been repeatedly rumored that a fleet 
of armored cruisers and perhaps a battleship was being pre- 
pared to go from Spain to the relief of Manila. While, there- 
fore, the desire was expressed not to incur any political alliance 
with any faction in the Philippines, tacit permission to do so, 
if necessary for his safety, was implied in the wording of that 
message. It is difficult to draw from it anything but the in- 
ference that Washington was chiefly concerned at the time 
with the safety of Dewey's men and ships, and to insure them 
would incur responsibilities, to some degree at least, as regards 


the future disposition of the Philippines. If a policy of " con- 
quest " was in the background, and was beginning to find 
some popular expression in newspapers and other periodicals 
(which had turned their inquisitorial talents loose to forage for 
Philippine material), it certainly as yet lacked definiteness of 
aim and coherency of details. It is noticeable also that when, 
in June and July, the newspaper stories about pledges made 
to Aguinaldo by the consuls had assumed quite definite shape, 
and the dispatches received from Consul-General Pratt were 
themselves sufficient to cause uneasiness on this score, the 
State Department was at pains formally to disown any idea of 
alliance. Cable instructions were sent to Mr. Pratt on June 17 
to " avoid unauthorized negotiations with insurgents." In a 
mailed dispatch of June 16, Secretary of State Day said to 
him : — 

To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Agui- 
naldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he was 
not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify. 
This Government has known the Philippine insurgents only as dis- 
contented and rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with 
their purposes. While their contest with that power has been a matter 
ef public notoriety, they have neither asked nor received from this 
Government any recognition.^ The United States, in entering upon 
the occupation of the islands, as the result of its military operations 
in that quarter, will do in the exercise of the rights which the state 
of war confers, and will expect from the inhabitants, without regard to 
their former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience 
which will be lawfully due from them. If, in the course of your con- 
ferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that 
this Government would cooperate with him for the furtherance of any 
plan of his own, or that, in accepting his cooperation, it would con- 
sider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might 
put forward, your action was unauthorized and cannot be approved.^ 

* This WM, M already seen, not strictlj correct, so far as re^rds the new Secre- 
tary of State's assertion that the insurgents had not " asked " recognition. 

* Sen. Doc. 6i, p. 354. The following four pages contain the subsequent corre- 
spondence and the various explicit denials of Mr. Pratt that he had discussed 
the policy of the United States with Aguinaldo. How far these two were from 
onderttanding each other may be leen from this statement in the former's dif- 


' Some weeks later, in consequence of dispatches to London 
papers with regard to promises being made to Aguinaldo by 
Consul Wildman, the latter was by cable "forbidden to make 
pledges or discuss policy " ; and he was still later cabled to 
" take no action respecting Aguinaldo without specific instruc- 
tions from this Department." ^ At about the same time, Con- 
sul Williams of Manila was also told by mail : " Your course, 
while maintaining amicable relations with the insurgents, in 
abstaining from any participation in the adoption of their so- 
called provisional government, is approved."^ 

patch of April 30 (a dispatch which at first reassured the State Department on 
the score of the alleged unauthorized negotiations at Singapore) : " The general 
[Aguinaldo] further stated that he hoped the United States would assume pro- 
tection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to 
establish a government of their own, in the organization of which he would desire 
American advice and assistance. These questions I told him I had no authority to 
discuss." Admiral Dewey, in his blunt fashion, told the Senate Committee in 1902 
(Sen. Doc. 331, p. 2932) : « I don't think I kept copies of Mr. Pratt's letters, as I 
did not consider them of much value. He seemed to be a sort of busybody there 
and interfering in other people's business, and I don't think his letters impressed 
me. ... I received lots of advice, you understand, from many irresponsible 

^ The correspondence here cited will be found on pp. 330, 338-40 of Sen. Doc. 
62. In quoting, on p. 339, from his letter to Aguinaldo of July 25, which had been 
the basis of the London stories, Mr. Wildman made some important omissions. 
At any rate, the same letter, as quoted in the Aguinaldo-Buencamino document 
{Cong. Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6180, the date here showing a mistake in 
the months, as the letter is clearly of July instead of June), contains the clauses : 
" Your reward from my country will be sure and lasting." " It will require all 
the power of the United States and Great Britain [in the face of a European 
coalition] to keep your islands intact and to hold you as the first man in them." 
" I have vouched for your honesty and earnestness of purpose to the President of 
the United States and to our people, and they are ready to extend their hand to 
you as a brother and aid you in every laudable ambition." Mr. Wildman also for- 
got to report his letters about the securing of arms, and his remark in the letter 
of June 28 : "I suppose you have taken Manila by this time. I hope so." His last 
rebuke from Washington, that of August 15, was in consequence of his suggestion 
that he be sent to the Philippines, on the ground that he could " be of service to 
Dewey should Aguinaldo make trouble." 

* Except for the warning cited above. Consul Williams managed to escape the 
censure that was being passed around at the time. (He did not come into contact 
with Aguinaldo until the same time that Dewey did.) He made the very remark- 
able statement in a dispatch of June 16 (Sen. Doc. 62, p. 329) that, immediately 
after the Philippine provisional government was formed and independence had 
been proclaimed and reiterated, Aguinaldo told him that "his friends all hoped 




AsTuinaldo went on shore the afternoon of his arrival, but 
after interviews with some Filipinos at the arsenal, returned to 
sleep on the McCulloch that night. He had met some of his 
old companions and intimates in Cavite, and had not been 
encouraged by the news they gave him of the success of the 
Spaniards in allying themselves with former insurgent lead- 
ers.^ The truth is, the Biak-na-bat(5 affair had greatly injured 
the prestige of those who were commonly reputed to have 
reaped the greatest advantage from it (as, indeed, General 
Primo de Rivera had thought it would). Aguinaldo claims 
that it was agreed by most of the exiles to Hongkong that 
they should live economically, keep the money intact, and use 
it to organize another and more effective resistance to Spain, 
in case she did not provide better government ; ^ and there is 

that the Pbilippiues would be held as a colony of the United States." This may 
have been a reference by Aguinaldo to the undoubted attitude and feeling of cer- 
tain of the wealthier Filipinos not formerly associated with him in favor of an ex- 
change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States ; but it is a sufficiently 
strange statement to raise doubts as to the ability of Mr. Williams's interpreter. 
On August 4, he reported " friendly but unofficial " conferences with Aguinaldo 
and his associates, wherein " they traversed the entire ground of government," 
he urging upon Aguinaldo the advantages of annexation to the United States. Mr. 
Williams was never bashful about his annexation sentiments ; he told the State 
Department on July 2 that he hoped to see an influx of ten thousand Americans 
at once, and he thought " early and strenuous efforts should be made to bring 
here from the United States men and women of many occupations" — among 
them mechanics, blacksmiths, and shipbuilders (I). See Sen. Doc. 6S, p. 307, for a 
letter written by Aguinaldo to Consul Williams on August 1, 1898 (about the time 
the Filipinos were preparing their note to the foreign powers), wherein the former 
says that his people wish to see *' active " instead of " passive cooperation " on the 
part of the Americans, and that they are opposed to annexation. 

1 Admiral Dewey testified (Sen. Doc. 557, p. 2928) tl>at Aguinaldo returned to 
htm from his first visit ashore, much downcast, and informed him that he wished 
to leave the islands and go to Japan, and that he (Dewey) urged him not to give 
up, but try again. 

* See his Renefia veridica. See also Sen. Doe. 90S, 66th Cong., Ist Sess., part 2, 
pp. 2-4, for a meeting of the insurgent leaders in Hongkong on February 24, 1898, 
wherein the "contract" made at Biak-na-bat<5 was declared "null and void," be- 
eftose Spain would not make the third payment of 8200,000 and was supposed to 


much in the facts as known to bear out this claim, it being cer- 
tain that the bulk of the money had been kept intact (in 
Aguinaldo's name) up to the time of his leaving Hongkong 
for Manila. This was not at the time the understanding of the 
people of the Philippines, however ; * and it was far from cer- 
tain how the insurgent leaders who had come to look upon the 
whole Biak-na-bato affair as a big " grab game " would re- 
ceive the man commonly supposed to be the greatest individual 
beneficiary. It was with the knowledge that various of these 
leaders had already allied themselves with the Spaniards for 
defense against the Americans that the Filipino colony at 
Hongkong (a number of whose most prominent members had 
turned pro-American) sent to the Philippines prior to the de- 
parture of Dewey's fleet the proclamation beginning " Com- 
patriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence 
within our reach ^; wherein the idea of alliance with the 
Spaniards is repelled, and the Filipinos are urged to organize 
resistance on land, while the Americans cut off Spanish rein- 
forcements by sea, a closing exhortation being: "There, where 
you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers ; they 
are our redeemers."^ There was for the moment, however, 

have given the second payment to Artacho and his associates, it being resolved 
that the original payment of S400,000 should be kept intact, in Aguinaldo's name, 
and to be spent only "for the common good." It is significant that no mention is 
made in this document of " reforms " promised by Spain; they are mentioned 
only when, in the meeting of May 4 follovring (ibid.j pp. 6-9), it was debated 
whether Aguinaldo ought to return to the Philippines and make common cause with 
the United States against Spain. 

1 Yet the Spanish authorities had, though apparently rather late in the day, 
bethought them of the danger involved in the accumulation of so much money in 
the hands of the insurgents in Hongkong, and this was one reason for the refusal 
of Primo de Rivera to pay over any further instalment of the sum agreed upon 
in December. (See his Memoria, p. 139.) It was claimed, too, by some of the in- 
surgents that the suit begun by Artacho for a division of the money was the 
result of the intrigues of the Spanish friars resident in Hongkong, who had been 
commissioned by their brothers in Manila to use every effort to break up this 
accumulation of money. 

* This manifesto has had a much wider circulation in Sen. Doc. 62 (where it is 
to be found on p. 346) than it ever did in the Philippines. Foreman (p. 682) 
wrongly ascribes it to Aguinaldo. 



something more positive about the Spanish programme of con- 
ciliation, offered by men with whom the Filipinos had had 
more or less intimate relationships, while the Americans were 
strangers, and, aside from the protection their guns afforded 
to the half-organized insurgent horde at Cavite, their attitude 
towards the Filipinos had nowhere else been shown. But when 
once the anti-Spanish propaganda was begun among the na- 
tives, with the prestige which Dewey's apparent championship 
of Aguinaldo gave it, it was speedily apparent, in spite of ties of 
blood between Spaniards and the upper-class Filipinos and 
of an acquaintanceship of centuries and some degree of unity 
in forms of government and community of speech, how weak 
was the allegiance of the native population to their former 
sovereign. Still, Aguinaldo made from the first the utmost 
use that was possible of the fiction that he had an " alliance " 
with the Americans. It is peculiar to note how, at the outset 
and for two months thereafter, he issued no proclamation of 
any sort in which pains was not taken to set before the people 
the fact that he and they could count upon the protection and 
the friendship of the Americans for the realization of their 
aims. The private evidences that he repeatedly gave definite 
verbal assurances that there was an alliance are plentiful. 

Already, on the afternoon of the 19th, Aguinaldo had seen 
in the bay natives of Bataan province, which lies on its north 
shore, and had communicated to them verbally the word to 
prepare for an uprising in the provinces north of Manila. His 
arrival had been whispered about, and he probably felt more 
cheerful at meeting delegations from elsewhere than his native 
town of Old Cavite, when he went to land again the next day. 
His companions busied themselves in writing any number of 
copies of the first proclamation of the insurrection, assigning 
May 31 at noon as the time for a simultaneous uprising, urg- 
ing the Filipinos to ^^ expel from among themselves all trea- 
son," giving the implication that the Americans would help 
them establish their independence, and warning against all acts 


contrary to the laws of civilized warfare.^ He remained, how- 
ever, for four days within the limited American territory on 
land (which was confined to the arsenal and surrounding navy 
buildings), and started to conduct his recruiting and his cam- 
paign of proclamations from there, not even going into the 
half-governed town of Cavite, which his compatriots held, un- 
til Admiral Dewey requested him to move outside of the Amer- 
ican lines to conduct his campaign.^ 

The admiral turned over to him some sixty Mauser rifles and 
considerable ammunition for them, which had been taken from 
the Spaniards at the entrance of the bay. His followers on the 
little peninsula of Cavite had at the time probably no more 
than 200 miscellaneous rifles. But on the 27th, the first con- 
signment (2000 Mausers and 200,000 cartridges) arrived from 
Amoy, and some were furnished at once to the volunteers of 
Aguinaldo's town of Old Cavite, just off the peninsula.^ It was 

1 This first proclamation seems never to have been published in English, and 
the decree of May 24 establishing a dictatorial government is usually called the 
first of Aguinaldo's series of 1898. This proclamation of May 20 was in the form 
of a personal letter to the " Revolutionary Chiefs of the Philippines." A few sen- 
tences are worth quoting. He urges those to whom the letter is sent to confer to- 
gether with regard " to the manner in which we may capture our enemies, employ- 
ing astuteness to realize that end. I therefore beg all our brothers to unite, expel 
from among themselves all treason, let there not happen what in former times has 
happened with regard to other brothers. . . . Bear in mind that as soon as the 
Spaniards know we are here, they will order the arrest of all our companions. Per- 
haps we shall never find an opportunity so propitious as this. . . . Seduce the force 
of native infantry, employing the means that you think suitable." [He gives the 
impression that he has had a four-hour conference with the American admiral] 
" with reference to what we all aspire to for the attainment of our liberty. . . . 
I have promised, not only the American admiral, but also the representatives of 
other nations with whom I have conferred, that the war they will see here shall 
be of the sort that is called war among the most civilized nations, to that end that 
we may be the admiration of the civilized powers and they may concede us inde- 
pendence." [The Spanish is bad.] Again : " Many nations are on our side.** The 
full Spanish text of this document will be found in Sastrdn op. cit., pp. 419-20. 

* See Sen. Doc. SSl^ p. 2928. Aguinaldo virtually admits this in the Resena 
veridica. He made his headquarters thereafter in Cavite, until the first American 
troops arrived, and General Anderson requested him to give up that place. 

• The arrival of these arms was reported by Admiral Dewey in a cablegram to 
Washington on May 27, he adding that Aguinaldo's " force is increasing constantly." 
So far as arms went, the small consignment above mentioned is the only one ever 


the sending of a detachment of Spanish marines to capture 
these arms that brought on the first engagement between Fil- 
ipinos and Spaniards, on May 28, resulting in the surrounding 
and capture of the marines and their arms. This was but the 
forerunner of a succession of similar events occurring in Cavite 
within the next week. General Pena had 2800 troops scattered 
in small detachments about Cavite province, and the orders to 
concentrate them came to him from Manila when they were 
already cut off and surrounded. They held out from one day 
to seven, before surrendering or being captured, the prompt- 
ness with which the native military or police forces with them 
deserted or turned against them having something to do in 
each case with the amount of their resistance, which must, in 
any event, be accounted very weak. So rapidly did the out- 
ward state of affairs change that, within a week's time, the 
population of Manila, which had left the walled town almost 
deserted to flee to the districts farther inland, in fear of a bom- 
bardment, now began flocking back within the walls for ref- 
uge, lest their land enemies should make a successful attack 
upon Manila's outer lines of defense. 

Even at the first, and while the official optimism as to native 
cooperation lasted, most attention had been devoted by the 
defenders to establishing a line of fifteen blockhouses around 
the outer districts of Manila and to preparing for a land rather 
than a sea defense. The plans for allying the natives with the 
sovereign power had, before the arrival of the American men- 
of-war, centered about two things; namely, the organization of 
Filipino volunteer militia and the introduction of a " Consult- 
ative Assembly," composed of prominent Filipinos, into the 
scheme of insular government. The " Board of Authorities," 
enlarged by various new members called in to consult upon 

fornisbed to Aguinaldo directly by Dewey. He told bim be was welcome to tbe few 
old sroootbbore pieces of artillery at tbe Cavite arsenal ; and right after tbe battle 
of Manila Bay, the natives of Cavite bad taken two or three small pieces of artil- 
lery o£F tbe boats sunk in Rakoor Bay, and had later fished out some of the Mau- 
ser ammunition which had been thrown into the water by tbe Americans. 


measures to meet the situation/ had, as early as April 24, 
adopted these two plans of the insular administration, with 
only two opposing votes, Archbishop Nozaleda being one of 
the chief advocates of the idea of organizing native militia. 
The day after the destruction of the fleet, this advisory board 
met for the last time. Both plans again received a favorable 
vote, but the opposition of several officials, who were sure that 
the native volunteers would not be loyal to the old sovereignty, 
and who urged instead that the Spanish troops both to the 
north and south of Manila be at once concentrated there for 
a defense of the city, had been so pointed that from that time 
Augustin and his personal cabinet of advisers determined to 
carry the plans through without so much discussion. On May 4, 
the governor-general published two decrees, the first of which 
prescribed the details under which the recruiting of volunteers 
was to be pushed forward in the provinces and in Manila. The 
other announced the Consultative Assembly of Filipinos, at 
the head of which was to be the " Gentleman of the Grand 
Cross of Isabella the Catholic," Don Pedro A. Paterno ; the 
seventeen other members were announced a few days later, 
and it was planned also to add some twenty more Filipinos of 
prominence in the provinces.^ 

The purpose of the Consultative Assembly was announced 
in the decree organizing it to be to " deliberate and report to 
the governor-general upon matters of political, governmental, 
or administrative character upon which the said superior au- 
thority may deem it proper to consult them." It was given 

* Among them the provincials of the religious orders and certain of the Spanish 
civil authorities of Manila. 

^ The other members were : Cayetano Arellano, Isaac Fernando de los Rios, 
Joaquin Gonzalez, Maximino Paterno, Antonio Rianzares Bautista, T. H. Pardo de 
Tavera, Manuel Genato, Gregorio Araneta, Juan Rodriguez, Bonifacio Ar^valo, 
Ariston Bautista, Josd Luna Novicio, Jos^ Lozada, Ricardo Esteban Barretto, 
Teodoro Gonzalez, Pantale6n Garcia, and Pedro Serrano. With two or three ex- 
ceptions, these men were all Spanish half-castes of families of prominence in the 
Philippine capital. Most of them were conservatives, and the list was quite repre- 
sentative of Filipino leadership in professional and commercial affairs. 



the faculty of "placing before the governor-general the 
advisability of measures affecting the interests of the towns, 
always provided that it does not invade the functions of 
other organizations nor infringe the laws." On May 28, the 
Assembly held its first meeting, which consisted principally 
of the reading of the address of Governor-General Augustin 
and of the oratorical reply of Pedro Paterno. A subcommittee 
spent some time in drawing up a scheme of Philippine gov- 
ernment which virtually meant autonomy. The whole project 
for an assembly had been bitterly criticized from the first by 
those who called themselves "patriotic Spaniards"; and the 
governor-general's own secretary protested against its pre- 
tending to advocate governmental measures which, he de- 
clared, were far outside its jurisdiction as defined in the decree 
of organization, and were, besides, only in the competence of 
the Government at Madrid to decide. At the very moment of 
the first meeting of the Assembly, one of its best-known mem- 
bers, a lawyer, was with Aguinaldo at Cavite, whence he was 
caUing urgently upon friends in Manila to send him treatises 
on international law and documents showing " how other coun- 
tries declared their independence." Some of the members never 
attended the sessions of the Assembly, and others identified 
themselves with it only through motives of prudence. By June 
13, Paterno and his personal followers were about all that was 
left of the Assembly as an active organization, and they went 
outside of its ranks to get together a delegation of natives 
which called on the governor-general that day and laid before 
him propositions for governmental reform amounting to au- 
tonomy, or at least aimed at that. The rapid change in the 
state of affairs, by which the Spaniards had lost all the neigh- 
boring provinces of Luzon and were besieged in Manila, had 
opened the eyes of Augustin, and he replied that he would 
undertake to secure what they wanted, provided they would 
induce the insurgents to lay down their arms. That had al- 
ready been tried and had failed^ and the revolutionists at 


Cavite had threatened with death all who came to them as 
emissaries with such a proposition.^ 

The first special emissary whom Augustin sent to Aguinaldo 
never returned, and very shortly afterward appeared as one of 
the chief propagandists at insurgent headquarters, instead of 
a colonel of Pampanga volunteers protecting the south line 
of Manila. After General Pena and his men were captured, 
there was no good reason to expect that Filipinos who had 
been given commissions would resist their own brothers. By 
the middle of June, there were only two of these commanders 
of any note remaining with the Spaniards.'^ There should have 

1 Information as to the conciliatory policy of Augustin, and especially as to th« 
Consultative Assembly, may be found in the Manila newspapers of the time, nota- 
bly La Voz Espanola and El Diario de Manila. Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, a mem- 
ber of the Assembly, gave testimony in regard to it before the first Philippine 
Commission {Report of same, vol. n, p. 389). Accounts of these events from the 
standpoint of the Spaniards who were bitter against the natives may be found in 
Sastrbn, op. cit., pp. 406-10, 434-36, 463. Paterno's speech at the opening of the 
Assembly is the manifesto which he addressed to his countrymen a few days later; 
it is quoted by Foreman (op. cit., pp. 590-97), together with the reply of the revo- 
lutionists of Cavite. It may be imagined how sarcastic the recalcitrant Spanish 
party in Manila would become over Paterno's apostrophes to his people to " ally " 
themselves with Spain, just as other " nations " sought allies. Paterno's plan of 
autonomous government, which he put forth unheeded in Manila on June 19, as a 
"graphic explanation in a synoptic form" of autonomy (a sort of attempt to 
achieve Philippine happiness and prosperity on a diagram, while the war-dogs 
were unleashed outside), is Exhibit vii to vol. i of the Report of Philippine Com' 
mission^ 1900. According to a diary kept by the Belgian consul in Manila, Gen- 
eral Augustin allowed Paterno to issue this manifesto because it was hoped at the 
time to get the insurgents to give up the Spanish prisoners captured in Pampanga 
(see McClure*s Magazine, June, 1899, p. 172). 

■ These were Licerio Gerdnimo and Enrique Flores, in arras on the north line 
in Bulakdn, where things had not moved quite so rapidly as in Cavite. Mariano 
Trias, the personal friend of Aguinaldo in Cavite, and his closest military associ- 
ate in the former rebellion, was one of those who held out longest; he had shown 
his loyalty to his Spanish commission, and had also given the Spaniards a sufficient 
indication of what was his judgment as to the situation, when he refused to dis- 
tribute the rifles that had been sent out to him for the Cavite volunteers it was 
planned to raise, lest he might subsequently be charged with having betrayed the 
Spaniards who trusted him. Felipe" Buencamino, the Filipino referred to above as 
the emissary to Augustin from Aguinaldo, charges that General Peiia made no real 
defense,through his unwillingness to "defend the causeof the friars." (See Hearings, 
etc., Committee on Insular A fairs, 1901-03, p. 276.) Buencamino there says he was 
made a prisoner by Aguinaldo even before he had a chance to present the concili- 
atory propositions of General Augustin. His statements that he was assured by 


been a sufficient warning to the Spanish authorities of what 
was going on under the surface in the Tagalog provinces in 
the fact that the provincials of the religious orders felt it ne- 
cessary, upon their information, to call into Manila all the 
friars then in charge of parishes in the provinces, if not in the 
further fact that, when General Pena started to fortify the 
positions held by his troops, he could not even hire the natives 
of Cavite to work on the intrenchments, where formerly the 
Spaniards had been wont to impress their labor. The orders 
for the concentration of the friars came a little before that of 
the governor-general for the concentration upon Manila of the 
troops both upon the north and south lines; but the orders in 
both cases were sent too late to prevent most of the friars and 
practically all the soldiers from being made prisoners. The 
situation had become so threatening, by the time the order 
was sent to General Pena, that a column of 500 troops was 
started at the same time from Manila to relieve him in his 
position at Imus ; but Paciano Eizal had already effected an 
organization of the Tagalogs of the Laguna province, and the 
last of the native volunteers south of Manila had deserted the 
Spaniards under the leadership of Pio del Pilar, making it 
impossible for this column to get through to Imus at all, much 

Againaldo that Admiral Dewey had pledged him (though not in writing) the sap- 
port of the United States to secure Philippine independence are to be found in the 
same document, on pp. 231, 275, 276, and 292. When Buencamino joined the in- 
surgent forces, he issued a manifesto to the Filipino people explaining his deser- 
tion of the Spaniards, couched in the same terms as those of a letter which he 
then addressed to Grovernor-General Augustin calling upon him to surrender (por- 
tions of which are quoted in Sastrdn, op. cit.y p. 4G0). These clauses are worth 
quoting : ^ Manila being besieged by sea and land, without hope of help from 
anywhere, and Aguinaldo being disposed to make use of the squadron to bombardj I 
don't know, frankly, any other recourse than to give up to death ; for Your Excel- 
lenoy knows that the entrance of 100,000 Indians, flushed with fighting, drunk 
with victory and with blood, would produce a hecatomb from which not even 
women, nor children, nor priests, especially the friars, would escape." And also: 
** We hold at this date seven provinces, with various seaports, namely, Taal, Ba- 
tangaa, Balayiin, Cavite, Subig, and Mariveles, and we possess three steamers and 
various launches, with many small boats, to conduct our communications, aside 
from disposing, when it it desired, o/tht North American squadron" [Italics inserted 
by editor.] 


less to prevent the surrender of that town upon the third attack 
on it in numbers. Thus, on May 31, Manila was actually be- 
sieged, up to its very suburbs, at all points south of the Pasig 
River. The Spanish outposts were driven in upon Santa Ana 
on June 3, and on the same day the Spanish garrison at 
Kalookan, just north of Manila on the railroad, retreated 
toward the city. From June 1 to the day of the surrender to 
the Americans, rifle-fire could be heard in Manila every day, 
especially at night and in the early morning. The walled town 
soon held 80,000 to 100,000 people at night. Including the 
convents, seven infirmaries, with sick and wounded, were soon 
established there ; and the Augustinian convent at least was 
made a great repository of rice and other provisions, while 
here were sheltered numbers of women and children, and here 
also for a time were the virtual headquarters of the governor- 
general and his closest attendants.^ 

The revolt in Bulak^n,just to the northward of Manila, had 
to some extent been organized from the Cavite insurgent head- 
quarters, and arms had been sent across the bay from there, in 
one of the small boats that had been donated to Aguinaldo for 
his use by Filipino merchants of Manila. With the surround- 
ing and taking of the town of Malabon on June 12,^ the 

^ Early in the siege, a great commotion was created one day by the appearance 
in the courtyard of the Augastinian convent of two of&cers from the northern out> 
posts, hatless and almost speechless in overwrought, nervous excitement, calling 
on the friars, " for whom we are fighting," to put off their " skirts," take rifles, 
and assume places of defense on the outer line. This was one of the many dramatic 
and curious incidents connected with the Spanish defense, for most of which courts- 
martial were promptly held. The commander of the little gunboat which came 
into the bay on May 12, ignorant of what had taken place, and having, of course, 
had no choice but to surrender to Dewey's fleet, was court-martialed for doing so. 
Another mysterious episode was the suicide, at the door of the governor-general's 
headquarters, of the Spanish colonel of artillery who had charge of the guns of the 
Luneta and walled city. His friends in Spain claim that he committed suicide be- 
cause of a reprimand just received from his superiors for firing on one of Dewey's 
vessels. Foreman {pp. cit., p. 579) says it was in despair because he was ordered 
to prepare the old guns of the fort for defense, and the rust could not be scraped 
off them. 

2 A description of this affair and of the uprising in Bulakdn will be found in 
no. 1 of La Libertad, the first periodical of the insurrection, a few numbers of which 



Spaniards were once for all driven back upon their line of 
outer defense, running through the fifteen blockhouses they 
had constructed in April and May. They had about 7000 men, 
mostly Spanish troops, for this outer line of defense ; but the 
total number of their available troops within the city was steadily 
being reduced by the desertions of native troops constantly 
going on.* 

The Spanish troops further away from the city, along and 
near the railroad, were cut off from their capital almost as 
suddenly as the forces in Cavite. When General Monet, in com- 
mand on the north, got his orders to bring his forces to Manila, 
and started to do so on May 27, he found the road between 
Angeles and San Fernando, Pampanga province, already in- 
trenched.2 Between him and Manila, an evidence of the atti- \ 
tude of the population had already been afforded by their at- ' 
tack upon a p^rty of Augustinian friars and of Spanish men \ 

were got oat, nnder the direction of Clemente J. Zulueta (late Collecting Librarian 
of the Philippine Government, engaged in procuring from the archives of Spain 
and of other countries manuscript material bearing on the history of the Philip- 
pines), at the printing establishment run in connection with the orphanage of the 
Augustinian order at Tambobong (Malabon). The first number is principally made 
up of contributions from Messrs. Zulueta and Epifanio Santos (now provincial 
governor of Nueva ficija), the latter writing, among other things, a letter from 
Manila which described the situation of affairs within the city. It contains a pro- 
clamation of war, based upon a decree of the dictatorial government of May 24, 
wherein it was stated that, among others, all those " who directly or indirectly op- 
pose obstacles to the realization of our aspirations," and " who abuse, either in word 
or act, the enemies who surrender," will be summarily executed. We are informed 
that it was not necessary to carry out any of these provisions in connection with the 
taking of Malabon. This first periodical of the insurrection was very soon sup- 
pressed by the "kitchen-cabinet" of Aguinaldo, who wished to keep the entire 
direction of affairs at the headquarters in Cavite. 

1 An official list of May 29 showed 6760 Spanish and 4332 native soldiers in 
Manila on that date. That was about the number supposed to be surrendered when 
the city fell, but the native force had then shrunk by over thirty per cent. 

' It was a very open secret in Manila that both Generals Monet and Peiia had 
urged concentration of the troops long after the authorities in Manila continued 
to plan on holding all the Spanish territory through the aid of native volunteers. 
In a telegram as early as May 2, General Monet had expressed his objections to 
distributing arms among the Filipinos, and had asked reinforcements if he was 
expected to hold so much territory; General Augnstin replied that Monet had 
" forces enough with the 7000 volunteers " organized and to be organized. (See 
Hittoria NegrOf per el** Capitan Verdades," Barcelona, 1899, pp. 73-74.) 


and women on their way to the railroad station at Giginto, 
Bulakan province, several being killed and others wounded. 
His northernmost column of a few hundred men was unable 
to obey his orders for concentration, and retreated on Dagu- 
pan, where it was later captured. Already, in the last days of 
May, an uprising in Pangasinan had resulted in the assassina- 
tion of several officers of the native militia and of a Spanish 
friar and a Spanish civil official. Pampanga — in which some 
of the earliest preparatory work of the new revolution had 
been done, and where Maximino Hizon, named "commanding 
general of central Luzon," had gone immediately after Agui- 
naldo's arrival as the direct representative of the latter — was 
ripe for insurrection at the appointed time. From June 1 to 8, 
every town in the province rose in revolt, with a single excep- 
tion, and in the outlying towns the friar curates were all cap- 
tured, one of them being assassinated. The single exception 
was the town of Makabebe, in the extreme southern part of 
the province, near the bayous of the river delta. Most of the 
land here was owned by a prominent Spanish family, the 
Blancos, to whom the people bore feudal relations, and, or- 
ganized by the sons of this family, the Makabebes had re- 
mained loyal to Spain when all the other native troops deserted. 
It was toward this town that Monet felt it necessary to with- 
draw his column, for sheltered in the Blanco mansion were the 
wife and children of Governor-General Augustin. Similarly, he 
could not abandon the Spanish women and children nor the 
wounded soldiers caught by the outbreak in the province of 
Pampanga ; and the movements of his 700 soldiers were seri- 
ously handicapped by these burdens. He reached Makabebe 
with comparatively few losses, though facing some opposition 
all the way to the river above, whence steamers were taken ; 
but he would have sustained much greater losses, had he not 
threatened to burn the towns as he went through them if he 
was "sniped" from them. Makabebe was speedily besieged 
and bombarded with old cannon after his arrival, but eventu- 


ally held out until July 3. He had the women, children, and 
friars placed on board a river steamer flying the red cross, and 
it reached Manila from the mouth of the Rio Grande de Pam- 
panga without attention from the American vessels, this per- 
haps being due to the thick fog at the time. Placing the Au- 
gustin family in a large native canoe. General Monet boarded 
it himself, and under cover of the darkness succeeded in landing 
on the shores of the Tondo district of Manila without being ob- 
served. He was speedily court-martialed for his desertion of his 
troops. The latter were loaded upon large canoes at Makabebe 
and pulled out into the bay in tow of the little river steamer Leite, 
on which their officers had taken passage. As the Leite ap 
peared at the mouth of the river flying the white flag, she was 
sighted by the Concord, and was speedily made a capture and 
the officers on board taken prisoners. They had cut loose the 
canoes bearing the soldiers (they claim, because they intended 
to "make parley" with the Americans); the canoes were driven 
on shore by the wind, and their inmates were speedily made 
prisoners by insurgents of Bataan and Pampanga. In the 
course of but a few days, the territory from Manila to the 
northern end of the railroad, the great valley of central Luzon, 
had thus passed almost without opposition from the possession 
of the panic-stricken Spaniards to that of the Filipinos, who 
had only to complete their control by the capture of the sur- 
rounded garrison at Dagupan. 


In the Filipino camp, the principal activities were, of course, 
devoted to the extension of the insurgent propaganda, and to 
organizing armed opposition to Spain. Their easy victories, 
however, speedily laid upon them the burden of the control 
in a governmental way of vastly more territory than they had 
ever held, even for a moment, in the previous insurrection. It 
is significant that, nearly from the first, they had laid their 
plans more or less comprehensively with this result in view. 



Without attempting at this point an exposition of the form or 
character of the insurgent organization as a government, an 
outline of their undertakings must be presented. The call to 
^ \ arms of May 20 had speedily been followed on May 24 by 
three proclamations over Aguinaldo's name. The first pro- 
claimed the establishment of a Dictatorial Government, " to 
be administered by decrees promulgated upon my responsi- 
bility solely," until the islands shall be " completely conquered 
and able to form a constitutional convention, and to elect a 
President and a Cabinet, in whose favor I will duly resign the 
authority." In this proclamation also Spain was accused of 
lack of faith in not extending the reforms promised in the 
** treaty " negotiated by Paterno, Japan was declared to be 
the pattern for the Filipinos, and it was asserted that the 
" great and powerful North American nation has come to offer 
disinterested protection to secure the liberty of this country." 
The first decree of the dictatorship thus assumed dealt with 
the manner of conducting the war, it being distinctly stated 
that the Filipinos must make a good showing in this respect 
before the nations of the world, and particularly the United 
States, which, it was reiterated, had come to offer its protec- 
tion, " considering us sufficiently civilized and fit to govern 
for ourselves our unfortunate country." The lives of all 
foreigners including Chinese, as well as of those Spaniards not 
taking up arms against them or who should surrender tc them, 
must therefore be respected, as also the medical corps of the 
enemy ; the penalty for disobedience was to be execution after 
summary trial, if the disobedience resulted in murder, incendi- 
arism, robbery, or rape. There followed this decree, drawn in 
consequence of the sending by Augustin of one emissary to 
Aguinaldo and the rumors that a mixed commission of Span- 
ish military men and civilian Filipinos was soon to be sent to 
him from Manila ; all persons who appeared for such purposes, 
unless under a flag of truce and with proper credentials 
to " negotiate," should be executed as spies, and any Filipino 


accepting such a mission should be hanged with a label as traitor 
on him.^ 

In these documents of May 24, it will be observed, " inde- 
pendence " was implied by the words used, but not formally 
stated, as in the private call to arms of May 20. Similarly, 
when the "flag of the Philippines" was formally acclaimed in 
Old Cavite on June 12, everything about the elaborate cere- 
monies got up for the occasion was made to center about the 
idea of independence, and the affair was bruited abroad among 
the natives far and wide as the " proclamation of independ- 
ence." The significance of such an occurrence, close under 
the guns of the American men-of-war, is evident; yet the 
formal documentation of the Filipino "declaration of inde- 
pendence" was still delayed.^ The succeeding month was, 

^ Aguinaldo asserts (Keseha veridicd) that such a commission did afterward 
come to him in the names of Archbishop Nozaleda and Governor-General Au- 
gnstin, offering him and his companions recognitions as generals with " a million 
pesos," besides " great gratifications and salaries in the assembly of representa- 
tives," if they would join forces with the Spaniards. According to his story, he dis- 
cussed the situation very fully with them, but sent them back to say they were not 
received because they did not present official credentials. He also asserts that Noza- 
leda and Augiistin had commissioned four Grermans and five Frenchmen to assassi- 
nate him. It is true that there was some communication back and forth between 
Manila and the insurgent headquarters, and there is no doubt that Augustin au- 
thorized certain Filipinos (and perhaps some of the German naval officers) to offer 
conciliatory propositions to Aguinaldo at various times during May and June. The 
conversation which Aguinaldo here reports as having taken place, and as having 
been detailed by him to Admiral Dewey, probably has no basis in fact except the 
visit to his headquarters on June 19 of a committee of Spanish military surgeons, 
who bore passports from Augustin to accredit them to the commander of the 
American fleet and were charged with conducting to Manila 185 wounded soldiers 
and sailors who were in the hospital under Aguina1do*s control in Cavite. At the 
instigation of the British consul and with the appro^ of Admiral Dewey, Agui- 
naldo had consented to the transfer of these wounded men to their own lines, and 
had written a letter to Augustin to that effect. He was greatly chagrined that the 
latter did not reply directly to him, thus giving him something upon which he 
might set up the claim that he had been " officially recognized " by the Spanish 
authority. (Sastrdn, op. cit.f pp. 46^-^.) On July 6, Aguinaldo commissioned two 
of hiB officers, " in my name and that of the Filipino people," to treat with Au- 
guttin for the surrender of Manila, promising treatment in accordance with the 
laws of war (Sen. Doc, 208, part 3, pp. 3-4). 

• The •' Act of Independence," indeed, was not promulgated until August 1, 
after a number of towna had been organized under the rules laid down bj the 


however, a period of great activity in the making of decrees, 
etc. On June 18, there was promulgated a scheme for the 
civil organization of the towns and provinces, as soon as the 
Spaniards should have been captured or expelled from them, 
and providing also for the election by each province of three 
representatives in the Revolutionary Congress which was to 
be formed. Again Aguinaldo declared that he knew inde- 
pendence to be his people's aspiration, and he assured them 
that he had made it so known to the world. On June 20, as 
supplementary to the foregoing scheme of government, which 
was the merest outline, forty-five rules for the conduct of the 
municipal and the provincial governments were promulgated, 
the Spanish word pueblo (town) being proclaimed to be sub- 
stituted by the Tagalog word sangunian (council). On June 
23, a decree was issued organizing the "Revolutionary Gov- 
ernment of the Philippines," which it was hoped would become 

Dictatorial Goyernment, and the chiefs of these towns joined at Bakoor in a pro- 
ceeding which seemed to be designed mainly to prepare the way for the appeal to 
foreign Governments for the recognition of independence, dated August 6. This 
act was afterwards ratified by the Congress at Malolos on September 29, and the 
latter date was proclaimed to be that of the Filipino " Independence Day." The 
desire to imitate the procedure of other nations which had attained independence, 
by making the formal process at least appear to be the act of a representative 
assembly, of course had something to do with the procedure followed by these 
Filipinos. Yet one can hardly escape the conclusion that one thing in mind at the 
outset was to commit no overt act which might cause a break with Admiral 
Dewey and thus interfere with the use of the fiction of an " alliance " with the 
United States as the most effective campaign-cry for the time being. Admiral 
Dewey was, as if casually, invited to the celebration of June 12, and in an even 
more informal way sent his secretary on shore to excuse him because it was 
"mail-day." Yet there were scattered among the Filipinos outside of Cavite 
copies of a decree of Aguinaldo, dated June 9 (a copy of which was not furnished 
to the Americans with the others of the time), appointing June 12 " for the procla- 
mation of the independence of our loved country "; and this curious language was 
used in hinting to the people at large the full participation in the event of the 
Americans : " There may attend also as many as wish of the notables who figure 
in our political communion, as the admiral of the North American squadron, the 
commanders and officers under him, to whom a courteous invitation will be sent, 
and all present will sign the record which will be drawn up by the official whom 
I may commission." (See Sastrdn, op. cit.f p. 459.) Admiral Dewey did not report 
the occurrence to Washington, but cabled on that same day that on his advice the 
instirgents would not attack Manila mitil American troops should arrive. 


the new central government of the islands. Aguinaldo dis- 
carded the title of "Dictator" for that of "President," and 
his cabinet was to be composed of four secretaries (under 
whom were to be combined such mixed functions as "war and 
public works" and "police and education"). The members of 
the Revolutionary Congress were, in general, to be elected, 
but the President could appoint for provinces not entirely 
freed from the Spanish domination. A large part of the decree 
was devoted to the matter of trials for "military offenses." 
The object of the Revolutionary Government was declared to 
be "to strive for the independence of the Philippines, until 
the free nations, including the Spanish, expressly recognize it, 
and to prepare the country to the end that it may be possible 
to set up a real Republic." (This last clause held an im- 
portance, in the plans of the insurgent leaders of the time, 
which has never been properly recognized.) This decree was 
accompanied by the "Message of the President" of the same 
date, which asserted that the Filipinos' effort to secure a liberal 
government from Spain had always been frustrated by the 
friars, and that now " it does not restrict itself to asking as- 
similation or the Spanish political constitution, but asks defini- 
tive separation and strives for its independence, in the full 
certainty that the time has come when it can and ought to 
govern itself." Rules for the conduct of executive business at 
the headquarters of the Central Government were put forth 
in a decree of June 27 ; but the members of the Cabinet 
were not named until July 15, in a decree which prescribed 
"Seiior" or "Maguinoo" (Tagalog for "noble," a title which 
Pedro A. Patemo had dug up from antiquity and assumed 
for himself) as the proper form of address to officials, and 
which detailed the kinds of canes to be carried or of triangular 
plates of gold or silver to be hung from the necks of pro- 
vincial and municipal officers respectively. Aguinaldo was to 
wear as his distinguishing emblem " a collar of gold, from 
which hangs a similar triangle and a whistle, also of gold," 


and could carry also a cane with gold head and gold tas- 
sels. On July 18, a strictly military decree was issued, pre- 
scribing the number of adjutants the various general ofl&cers 
might appoint (assigning twelve to the President, the first of 
whom might be a brigadier-general.^ 

It was after the appointment of his Cabinet on July 15 that 
Aguinaldo addressed Admiral Dewey, inclosing the decrees of 
June 18 to 27 and asking him to forward them to the Govern- 
ment at Washington, with the statement that " the desires of 
this Government are to remain always in friendship with the 
great North American nation, to which we are under many obli- 
gations."^ By this time, the first expedition of American soldiers 

1 The delay over the naming of the cabinet members had been occasioned by 
the customary jealousies in camp. The Department of Foreign Relations was left 
under the charge of Aguinaldo, until the " most fit " person could be selected. 
The President's cousin, Baldomero Aguinaldo, was made Secretary of War ; Le- 
andro Ibarra, Secretary of the Interior, and Mariano Trias, Secretary of the 
Treasury. The organization of the insurgent government, as well as the details of 
the internal administration of the provinces controlled by it, will be hereinafter 
treated. All the documents referred to above are to be found in a little pamphlet, 
entitled Disposiciones del Gobiemo Revolucionario de Filipinos, printed on the press 
set up at Bakoor, Cavite, in July, to publish El Heraldo de la Revolucion, the 
ofBcial organ of the new government (the establishment of which had coincided 
with the suppression of the newspaper started independently, as hereinbefore 
mentioned, by the Filipinos who had taken Malabon). English versions of these 
documents are in part to be found in Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 431-39 ; Sen. Doc. 208^ 
56th Cong., 1st Sess., part 1, pp. 88-101, and part 3, p. 2 ; Bureau of Naviga- 
tion, pp. 104-05 and 111-19, and in various other books and documents. The de- 
tailed decrees of June 20 and 27 it was, unfortunately, not deemed necessary 
to translate in connection with the work of the Peace Commission at Paris {Sen. 
Doc. 62), and no English version of them seems ever to have been provided, ex- 
cept in a document of the War Department entitled Report on the Organization for 
the Adminvitration of Civil Government Instituted by Emilio Aguinaldo and His Fol- 
lowers in the Philippine Archipelago, compiled by Captain John R. M. Taylor in 
1903, for use in connection with a suit brought against the Government, and not 
available for public distribution. 

^ Bureau of Navigation, p. 111. Two days later. Admiral Dewey sent the docu- 
ments to the Navy Department, with this simple indorsement: "Respectfully 
forwarded for the information of the Department." He never cabled to Washing- 
ton anything about the pretensions of the Filipinos to independent government. 
He testified before the Senate Committee (Sen. Doc. SSI, p. 2928): " This was the 
first intimation, the first I had ever heard, of independence of the Philippines. . . . 
I attached so little importance to this proclamation that I did not even cable its 
contents to Washington, but forwarded it through the mails. I never dreamed 
that they wanted independence." This will serve to indicate how well the admiral 


had arrived and had taken possession of Cavite, and more were 
arriving and on the way, to the undoubted displeasure of the 
Filipino leaders. Talk of the United States retaining the 
Philippines had already become common in the American and 
European press, and had been communicated to Aguinaldo's 
camp by his informants in Hongkong and Singapore.^ In- 
surgent documents captured in 1899 brought to light the 
fact that, at a meeting of Filipinos, held in Hongkong before 
Aguinaldo's departure for the PhiHppines, consideration was 
given to the possibility that the Americans might decide to 
impose their sovereignty upon the archipelago and to the pos- 
sibility of fighting them also.^ Either the arrival of American 

was posted on what was going on under the shadow of his own guns. On the other 
hand, it is rather hard to reconcile this with the statement of General Anderson 
(North American Review, February, 1900, p. 276) that he " was the first to tell Ad- 
miral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of the American people 
to hold the Philippines if they were captured," as well as with the statement of 
Aguinaldo (Resena veridicd) that, in their first conversation, he told Dewey that, 
before he left Hongkong, the Filipinos there had discussed the possibility of a war 
with the Americans, after they had conquered the Spaniards, because of the 
Americans' refusal " to recognize our independence," and that the admiral replied 
that he was " delighted with Aguinaldo's sincerity." Statements made in the i?e- 
teha veridica are to be regarded as suspicious, but this one, at least, had foundation 
in the fact that, as will hereinafter be seen, such a meeting was held in Hongkong 
and the possibility of a war with the Americans was there discussed. Moreover, 
except that they were more pretentious in form and specifically mentioned " inde- 
pendence," without it being formally declared, the decrees of June did not involve 
any greater assumption of authority on Agumaldo's part than that of May 24, 
which Admiral Dewey had forwarded to Washington in a letter of June 12. 

> Through the conduct of Mr. Bray, Aguinaldo had, on June 10, addressed a 
letter to President McKinley, protesting against the rumored intention of the United 
States (as reported in the London Times of May 5) either to demand an indemnity 
from Spain or to transfer the Philippines to some other power, preferably Great 
Britain. He protested " one and a thousand times" against such a project, and de- 
clared that the Filipino people trusted blindly in the United States " not to aban- 
don them to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave them free and independent." (See 
Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 359-61.) 

* Sen. Doc. S08, 56th Cong., Ist Sess., part 2, pp. 5-9. A smoother translation 
of the minutes of that meeting than the one there given was recently made by 
Captain J. R. M. Taylor, the significant passage in which it : " There would be no 
better occasion than that afiforded them to injure the landing of the expeditionary 
forces on those islands and to arm themselves at the expense of the Americans, 
and to assure against those very people the situation of the Philippines with regard 
to oar legitimate aspirations. The Filipino people, ouprovidcd with arms, would be 


troops or the extraordinary success which the insurgent forces 
had had in "wresting from Spain the most important parts of 
Luzon, or both these attending circumstances, made them 
ready to adopt in July a very much more independent attitude 
than hitherto, which was manifest even to Admiral Dewey, 
much as their petty affairs " bothered '* him.^ The glowing 
phrases of gratitude to the United States disappeared from 
the insurgent proclamations.'^ Such documents ceased to make 

the Tictims of the demands and the exactions of the United States, but, provided 
with arms, would be able to oppose themselves to them, struggling for independ- 
ence, in which consists the true happiness of the Philippines." This declaration 
appears in the minutes as the argument used by the chief speakers of the occasion 
to overcome Aguinaldo's objections to going to the Philippines without a written 
agreement with Dewey for the recognition of Philippine independence by the 
United States — a fact in itself sufQciently illuminating as to the later claims re- 
garding an " alliance." Back of the reasons given by Aguinaldo for his hesitancy 
there was evidently some sense of a moral obligation to return to Spain the $400,- 
000 he held, if he joined the United States in fighting Spain. These scruples were 
overcome. It is also interesting to note that he wanted to send the members of the 
"junta" to prepare the way, instead of going himself. This document of May 4, 
even if unsupported by other bits of evidence, disposes of that view of the case which 
has regarded the Filipinos as poor, misguided souls, who, through their scanty ex- 
perience in the ways of government and in international affairs, were led astray 
by the belief that the consuls of the United States, or even the admiral of its vic- 
torious fleet, could pledge their nation to a political course of action (whatever 
view is taken of Aguinaldo's interviews with the Americans). As a matter of fact, 
this is only the first of a series of events and documents which show that the Fili- 
pinos, during 1898 and early 1899, looked into the future more shrewdly, and 
mapped out their course of action in a less haphazard way, than did the Americans. 

^ Notwithstanding the very noteworthy surface change that took place in 
American and Filipino relations at this time, it is difBcult to see how the first 
Philippine Commission came to make in its preliminary report of November 2, 
1899 (vol. I, p. 172), this extraordinary statement : " Now for the first time arose 
the idea of national independence," speaking of the period just after General 
Anderson's arrival. 

2 The one exception to the uniformity with which the insurgent documents 
up to July 1 made use of the boast of American protection is the answer to Pa- 
terno's manifesto in behalf of alliance with Spain, which Foreman cites on pages 
692-97 of his book, wherein it is stated that the revolutionists " make war with- 
out the help of any one, not even the North Americans." But this was an anony- 
mous document of little circulation, not put forth from insurgent headquarters at 
Cavite, though doubtless written with their cognizance, as it employed the argu- 
ments then being used among them to assure the doubting Filipinos that the 
United States could not go back on its " promises " to Aguinaldo, namely, " that 
its own constitution prohibits the absorption of territory outside of America," in 
accordance with the Monroe Doctrine and that the independent countries of South 


ostentation, in one mysterious f onn or another, of the " alli- 
ance" with the United States; henceforth, that "alliance" 
would be only for the purpose of extending the propaganda in 
provinces other than Tagalog, while in the Tagalog camp it- 
self the more radical spirits would freely discuss the time when 
they might have to fight the United States. 

America owed their existence largely to this fact. This view of the Monroe Doc- 
trine, which has filtered through to the Filipinos from the many random and mis- 
informed comments on that " doctrine " then being made in Europe, was what led 
Aguinaldo to make to Greneral Anderson in their first interview what seemed to 
the latter the " remarkable statement " that he found " no authority for colonies " 
in the American Constitution. (North American RevieWy February, 1900, p. 277.) 



The relations which the Americans proposed to bear toward 
the Philippines and the Filipinos had become a matter of keen 
speculation among foreign nations other than Spain long 
before the first American soldiers arrived to continue the con- 
quest. Among the members of the various foreign colonies at 
Manila, speculation on this question took on the form of 
anxiety, stimulated by the practical interest which the posses- 
sion of property in the islands gave them. Naturally this anx- 
iety was reflected, in quasi-official form, on the part of their 
respective consular representatives and the officers of their 
men-of-war which had followed Dewey to the scene to protect 
national interests. Not less in the natural order of events was 
it that national, as well as sometimes personal, prejudices 
should manifest themselves in this connection. With a min- 
gling of jealousy and of ignorance of American motives and 
character, continental Europe undoubtedly sympathized with 
Spain in the war of 1898 and regarded the United States as a 
brutal aggressor ; and this attitude was reflected more or less 
plainly by the acts of the European representatives on the 
spot. Partly through the Englishman's constitutional antipa- 
thy to most of the ways and beliefs of the Spaniard, and partly 
through greater community of interest and better knowledge 
of American aims and character. Englishmen everywhere, and 
particularly in the Orient, wished their kinsmen well. No- 
where were the opposing sympathies of these outside observers 
more clearly brought out than in the respective attitudes of the 
British and the German naval representatives in Manila Bay. 

Admiral Dewey reported to Washington, on May 13, that 
there were in Manila Harbor five foreign men-of-war, — two 


German, one British, one French, and one Japanese. On June 
25, he reported five German vessels, three British, one French, 
and one Japanese ; and soon after a second German battleship 
arrived, making six of the seven vessels then constituting the 
Asiatic Squadron of Germany. Considering that German in- 
terests in the whole Philippine Archipelago were practically 
confined to Manila and were not to be compared in impor- 
tance with those of British citizens, while subordinate also to 
those of the French and even of the Swiss colony, the Ger- 
man naval representation, which was at times superior to the 
blockading squadron, was disproportionate. There was friction 
between the German and American naval officers and men, in 
small ways, most of the time, of the sort inevitable where two 
navies, which have grown to think, in some indefinite fashion, 
" that they don't like each other," are thrown into close con- 
tact. This feeling, which affected the fleets from the youngest 
apprentice up to the admirals in command, was responsible for 
considerable bluster and braggadocio on both sides. Techni- 
cally, however, the right lay entirely on the side of the Amer- 
icans ; for they were the blockaders in command of the situa- 
tion, and it was for them, within the limits of international 
law, to lay down the rules under which they would enforce 
their supervision. There were many little things to justify the 
reported message of Admiral Dewey to Admiral von Diede- 
rich that the latter's ships were acting as if they were the 
blockaders, and not the Americans.^ On the other hand, from 
the German point of view, there was excuse for certain actions 
of a more conspicuous character, which were, to naval men 
with the traditional " chip on the shoulder," evidences of hos- 
tile intent, and which were magnified into ugly episodes by an 
over-patriotic press in the United States, then in the full tide 
of triumphant proclamation of victories. Germany was more 

' This incident, as well as the messaj^ sent to Von Diederich by Dewey, after 
he learned that a German ressel had landed supplies for Manila, to the e£Fect that 
" if he wanted war, he coald hare it right now," are reported by Joseph L. Stick* 
ney {Harper^i Magazine^ February, 1899, pp. 483-84). 


or less avowedly on the lookout for colonies in the Asiatic 
Orient; the United States supposedly was not. Only in 
1885-86, Germany, which had long had her eye on the Caro- 
line Islands, had, through the over^zealous action of naval 
officers in the alleged protection of traders' and missionaries' 
rights in those islands, seriously offended Spanish dignity, 
and had withdrawn with apologies from an awkward situa- 
tion.^ Europe was much quicker than the United States to 
perceive that the end of Spain's domination had come in the 
Pacific as well as in the Atlantic, with the peculiar complica- 
tion of events following upon the outbreak of war over Cuba. 
In the absence of any definite attitude on the part of the Gov- 
ernment at Washington as to the future of the Philippines, 
there was more than a little in the history and traditional pol- 
icy of the United States (especially as interpreted in Europe) 
and in the discussions of its press at the time, to warrant the 
belief that the United States would not retain hold upon the 
PhiUppines. And very much more important than this, to the 
Germans on the spot, the attitude of our naval representatives 
toward the insurgents, and toward the claims the latter put 
forth with regard to the Americans having no intention of 
keeping the islands, might afford easy confirmation of the 
conclusion that the Americans were simply making war on the 
Spaniards for the time being, and had no intention of involv- 
ing themselves in the future control of the archipelago. It is 
to be remembered that, with Germany, the deciding upon a 
course of action under such circumstances would have lain 

^ The idea of foreign intervention in the Philippines had been exploited by friar 
organs, anxious to place an anti-Spain brand upon the advocates of Philippine 
reform, before ever the Filipino revolutionary party talked of intervention by 
Japan. The Caroline Islands affair, especially so far as Protestant missionaries* 
rights were put forward by Germany and other nations, was long used as a bug- 
aboo by these organs (as was also the victory of Japan over China in 1895). The 
fact that Rizal and other propagandists had been to Germany for education was 
made much of ; also the writings of Blumentritt in behalf of the Filipinos (Blu- 
mentritt, being, however, an Austrian subject). The German press protested vig- 
orously against insinuations in the press of Spain that the revolt of 1896 was 
secretly instigated by Germany. 


virtually with one man and would iiave been speedily an- 
nounced or at least made fairly manifest ; and German naval 
officers were scarcely to be expected to reason that the consti- 
tution and methods of government of the United States made 
any such one-man action out of the question. They were not 
slow to reach the conclusion that the world would not tolerate 
a Filipino Government. There was much in the attitude of 
the American naval commander to justify the conclusion that 
his home authorities were willing to see such a government 
instituted. They may have thought that a pro-Spanish, anti- 
insurgent attitude on their part would help Germany to step 
into the place of Spain when the Americans washed their 
hands of the affair. Naval men are rarely equipped with the 
training of statesmen ; and these naval men overlooked the 
fact that, if Spain must go, the conquering power would in- 
evitably become the chief factor in determining the future fate 
of the Philippines. If we assume, therefore, that such thoughts 
were in their minds, and not merely an anti-American preju- 
dice, they were none the less shortsighted, as well as techni- 
cally wrong, in the innumerable things, both important and 
petty, which they did during the siege of Manila, and which, 
whether so intended or not, operated to raise the hope con- 
tinually among the optimistic Spaniards of Manila that a Euro- 
pean coalition would come to relieve their situation, or that 
Germany at least would constitute herself their active protector 
against the Americans.^ 

1 Admiral Dewey's information that the German yeuels supplied flour to the 
city of Manila was correct, as may be seen by a reference to the work of a Span- 
ish official among the besieged in Manila (Sastr<5n, op. d/., p. 413). When Ad- 
miral Ton Diederich visited the German consulate in Manila, he was the object of 
a spontaneous reception on the part of the crowds of Spaniards. Two officials of the 
Irene who risited the city for some days were taken about the lines of defense 
and banqueted at the Spanish Club. German vessels brought women and children 
and wounded men to Manila from the besieged town of Dagtipan, and received 
Spanish refugees from the city whenever there was fear of bombardment (ibid., 
pp. 413-14 and 405-66). Foreman relates (op, cit.^ p. 584), as a rumor, that a 
German naval officer, at a lawn-party in Manila, " declared that so long as Wil- 
liam II was Emperor of Germany, the Philippines should never come under 


As we have seen, Aguinaldo had repeatedly claimed to be 
operating under the formally pledged protection of the United 
States; no protest against such pretensions on his part had 
come from the chief representative of the United States on the 
spot. Arms bought for him by Americans had been landed 
under the American guns at Cavite, and he had received some 
few guns directly from the American naval commander. Until 
the arrival of the American troops, he was allowed to retain 
possession of the town of Cavite, surrendered by the Spaniards 
to the Americans. When the small steamers bought with his 
funds in China and the steam launches donated to him by Fil- 
ipino adherents began to move about the bay, they flew the 
new Filipino flag, with the tacit consent of the Americans. In- 
deed, when the German admiral sought to obtain from Ad- 
miral Dewey a definite statement as to whether or no that flag 
was officially recognized by the latter's home government, the 
American commander evaded the question by saying that it 
was "only a little flag," and anybody could fly a little flag or 

When the river steamer Leite, bearing the Spanish officers 
from Makabebe, was captured in the bay, the prisoners were 
turned over to Aguinaldo to keep, though the steamer was re- 
tained by Admiral Dewey. Just after that, the inter-island 
steamer, Compaiiia de Filipinas, of about 800 tons burden, the 
property of the leading tobacco company of the islands, owned 

American sway." But rumor among the British residents of Manila, whose sym- 
pathy with the Americans was not concealed, may easily have exaggerated what 
he did say. 

1 This is Admiral Dewey's own testimony (Sen. Doc. SSI, pp. 2929 and 2941) : 
" I said [in response to Von Diederich] : ' That is not a Filipino flag ; ... no gov- 
ernment has recognized them ; they have a little bit of bunting that anybody could 
hoist.* . . . They called this a Filipino flag, but I did not." The official denial of 
Admiral Dewey that he or any of his vessels ever saluted " the flag of the so-called 
Philippine Republic " is contained in Sen. Doc. S87, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. Yet Oscar 
King Davis, one of the best-informed American newspaper correspondents on the 
ground in 1898, says {Everybody's Magazine, August, 1901, p. 141): "Admiral 
Dewey had caused the marine guard to be turned out for him [Aguinaldo] and 
had given him a general's salute." 


by French and Spanish capital, appeared in the bay flying the 
insurgent flag and was allowed to add herself to the "mos- 
quito fleet " of the insurgents. On receipt of the news of the 
American victory at Manila, she had been ordered by her owners 
to leave Aparri to go and take refuge in Formosa. Just out of 
Aparri, her crew, led by a Cuban Spaniard, had mutinied and 
murdered her Spanish officers, taken charge of the vessel, 
hoisted the insurgent flag, and soon afterwards arrived at Ca- 
vite and placed themselves and the vessel they had captured 
under Aguinaldo's orders. Technically, they were subject, 
under international law, to the full penalties for mutiny and 
piracy, at least unless it was to be assumed that their act was 
a poHtical one, performed in behalf of a governmental organi- 
zation already recognized or with a right to be recognized by 
the nations of the world. Through the French consul, the 
French officers of the tobacco company, which had its head- 
quarters at Manila, demanded of Admiral Dewey the seizure 
of the vessel and its return to them. It had, however, flown 
the Spanish flag in the inter-island service, and at the time of 
its capture by Filipinos, and Admiral Dewey replied to the 
French consul that "the forces under his command were in no 
way concerned in this affair, but that he would transmit his 
letter to Aguinaldo with a request that the latter show due 
regard for French interests." * Meanwhile, the Filipinos had 
loaded this vessel with armed men and had placed one or two 
small pieces of artillery on her. She was then dispatched to 
Subig Bay, to aid on the water side in the capture of the 
Spanish garrison of marines and 600 or 700 Spanish fugitives 
who had been driven into Olongapci on the outbreak of insur- 
rection in Sambales province. When the Compaiiia de Fili- 
pinas arrived, these fugitives had all been transferred to Isla 
Grande in front of Olongaprf, where, under protection of the 

' This is Admiral Dewey's own stRtemeDt, in an informal letter to Agninaldo 
under date of Jalj 16, 1898, which letter is reproduced in Cong. Record^ 57th 
Cong^ 1st Sess., pp. 6180-81. Aguinaldo also reUtei the incident in his Resefia 


trenches thrown up by the marines, they were safe from any 
attack that could be made against them by the insurgents from 
the Sambales shore, who must come over in small boats. The 
Cuban commander, who had assumed the title of "Admiral of 
the Filipino Navy," ordered them to surrender, and when they 
refused, prepared to open on their positions with the little ar- 
tillery he had. The German cruiser Irene appeared in the bay 
at the moment, and ordered the Compania de Filipinas to haul 
down the insurgent flag which it was flying. The latter vessel 
thereupon withdrew and reported the occurrence to Aguinaldo 
at Cavite. The German commander supplied the Spaniards 
on the little island with what stores he could spare, and took 
on board the women and children to carry them to Manila. As 
soon as the incident was reported by Aguinaldo to Admiral 
Dewey, the latter sent the Raleigh and Concord direct to Subig 
Bay, because, he afterward stated, he " did n't want any other 
power to interfere in the Philippines." The Irene retired from 
the bay on their arrival, on the morning of July 8, and the 
Spaniards on the little island speedily capitulated to the sen- 
ior American officer in command, Captain Coghlan, of the 
Raleigh. There were over 600 of them in all, about one third 
of whom were marines and the rest Spanish civilians and friars. 
The Compania de Filipinas had followed the American vessels 
to Subig Bay, and Captain Coghlan, acting upon the instruc- 
tions of Admiral Dewey, turned these prisoners and what arms 
they had over to the Filipinos on that boat, against the pro- 
test of the captured Spaniards. The Compania de Filipinas im- 
mediately steamed over to 01ongap(5 with them, where they 
were put on shore and left under charge of the insurgent com- 
mander a't that point. Fifty-two of them, including the friars, 
remained in the town, and the rest were marched inland with 
the insurgent forces.^ 

^ The American official version of this affair is very meager. Admiral Dewey's 
cablegram of July 10 reports the bare facts, with the obvious inference that 
he looked upon the affair chiefly as an instance of German ill-will and acted upon 
that basis (Bureau of Navigation, p. 110), His testimony in 1902 {Sen. Doc. 381, 



Viewed from the standpoint of Spaniards and foreigners in 
Manila who looked upon the capture of the Compania de Fil- 
ipinas in the first place as an act of piracy and assassination, 
and who had in the preceding twenty months had only too 
serious reason to fear what might happen to Spanish prisoners 
who fell into the hands of the insurgents, especially in Sam- 
bales, the act of the German commander was not only justifi- 
able, but highly commendable, upon broad grounds of hu- 
manity. Aside from Admiral Dewey's resentment of German 
officiousness, already sufficiently stimulated by minor incidents 
during the blockade, his justification for taking some hun- 
dreds of prisoners, who by their military code were forbidden 
to accept parole and who must be handed over to the insur- 
gents or turned loose for the latter to capture, must rest upon 
his acceptance in good faith of Aguinaldo's promise that such 

p. 2942) was wholly to the effect that it was German interference which led him to 
act. In Sen. Doc. 887^ 56th Cong., 1st Sess., he says that the Spanish garrison 
" WKS turned over to the Filipinos for safekeeping. . . . The prisoners had refused 
to give parole, and there were no facilities at my command for their care. Agui- 
naldo had promised that they should be treated humanely and according to the laws 
of war." The report of Captain Coghlan upon the incident (there stated to be on 
file in the Navy Department) has not been published. Various unauthorized ver- 
sions of the affair appeared at the time in American periodicals, always in connection 
with the question of Germany's attitude, hence presenting the matter from one 
side only. A very g^ood account from the American standpoint of the whole trouble 
between the Germans and the Americans was contained in a letter of July 18, 1898, 
written from Cavite by Oscar King Davis {Harper's History, pp. 40-43). American 
journalistic comment at the time was wholly commendatory of Dewey (see, e.g.^ 
The Outlook^ July 23, 1898), as the idea of German interference loomed large in 
the American mind (see also Public Opinion^ June 30 and July 7, 1898, for press 
comments before this incident). Just before sailing for the Philippines on July 29, 
General Merritt wired to Washington: " In view of possibility of foreign interfer- 
ence with my troops landing at the Philippines, I desire instructions as to how far, 
in the opinion of the Government, force should be used to enforce our rights." He 
was informed that the inquiry *' was not understood," and replied that it was made 
" in view of the many reports that Germany was negotiating for control of the 
Philippines," but was "perhaps not important." (Corr. Rel. War, pp. 710, 713.) 
Spaniards viewed the 01ongap<) episode as a piece of barbarity on the part of the 
Americans, in turning over to the insurgents of Sambales, where assassinations had 
already occurred, Spanish prisoners (the majority of them non combatants) who 
had surrendered not to the Filipinos, but to the American naval commander. For 
the Spanish side of it, see Sastrdn, op. cit.f pp. 471-75. 


prisoners should be properly treated. He had already reported 
to Washington (in a cablegram of June 12) that the insur- 
gents were treating their prisoners " most humanely," and he 
seems to have been convinced that not only was this the case 
with prisoners who were confined close to the insurgent head- 
quarters in Cavite, but that Aguinaldo's injunctions on this 
point would be obeyed in the more remote parts of the island. 
A knowledge of the history of the events of the two preceding 
years and of the bitterness excited by acts of retaliation and 
of race hatred on both sides would have raised with him very 
grave doubts on this point. The Spaniards assert that the 
friars put on shore at Olongapd were hitched to carts and 
made to do the work of karahaus, while Spanish civilians were 
made to follow them and drive them along with whips, and 
that all these prisoners were given but scant rations of rice 
which had been wet in salt water.^ As a matter of fact, there 
were some things about the treatment of the Spanish soldiers 
under Aguinaldo's own eyes in Cavite which were not in ac- 
cord with his decrees or his protestations of humanity to Ad- 
miral Dewey. Except for their receiving scanty food, they 
were not seriously mistreated, but were subjected to many 
minor humiliations, doubly injurious to the proud spirit of the 
Spaniard, whose own previous haughty attitude toward the 
natives (the "Indians," as he was wont to call them) inevitably 
stimulated the latter to retaliation under such unforeseen cir- 
cumstances of power. Unfortunately, the record of the Fili- 
pinos in their treatment of Spanish prisoners in some other 
places is not so pleasant to contemplate.'^ Many of the prison- 

^ Sastrdn, op. cit.y p. 474, 

* Between 8000 and 10,000 prisoners, of all sorts and conditions and of both 
sexes, fell into the hands of the insurgents during 1898, nearly all in Luzon. The 
record of their treatment will receive discussion later on. Those in Cavite com- 
plained mostly of the humiliation of being turned into servants of the native fam- 
ilies upon whom they had formerly looked with contempt, of being made to work 
on the roads and intrenchments in the hot sun, and of being underfed, unless they 
had money concealed about their persons with which to bribe their captors. A 
typical complaint of these prisoners is contained in a letter of the artillery lieuten- 


ers in Cavite were transferred across the bay to Bulak^n late 
in June, when American troops were expected to arrive. Others 
were transferred after the arrival of General Merritt, in con- 
sequence of endeavors made to issue American army rations 
to them, which Aguinaldo seemed to resent.^ The first intima- 
tion received at Washington that the insurgents were not 
treating their prisoners as promised seems to have come to the 
Government from the Vatican, which was solicitous for the 
lives of the captured friars. In accordance with this intima- 
tion, both Admiral Dewey and General Merritt were instructed 
by cable on August 1 to prevent the friars being put to death, 
if possible to do so.^ 


General Anderson and the troops of the first expedition ar- 
rived off Cavite on June 30. The Filipinos knew, probably 
through Admiral Dewey, that these troops would want some 
place along the Cavite shore. General Anderson called upon 
Aguinaldo in company with Admiral Dewey the day after his 
arrival ; and both this and a subsequent interview between the 
same parties were most amicable.' Nevertheless, the changed 
attitude of the insurgents toward the Americans, as soon as 

ant who had commanded the guns of Point Sangley on May 1 (cited in Historia 
Negrat por Capitan Verdades, p. 62). 

^ For General Anderson's report of this incident, with his message to Agui- 
naldo that, if the prisoners remained in Cavite, they must be fed, see Sen. Doc. 
t98, 5Cth Cong., 1st Sess., part 1, p. 15. At that time, also, the Americans de- 
manded from Aguinaldo the Spanish officers whom they had taken prisoners from 
the gunboat Leite. 

* The cable correspondence on this subject at the time is found in the Bureau 
of Navigation^ p. 118, and in Corr. Rel. War^ p. 743. On July 31, Cardinal Ram- 
polla cabled to Apostolic Delegate Martinelli at Washington that the vicar-apos- 
tolic at Hongkong reported that the friars imprisoned at Cavite were in danger of 
death and " the Holy Father wishes that you take steps at once to have the Gov- 
ernment of the United States prevent this evil." The instructions to Dewey and 
Merritt were identical in terms : " This should not be permitted, if you are in 
position to prevent it." 

■ Aguinaldo again (Resefia veridica) makes the claim that what amounted to 
Authoritative promises that the United States would recognize Filipino independ* 



the latter became a land as well as a sea force in the Philip- 
pines, was speedily made apparent. Two of Anderson's officers 
were arrested and taken before Aguinaldo for passing from 
the arsenal into the insurgent lines in Cavite. The American 
forces were disembarked on July 2, and Aguinaldo was in- 
vited to a Fourth of July celebration in Cavite, but did not 
come, because the invitation was not extended to him officially 
as President.^ The unfriendly attitude of himself and his fol- 
lowers seems, more than anything else, to have been the occa- 
sion for the first letter written to him by General Anderson on 
July 4 ; for, after courteous phrases about the " friendly sen- 
timents " of the American people " for the native people of 
the Philippines," and about the desire to have them " cooper- 
ate with us in military operations against Spain," the letter 
comes to the point with a formal notice to Aguinaldo that 
Anderson feels it necessary to take Cavite as a base of opera- 
tions and hints that there must be no interference with his of- 
ficers. Aguinaldo's reply was conciliatory and studiedly cour- 
teous, and the next day Anderson wrote again, in rather 
indefinite terms, about the desirability of an agreement in 
advance as to the territory which the American troops should 
occupy on shore, since they would move promptly against 
** our common enemy." After that, except for several notes 
virtually forming passports for American officers to go through 
the insurgent lines and reconnoiter the country south of Ma- 

ence were made to him by Dewey and ratified by Anderson in these interviews. 
Fortunately, General Anderson has given us a somewhat detailed account of the 
conversations, as he recalled them, in his article in the North American Review iov 
February, 1900. In a letter to the Secretary of War in February, 1900, General 
Anderson also categorically denied the statements of the Resena veridica, declaring 
that, in answer to Aguinaldo's request for recognition, he answered that he " was 
there simply in a military capacity, and could not acknowledge his [Aguinaldo's] 
Government because he had no authority to do so." (See Sen. Doc. 208, part 5, 
pp. 4-5.) Admiral Dewey says that he and General Anderson went in an informal 
way, not wearing swords or full uniform. {Sen. Doc. 331, p. 2976.) 

» North American Review, February, 1900, p. 276. In his official report, General 
Anderson has also touched briefly upon the hostile attitude of the Filipinos at the 
time of bis arrival {Report of Major-General Commanding Army, 1898, p. 54). 


nila, Anderson's correspondence with Aguinaldo related to the 
difficulties which seemed to be purposely put in the way of 
the American army securing supplies or transportation from 
the people, and it was more or less peremptory in tone. To 
some extent, of course, the disposition of the natives of Cayite 
not to comply with the Americans' demands for labor and to 
conceal their means of transportation and their supplies was 
due to their ignorance as to how they would be treated, their 
doubt as to whether they would be paid, and their non-eager- 
ness to work, as well as to the way in which the province had 
been scourged by war under the Spaniards and to the fact 
that the able-bodied population was already pretty effectually 
commandeered by the insurgent organization. Doubtless, too, 
the American quartermasters did not make proper allowance 
for the strength of the " manana " habit and wanted things 
done rather more quickly than immediately, as is the Ameri- 
can way. But the hiding of the wheels of carts, the sending 
of animals farther into the interior, and the exorbitant demand 
for such services and supplies as were furnished, are not alto- 
gether explained by these conditions. Admiral Dewey's naval 
officers had a pretty good force of natives at work at the arse- 
nal by this time, receiving double their former pay and better 
treatment than ever before had been the case with them, and 
having no disposition to leave the service of the Americans 
and be commandeered by men of their own race ; they were 
literally forced to give up a good portion of their pay in reg^ 
ular contributions to the insurgent treasury. General Ander- 
son's communications of the latter part of July are virtually 
threats to Aguinaldo that, if orders understood to have been 
given by him were not countermanded and transportation fa- 
cilities and men were not available at the points where the 
Americans were encamped, the latter would " pass him and 
make requisition directly on the people." Aguinaldo's reply 
of July 24 is virtually an admission that he controlled the 
attitude of his people in this respect. 


General Anderson's correspondence with Aguinaldo has 
been criticized in somewhat guarded terms by his own supe- 
riors and by Admiral Dewey. He may derive satisfaction from 
the knowledge that he was the first American officer to come 
in contact with the revolutionary party who reported to Wash- 
ington, without indefiniteness or ambiguities of any sort, that 
what they wanted and expected was independence, and that 
an attempt to set up an American Government in the Philip- 
pines would very likely bring on a conflict with them. On July 
9, he wrote a letter to the Adjutant-General of the army (re- 
ceived in Washington on August 29) to the effect that Agui- 
naldo, at first suspicious, was now friendly and " willing to 
cooperate," but if, as seemed improbable, he could take Ma- 
nila without American help, " he will, I apprehend, antagonize 
any attempt on our part to establish a provisional govern- 
ment." On July 18, he cabled, through the conduct of Ad- 
miral Dewey : " Aguinaldo declares dictator and martial law 
over all the islands. The people expect independence." The 
same day he wrote to the Adjutant-General that " the estab- 
lishment of a provisional government on our part will probably 
bring us in conflict with the insurgents, now in active hostility 
to Spain," and that, in spite of the friendly declarations of 
the latter, they " in many ways obstruct our purposes and are 
using every effort to take Manila without us." ^ Three days 
later, he wrote again that he had let Aguinaldo know verbally 
that he had only military authority and could not recognize 
his assumption of civil authority, but that he had made no for- 
mal protest against the declaration of dictatorship, this being 
at Admiral Dewey's request, though he had written such a 

^ General Anderson had then read the instmctions of the President of May 19, 
relative to establishing a provisional military government. This docimaent was 
brought by General Greene, who arrived with the second expedition on July 16. 

* On July 22, in a letter to Aguinaldo relative to the property of a wealthy Fil- 
ipino half-caste of Cavite (which Aguinaldo claimed had been donated to the in- 
surgent cause, and which he sought to recover from the Americans), Anderson did 


General Anderson had been but three days in San Fran- 
cisco between his arrival from Alaska and his departure with 
the first expedition, but in those few days he had heard enough 
of the discussion then going on in the United States about the 
future policy toward the Philippines to have the query arise 
in his mind as to what course of action the Government had 
decided upon. His instructions before departure did not men- 
tion the Filipinos. He was on arrival to confer fully with Ad- 
miral Dewey and dispose his troops so as to have them under 
the protection of the navy's guns. Hearty cooperation with 
Dewey was enjoined, and it was stated that he was not de- 
prived of the "fullest discretion" after such consultation, as 
"he must be governed by events and circumstances of which 
we can have no knowledge." He has said that he supposed 
that, on arrival at Cavite, "all he had to do was to consult 
Dewey," but the latter " had no more definite orders " than he 
himself, and "matters were seriously complicated because he 
had set Aguinaldo up in business."^ 

take the responsibilitj of putting it on record that he could not, without orders, 
recognize Aguinaldo's assumption of civil authority. Aguinaldo's reply was the 
usual protest of friendliness, but conyeyed the warning that American troops 
should not be disembarked without previous notice to him " in writing," stating, 
" the places that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation " ; other- 
wise he could not answer for what his people might do, because, " as no formal 
agreement yet exists between the two nations, the Philippine people might con- 
sider the occupation of its territories by North Ajnerican troops as a violation of 
its rights." (See Sen. Doc. 208, part 1, pp. 9-11.) 

^ The Anderson-Ag^inaldo correspondence may be found in its most complete 
form in Sen. Doc. 208, 66th Cong., Ist Sess., part 1, pp. 4-20, it being there made 
up from the less complete records of it in Report of Major-General Commanding 
Army, 1809, part 2 (same as part 4 of Report of War Department, 1899), pp. 335- 
44, and in Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 390-99. All but an abstract of Aguinaldo's letter of 
July 15 (transmitting to Anderson, at the same time as to Dewey, the decrees of 
the new Revolutionary Government) seems to have been lost. (See Sen. Doc. 2^4* 
56 Cong., 1st Sess.) Anderson's letters from Cavite to Washington are also found 
in Sen. Doc. 208, and his cablegram of July 18 in Bureau of Navigation, p. 117. 
His instructions before departure are summarized by him in his article in the Feb- ^ 
mary, 1900, number of the North American Review, and are quoted in full in a 
letter written by him to the Chicago Record-Herald and published in its issue of 
July 11, 1902. They are also given, in the form of a telegram to General Otis at 
San Francisco, on p. 668 of Corr. Rel. War. Therein it appears that the stars, 
which have been thought to point to significant omissions in Sen. Doc. 208 f from 


General Greene and the troops of the second expedition ar- 
rived in Manila Bay on July 16 and 17, and these troops were 
within the week disembarked and encamped in one of the few 
thicketless spots on the Cavite beach.^ General Greene brought 
instructions to General Anderson, as senior officer, that if he 
and Admiral Dewey wished to attack the city and were sure 
of success, they might do so in advance of General Merritt's 
arrival.^ It was decided that an attack by some 6000 men on 
perhaps twice their number behind fortifications and in- 
trenchments was hardly authorized by these instructions, even 
though the fleet could speedily reduce the city walls. It was 
not possible to invite the cooperation of the 10,000 to 15,000 
insurgents intrenched about the city, because, in General An- 
derson's words, "if Manila had been taken with his [Agui- 
naldo's] cooperation, it would have been his capture as much 
as ours. We could not have held so large a city with so small a 
force, and it would therefore have been practically under Fili- 
pino control."^ ^E 

his letter of July 9, do not take the place of any other statements by him 
with reference to the insurgents, but indicate long passages of criticism of the 
transport service and the equipment, especially as regards clothing, of the first 
expedition, in connection with his transmission of the reports of the commanding 
officers of the regiments comprising this expedition. His letter of July 21, from 
which passages are also omitted in the Senate document, is not given at all in 
Corr. Rel. War. The preceding letters from him were all received at Washington 
on August 29. Admiral Dewey's disapproval of Greneral Anderson's relations with 
the insurgents is most plainly indicated in his testimony before the Senate Commit- 
tee. (See Sen. Doc. S31, pp. 2976-80.) Dewey then said (p. 2937) that he had no 
recollection of requesting Anderson not to make formal protest against Agui- 
naldo's assumption of civil authority. He said, however, that " one's hindsight is 
better than his foresight," and if he had it to do over, he would not have anything 
to do with the insurgents. Similarly, General Anderson says, in the letter to the 
Chicago Record-Herald (cited above), which was written in protest against some 
of the statements in Admiral Dewey's testimony: "If I had known as much about 
him [Aguinaldo] then as everybody seems to know now, I might have arrested 
him then without correspondence." 

^ This was called " Camp Dewey." Some preparation for the location of troops 
there had been made before Greene's arrival, and Anderson had sent over from 
Cavite a battalion of Californians. (Rept. MaJ.-Gen. Comm., 1898, pp. 54-55, 61.) 

* See General Greene's contribution to the Century Magadne, March, 1899, 
p. 790. 

3 North American Review, February, 1900, p. 275. 



General Merritt, who arrived on July 25, evidently bore 
instructions to avoid, as far as possible, all complications with 
the insurgents. He himself remained on shipboard, but the 
commanding officers on shore were in numerous instances ex- 
plicitly instructed to keep as free as possible from the entan- 
glements with the Filipinos who were investing Manila, while 
at the same time pushing forward the preparations for the 
capture of the city without their assistance.^ These prepara- 
tions were considerably delayed by the insufficient equipment 
of the first expeditions ; the troops disembarked under Greene 
were poorly provided with shelter, and, because of the lack of 
land transportation in their own possession (no wagons or 
horses having been brought) and the difficulty of securing it 
on shore, the problem of supplying them was no small one to 
cope with. The rainy season had then begun, and the frequent 
typhoons outside kept the bay stirred up, while only the hardi- 
ness of the Western volunteers preserved their good temper and 
enthusiasm in the daily drenchings they received on shore, 
they having no change of clothing. The high surf running on 
the shallow beach and the lack of available small boats, except 

' In his official report, General Merritt says: ''As Aguinaldo did not visit me 
on mj arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my 
instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands 
by the American land forces, and stated that ' the powers of the military occupant 
are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of 
the inhabitants,' I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with 
the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially 
as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my 
authority, in the erent that his pretensions should clash with my designs." (Rept, 
MaJ.-Gen. Comm.t 1898^ p. 40. This report also forms vol. iii of Message of the 
President and Accompanying Documents^ 1898.) General Merritt here refers to his 
formal instructions of May 19 (Sen. Doc. 208^ part 1, p. 85). In his testimony be- 
fore the Peace Commission at Paris, he said : " It was part of my policy that we should 
keep ourselves aloof from Aguinaldo as much ai possible, because we knew trouble 
would occur from his wanting to go to Manila at the time of its surrender." {Sen. 
Doc. 62t p. 362.) And again (t6u/., p. 367) : "The whole correspondence [of General 
Anderson] was deprecated by Admiral Dewey before I got there, and I suppressed 
the whole thing after I arrived, because it was not the wish of the Government to 
make promises to the insurgents or act in any way with them. Admiral Dewey 
cabled to Washington the day after Merritt's arrival {Bureau of Navigation^ p. 118): 
*' [Aguinaldo] has become aggreuive and even threatening." 


the cumbersome native lighters (the insurgents having most 
of the launches, etc., that were not tied up inside the city on 
the river banks or in the possession of foreigners of Manila 
other than Spaniards), also made the landing of the 5000 
troops arriving at the end of July a slow process.^ But the 
chief problem from the outset was how to get the American 
troops in position for a decisive attack on Manila without in 
some manner joining with the insurgents or being compromised 
by some sort of recognition of them. The Americans held a 
comparatively small tract of land on the beach, but between 
this position and the Spanish line of defense on the south, 
terminating in the little old fort of San Antonio de Abad just 
south of Malate, the insurgents had themselves well intrenched. 
And from this point, running in an irregular line northeast 
to the river, and from the river near San Juan del Monte 
around the city on the north to the bay west of the Ton do 
district, their besieging line was fairly complete, and they had 
the country pretty thoroughly dug up with trenches, in 
some places approaching to within two hundred yards or so of 
the line of Spanish blockhouses. Sharp little engagements of 
no consequence occurred along these lines now and then, 

^ The brigade under General MacArthnr, which had arrived on July 31, could 
not all be landed until August 9. The criticisms of General Anderson and his regi- 
mental commanders on the equipment and transportation of the first expedition 
have been cited above. For the criticisms of a naval officer on the second and sub- 
sequent expeditions (only the first being under the more or less direct supervision 
of naval officers) see Bureau of Navigation, pp. 137-41. The Springfield Republican 
of September 30, 1898, raised the query why the China was kept waiting in Manila 
Bay for forty days at the expense of 81500 per day to the Government. General 
Anderson, however, says that he retained the Sydney and Australia (which he had 
been charged to send back as soon as possible) at Admiral Dewey's advice (letter 
of July 14, Corr. Rel. War, p. 780), as it might have been desirable to transport 
his troops to some other point in Luzon if the second Spanish fleet came to Manila; 
also (letter of July 9, ibid., p. 778) that he was advised by Dewey, on the above 
account, not to land anything at first but absolutely necessary supplies and impedi- 
menta. Admiral Dewey cabled on July 17 that he retained the China and Peking 
as auxiliaries, in view of tlie rumors about C^mara's fleet being en route to Manila. 
General Greene {Century Magazine, March, 1899) very vigorously defends the 
records made in equipping the first expeditions, and says that the troops encamped 
outside of Manila were made as comfortable as possible under the circumstances. 


mostly early in the morning or after nightfall; but there had 
been nothing like a general engagement inaugurated on the 
part of the insurgents, nor any evidence that they could drive 
in the Spanish outposts, defended by artillery, at any point, 
though the bullets might rattle about the roofs in Malate at 
intervals. Supplies in Manila were commanding four times the 
usual price, and horse meat had come to take the place of the 
tough flesh of the karabau; but the inhabitants were never 
in a desperate condition, or anything like it, as regards food, 
in part because of the provisions of the governing authorities 
with regard to the storing and sale of supplies, but principally 
because the Germans had supplied them with flour at several 
critical times, and because the insurgents' cordon was easily 
penetrated by bribery, and supplies were easily brought in 
from up the river and elsewhere.* The Spaniards within suf- 
fered principally from the barometric alternations of their 
changeful dispositions, now being raised to the heavens of op- 
timism by the latest tale of European intervention (to be in- 
augurated by the naval forces of Germany and France in the 
harbor), by word that Admiral C^mara would soon arrive and 
sweep the Americans off the seas, or by a fully detailed cable- 
gram announcing the destruction of the American fleet off 
Santiago de Cuba; and, again, they were cast into the pessi- 
mism of despair by new rumors of a bombardment, or tales 
of an uprising in the city and the sacking and massacre to 
coincide with the entry of the insurgents from outside. 

One of the Spanish delusions, which was rather more than 

^ On June 27, the insurgents gained possession of the pamping-pl&nt of the citj 
water-tupplj, up the Marikina River. The Spaniards, however, retained the reser- 
voir, near the city; and by allowing the water to run from it but three hours a day, 
and utilizing the rain water then falling so abundantly, the inhabitants were never 
in straits for water. The appeal to the insurgent commander Montenegro in the 
name of humanity, to let the pumping-plant continue its operations, was answered 
by him with a refusal to do so and a demand upon the Spaniards to surrender the 
etty to the insurgents and thus avert the 8u£Fering they feared (Sastrdn, op. cit., 
p. 471). Most of the red wine in the city was embargoed for the rations of the 
•oldiert in the trenches. Chickens rote to a price of four pesos each. 


a delusion, gave the Americans themselves no little concern, 
and had something to do with the postponement of the capture 
of the city. The Spanish squadron under Admiral Camara, 
which, it was rumored, both in the United States and Manila, 
had started for the Orient about the middle of May, did leave 
Spain's coasts a month or so later, and on July 5 passed the 
Suez Canal. The three torpedo-boat destroyers with it were 
there turned back, supposedly that the fleet might make speed. 
The battleship Pelayo, protected cruiser Carlos V, three cruis- 
ers, and three transports with several thousand troops were, 
for several weeks thereafter, expected by Admiral Dewey, with 
some anxiety, since the Pelayo was so much more powerful a 
vessel than any that he had. Inasmuch as it seemed quite cer- 
tain that this squadron would arrive at Manila before either 
of the slow-steaming monitors Monterey and Monadnock, which 
had been started from the Pacific Coast in June to add their 
powerful guns and protective armor to Dewey's force, could 
reach there, the latter considered various plans, it being finally 
decided that he would leave the close waters of Manila Bay, 
and, after uniting with the monitors, meet the Spaniards in 
the open waters, or else would await them inside the landlocked 
entrance of Subig Bay, while the American troops would either 
be transported to the northern end of the railroad at Dagupan 
/I or would strike inland with their thirty days' supplies. But the 
^^^ Spaniards did not come, and on August 4 the Monterey ar- 
rived, settling for once and all Dewey's apprehensions as to 
what he would do for defense against the rumored squadron ; 
also as to the damage which might be done to his ships, in an 
attack on the city, by the few powerful modern guns on the 

^ The cablegrams which passed back and forth between Dewey and the Navy 
Department in May, June, and July, on the subject of the Spanish relief squadron, 
may be found in Bureau of Navigation, pp. 97-118. On May 20, Dewey said, if it 
came, his squadron " would attempt to give a good account of itself." In June, 
when the strength of the Spanish reinforcements was known more in detail, and 
after the American admiral had begun to entertain suspicions of the future pur> 


It had been decided to make the attack on Manila from the 
south side and along the beach, where the navy could cooper- 
ate, and the chief problem was to get hold of the trenches 
held by the Filipinos between the American camp and the 
Spanish outer line. General Merritt instructed General Greene 
to endeavor by informal conference to secure these positions 
peaceably; if he could not, he was authorized, as a last ex- 
treme, to use force, as it was absolutely necessary to have this 
foothold for an attack. With the authority of Aguinaldo, the 
insurgent commander at this point moved out his troops, and 
the Americans moved in quietly on July 29, at once construct- 
ing new intrenchments a Httle in front of the old line. Subse- 
quently, insurgent positions extending farther to the eastward 
and inland were also yielded to the Americans, Aguinaldo 
stipulating only that formal requests in writing be sent to him.* 

poses of the German fleet facing him, he suggested (June 25) that an American 
fleet be sent to threaten the coast of Spain. This had already been amiouuced as 
the intention of the Washington Grovernraent. (For American press comment on 
this incident of the war, see Public Opinion^ July 7, 1898.) The official reports of 
Generals Merritt and Greene both bring out the delay that was occasioned by 
waiting for the Monterey. This was due, after Merritt's arrival, to Dewey's desire 
to have the monitor's heavier guns to cope with the Luneta battery, if the city re- 
sisted; he had heard, on July 22, of Ciimara's fleet having turned back. A letter 
of Merritt of July 26 (Corr. Rel. Watt p. 781) brings out very plainly Dewey's 
attitude at the time, as does Anderson's letter of July 14 (tfeirf., p. 780). See also 
Anderson's and Greene's magazine contributions, already cited. It has never been 
made clear why the Spanish ships did not continue on their course ; whether the 
threat to send an American fleet to the coasts of Spain caused their recall, whether 
their start was merely intended to frighten the Americans and prevent the fall of 
Manila until the inevitable truce was sued for, whether it was a false move of the 
latter sort but designed principally to relieve the Ministry from charges that 
might be made of abandoning Manila to its fate, or simply that Cdmara's " nerve 
did not hold out " (as General Greene hints). The probabilities are that the Pelayo 
and Carlos V — boats hastily completed after the beginning of the war — were 
not in fit condition to fight. 

^ The formal request of General Anderson of August 10 for the trenches facing 
Blockhouse 14, and Aguinaldo's reply consenting to this, are cited in Sen. Doc. 
t08t part 1, p. 17. The letter of General Greene to General Noriel, making the 
first request of this sort on July 29, is to be found on p. 8 of Telegraphic Corrt' 
spondence of E. Aguinaldo, July 15, 1898, to February 28, 1899 (War Department, 
Bureau of Insular Affairs, 19(X3). That force was authorized, if necessary, to get 
the firat trenches, was the testimony of General Merritt at Paris (Sen. Doc. 62, 
pp. 3C3 and 367). The article of General Greene in the Century Magazine^ April, 



It was at this time that the insurgents were putting forth 
their first formal appeal for recognition by foreign powers.^ 
There were at the time various instances of friction between 
the two attacking armies. The American Signal Corps, striving 
to meet the imperative demands made upon it to prepare a sys- 
tem of communication not only between the land forces at 
Cavite and those around the beach about Manila, but also be- 
tween the sea and shore forces which were to cooperate in the 
attack, all with very scanty means of transportation, clashed 
more or less with Filipino detachments in places where it oper- 
ated, and also with Aguinaldo himself; the peremptory fashion 
in which the Americans assumed possession of municipal build- 
ings, etc., and their way of cutting in on the wires of the in- 
surgent organization and temporarily disrupting its system of 

1899, shows, however, that it was distinctly forbidden by General Merritt to nse 
force in securing the trenches farther inland which Mac Arthur's troops occupied 
after August 9 (as before by the consent of Aguinaldo, through Noriel). Mac- 
Arthur and Greene had proposed a plan of attack on the city, based on securing 
the insurgent trenches, " by removing the insurgents " if necessary, in a memo- 
randum of August 9, and Merritt's reply on August 10 was specific : " No rupture with 
insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for per- 
mission to occupy their trenches, but if refused, not to use force." (Rept. MaJ." 
Gen. Comm.t 1898 , pp. 72-73; also Sen. Doc. 208, part 1, p. 14.) 

1 See Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 438-39 ; also Sen. Doc. 208, part 1, pp. 99-101. Certain 
municipal presidents, elected under the decrees of June 18 and 20, met at Cavite 
on August 1, to receive from Aguinaldo, as provided in those decrees, his approval 
of their election, without which they could not take office. Immediately thereafter 
they proceeded to " recognize and respect Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy as 
President of the Revolutionary Government," and the validity of his decrees, and 
to " proclaim solemnly, in the face of the whole world, the independence of the 
Philippines." This was Mabini's project, that independence might appear to be 
declared by a representative assembly of Filipinos. These men, were, however, 
only a handful of village presidents from various towns in Cavite and Batangas, 
with perhaps a few from the north side of the bay, all of whom had been carefully 
selected in advance by Aguinaldo and his immediate followers. The proclamation 
of August 6, accondpanying this document, was Aguinaldo's formal request to for- 
eign powers for recognition, " since they are the means designated by Providence 
to maintain the equilibrium between peoples, sustaining the weak and restraining 
the strong." It contains exaggerations in the statements that the insurgents then 
had 9000 prisoners and 30,000 troops " in the form of a regular army." It declared 
that " the revolution now rules " in the Tagalog provinces and in Pampanga, 
Tarlak, Pang^sinan, Uni6n, and Sambales, a statement which was in a sense cor- 
rect, though most of these provinces had as yet no civil organization. 


communication, injured the dignity of the Filipinos, besides ^ 
jarring their leisureliness.^ Also, the Spaniards feared a bom- 
bardment of the city by the war- vessels, there was also some 
feeling about the Americans' efforts to restrain the Filipinos 
from doing their customary firing nights and mornings and 
thus running the risk of prematurely bringing on a more or 
less general engagement, besides wasting lives uselessly.'^ 

The Spaniards had not noticed, or at least had not given 
any attention to, the presence of the Americans in front of 
their trenches until the night of July 31- August 1, when, for 
a time after midnight and also after dawn, they opened with ar- 
tillery and infantry a very vigorous fire against the American 
positions, on the first occasion also attempting to advance and 
drive the latter out of the trenches. Ten men were killed and 
43 wounded on the American side. There were a score more of 
casualties in similar but lesser engagements (merely picket- 
firing) during the next four days. Finally, the Monterey having 
arrived, the Spaniards were notified that bombardment might 
begin at any time after forty-eight hours, or sooner, if they 
indulged in further hostilities. From the time of this notice, 
on August 7, no shots were exchanged between the Ameri- 
cans and Spaniards until the advance was made on the city.^ 

* See Sen. Doc. 208y part 1, p. 14, for Agtiinaldo's complaint to General Ander- 
son about this. The reports of the American signal service officers (Kept. Maj." 
Gen. Comm., 1808, pp. 127-36) also confirm quite fully what he says. See also Tel, 
Corr. AgiUnaldo, pp. 8-9. 

■ The claim of Aguinaldo (Resefia verxdicd) that Noriel's troops one night came 
to the assistance of the Americans and repulsed the Spaniards, who had left their 
trenches and driven in the American outposts by a sudden attack, and that the 
Filipinos thus saved six cannon which the Americans had been compelled to aban- 
don, has been categorically denied by Generals Anderson, Greene, and MaoArthur 
and the colonels of the American regiments engaged {Sen. Doc. SOS, part 5, and 
Sen* Doc. SSI, p. 1902). Richard Brinsley Sheridan, " barrister-at-law," who calls 
himself an *• eyewitness " of American aggreMion against the Filipinos, makes some- 
thing of this incident in his book. The Filipino Martyrs (New York, 1900), p. 63 ; 
but this book is of no service in getting at the real history of affairs. The account 
of this episode by Foreman, op. cit., p. 615, is wholly erroneous; there was no 
soch engagement as he relates on August 12. 

* See General Greene's o£Bcial report and magazine article, already cited. 



Admiral Dewey had not only been waiting for the arrival 
of the monitor, but also was hopeful that negotiations then 
being carried on between him and the Spanish authorities in 
Manila would result in the surrender of the city without blood- 
shed. It had been apparent, even to the Spaniards, that they 
were really at the mercy of Dewey's guns at any time after 
May 1 when he might choose to direct them upon the city. 
The foreigners who had property in the business section of 
Manila were naturally very anxious that there should be no use- 
less bombardment of the city. It was through the English and 
Belgian consuls (the latter a business man in Manila) that the 
proposal to arrange for a peaceful surrender of the city first 
came to Dewey ; and it was through the Belgian that a quasi- 
agreement was finally reached in August, an agreement which 
more than gives color to the claim that Manila was really 
surrendered and not captured. However, the obstacle which 
prevented Consul Andre from securing the consent of the 
Spanish governor-general to surrender without further fighting 
(namely, the fact that, under the Spanish military code, the 
capitulation of a fortified town, unless it can be shown that all 
means of defense have been employed, involves court-martial 
and liability to severe penalties) made it impossible for any 
definite agreement to be conveyed by the consul to Admiral 
Dewey, other than that, after a certain amount of resistance 
had been offered, the walled city would capitulate under a 
white flag, provided it was not previously bombarded. In other 
words, " Spanish honor," as incorporated in the Spanish mili- 
tary law, required on this occasion that a number of Spanish 
lives should be uselessly sacrificed on the outer lines (where 



the soldiers fought bravely for a time, in ignorance, except 
for a few superior of&cers, of the surrender previously agreed 
upon in their rear) before the inevitable verdict of stern neces- 
sity could be accepted. The other side of the picture presents 
also the loss of four American lives ; but it is to be remembered 
that, although General Merrittwas cognizant of the negotiations 
conducted by Dewey through Consul Andr^, he did not think 
the Spaniards in authority were dealing in good faith, and 
that on the part of the American troops on shore, the attack on 
the city was planned and carried out in good faith as a bona- 
fide attack. The net result for the Americans was that the 
stipulated yielding of the Spaniards after a show of resistance 
had been made saved some hundreds of lives, which would 
have been lost had the resistance been real and been prolonged 
as it might have been. All this, however, makes talk of the 
" capture by assault " of Manila seem rather bombastic. The 
decisive factor in the situation throughout was the guns of the 

The verbal negotiations between Admiral Dewey and the 
governor-general, which had been conducted through the Bel- 
gian consul in a desultory fashion for two weeks, came to a 
head very quickly after Dewey and Merritt joined, on August 7, 
in the formal notice of bombardment at any time after forty- 
eight hours had passed. To the intimation that he remove non- 
combatants from the city, the governor-general replied that it 
was impossible to do this, he being " surrounded by insurrec- 
tionary forces." On August 9, when the forty-eight hours were 
about to expire, the vessels of the foreign fleets withdrew 
from in front of Manila, and private launches brought away 
from the city members of the foreign colonies.^ Then Dewey 

^ The condition inside the city is deioribed bj Sastr<5n (op. eit.t pp. 490-96). 
The people crowded into the churches and conrents, where supplies had been col- 
lected, even brinfi^ing their household treasures and furniture also, until the fi^v- 
•mor-general ordered this stopped. He forbade all carriage traffic in the walled city, 
and only two gates were left open. His own headquarters were transferred to the 
Angnsttnian monastery, which was very strongly built of stone. Places of shelter 
eUwe under the walls and in earihqnalu ruins near by were Msigned to the aged 


and Merritt joined in a formal demand upon the governor- 
general to surrender the city and avert sacrifice of life. 
He replied that he was without authority to do this, but would 
communicate the situation and their demand to his Govern- 
ment, if given time to send to Hongkong and get an answer 
by cable. This request the American commanders refused on 
the following day. So much for the formal intercourse between 
American and Spanish headquarters, which was conducted 
through the British consul in Manila.^ The Belgian consul now 
brought almost to a head the somewhat vague and indefinite 
proposals which he had been extracting, bit by bit, from the 
Spanish superior authority in the city. The incident can be fully 
appreciated only in the light of the change in administration 
which at that moment took place in Manila, by order of Ma- 
drid. Toward the close of July, it had become definitely known 
in Manila that the Spanish fleet had been disastrously defeated 
off the coast of Cuba, and, what was more immediately im- 
portant to them, that Admiral C^mara and his long-expected 
relief squadron had repassed the Suez Canal. Thereupon, 
Governor-General Augustin sent a long cablegram to his Gov- 
ernment explaining the difficulties of his situation, stating that 
the American forces were steadily being increased, and closing 
by declaring that he " declined the responsibility of the situ- 
ation " produced by the return of the relief squadron and that 
there was " no possibility of resisting unless they had assist- 
ance." The reply from Madrid was an order to Augustin to 
turn over his office to the second in command, General Fermin 
Jaudenes, with virtual instructions to the latter to "preserve 
the Philippines to the sovereignty of Spain." This was received 

and sick and to women and children. This crowding of the principal Spanish people 
into the places which would most quickly suffer bombardment, if bombardment 
there was, indicates that the Spaniards expected to yield without it, and also shows 
that their chief fear was that the Tagalogs would enter the parts of the city out- 
side of the walls. 

1 This formal correspondence may be found in Admiral Dewey's report of 
August 16 (Bureau of Navigation^ pp. 120-22) and in General Merritt's report of 
August 31 (Rept. MaJ.-Oen. Comm.y 1898 , pp. 46-48). 


at Manila on August 3 or 4, there being received at the same 
time with it a telegram from Premier Sagasta of earlier date 
commending Augustin's efforts and stating that he must 
hold out at all hazards, as peace negotiations were being hur- 
ried forward.^ On August 5, Jaudenes assumed command, with 
the inevitable " allocution." Quite naturally, the news received 
from Spain of peace negotiations being under way, and the 
instructions he had received to hold out at all costs, interposed 
a new obstacle to the hopes that had been entertained of a 
peaceful surrender. However, the facts that faced the Spaniards, 
particularly in the shape of a fleet which could readily reduce 
their works and cause great destruction of life and property, 
were as stubborn as ever ; hence, the endeavor to gain time, in 
response to the demand of August 9 for surrender. According 
to the notes kept by Consul Andr^ the chief concern of Au- 
gustin, who had, before August 3, almost consented to a mere 
show of resistance, was as to whether the Americans would 
allow the Tagalogs to enter and sack the city, and possibly 
massacre its Spanish inhabitants." 

Upon Dewey's authority, Andr^ had been able to reassure 
the Spaniard on this point. He now found that this was his 
strongest card to play with Jaudenes in getting the latter to 
promise that the Luneta guns would not be fired at the Amer- 
ican ships, which was the condition stipulated by Dewey for 
refraining from bombarding the city. According to Andr^ 
himself, he, on August 9, on his own responsibihty, virtually 
threatened Jaudenes that the Americans would permit the 

> Data regarding the substitntion of Jandenes for Augnstin will be found in Saa- 
tr<5n, op, cit.f pp. 478-79 and 485-86, and in McClure's Magazine for June, 1899, 
wherein Oscar King Davin giyes a very full abstract of the diarj kept by Consul 
Andr^. It is somewhat difficult to reconcile with this episode the dates assigned in 
these two sources to the cablegrams, but the fact that Angustin's pessimistic mes- 
sage of late July is what caused his dismissal is Tery well established by current 
Spanish comment. 

* On July 29, Dewey cabled to Washington that he had reliable information 
that Manila would be surrendered to the Americana *' if it were not for the insur- 
gent complication " {Bureau of Navigation, p. 118). 


Tagalogs to enter and do as they pleased when the city was 
taken. The threat worked so effectively that Jaudenes at once 
submitted to a council of war the question whether they should 
surrender or should make a show of resistance to the Ameri- 
cans.^ The formal reply given after this meeting to Andre (at 
the same time that Dewey was asked to permit communication 
with Madrid) was that the Spaniards must " defend their 
honor" and make the most of their resources; but after that 
and subsequent conferences, he was allowed to convey to 
Dewey rather indefinite promises to the effect that the Luneta 
guns would not be fired " if he did not come too close " ; that 
the resistance on the outer line of defense would not be pro- 
longed if the Spaniards had sufficient chance to withdraw after 
the fleet had shelled the fort and their trenches on the south ; 
and that a white flag would be displayed on the city wall 
when the Americans could come in to conduct the capitula- 
tion. The Spaniards wanted definite assurances that the insur- 
gents would be kept out, and that they would be given honor- 

^ The best account of the discussion of this question in Spanish official circles 
in Manila is contained on pp. 14-24 of Defensa obligada (Madrid, 1904), a pam- 
phlet by Archbishop Nozaleda containing answers to the charges against himself, 
quoting quite fully from the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Authorities 
on August 8 and from the records of the later courts-martial in Spain, which tried 
Jaudenes, Tejeiro, and others for surrendering Manila. We find the civilians of 
the Board of Authorities, including the archbishop, practically advising surrender, 
as being the wish of the inhabitants, with the exception of the chief judge of the 
Audiencia, who thought the Government's cablegrams required resistance to the 
last. A touch of Spanish character is found in the statement of the governor of 
Manila province, who, as a civil officer, reported that the people thought resist- 
ance to the last could be of no practical use, but who declined to speak for a sur- 
render " in his capacity as a military officer." This meeting of civilians was a 
mere formality, calculated to put it on record that the inhabitants urged surrender 
upon the military authorities, thus protecting the latter in the inevitable trial they 
would have to face. The meeting on August 9 was that of the " military council 
of defense." According to Nozaleda, seven officers voted for conducting negotia- 
tions for an honorable capitulation and seven for resistance " until the outer line 
should be broken ," and it is said that Jaudenes settled the tie in favor of the latter 
procedure. See also Sastrdn (op. cit., p. 495) ; he says it was also put on record 
that " military honor is already completely satisfied by the hundred combats so 
brilliantly sustained during the blockade and siege." The account of this meeting 
in Historia Negra, p. 98, differs somewhat from that of Nozaleda, but is there based 
upon rumors outside. 


able terms of surrender ; but they received no more decisive 
pledges on these matters than they had themselves given on 
their part. The whole matter, then, hung on contingencies ; 
but the Americans were reasonably well assured in advance 
that they would have an easy victory.^ 

Aside from the communications through Andr^, somewhat 
similar messages had probably been exchanged through the 
British consul and through an American chaplain, a Roman 
Catholic priest,^ who entered Manila some four or five days 
before the capture of the city and had interviews with Arch- 
bishop Nozaleda and with the Chief of Staff, Tejeiro, who was 
really the power behind the throne both under Augustin and 
Jaudenes, and was at the same time in command of the Span- 
ish troops. 

^ The chief source of authority on this dramatic affair is the diarj of Consul 
Andrtf, already cited (McClure*s Magazine, June, 1899). Consul Andre's part in 
the affair there assumes an exaggerated importance, in view of the failure of the 
other principal actors to state their share in it as minutely as he has done. Ad- 
miral Dewey touched briefly, but unsatisfactorily, upon it in his testimony before 
the Senate Committee (Sen, Doc. 331, pp. 2929, 2943-47, 2961), saying that " it 
was a part of the history which he was reserving to write for himself." His testi- 
mony left room for the inference that the part of the army in the capture of Manila 
was a sort of op^ra-bouffe role; and it was in protest against this inference that 
General Anderson wrote his letter in the Chicago Record-Herald of July 11, 1902, 
wherein he points out very plainly that, if any such definite agreement had been 
made, it would have implied that " American soldiers were to be sacrificed for the 
honor of Spain." Admiral Dewey feels sure (Sen. Doc. SSI, pp. 2927-28) that the 
Spanish governor-general was ready to surrender the city to him in this same 
fashion at any time in May, and that at various times he desired to surrender to 
the navy ; this is hardly possible, in view of the Spanish military code, and it must 
be assumed that the communications of the consuls were misunderstood by Dewey. 
In Century Magazine, April, 1899, John T. McCutcheon gives further data on the 
matter, mostly confirmatory of the proceeding. The magazine contributions of 
Generals Anderson and Greene, already very frequently cited, make it plain that 
the army's attack was bona fide, regardless of the knowledge, by some at least of 
the general officers, that a quasi-agreement with the Spanish authorities had been 
reached. General MacArthur says (Sen. Doc. SSI, p. 1407) that he knew nothing 
about a prearranged surrender. General Whittier testified at Paris (Sen. Doc. G^, 
p. 391) to a full knowledge; he was on General Merritt's staff and was one of the 
commissioners to arrange the capitulation. 

* This chaplain was Father William D. McKinnon, serving at the time with the 
First California, who afterward was made a regular army chaplain, and, under 
detail in Manila, served for a long time as a medium of communication between 


The American troops had been organized by an order of 
General Merritt on August 1 into the " Second Division of 
the Eighth Army Corps," under command of General Ander- 
son, composed of two brigades under command respectively 
of Generals MacArthur and Greene. The navy was all ready 
for the attack on August 9; but, besides the pending negotia- 
tions with the Spanish authorities, delay seems to have been 
caused by General Merritt's request that the attack be made 
on Saturday, August 13, when the tide in the estuaries be- 
tween the American forces and the Spanish trenches and Fort 
Antonio de Abad would be most favorable for fording. Mean- 

the Spanish archbishop and the American military occupants. He also first reor- 
ganized the Manila schools under General Otis. He died in Manila in 1902, in the 
midst of his labors in behalf of cholera victims. The only mention by any Amer- 
ican of his mission to the city in early August of 1898 appears to be in General 
Anderson's letter to the Chicago Record-Herald of July 11, 1902, wherein the latter 
says that the chaplain reported that the Spaniards " would not surrender without 
a fight." It is altogether possible that this visit had something to do with a prop^ 
osition to transport to Hongkong the friars then concentrated in the monasteries 
of the walled city, thus removing a possible source of embarrassment between 
Americans and Filipinos; the friars, it appears, were at that time anxious to leave. 
(See cablegrams of Dewey and Consul Williams, Bureau of Navigation, p. 126; 
Washington's permission to carry out the plan with army transports, Corr. Rel. War, 
p. 782; also Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo, p. 11, for a rumor of the plan.) In his Defensa 
obligada, pp. 10-14, Archbishop Nozaleda describes his meeting with McKinnon, 
and says the latter came merely to present to him a letter in Latin from the Arch- 
bishop of California, which served as a basis for his request for authority to exer- 
cise his ministrations on land, within the jurisdiction of Nozaleda, and that they 
did not discuss the question of a surrender. In his Historia Negra (pp. 21,97-98), 
"Captain Verdades " (who was Juan de Urquia, a Spanish volunteer officer in 
Manila) makes much mystery of this incident. This book, already cited several 
times, is of value chiefly as showing the sort of semi-libelous attacks that were 
made in the Spanish newspapers of 1898 and 1899 on all who had had any part in 
the loss of the Philippines to Spain. There was plenty of room for charges of in- 
competence, and probably no little foundation for the insinuations of official scan- 
dals at the time. But Spanish public criticism is scarcely ever either temperate or 
well-reasoned, and the attitude of the Spanish officers who surrendered Manila 
was sufficiently quixotic without their being pilloried for not preventing the inev- 
itable. The attacks on Archbishop Nozaleda in early 1904 (in connection with his 
nomination to the archbishopric of Valladolid) would have been much more to the 
point if, instead of accusing him of urging the surrender of Manila, or of there- 
after being polite to the Americans, they had been devoted to showing how his 
bitter pursuit of Josd Rizal in 1896 played a leading part in bringing about the 
downfall of Spain in the Philippines. 


while, the ground was thoroughly reconnoitered by various 
daring American officers and privates.^ On August 12, Gen- 
eral Anderson prepared the formal plan of attack for the 
8500 troops who were in position in the two brigades south of 
Manila. Merritt himself did not come on shore, but kept his 
headquarters on the navy transport Zafiro, from which he 
could watch the operations and move promptly into the city 
when the time should come. His instructions to his forces on 
shore were sent over on the night before the attack, in the 
form of a "memorandum for general officers in camp regard- 
ing the possible action of Saturday, August 13," and the next 
morning his adjutant landed with precise instructions as to 
the posting of troops in the various parts of the city after it 
was entered. The wording of these instructions makes it evi- 
dent that the chief thought in mind was not merely the ordi- 
nary policing of a city whose capture was regarded as a fore- 
gone conclusion, but was the keeping of the insurgents out. 
General Merritt sent a signal officer ashore in the surf late at 
night on the 12th, with instructions to General Anderson to 
let Aguinaldo know that his troops must not enter the city, 
and the following message was accordingly sent to the latter: 
"Do not let your troops enter Manila without the permission 
of the American commander. On this side of the Pasig River 
you will be under our fire." ^ 

^ The most notable reconnoissance, made by Major James Franklin Bell, an 
engineer officer, on August 10, revealed that the estuary was easily fordable at 
certain points, and delay on that account was unnecessary. Major Bell and Lieu- 
tenant Means, of Colorado, crawled and swam to within one hundred and fifty 
yards of the Spaniards on the walls of the fort, after being discovered. An ac- 
count of this exploit is given in Harper't History^ pp. 80-81 ; the official account, 
in Rept. Maj.'Gen. C<mm.,1898t pp. 124-26. Under Colonel Irving Hale, the 
Colorado troops cut Spanish wire entanglements dose to the enemy's intrenoh- 
ments the night before the attack. 

* This telegram seems to be on record only in the Buencamino document here- 
tofore cited (Cong. Record. 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6181). The memorandum of 
Merritt to the general officers and the verbal instructions of Adjutant-General 
Baboook are in Rept. Maj.-Oen. Comm., 1S98, pp. 82-83. The instructions to 
MacArthnr were, if he could move forward rapidly enough to the eastward, " to 
permit no armed bodies other than American troope to erose the irenchei in the 


The morning of August 13 was misty and cloudy, hamper- 
ing signal communication between the vessels and the shore. 
At nine o'clock the Olympia led most of the fleet into position 
off the fort below Malate. The Monterey, however, steamed 
in as close as the shallow water would permit in front of the 
walled city, and trained her guns on the Luneta battery ; while 
the Concord took position off the mouth of the Pasig, ready to 
open on the battery there or to meet any movement to escape 
on the part of the vessels in the river. The Olympia opened fire 
on Fort Antonio at half past nine, followed by the Raleigh and 
Petrel and the little captured gunboat Callao. The navy fire, 
which continued more or less spasmodically during an hour, 
did no great damage to the Spanish fort or other works, and 
probably was not meant to do so.^ The guns of the Utah ar- 
tillery, firing from a thousand yards on land, raked the para- 
pet of the crumbling old fort, and finally a shell from one of 
the vessels exploded its magazine ; but this was all wasted am- 
munition, for the fort never fired in return, and was abandoned 
almost at the first shot, in accordance with the plans which 

direction of Manila." Greene, who was to proceed through Malate and Ermita, 
was to place a guard at the Spauish trenches near the bay for the same purpose. 
While " forcible encounters with the insurgents " were to be " very carefully 
guarded against," yet " pillage, rapine, or violence " must be prevented at any 
cost. The memorandum signed by Merritt stated that, even though the navy 
might be delayed in destroying the enemy's works, no advance should be made 
unless ordered by headquarters. " In the event of a white flag being displayed by 
the enemy on the angle of the city wall," its meaning would be surrender, and the 
troops should advance quietly and in good order. Finally: " It is intended that 
these results shall be accomplished without the loss of life." This memorandum 
was modified by verbal instructions to Greene in the morning that he might ad- 
vance a regiment ou the Spanish position as soon as the navy shells had made any 
effect, without waiting for the signal of surrender. The formal orders organizing 
the army and providing for the attack will be found in ibid., pp. 59-60, 73-74. 

1 Oscar King Davis says (McClure^s Magazine, June, 1899, p. 183) that the range 
with which the Raleigh gunners were set to work was officially given as 7000 
yards, but a gun-captain soon found it to be actually 1700 yards. Sastrdn (op. cit.t 
p. 499) says the projectiles fell thickly about Santa Ana, three miles inland from 
the fort. General Greene noted the inaccuracy of the fire, but charged it to the 
clouds and mists (Century Magazine, April, 1899, p. 926). John T. McCutchcon, 
on board the Olympia, makes the same comment as to the failure to do much 
damage to the fort (ibid.f p. 940). 


General Tejeiro had secretly promulgated for a retreat. The 
Spaniards had, however, expected to make their retreat an 
orderly and, of course, a "dignified" performance, the troops 
of the entire line south of the Pasig to be withdrawn so as to 
come simultaneously upon a " second line," close in toward the 
walled city, into which, with or without resistance as might be 
ordered, they could then all be withdrawn.^ Various circum- 
stances combined to interfere with this programme of outward 
show : among them, the withdrawal of the Spanish right more 
rapidly than had been expected, under the Utah artillery fire and 
the advance of the Colorado infantry ; the raising of the red 
flag on the fort somewhat earlier, therefore, than the troops far- 
ther inland were expecting it, while they had become occupied 
also quite vigorously with MacArthur's brigade in front of 
Singalong and with the insurgents at Santa Ana; the fact 
also that the Spanish plans of retreat had been confided to but 
a few of the general officers, and one or two of them were 
incensed and quite ready to take some comfort out of a short- 
lived resistance to the Americans. 

Acting under his modified instructions. General Greene had 
started the Colorado volunteers forward upon the Spanish 
position about three quarters of an hour after the bombard- 
ment began, and the navy was then signaled to cease firing. 
The Colorado troops went gayly to the attack, rapidly fording 
the estuary, rushing into the old fort from behind, raising the 
American flag over it, and then starting to follow up the Span- 
iards who were withdrawing into Malate.^ Opposition, how- 

^ For a r^sum^ of the scattered items of information on this morning's eventSy 
M gleaned from Spanish officials' reports, tee Sastr6n, op. cit.^ pp. 497-503. 

* The flag waa raised over the fort by Lieatenant-Colonel H. B. McCoj. One 
of the most amasing incidents of the siege and capture of Manila was the way in 
which the Colorado regimental band followed at the heels of its advancing fellows, 
•plashing through the ford, the muddy marshes, and along the beach, to the tune 
of "There '11 Be a Hot Time in the Old Town To-night." Says the correspondent 
John Bass, who was with the Colorado advance, and had taken refuge with it in 
the Spanish trenches when firing from the right began : " Suddenly we heard the 
•onnd of martial music, and what was our aKtonishment to see the Colorado band 
eome around the comer of the fort, the fat bandmaster blowing his comet with 


ever, had developed from the Spanish trenches on the right, 
and bullets also came from the Spaniards who had retreated 
into Malate ; one man was killed while raising a flag over a 
house, and several were wounded. But the Eighteenth In- 
fantry and Third Artillery had been ordered forward against 
the trenches on the right near the beach, and their occupants 
were speedily in full retreat. At the same time. General Mac- 
Arthur's brigade farther eastward had begun its advance, the 
Astor and one of the Utah batteries dragging their guns along 
by hand, after they had driven the Spaniards out of the block- 
houses on that part of the line. The resistance for Greene's 
brigade, such as there was, was all over. The troops held in 
reserve came along up the beach ; the Nebraskans marched in 
toward the walled city on the sand, the gunboat Callao guard- 
ing them ; the California and Colorado troops were reformed 
in the streets of Malate and, together with the Eighteenth 
Infantry, proceeded slowly through that suburb and Ermita, 
toward the open space between the latter and the walled 
town; while along the two parallel streets of the suburbs 
the Third Artillery battery and the Tenth Pennsylvania fol- 
lowed them. A battalion of the Eighteenth Regulars elicited 
some spirited firing for a few moments from the Spanish 
troops ; there was also some stray shooting from the houses, 
and Mauser bullets were heard at intervals coming from the 
right, where the insurgents were pressing into the city, around 
the right of MacArthur's troops ; these circumstances made 
the advance through the suburbs somewhat slow. General 
Greene himself had ridden forward and came out into the open 
space in front of the Luneta at one o'clock, to see the white 
flag flying conspicuously on the southwest angle of the city 
walls, where it had been displayed since eleven o'clock, — the 
hour at which the American soldiers had entered the fort at 

might and main in the lead. . . . With difficnlty the valiant band was persuaded 
to take refuge behind the earthworks and stop their patriotic but dangerous blow- 
ing, which drew the enemy's fire. (Harper's History f p. 55.) 



Malate, — and perhaps longer. Admiral Dewey had at that 
hour signaled the city, " Do you surrender ? " and the reply 
in the international code had been a request for conference. 
The personal representatives of the American chiefs in com- 
mand, Flag-Lieutenant Brumby and Colonel Whittier, had at 
once gone ashore, and were in conference with the Spanish 
authorities inside the walls when Greene's troops arrived out- 
side these old fortifications and faced the Spanish soldiers who 
lined their top and other Spanish troops who were retreating 
confusedly from the southeastward, each side uncertain as to 
what should be its attitude toward the other.^ 

When the Spanish troops in the suburb of Santa Ana ini- 
tiated their rather premature retreat, they were pressed closely 
by the insurgents, and one or two small detachments with offi- 
cers were captured. This force of insurgents was now pushing 
on toward the walled city, and up the Pako road toward the 
walls there came also a large force of Filipinos who had moved 
with no resistance around MacArthur's right. Shots between 
them and the troops on the walls and those retreating to the 
gates were being exchanged, and, as the American regiments 
came out into the open space stretching back from the bay, 
they also joined in. Several men of the California regiment, 
which, under General Smith, was endeavoring to block the 
Pako road to the insurgents, were hit. Most of all, there was 
danger of a promiscuous engagement, in the then bewildered 
state of mind of the various troops and their commanders ; the 
only decisive-minded force was that of the Filipinos, who were 
bent on firing at the Spaniards as much as possible and on 
getting inside the walls if there was a chance.^ The Spanish 

^ The white flag had been raised for tome time before it wai first seen by 
Admiral Dewej himself ; the clouds had prevented it being seen, and the vessels 
fired some shots after it was raised. See Sastr<Sn, op. cit., p. 501 ; Century Maga» 
tine, April, 1899, p. 942 ; and Sen. Doc. SSI, p. 2043. 

* The part of the California troops in preventing a fight between Filipinos and 
Spaniards, or a promiscuous engagement, is related in Hept. Afaj.-Gen. Comm., 1898^ 
pp. 69, 96, 102, 678. Just before that. Major S. R. Jones, division quartermaster, 
and Private Francis Finla/, of Califoroia, had, all alone, stood off a crowd of in- 


officers were as eager to prevent this indiscriminate firing as 
were the Americans, and communicated to General Greene 
from the walls that negotiations for the capitulation were going 
on at headquarters. He thereupon went inside, improving the 
opportunity to communicate with General Merritt, through 
Colonel Whittier, the condition of the forces on land.^ The 
Spaniards offered no great objections to the general conditions 
of the capitulation as proposed by the Americans, although 
the specific terms were not agreed upon until the following 
day. Meanwhile, their consent to surrender caused the Oregon 
troops, who were awaiting on small transports at Cavite, to be 
sent for, that they might enter and police the walled city. It 
was General Greene's prescribed duty to march his troops 
across the river and distribute them as guards in the business 
and residence sections north of the Pasig. In order to do this, 
he had to form the Nebraska regiment in close order at "port 
arms " and virtually push out of the road a body of 2000 or 
more insurgents which had come in from the southeast and 
was massed between his troops and the bridge. Similarly, the 
forces which he sent southeastward to prevent the entrance 
of more insurgents from that quarter narrowly escaped getting 
into trouble with the latter and were fired on a number of 
times from cover.^ 

snrgent troops and prevented them advancing farther toward the walls (see ibid., 
p. 62, and Harper^s History, p. 52). The strangest experience of the day was that 
of Captain Stephen O'Conner and a company of the Twenty-third Regulars, who, 
moving forward with the advance on MacArthur's extreme left, met no serious 
resistance, and pressed on till they arrived at one of the gates of the city, some 
minutes in advance of Greene's troops. There they held their position, quietly 
awaiting orders, with several thousand Spanish troops around them and on the 
walls above them (see Rept. MaJ.-Gen. Comm., 1898, p. 58, and Century Magazine, 
April, 1899, p. 929). The Third Artillery battalion had fired only one shot all day, 
" and that in disregard of orders," remarked Captain Birkhimer, its commander. 

^ The Spanish officers in highest authority, clothed in all the regalia of full 
uniform, were rather stunned when the mud-splashed American general and his 
special aide. Major Frank S. Bourns, entered the stately office in the Ayunta- 
miento, and, not having had anything to eat since four in the morning, offered to 
share with them some hard-tack and a flask of American whiskey. (Century Mag- 
azine, April, 1899, p. 929.) 

* See Century Magazine, April, 1899, p. 930, and Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898, 
pp. 70, 102. 


General MacArthur's troops had been assigned to occupy 
all suburbs of the city south of the Pasig. But, as has been 
seen, they had met some resistance, through the failure of the 
plans for a united withdrawal of the Spanish outer line, and 
perhaps also through a desire of the Spanish officers facing 
them to have the satisfaction of a fight. The terrain in which 
this brigade had to operate was much more difficult than that 
nearer the bay, while the unwillingness of Merritt to ask for 
more insurgent trenches or to extend the line farther inland 
had made it impossible to prepare as well as might have been 
done for an attack. The firing of insurgents on their right, 
where they had massed in numbers for several days, brought 
MacArthur's men under the Spanish fire early in the morning. 
They held their places, however, until the artillery had com- 
pelled the abandonment of the Spanish blockhouses in front 
and the American flag had gone up on Fort San Antonio. In 
the thickets near Singalong, they met vigorous resistance to 
their advance from intrenched troops who were under cover. 
General Anderson authorized them to move around to the left 
and follow Greene's men into the city, but they were too 
heavily engaged. An advance party of Minnesota volunteers 
and of Astor Battery men, with no arms but revolvers, charged 
the Spanish position against considerable odds; the main body 
of the Twenty-third Infantry and Minnesota volunteers sup- 
ported them, and the resistance was soon over. The brigade 
moved on cautiously, however, through the uncertain territory, 
and it was 1.30 before it was discovered that all the Spaniards 
had withdrawn from the front — some time before, in fact. 
These forces then pushed on to occupy the districts assigned 
to them, and thus made contact with the troops which Greene 
had sent to keep the insurgents out on the southeast. The lat- 
ter had, however, fully established themselves in some of the 
southern districts of the city, and were helping themselves to 
the Spanish military barracks.* 
> The oMualties in MaoArihur*i brigade for the day were 4 men killed and 38 


The Oregon troops were policing the walled city and had 
begun to receive the surrender of arms from the Spanish soldiers 
who had retreated thither, and also to occupy their military 
quarters, before the bases of the capitulation were finally 
agreed upon, late in the afternoon, upon the arrival of General 
Merritt at the new headquarters. It was only after the an- 
nouncement of its terms that the Spanish flag was hauled down 
from over Fort Santiago, in the corner of the walled town, 
and the American flag went up in its place, at 5.30 p.m.i 
Even then, the capitulation was not put into formal shape 
until the following day. The Spaniards were conceded a sur- 
render with the honors of war (which was in agreement with 
their previous stipulation and with the hypothesis that this 
was a surrender rather than a capture) ; but there were some 
difficulties about minor points, particularly as to the return of 
the arms of the troops, to which the Americans finally con- 
sented, in case either party should afterward evacuate the city. 
The most important difficulty lay in their desire to interpose 
a preamble, much in the form of the preliminaries to a formal 
treaty, prescribing especially conditions as to the public and 
private property of the city. The Americans insisted that all 
public property and public funds should be surrendered to 

wounded, including 3 Minnesota officers wounded. This made the total of casual- 
ties for the day 5 men killed and 44 wounded, of whom 3 afterward died. Includ- 
ing 1 man killed by a stray shot on August 14, the total of casualties for the entire 
campaign before and in Manila was 123, of whom 17 were killed outright, 7 died 
from wounds, and 99, including 10 officers, were wounded but recovered. (The 
figures given in Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898, pp. 58, 84, 503, have here been cor- 
rected by reference to General Merritt's cablegrams of August 9, 20, and 30 in 
Corr. Rel. War.) 

^ Flag-Lieutenant Brumby represented Admiral Dewey, and he himself hoisted 
the American flag. The confusion existing at Spanish headquarters may be indicated 
by the fact that no Spanish officer or guard was on hand to observe the customary 
military honors at the time or to receive the Spanish flag as it was lowered, and 
it was borne away as a souvenir by the Oregon troops. When the Spanish soldiers 
came forward at the arsenal to deposit their arms before the Americans there 
drawn up, many of them threw their rifles on the ground so hard as to break them. 
The Spanish officer of a battery near the walls stayed by his post for some time 
after the surrender, having received no formal notification, until his wife finally 
telephoned to him news of the surrender (Sastrduj oj>. cit.f p. 503). 



them, pending peace negotiations, and closed the articles of 
capitulation as adopted with this declaration (on the lines of 
those governing General Scott's occupancy of Mexico City) : 
" This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, 
its educational establishments, and its private property of all 
descriptions are placed under the special safeguard of the faith 
and honor of the American army." * 

All the Spanish troops defending the city did not surrender 
until the afternoon of Sunday, August 14. That morning word 
was sent out to the commanders of the outer Spanish line 
running from the river near Santa Mesa northwest to the bay, 
who had been holding off insurgent attacks, to come in and 
lay down their arms, and the American line was pushed out 
to cover practically the ground which they had held. The 
Spaniards stated that they would surrender over 13,000 troops, 
and they did eventually turn over about that many Mauser 
and Remington rifles; but most of their native troops had 
been lost by desertion, and there were fewer than 9000 soldiers 
under arms in the city, including two practically complete 
regiments of native troops.^ Nearly $900,000 (value in Mexi- 
can silver) were captured, $750,000 being in the public treas- 
ury and the rest in the custom-house and other dependencies 
of the administration.^ The Americans had taken possession, 

^ For the text of the articles of capitulation and the official reports on the same, 
fee Rept. MaJ.-Gen. Comm.t 1898^ pp. 43, 49, 70-72. See also the account by General 
Greene, who headed the American commission to negotiate capitulation, in Century 
Magazine, April, 1899, p. 931 ; also Sastrdn, op. cit., pp. 504-06. 

* For more detailed account of the men, arms, ammunition, supplies, etc., that 
were surrendered, see Sen. Doc. 6B, pp. 364 and 413; also the scant report of 
Colonel Summers (Oregon), who received the surrenders (Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.^ 
1S98, p. 136). 

* Of the sums in the central treasury, more than twice the total found there 
WM owed by the Spaninh Goyemment of the Philippines to the Spanish-Philippine 
Bank of Manila for recent loans. The bank had advanced to the Spanish authori- 
tiet 9600,000 silver on Monday of the week the city was taken, the record being 
that this was a loan ** to cover confidential operations." (See Sastrdn, op. cit., p. 
219.) Many dark hints have been made in Spain about the financial operations of 
the dosing days in Manila. The bank and other private claimants sought to recover 
from the American military government the iumi to their credit in the treasury. 



on the afternoon of the 13th, of the captain-of-the-port's office, 
this over the protest of the Spanish officer in charge, who, in 
spite of the overwhelming military force surrounding him, de- 
clared that he dared not surrender the office unless given a 
written statement that he had yielded only to superior force, 
as otherwise he would subject himself to court-martial. The 
same process was gone through, only in more dramatic form, 
on the 19th, when the Americans took possession of the cus- 
tom-house almost at the point of bayonets; and similar for- 
malities, though less of theatric display, were connected with 
the transfer of control over the treasury, the mint, and internal- 
revenue office.^ There was naturally delay in assuming charge 
of the affairs of civil administration, as the first days were 
occupied with the posting of the troops and the miHtary and 
the provost organization necessary to control the situation and 
police the city. For a few days, the so-called Veteran Civil 
Guard (native soldiers organized to serve as police in the city 
of Manila) were retained in their places under their Spanish 
officers; but this was impracticable for various reasons, not 
the least being the bitter hostility of the native population to 
this organization, which was only too justly accused of past 
abuses. The fact also that, at first, from very necessity, Spanish 
civil officers and employees were, when they would consent to 

bat of course could only be referred to Spain with their claims, as this money was 
captured in war. However, the American Peace Commission at Paris conceded the 
return of these and other public funds to Spain. 

* General Greene describes these events, with which he was connected, in the 
Century Magazine^ April, 1899, pp. 930-34. The custom-house episode has been 
most humorously described, from the point of view of the American who had no 
great reverence for forms and formalities, by Collector James F. Smith (now a 
member of the Philippine Commission) in his annual report, appendix P to the re- 
port of Military Governor MacArthur for 1901 (Report of War Department^ 1901, 
vol. I, part 4, p. 282). Collector Smith says, however, that the conquerors were 
like the man who caught the bear, " they hardly knew what to do with the custom- 
house after they got it," for the little gray old Spaniard had departed, "firing 
protests " and carrying most of his assistants with him. The formal protest of the 
latter is cited in Historia Negra, p. 116. The viewpoint of another nationality is 
given in this author's description of the document as an " act of energetic protest 
formulated with all the characteristics of our race." 


remain^ left in their places in the various administrative offices 
was the cause of much criticism on the part of Filipinos. In 
the main, however, there was very apparent a disposition, on 
the part, at least, of the more important Spanish civil em- 
ployees, to embarrass the Americans in their assumption of the 
administration as far as might be done; and sheer necessity 
compelled the reorganization of the post-office, the custom- 
house, and other minor departments from the ranks of the 
volunteers (among whom every sort of mechanic, clerk, and 
professional man could be found), while also many FiHpino 
employees, hitherto subordinates, found their services in de- 
mand and their assistance recognized as of more importance 
than formerly.^ The feeling alluded to as existing on the part 
of most of the Spaniards of any prominence in the civil ad- 
ministration was also manifested in other ways. The gunboat 
which had been used to block the mouth of the Pasig was set 
on fire, lest it might fall into the hands of the Americans, at 
the very moment when the capitulation was being agreed 
upon, and her flames lighted up the sunset sky when the new 
flag was raised over the city. The spirit shown in this deed 
was exhibited in many pettier ways; in some cases, it led to 
the mutilation of public records, in others to the spiteful dis- 
figurement of the furniture or fittings of the Government 
buildings ere they passed into the conqueror's hands.'^ On the 
whole, however, there was comparatively little friction between 
Americans and Spaniards, and the latter have generally been 
willing to testify to the effective way in which order was main- 

^ Some of the employees of the United States postal serrioe in California had 
accompanied the third expedition, and they took charge of the organization of the 
post-office in Manila, conducting it yirtoally as an adjunct of the War Department. 

* In some cases, the mutilation or absence of public records, only noted afteiw 
ward, when the military authorities began to take systematic control of the ofRces 
of the public administration, was due to the American soldiers, who were quartered 
in the buildings where such records were lying loose and unguarded, and who 
sometimes sold them to Chinese hucksters for waste-paper. Both sides bear their 
share of blame for the carelessness which permitted some offices of the public ad- 
ministration to be Tirtually unguarded and their oontenti to be scattered or mil- 


tamed in the city by the Americans and to the considerate 
treatment which Spaniards and their property received. There 
was some feeling over the crowding of the Spanish soldiers 
into the churches when the Americans took their quarters. 
Spanish officers took advantage of the privilege allowed them 
of retaining their sidearms to make themselves very prominent 
in public places, with their swords clanking about them; and 
there was such a feeling between Spaniards and Filipinos that, 
in order to avoid quarrels that might involve more serious con- 
sequences, they were asked to desist from wearing their side- 
arms. The conception which the Spaniards generally had held 
of the Americans, as being no respecters of persons, property, 
or religion, may be seen from the astonishment which they 
expressed at the literal fulfillment of the clause of the capitu- 
lation relating to the churches and other property pertaining 
to the Catholic worship.^ As for the foreigners resident in 
Manila, however much they might afterward criticize the taste 
of the American soldiers in matters of drink, they have never 
failed to render tribute to the effective way in which they 
brought about and kept order in the city, with comparatively 
few instances of disregard of private property. 

^ It need not be remarked that, among the more ignorant Spaniards and Fili- 
pinos, the allocutions of the governor-general and the archbishop in April and 
May (see p. 155), in which the Americans were held up as profaners of tem- 
ples and brutes generally, had had their effect in causing most of the inhabi- 
tants of the city to expect especially outrageous conduct on the part of the Amer- 
ican troops, while at the same time they reveal what is unfortunately a too com- 
mon Spanish idea about Americans, though somewhat overdrawn to suit the 
purpose of the moment. Sastr6n (op. cit., p. 516), who has small tolerance for 
Americans, found himself compelled to exclaim : " It is a great pity that, among 
not all civilized peoples, and very much in spite of what has been written in all 
political constitutions, and very contrary (though not so considered) to the true 
liberal principles, religious interests fail to find such effective evidence of the con- 
sideration and respect as the Americans displayed in the Philippines for those 
there existent." Sastr6n also (p. 518) has to admit that the Americans, "practical 
as they are wont to be," speedily made the city cleaner than it had ever been be- 
fore. For accounts of the capture of Manila from the American point of view, 
aside from those herein cited, see the current letters of John F. Bass, in Harper^s 
History, pp. 50-67. Another Spanish account is El Sitio de Manila, by Juan and 
Jos^ Toral (Manila, 1898). 


Both Merritt and Dewey had dispatched cablegrams to 
Hongkong, for transmission thence to Washington, as soon as 
the city fell. These messages did not reach Washington until 
the morning of August 18. But Washington had meanwhile 
received word of the arrival at Hongkong on August 15 of 
the Kaiserin Augusta, a German battleship, bearing there ex- 
Governor-General Augustin and news of the capture of Manila, 
this vessel having taken the Spanish general on board and 
started for Hongkong just before the flag was changed over 
the city.^ The peace protocol had been signed on behalf of 
Spain by Ambassador Cambon of France at about 4.15 p.m. 
on August 12 in Washington, or at the same time that the 
American troops were drawn up in their trenches, all ready for 
the attack, on the dawn of the 13th at Manila. The orders to 
suspend hostilities, cabled from Washington on the 12th, to- 
gether with the text of the protocol, which provided for the 
occupation by the forces of the United States of the city, bay, 
and harbor of Manila, pending the negotiation of a definitive 
treaty, did not reach Dewey and Merritt, through Hongkong, 

> This episode caased a renewal of the attacks upon Germany in American news- 
papers. It coincided with news that Admiral Chichester, in command of the Brit- 
ish forces in Manila Bay, had, on the morning of the bombardment of the Malate 
fort, steamed over with the battleship Immortality and taken a position squarely 
between the German vessels and the American attacking squadron. (See Century 
Magazine^ April, 1899, p. 910, for Correspondent McCutcheon's account of this.) 
The British news-agencies also sought to impress upon the Americans that the 
friendship of their nation had helped avert European intervention. The criticisms 
of Germany in regard to the Augustin episode were based on the supposition that 
he was still governor-general in Manila instead of being a private citizen, virtually 
under orders to come home (see Public Opinion^ Ang^ist 25, 1898) ; also, that the 
Germans took him away surreptitiously. The writer had it upon the authority of 
Dr. F. Krttger, then consul of Germany at Manila, that the arrangement for Angus- 
tin's departure was made by the former with Admiral Dewey, who gave full con- 
sent to it. The Grermans in the Philippines observed afterward that there was 
eonsiderable hostility toward them among the Filipinos, on account of their pro- 
Spanish attitude during the summer of 1898, and in consequence addressed a 
letter of explanation to one of the insurgent newspapers (see La Independenciaf 
Malolos, October 17, 1898). On November 7, (reneral Otis cabled Washington that 
a (rerman battleship, just arrived in harbor, bad not sainted the flag on the city 
wall, but later gave the Admiral's salute, and that the cruiser Irene, coming in 
At the same time, had not saluted at all {Corr. Rel. War^ p. 833). 


until August 16. The Spanish governor-general at once sought 
to have the terms of the capitulation nullified and the Ameri- 
can occupation of the city based upon the protocol ; but the 
American official attitude at Manila, as also later at Paris in 
negotiating the treaty of peace, was that Manila was captured, 
and was not surrendered in consequence of the protocol.^ By 
the operations of the United States Signal Corps, cable com- 
munication between Manila and Hongkong was restored late 
on the night of August 20, and the first message that it bore 
direct from Washington was one of congratulations from Pres- 
ident McKinley.^ On the 26th, General Merritt was instructed 
to turn over the command to General Elwell S. Otis, who had 
arrived on August 21, at the head of the fourth expedition, 
comprising nearly 5000 troops on four transports,^ and him- 

1 See General Merritt's report {Rept Maj.-Gen. Comm.f 1898, p. 44). The cir- 
cumstances of the signing of the protocol and the bearing which they had after- 
ward upon the negotiations regarding the Philippines will be discussed below, in 
connection with the Paris Treaty. In his executive proclamation of August 12, 
announcing the signing of the protocol, President McKinley said: *•!... de- 
clare and proclaim on the part of the United States a suspension of hostilities, and 
do hereby command that orders be immediately given through the proper channels 
to the commanders of the military and naval forces of the United States to abstain 
from any acts inconsistent with this proclamation." 

* Communication was restored by the consent of Spain, as her consul at Hong- 
kong had that end of the cable (a subsidized enterprise) sealed up (see Century 
Magaziney April, 1899, p. 935). For previous diplomatic correspondence relative to 
the opening of this cable see Foreign Relations of United States, 1898, pp. 976-80. 
It therein appears that the United States, after ascertaining tliat the British com- 
pany which held the concession could not operate this cable contrary to the per- 
mission of Spain, without forfeiting the concession, wished in May to obtain 
permission from Great Britain to land a new cable, run from Cavite to Hongkong; 
bat this was refused by Great Britain, on the ground that it would be a violation 
of neutrality. In July, Spain consented to the operation of the cable from Manila, 
if fully neutralized and open to the messages of both parties, pressure having been 
brought to bear at Hongkong and Madrid, because of the desire of maritime in- 
terests at Hongkong to have the typhoon warnings of the Jesuit observatory at 
Manila. This time, however, the United States Government objected. (Ibid., p. 979.) 

* For an account of this expedition and his assignment to duty, see General 
Otis's report (in Report of War Department, 1899, vol. i, part 4, p. 3). For the orders 
both of a military and a civil nature, given by Merritt during his two weeks of 
command at Manila, see Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.,1898, pp. 50-54. General Otis had 
<Mriginally been selected as the officer to command the first expedition to the Phil- 
ippines (Corr. Rel, War, pp. 639, 661-69). Before he sailed from San Francisco, 


self to proceed to Paris, after consulting fully with Admiral 
Dewey, in order to present his information and views and those 
of the admiral to the Peace Commission there.^ 



The first official act of General Merritt, after the capitula- 
tion was arranged, was the publication, as commander of the 
American forces, of a proclamation "to the people of the 

Greneral Merritt had obtained authority to transfer the command of the Eighth 
Army Corps (made a corps at his request) to some one else, if he desired to do so, 
retaining for himself the place of military governor, " so as to devote attention to 
the important matters of the government of the vast territory and the general 
military operations." (Ibid.j pp. 705-08.) He had availed himself of this authority 
CD August 23, assigning General Otis to the command of the corps; and, with his 
departure on August 30, the positions of military governor and of commanding officer 
of the American troops in the Philippines were united under one man, and so re- 
mained until 1902. 

^ The cables exchanged between Merritt and Dewey at Manila and the Govern- 
ment at Washington, in connection with the capture of Manila, will be found in 
Bureau of Navigation^ pp. 118-24, and in Carr. Rel. War^ pp. 742-67. Admiral 
Dewey answered the intimation of the President that he might be summoned to 
Washington to give advice and information by saying: "Should regret very much 
to leave here while matters remain in present critical condition." He was 
thereupon told to stay, as he desired. On the other hand, it would appear that it 
was not originally intended to call Merritt home, as he was instructed on August 
25 to cable fully the information he possessed. But he at the same time intimated 
that he would like to be on the Paris Peace Commission (perhaps having heard of 
military men being on the evacuation commissions of Porto Rico and Cuba), or at 
any rate wanted to come home (iWrf., p. 764). Before he sailed from San Francisco, 
also, General Merritt had been quite insistent on having a navy vessel assigned to 
take him, as thus "the prestige and importance of his mission would be more 
clearly indicated." (Ibid., pp. 703, 710.) This record of army cablegrams also shows 
•ome discussion between Washington and San Francisco as to whether, after the 
Bgning of the protocol, the troops then ready for shipment could be sent. Washing- 
too seems at first to have been disposed to send them, in case it was learned that 
Merritt needed more troops to control the situation; but even before his answer 
arrived showing that he did not need them, the protocol had been interpreted to 
forbid the sending of retnforcementa, though the organizations already in the islands 
might be completed by recruits. The Arizona (afterward the transport Hancock) 
took the New York volunteers and California troops to Hawaii, and she and a 
ho^ital-ship and horse-boat made trips to Manila with supplies. Hospital Corps 
m«D, transportation facilities, etc. The day before the protocol was signed, however, 
Washington had sought to haiten the dispatch of the troopt then ready for the 
Pfailippbei. (Ihid.f p.749.) 


Philippines/' on Sunday, August 14. This followed the lines 
and phraseology of the President's formal instructions to him 
of May 19, and was chiefly occupied with laying down the 
more fundamental rules of international law as to the rights 
and duties of a military occupant, relative to public and pri- 
vate property, to the maintenance of public order, to the 
continuance of municipal laws except as modified by special 
orders, to the resumption of trade, collection of duties, etc. 
The Filipinos were assured that the United States forces had 
not come to " wage war upon them, nor upon any party or 
faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in 
their employments, and in their personal and religious rights " ; 
that " all persons who, by active aid or honest submission, co- 
operate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to 
this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support 
and protection " ; and that, so long as they should " preserve 
the peace and perform their duties toward the representatives 
of the United States," they should not be " disturbed in their 
persons and property, except in so far as may be found neces- 
sary for the good of the service of the United States and the 
benefit of the people of the Philippines." ^ The United States, 
as a military occupant merely, could not presume to provide 
for anything more than temporary conditions ; but the Fili- 
pinos were already raising the troublesome queries as to 
whether the Americans intended to return Manila to the Span- 
iards, or intended to retain it and seek possession of the entire 
archipelago, or would wrest it all from Spain only to estab- 
lish them in possession and guarantee their status before the 

More important for the moment to the Americans than the 
embarrassing questions as to their future policy was the prac- 

^ This proclamation has been frequently reproduced in official documents. It is 
cited, in conjunction with the President's instructions, in Sen. Doc. SOS, part i, 
pp. 85-87; also by General Merritt in Rept. MaJ.-Gen. Comm., 1898, p. 49. For the 
general order by Merritt, congratulating the soldiers in his command on having 
" captured by assault " the city of Manila, see ibid., p. 61. 


tical difficulty which confronted them simultaneously in the 
shape of the 4000 or so insurgents who had got into the city 
on the south side and established themselves in the Spanish 
barracks and other Government buildings of the suburbs. 
They had come in, as seen, around the right of MacArthur's 
brigade, despite the battalion which Anderson had sent to a 
bridge east of Pasai to intercept such a movement ; and before 
the troops of this brigade were posted on the afternoon of the 
13th, the insurgents who had followed Greene's troops into 
Malate and Ermita had estabhshed themselves in Spanish bar- 
racks and other Government buildings. Aside from the ques- 
tion of pillage, to prevent which the Americans were somewhat 
informally compromised with the Spaniards, but more espe- 
cially compromised before the world, there was danger of 
friction between Americans and Filipinos in these two suburbs, 
and in Pako friction actually did arise, and threatened serious 
trouble on that evening and the next day.^ 

There is no evidence that insurgent headquarters either 
sought or desired trouble with the Americans at this time, 
although some of the American officers thought so. Some of 
the subordinate insurgent officers, in command of troops which 
were pressing into the city, were, however, much more bitter 
enemies of the Americans than of the Spaniards, and were 
ready to make trouble. And the insurgent organization itself 
had laid full plans for a vigorous attack on the city through- 
out the full length of its besieging lines, and hoped, if not 
able to capture parts of it before the Americans entered, at 
least not to be behind the latter in getting inside. From their 
point of view, this was merely an intention to prevent their 
siege of a month and a half going for nothing. When Mer- 
ritt's orders to remain outside were received just before the at- 
tack by the Americans, the insurgent commands had all been 
forewarned of the Americans' intentions to capture the city 
unaided (indeed, they were fully posted as to there being some 

> See Rept. MaJ.-Gen. Comm., 1808, pp. 79, 88, 121, and 678. 


sort of plan on foot for the surrender of the city, for they 
received information from inside), and had been instructed to 
press their own attacks. This order from the Americans prob- 
ably was received too late for these instructions to be changed 
had the insurgent headquarters entertained any notion of chang- 
ing them ; but it did serve one purpose, namely, to arouse all 
the more the growing resentment toward the Americans.^ 

The Tagalog lines about the city had been reinforced on 
all sides for several days prior to the 13th. The commander 
of the forces along the river above the city had, indeed, some 
days before the Americans were ready to attack, used the fact 
that the latter were getting into position for assault in an at- 
tempt to coerce the Spaniards at Santa Ana into surrendering 
their position to him.^ It was here that the insurgents had 

» Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo, p. 12, shows that Aguinaldo gave orders late the night of 
the 12th for General Ricarte's troops (stationed just east of MacArthur's at Pasai) 
to attack at four o'clock the next morning. It is not certain that this order was 
given after the receipt of the message from Anderson. Ricarte's men did begin 
firing early in the morning, and thus drew Spanish fire upon the Americans, lead- 
ing to feeling between Americans and insurgents and to some interchange of 
threats. (Ibid., p. 12; also Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm.j 1898, p. 79.) 

2 This was Pio del Pilar, an ignorant fellow of bad antecedents, who had risen 
from house-servant to chief of ladrones, and from chief of ladrones to insurgent 
general, in which position he earned for himself a very dark record during 1897, 
1898, 1899, and 1900, after which he was exiled to Guam. (He is never to be con- 
fused with Marcelo del Pilar, the intellectual propagandist, or Gregorio del Pilar, 
a young general of the Filipino aristocracy, who lost his life at Tilad Pass in Janu- 
ary, 1900, in a chivalrous attempt to cover the retreat of Aguinaldo.) He was 
always a consistent hater of Americans. The letter in which he intimated to Major 
Ac^vedo, the Spanish commander at Santa Ana, the advisability of a surrender 
to him before the Americans began to attack, which he asserted would be on Au- 
gust 2, was dated July 30, and may be found in Sastrdn, op. cit., p. 484. He claimed 
to have this information through Aguinaldo, who charged him to inform the 
Spaniards and to tell them " not to be afraid or become disheartened, but, on the 
contrary, to take courage, fortify themselves well, and not yield before their 
[Americans'] cannon." It has already been seen (Sen. Doc. 208, part 3, pp. 3-4), 
that Aguinaldo had commissioned officers on July 6 with the futile notion that 
they might be able to negotiate the surrender of Manila, disregarding the Ameri- 
cans. Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo (p. 19) shows also that he knew something of this 
dickering with Ac^vedo. The same document shows that, on August 10, Pio had 
telegraphed to Aguinaldo an absurd tale about 10,000 Germans having disem- 
barked at Subig to seize the country ; and that, on August 14, Pio said he was 
constructing trenches ready for a fight with the Americans. 


most easily got into the city on August 13, the Spanish re- 
treat being so confused, as already seen, that the insurgents 
cut off and captured five columns.^ There is, however, no rea- 
son for supposing that, except for the preconcerted Spanish 
withdrawal upon the walled city, they could have driven the 
latter in and taken Santa Ana and part of Pako any more on 
this occasion than during their many preceding attacks, espe- 
cially as they were at the time short of ammunition.^ In spite 
of the confusion prevailing on the south side of the Pasig all 
day of the 13th, and of the surrender of the walled city to the 
Americans, together with the occupancy by the latter of the 
business section on the north side of the river, the Spanish 
troops on the north line of defense virtually held their posi- 
tions from the river near Santa Mesa to the bay west of Tondo, 
losing, indeed, the waterworks reservoir, a little outside of 
their lines, and temporarily being driven in at various points, 
but surrendering to the Americans their outer line almost intact 
the following day. Some of their troops were in the trenches 
until the following afternoon. The artillery in the blockhouses 
and at other points had, as always before, repelled the unusually 
fierce attacks of the insurgents north of Tondo and at La Loma, 
as well as the repeated attacks in numbers on Sampalok and 
Nagtahan. The following day, when the Spaniards withdrew 
from the north of Tondo, the Americans moved quietly into 
their places and reached an amicable agreement with the in- 
surgents facing them. The capture the previous day of Santa 
Ana and Pandakan by the insurgents had facilitated their cross- 
ing the river at the latter point and reinforcing their com- 
patriots from Santa Mesa in their renewed attempts to take 
the rotunda at Sampalok ; and, when the Spaniards withdrew 
with the two cannon they had bad at this point, the troops of 

* Tbesa were four eolamni of rolanteen and one of nmrinei. Af^in&Ido's as- 
•ertion in refj^rd to tbia capture (in Rtieha veridica) ia corroborated bj Sastrdn 
(op. cit., p. 600). 

• Tel. Corr. Agumaldo, p. la 


Pio del Pilar pressed forward so rapidly as to become engaged 
in an attack on the Americans going to take outpost at Santa 
Mesa. One hundred and fifty of them were surrounded and 
disarmed by the Americans on the afternoon of the 14:th. 
Other insurgents pressed on, in disordered bands, as far into 
the city as Kiapo.^ 

Under instructions from Merritt, Anderson had telegraphed 
to Aguinaldo at Bakoor on the evening of the 13th : " Serious 
trouble threatening between our forces. Try and prevent it. 
Your forces should not force themselves into the city until we 
have received the full surrender. Then we will negotiate with 
you." Aguinaldo had already, earlier in the day, in reply to 
Anderson's telegram of the night before, ordering him to 
keep his troops out of the city, complained that his troops were 
being threatened with force by the Americans in the trenches 
outside, before the attack, and had intimated that the two 
forces should cooperate. He had also directed Felipe Buenca- 
mino and other Fihpinos at Cavite to see General Anderson or 
some other American commander and " demand an explana- 
tion " of the order, but they could find no one in authority. 
The next morning, Aguinaldo wrote to Anderson, reminding 
him of his cession of the trenches to the Americans and 
claiming that he could not order his troops to withdraw from 

^ See Sastrdn, op. cit., pp. 612-13 ; also Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo^ pp. 12, 15, 16. 
The latter contains the unintelligible telegram of Gregorio del Pilar, insurgent 
commander at Kalookan, saying trouble was threatening with the " Napotas " peo- 
ple there. This can be interpreted as referring to the Americans only on the sup- 
position that he thought the position taken by one of the American gunboats off 
Tondo indicated an intention to attack there ; for no American troops were dis- 
embarked on the north side of the Pasig. Aguinaldo seemed to have guessed his 
meaning to be that trouble was threatened with the Americans, for he answered: 
" We must avoid conflicts with the Americans by every means possible." Gregorio 
del Pilar, in immediate command just outside of Tondo, reported on August 15 
the withdrawal of the Spaniards the afternoon before and the apparently amicable 
arrangement of a line between Americans and Filipinos. The disarming of the in- 
surgents at Santa Mesa was reported on the same date by Colonel San Miguel. 
There is a report by Colonel Irving Hale on the same incident {Rept. Maj.-Gen. 
Comm.f 1898, p. 77). These arms were afterward returned to the insurgents. This 
was the place where the trouble occurred between Filipinos and Americans the 
following February, and the insurgent commander was the same. 


Manila in their present state of mind, as they had *^ always been 
promised that they should appear in it " ; yet he thought some 
arrangement might be possible, and sent as commissioners 
Messrs. Buencamino, Araneta, Legarda, and Sandiko, the first 
two of whom were Filipino lawyers of Manila, the third a 
prominent Filipino business man of the capital, and the last 
a young Filipino revolutionist who had come over from Hong- 
kong. Anderson took them in to see Merritt. Their instruc- 
tions were to consent to the withdrawal of the insurgent troops 
from the city, if the Americans would make a formal promise to 
reinstate them where they were in case the United States should 
withdraw from the islands on making peace with Spain. Gen- 
eral Merritt had no instructions on the latter point,^ and could 

^ See Sen. Doc. 62^ p. 367, for Greneral Merritt's statement about this interriew 
before the Peace Commission at Paris. He says he " had to mix diplomacy with 
force in order to avoid a tilt," not having received any reply from Washington to 
his request for instructions as to how he should treat the insurgents. He referg 
here to his cablegrams received at Washington August 1 (Corr. Rel. War, p. 743), 
wherein he did not specifically ask instructions, but said : " Situation difficult. In- 
surgents have announced independent government ; some are unfriendly, fearing 
they will not be permitted to enter Manila with my troops. Will join Dewey in 
note demanding surrender, with assurance of protection [to Spaniards] from insur* 
gents. May be important to have my whole force before attacking, if necessary to 
hold insurgents while we fight Spanish." On August 13, he sent, through Dewey, 
a message stating that the insurgents were demanding joint occupation, and asking 
immediate instructions as to how far he might go in ** forcing obedience," conclud- 
ing: " Is Government willing to use all means to make the natives submit to the 
authority of the United States ? " (Ibid., p. 754.) This message reached Washing- 
ton late on the night of the 17th (in advance of Merritt's formal message about 
the capture of the city), and a reply was at once sent : " The President directs 
that there must be no joint occupation with the insurgents. . . . Use whatever 
means in your judgment are necessary to this end." This message reached General 
Merritt on the 22d, and was acknowledged at once, with the remark that the instruo- 
tions had been anticipated. (Ibid., p. 760.) For Dewey's side of this correspond- 
ence, see Bureau of Navigation, pp. 123-24. Said President McKinley in his mes- 
sage to Congress in December, 1898 : " [The insurgent forces] were constrained 
by Admiral Dewey and General Merritt from attempting an assault. It was fit- 
ting that whatever was to be done in the way of decisive operations in that quarter 
should be accomplished by the strong arm of the United States alone. Obeying 
the stem precept of war, which enjoins the overcoming of the adversary and the 
extinction of his power wherever assailable as the speedy and sure means to win 
a peace, divided victory was not permissible, for no partition of the rights and re- 
sponsibilities attending the enforcement of a just and advantageous peace could be 
ihonght of/' 


only hold before them the impracticability of a dual occupation, 
emphasizing the likelihood of conflicts between Spaniards and 
Filipinos. At the same time he furnished them his proclama- 
tion of that date, outlining in a general way the duties of a 
military occupant and the intentions of the United States. 
The Filipinos were already greatly concerned over whether 
the Spaniards were to retain their governmental offices in the 
city, and were watching with jealousy the use by the Ameri- 
cans of the Veteran Civil Guard in portions of the city. Mer- 
ritt's proclamation of military rule evidently inspired the more 
definite and numerous demands which the commission pre- 
sented when it returned the following day. As conditions 
precedent to the withdrawal of their troops from the city, they 
stipulated for such a statement of the limits of Manila as would 
leave them Pandakan and Santa Ana (on the river beyond 
Pako), for free entrance for themselves and their products to 
Manila (but Americans to pass through their lines only by 
permission) ; for possession of the governor-generars palace at 
Malakanang and the convents they were occupying in the sub- 
urbs ; for the return of the arms taken at Santa Mesa ; for 
the ousting of the Spaniards from office and the recognition of 
Filipinos nominated by themselves ; and for " a part of the 
booty of war " ; all which they wished to have incorporated in 
a formal agreement in writing. In return, they would have 
the waterworks started up again and would be responsible for 
order there, provided the Americans would bear the expense ; 
but they desired it recorded that such action did not " signify 
acknowledgment on their part of North American sovereignty 
for any longer than during the necessity of the present war- 
fare." General Merritt, for the first time addressing himself di- 
rectly to the " Commanding General of the Philippine Forces," 
accepted the city boundaries as outlined by the insurgents, and 
agreed to their stipulations about the waterworks and free tran- 
sit to and from the city on the river (the Americans being, in 
fact, eager to have the country products brought in), and that 



unarmed Filipinos should have free access and entrance to the 
city, while the same privilege must be conceded to Americans 
going outside. Aguinaldo promptly stated that his request 
had been for free navigation for all his boats, and in all ports 
controlled by the Americans, and also put in a claim for part 
of the Pako district, well inside the city. General Merritt re- 
ferred Aguinaldo to Dewey as to navigation matters, refused 
to concede occupancy of what Americans then adopted as ter- 
ritory within the city's limits, and made the assurance to Agui- 
naldo that, in case the Americans should withdraw from 
Manila, they would " leave him in as good condition as he was >l 
found by the forces of the Government." The insurgent troops 
in Malate and Ermita were mostly withdrawn, but at Merritt's 
departure Aguinaldo was still clinging to his claim to part of 
Pako, having on August 27 proposed a new line of delimination 
which would give him an excellent foothold in Manila south of 
the Pasig and enable him to move freely on Malate and Ermita, 
if not the walled city. He also stated that his concession of 
the waterworks was only an evidence of good will, not an 
indication that he could yield the other points offered, unless 
he could have a written agreement with the Americans.* 

1 Nevertheless, General Merritt, in writing his report on his way to Paris, said 
that he anticipated no trouble with the insurgents, because the leaders were " suf- 
ficiently intelligent and educated to know that to antagonize the United States 
would be to destroy their only chance of future political improvement." (See 
Rept. Maj.'Gen. Comm.f 1898, p. 44.) He had, of course, only come in contact with 
the better-educated men who had been sent to see him. They were constantly 
urging conciliation upon the insurgent authorities at Bakoor, and it was the radical, 
Mabini, always close at Aguinaldo's side and the adviser who for months dictated 
almost every move of importance, who was now pressing the demands upon Agui- 
naldo. Tel. Con. Aguinaldo^ pp. 12-18, sheds much light on these negotiations. 
On the 13th, Buencamino and Araneta had teleg^phed from Cavite that it was 
impossible to see Anderson or Dewey; hence they advised to " continue hostilities 
while we ask for an explanation." They knew of the prearranged capitulation, 
ftod anticipated that it would be pleaded as an objection to joint occupation, but 
suggested the answer : " We do not suspend onr attempt to enter Manila. Its 
capitulation not favorable to our independence." Mabini was more than agreeable 
to this, but urged the securing of a definite answer from the Americans, in order, 
if they refused joint occupation, to " lay a protest before the foreign consuls." 
Mabini wa« alwaji more particular about written forms than he was about meet- 
ing th« piMtioal tzigVDciet of a situation, and for the succeeding few days he con- 


During the first week in September, Aguinaldo transferred 
his headquarters to Malolos, some twenty miles northward of 

stantly held this idea of a protest to the consuls before the commissioners who 
went to Merritt. As soon as these men of legal training had been presented with 
the difficulties in the way of joint occupation, especially after the terms of the proto- 
col were known, they admitted the force of the American argument ; at the outset 
they told Aguinaldo that it was " prudent to yield " ; especially as the Americans 
refused further negotiations until Noriel's troops were withdrawn from Malate 
and Ermita. The conservatives eventually prevailed, under the necessities of the 
situation. American engineers were allowed to start the pumps at the waterworks 
on August 23, and later to construct a telegraph line to the pumping-plant ; but 
Mabini insisted they must take no troops there. (Ibid., pp. 18, 20 ; also Sen. Doc. 
S31, p. 814.) The sources of information from the American side as to these nego> 
tiations are : Report of War Department, 1898, vol. I, part 4, pp. 342-450 ; Sen' 
Doc. 62, pp. 399, 400-03; and General Anderson, in North American Review,Feh' 
ruary, 1900. The data from the foregoing official reports were presented in nearly 
complete form, with a few errors of position, in Sen. Doc. 208, part 1, pp. 17-28. 
The Americans resented especially the pretension that they could not pass outside 
the city without permission from the Filipinos. On August 15, Merritt instructed 
Anderson that the insurgents must be made to understand that he would not 
" tolerate a line of troops or works which would give the appearance that our 
troops were hemmed in by a besieging force." (Yet this is exactly what afterward 
came to pass.) After the first few days, Merritt conducted negotiations directly by 
letters or through Major J. F. Bell of his staff. According to Bell's memoranda 
(made afterward for the information of General Otis), the assurance to the Filipinos 
that, if the Americans withdrew, " they would be left in as good condition as they 
were found by the Government," excited distrust in Aguiualdo's headquarters; 
also, Merritt intended, if necessary, to interpret this subsequently to mean in the 
same condition in which they were found by Dewey. When Merritt made this 
offer and wrote his letter of August 24, he had not received the instructions from 
Washington not to permit joint occupation. He accompanied this offer with some 
flattering remarks on Aguiualdo's personality, with the promise to speak well of the 
Filipinos before his Government, and with the suggestion that it would be a good 
idea for Aguinaldo to visit Washington with some of his leaders (which was 
an informal authorization for Agoncillo, then preparing to go to the United 
States, to represent Aguinaldo at the American capital). Aguinaldo kept urging 
that Merritt secure from Dewey a pledge as to the free navigation of Filipino 
boats, and Bell thinks that Aguinaldo already felt himself " at outs " with Dewey; 
the latter soon after seized all his small boats in the bay. The Spanish text of the 
Filipino memorandimi of Augpist 15 has not been published, hence it is unsafe to 
assert just what might have been meant by the words translated as " booty of war." 
(The early American translations of Filipino documents were quite commonly made 
by incompetent translators.) Benito Legarda, one of the first commissioners to 
Merritt on behalf of Aguinaldo, testified positively in 1899 (Report Philippine Com- 
mission, 1900, vol. n, p. 383) that there was a plan to sack the city, known to 
Aguinaldo. Sastrtfn asserts (op. cit., p. 514) that the insurgents in Malate and 
Ermita did pillage to some extent public and private property. Before the entrance 
into the city, Merritt had communicated to Aguinaldo his order to the American 
soldiers forbidding pillage and looting. (Rept. Maj.-Gen. Comm., 1898, p. 50.) 


Manila and near the railroad.^ His commanders south of Ma- 
nila were still keeping possession of most of the Pako suburb 
and part of Malate, and Filipino officers were attempting to 
exercise civil authority withm those limits, when, on Septem- 
ber 8, General Otis sent a long formal reply to Aguinaldo's 
proposals to Merritt. He went, in some detail, into the obhga- 
tions which international law imposed upon the Americans as 
occupants ; pointed to the friction there had already been as 
indicating the impracticability of joint occupation ; informed 
Aguinaldo that the United States Government had never rec- 
ognized " booty " in war, and severely penalized the convert- 
ing of property to private uses at such times ; stated that all 
people would be treated alike as regarded commerce and navi- 
gation ; said that he had " not been informed as to what 
policy the United States intends to pursue in regard to its 
legitimate holdings here " (inferentially a reply to Aguinaldo's 
requests for a formal agreement as to the reinstatement of the 
Filipinos in the positions surrendered, in case the United 
States left the islands) ; assured Aguinaldo that he realized 
that his forces had made " many sacrifices in behalf of civil 
liberty and for the welfare of their people," but reminded 
him also that the United States had made sacrifices in taking 
up war with Spain in behalf of the latter's colonies; and, 
finally, while hinting that more troops were ready to come 
from the United States, though he hoped this would not be 
Decessary, he ordered that the insurgents " withdraw beyond 
the line of the city's defenses " before the 15th, or he would 
be " obliged to resort to forcible action." Aguinaldo again 
commissioned some of the conservatives, men of education and 
property, who were now associated more or less closely with 
the insurgent organization, to discuss the matter with the 
American commander. He was ready to concede the with- 

^ Already, in Jnlj and Angnst, the iniurgenU had Tirtually put the railroad 
under their control, the English manager apparently reaching •ome sort of work- 
tog agreement with them. See Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo^ p. 18, for an order to him on 
Aogott 22 not to transport troops without Aguinaldo'i consent. 


drawal, as he had in fact already done, but the point of all 
their discussions was that he could not do this under a virtual 
threat, as it would compromise him before his people/ Otis 
did not withdraw his letter, but wrote an informal one in the 
nature of a request on the 16th, the day after the insurgent 
troops had withdrawn from Malate and part of Pako nearest 
the walled city, marching up past the Luneta and being cheered 
by groups of American soldiers as they went out. General Otis 
had not specifically stated what districts were to be evacuated ; 
hence the insurgents continued to keep the portions of Pako 
lying on the river and all the south bank above that point, 
giving them a frontage on the river which for over a mile faced 
the American territory on the north bank. They exercised the 
right to stop traffic here, and finally, by order of Pio del 
Pilar, General Anderson and a party were stopped and told 
they could not pass up the river without permission from 
Aguinaldo. In all their correspondence and negotiations, the 
Americans had been more concerned with laying down inter- 
national law and assuring the Filipinos in general terms of 
their good intentions than with definitely prescribing the lim- 
its of the city as they interpreted them ; so General Otis finally 
had to have the records searched for an official delimitation of 
the boundaries, and even to have his engineers construct a new 
map of the city in place of the faulty Spanish maps.^ Thus 

^ Already Aguinaldo was playing the conservatives against the radicals in his 
camp, or wavering between the alternate councils of the two groups, as one chooses 
to see it. The conservatives had made him see that insistence on joint occupation 
was legally untenable, and moreover was unwise ; but he wished to " keep face " 
before the radicals (especially commanders like Pio del Pilar, whose allegiance 
was never very stable), and hence wished to have his yielding appear like the 
granting of a request from the Americans, if he could not obtain from the latter 
some sort of formal agreement as to the future. 

^ Manila, as a city, was originally, and, until quite recent years, considered to 
be, the only walled town in which, even as late as 1844, natives, half-castes, op 
Chinese were forbidden to have their residences. The outlying posts on the north 
and south of the river, once separate villages, gradually grew together, though 
some open stretches still intervene. As business grew during the last half-century, 
making Binondo particularly, and to some extent Tondo, Santa Cruz, and Kiapo, 
the most important section of the city, while the walled town became merely the 


fortified, he again opened correspondence with Aguinaldo on 
October 14, demanding the withdrawal of the Filipinos not 
only from all Pako but also from Pandakan, lying just beyond 
and along the river. He intimated that force would be used 
on the 20th, if necessary ; but the tenor of the letter was con- 
ciliatory, and it broached the idea of establishing, with Agui- 
naldo's good will, a convalescent camp for sick Americans 
on higher ground outside the city. As Pandakan had been 
omitted by Aguinaldo in his list of suburbs included within 
the city, and Merritt had accepted this list, it was now vigor- 
ously claimed by the insurgents. There was really much doubt 
about it ever having been included technically within the city ; 
but it was well within the lines of defense the Spaniards had 
maintained ; and moreover it held a commanding position at 
a turn of the river facing the territory held by the Americans 
on the north side at Sampalok and Santa Mesa, and Otis had 
to insist on its being evacuated. The insurgents finally with- 
drew on October 25, and from that time forward occupied 
virtually the same positions which they had held against the 
Spaniards from early July to August 13, sometimes encroach- 
ing inside the blockhouses, which the Americans did not use.^ 

goTemmental and religions headquarters, it was necessary to effect a better con- 
solidation of the city under one government; yet the various districts outside the 
walls were to some extent separately governed until 1898. There was no great pre- 
cision about the boundaries of the city as included under the AyuntamientOy because 
of a certain Spanish aversion to precision in such matters, as well as because there 
had been some recent rather confusing provisions of law as to boundary extensions, 
and accurate maps had not been made. Moreover, since the city government was 
to a large extent united to the province of Manila, there was not an urgent neces- 
sity for precision as to the more scattered outlying sections. 

^ The published sources as to these negotiations between Otis and the insur- 
gents are all from the American side, though some of the captured documents 
from the War Department shed light upon the attitude of the different insurgent 
factions at the time and as to preparations for resistance on the part of their mili- 
tary leaders. The correspondence and Otis's statements as to the interviews are 
given, as forwarded by him to Washington in Kept. War Dept. 1899, vol. I, part 4, 
pp. 6-10, 15-22, 334, 350-54, and these were brought together in order in Sen, 
Doe. 208, pp. 28-41. See also Sen. Doc. S31, pp. 742-56, for Otis's testimotiy about 
these negotiations in 1902. The idea of a convalescent camp was dropped by Otis 
in November; Aguinaldo appeared iuspiciooi about it, and claimed to be afraid it 


That the military Filipinos were ready to fight the Ameri- 
cans as early as September, and on various occasions before it 
was definitely known that the Americans would take the Phil- 
ippines from Spain, as well as before their own organization 
had been well established in Luzon or extended to other parts 
of the archipelago, is fairly well shown by evidence left by 
themselves. Before the withdrawal of troops on September 15, 
Aguinaldo issued instructions to Generals Noriel, Garcia, and 
Pio del Pilar, commanding the troops about the city, to be 
prepared to resist the Americans, though waiting for them to 
give the provocation.^ Already, on September 10, when it was 
reported that the Americans on the north of the river were 
pressing forward their lines toward Kalookan and La Loma, 
Aguinaldo had authorized resistance to secure these positions 
again and had given instructions to " warn the Sandatahan " 
(a sort of Katipunan militia inside the city) to be ready to 
cooperate with the troops outside when trouble began. '^ Again, 
in October, when Otis delivered a second quasi-ultimatum as 
to the withdrawal of the insurgents from the city, he noticed 

would excite his people, unless the Americans would first conclude a formal agree- 
ment with them. (Perhaps also the sight of insurgent trenches going up around 
the city did not invite the placing of sick Americans where they would be subject 
to capture.) In closing these negotiations in November, Aguinaldo brought up 
again the absence of a " fixed basis of agpreement " as a reason for the lack of con- 
fidence on the part of his countrymen. These negotiations marked the appearance 
for the first time of Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera (later a member of the Philippine 
Commission, and one of the foremost " Americanistas " among the Filipinos from 
the time it became apparent that the Filipinos would resort to war) as a medium 
of communication between Filipinos and Americans in the interest of peace. He 
misunderstood Otis as to the blockhouses, thinking the latter gave permission for 
the Filipinos to occupy them; and there was a little friction over this matter later 
on, though not serious. 

1 See Cmxg. Record^ vol. 35, part 6, p. 6107, for captured insurgent documents 
containing these instructions, stated by the editor of the insurgent documents in 
the War Department to be in the handwriting of Aguinaldo, though unsigned. It 
is curious to note that, in cautioning him to save ammunition, Aguinaldo tells Pio 
that " there are occasions when one shot kills as many as four men." 

* See Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo, p. 28. General Garcfa's report leading to these in- 
structions was to the effect that the Americans had sought to push the Filipinos 
back ; and there had been trouble between the outposts. The Filipinos, however, 
were at the time inside the line of blockhouses. 


that their forces on the north were being recruited by troops 
brought down the railroad, and upon his protest this was 
stopped for the time being.* On November 30, upon a rumor 
that American troops were to be landed on the shores of Pam- 
panga along the bay, Aguinaldo authorized the commander 
there to fire on them.^ 

The American correspondents in the Philippines were from 
the first disposed to discount the official optimism prevailing 
with regard to their country's relations with the insurgents. 
They and the subordinate army of&cers who sought to satisfy 
their curiosity as to the Philippines and the Filipinos soon 
found themselves objects of suspicion whenever they went out- 
side the city, and they constantly acquired evidence that the 
military Fihpinos at least were preparing for a fight, and that 
a great many of them were using every means to excite the 
masses to distrust the Americans. They had to run the gant- 
let of a troublesome system of permits, and the possession of 
photographic cameras subjected them frequently to detention 
or other interference. They were also inclined to lay more 
stress upon the growing animosity between the American 
soldiers and the natives in Manila than were the superior offi- 
cers of these troops, who were confronted daily in their offices 
with questions of administration that seemed more important 
for the moment than psychological questions as to the attitude 
of the Filipino populace. The American — already well adver- 
tised to the Filipinos by the Spaniards as an intemperate, irre- 
ligious product of mixed ancestry, who had ruthlessly slaugh- 
tered the red man of his continent and was engaged in 
lynching the black men whom he had held in slavery till late 
in the century — was not slow in putting in evidence his 
Anglo-Saxon contempt for people of any other color than 
white. He also (in a very conspicuous minority of cases, that 

» See Oti$*M Rept.,1899 (Rept. War Dept., 1S99, toI. i, part 4), p. 19. This docu- 
mt will hereafter be cited by the aboye foregoing short title. 
• TeL. Corr. AguinaldOf p. 31. 


is) succeeded in justifying the reputation that had been given 
to him for intemperance, and, being confined within the limits 
of a tropical city, was quite commonly most obtrusive about 
it, which latter feature probably seemed to the average Filipino 
more a sign of weakness than the intemperance itself. What- 
ever may be the faults of the Spaniard, his race is a most 
temperate one, taking its stimulating drinks mostly in the form 
of wine with meals ; and neither by disposition nor by example 
are the Filipinos themselves intemperate. Moreover, the 
Western volunteers, sometimes the officers as well as privates, 
regarded the fighting as over and the rest of their Philippine 
experience as justifiably a sort of " lark '' : perhaps the least 
offensive manifestation of this disposition was the mania for 
acquiring souvenirs of this semi-mediaeval outpost of Spain, 
though this not infrequently led to abuses well within the 
meaning of the proclamations against looting and misconduct 
generally.^ For, as indicated, there was no lack of official ef- 

1 The letters of John F. Bass and F. D. Millet {Harper's History, pp. 56-57, 
"t 65) are typical of contributions to the American press of that time, showing that 
the correspondents appreciated the seriousness of the trend of thought and action 
among the Filipinos. Says Mr. Bass, in a later article {Everybody's Magazinet 
August, 1901, p. 142) : " An hour after [Aguinaldo made his triumphant entry 
into Malolos in September], I was discussing with two of his most important cab- 
inet officials what would happen when the Filipinos tried to fight the Americans. 
More than four months later, General Otis telegraphed to Washington his opinion 
that there would be no conflict of arms." A contemporary letter of the same 
writer (dated at Manila, August 30, 1898, cited above in Harper's History) gives 
the typical American attitude toward the Filipino masses at that time : " There 
can be no doubt that our soldiers are spoiling for a fight. They hate and despise 
the native for the manner in which he has lied to and cheated them, and on the 
whole they are inclined to treat the Filipino the way a burly policeman treats a 
ragged street urchin. The native is like a child, unreasonable and easily affected 
by small things. Unable to appreciate the benefits of a good government, he 
fiercely resents the rough manner in which the soldier jostles him out of the way." 
The common opinion of foreigners in Manila is expressed by Frederic H. Sawyer, 
though himself not an eyewitness : " I have no doubt that they [the American 
volunteers] are good fighting men, but from all I can hear about them, they are 
not conspicuous for military discipline, and too many of them have erroneous ideas 
as to the most suitable drink for a tropical climate." {The Inhabitants of the Phil- 
ippines, p. 114.) In the Resena veridica, Aguinaldo charges abuses by the Ameri- 
can soldiers. He claims that the soldier killed at Cavite before Merritt's depar- 
ture was killed in a drunken quarrel with his own companions ; this matter was 
not satisfactorily cleared up. General Anderson {North American Review^ Febru- 


fort to check abuses or misconduct on the part of the Ameri- 
can forces. This was not merely limited to orders from above, 
but extended to informal instructions to commanders of regi- 
ments and of companies, which were quite generally acted 
upon, and to the operations of military courts, which as a rule 
treated offenses by soldiers, mostly of a minor character, with 
all due severity. In the main, the things which were only too 
constantly operating to produce friction and animosity between 
the native people and the Americans were too small in them- 
selves to be reached either by general orders about the con- 
duct of the war or specific regulations as to military discipline. 
They were of the sort inevitably incident to the quartering of 
a restless body of troops in a strange and tropical city, after a 
brief campaign that seemed somewhat like the " picnic " many 
of the men were after and which had not been calculated to 
sober them to a reahzation of war. Add to this a prejudice 
against all other ways and customs but those of " good Amer- 
ican citizens," and a disposition to look upon being born to 
any other color than white as in some degree a crime^ and the 
situation is pictured.^ 

ary, 1900, p. 282) says the attitude and conduct of the American soldiers bad 
some part in bringing on the trouble. The numbers of La Independenda reveal 
many of the things, unimportant in themselves, which were at the time causing 
comment and criticism among Filipinos about the Americans and their admin- 
istration of affairs in Manila. On November 16, 1898, it says the native street- 
venders are being interfered with and complain about the licenses they have to 
pay ; it also says the residence-streets of the pleasant suburbs of Ermita and 
Malate are being invaded by unseemly laundries, tailor-shops, etc., springing up 
around the barracks. In the issue of November 30, 1898, there is an enlightening 
advertisement : a partner is wanted for a new saloon in the walled city, and he is 
assured profits of one hundred and fifty per cent; for, says the advertiser, "In 
the present historic moment there are no business undertakings offering as positive 
gain as restaurants, bars and taverns, caf^s and saloons of recreation. For here 
are the Americans, the most practical men in business matters, and has any of 
them started here any other business than that? " 

* General Anderson, on July 5, had issued an order reciting the paragraphs of 
the Army Regulations relative to respect for private property and for noncom- 
batants, with some strong remarks upon the subject, and had directed them to be 
reed before each company daily for one week ; be repeated this order in Septem- 
ber. Before attacking Manila, General Merritt, in a general order, stated to the 
troops that they had " come not as despoilers and oppressors, bat simply as the 



More or less constant friction was also necessarily involved 
in the attempt to administer affairs in Manila, as military 
occupation presumes, under the municipal (as distinguished 
from international) law previously obtaining there, except as 
specially modified by the conqueror. The Spanish system was 
in many ways an anomalous one for Americans, whether mili- 
tary men or civilians, to undertake to carry out; and in this 
instance there was the further anomaly of American possession 
being Hmited to the capital and to some general supervision 
over navigation, while the remainder of the archipelago, al- 
ready to a considerable extent lost to the Spaniards when 
Manila fell, was, before the treaty came to confer upon the 
United States sovereignty over the whole group, in the hands 
of Filipinos, more or less openly hostile to the United States 
and to some degree in possession of a governmental organiza- 
tion. Inside the city itself, the Spanish prisoners, who were to 
a very slight extent deprived of their liberty, more and more 
came to be an unnecessary menace to the peace and the health 
of the city as it became apparent that Spain was not to retain the 
Philippines. Coincidently with the course of events, the hostil- 
ity of the native population was gradually being transferred 
from Spaniards to Americans, and there was a tendency to 

instmments of a strong, free Government, whose purposes are beneficent, and 
which has declared itself in this war the champion of those oppressed by Spanish 
misrule " ; and acts of pillage, rapine, or violence were to be punished " on the 
spot with the maximum penalties known to military law." This order was fur- 
nished to Aguinaldo before the city was taken, as a statement of the attitude of 
the United States with regard to private property in time of war. In January, it 
became necessary for General Otis to publish some instances where soldiers had 
made purchases from native tradesmen and refused to pay, and thereafter during 
the course of military operations frequent orders were issued as to respect for 
private property and for noncombatants. (See Sen. Doc. 331, pp. 982-89, for such 
orders; there also follows a list of trials of officers and soldiers for abuse of na- 
tives, mostly in 1899 and 1900.) The orders from Washington at the beginning 
of the war, being one of May 17 announcing the adherence of the United States 
to the Geneva Convention, and one of May 30 enjoining strict military discipline, 
are found in Rq)t, Maj.-Gen. Comm.t 1898, pp. 612-13, 617. 


fraternize between the former foes, stimulated by some com- 
munity of speech and customs.^ 

The sanitary condition of the city, overcrowded with troops, 
was worse than usual ; and the hygienic conditions prevailing 
in Manila under Spanish rule were never other than wretched. 
One of the first steps in the reorganization of the city govern- 
ment was the estabUshment of a board of health composed of 
American army surgeons, which set out at once to vaccinate 
the inhabitants of the city more effectively than had ever be- 
fore been done. It had also to round up again the 200 or so 
lepers who had, at the time of the taking of the city, been 
allowed to escape and mingle with the population.^ 

The Spanish newspapers of Manila, which had resumed pub- 
lication a few days after the occupation, adopted the policy, 

1 General Otis secured authority from Washington to permit the departure 
for the Bisayas of some of the Spanish troops, under the pledges of their officers 
that they would not resume hostilities against the United States if a treaty should 
not be concluded. He was also glad, under similar authorization, to permit the 
sailing for Spain of officers certified to be sick. 

• The city health board was organized on September 10, its head being Major Frank 
S. Bourns, who had in previous years accompanied two scientific expeditions to the 
Philippines and had come with Greneral Merritt to the islands as chief surgeon 
of volunteers. The vaccination campaign was vigorously conducted by him. Some 
notes on the organization of sanitary work in the city may be found in Dr. Boums's 
Report of 1899, exhibit B with appendix M to Otis*s Kept., 1899 (pp. 260-61), and 
in appendix UU to General MacArthur's Report for 1900 {Rept. War Dept.^ 1900^ 
Tol. I, part 10). From the first, prominent Filipino physicians were associated 
with the board as advisory members, the first being Drs. T. H. Pardo de Tavera and 
Aristdn Bautista Lim. For an account of how the lepers were neglected and al- 
lowed to scatter at the time the city was taken, see this subject in appendix AA 
to Mac Arthur* $ 1901 Report (Rept. War Dept., 1901, vol. I, part 4, pp. 248-60). 
The Franciscan friars had been in charge of the leper hospital and of the estate 
near Manila which supported it ; on May 23, 1898, they had asked the Spanish 
governor-general to release them from their charge, thus admitting, what was a 
well-known fact, that the institution was a public one, belonging to the crown of 
Spain. Notwithstanding the abandonment of the lepers at the time of the sur- 
render of the city and the fact that the Americans subsequently took the hospital 
•ad the estate in charge, the following January the Franciscans petitioned that it 
bt restored to them, alleging that it belonged to their order. They were, of 
course, refused. A most thorough r^surod of the provost-marshal government of 
Manila up to August 7, 1901, when the city was again given a civil government, 
wae made by Major-General George W. Davis at that time (see Rept. War Dept, 
190t, vol. I, part 7, pp. 77-274). Appended to it are all the laws and regulations 
promulgated by military authority in this eonnection. 


which, with one or two exceptions, they have steadily followed 
ever since, of stimulating hostility between Americans and 
Filipinos, principally by holding constantly before the latter, 
in the many ways of insinuation in which their editors excel, 
the fear of a ruthless "exploitation" by the Americans and 
of a fate like that of the red man and the black man in North 
America. Finally, one Spanish editor was tried by military 
commission and fined heavily and his paper suspended, though 
afterward permitted by General Otis to resume publication ; 
but in the main, the carefully worded insinuations of these 
writers were beyond the reach of the military censor's blud- 
geon-like pen, and could only have been prevented by the ab- 
solute suppression of their periodicals. Two insurgent papers 
also sprang up in Manila; they were at first more cautious, 
also more friendly to the Americans ; but when the cables from 
Paris showed a determination on the part of the United States 
to take over Spain's sovereignty, their political articles began 
to be directed chiefly at the Americans and in behalf of Fili- 
pino independence, and they removed to Malolos for greater 
safety.^ Besides the editor mentioned, two other Spaniards, 
officers of the army, were tried by miHtary commission and 
convicted of conspiracy and embezzlement of funds of Bili- 
bid Prison, which they had been allowed to continue to man- 
age for three months under the provost-marshal ; they were 
heavily fined, but the imprisonment for three years in each 
case was reduced by General Otis to six months.'^ 

1 See Otis^s RepU^ 1899, pp. 52-53, and Military Secretary Crowder's r^sum^ 
of the activity and attitude of the Spanish press up to 1901, in Rept. War Dept.f 
1901, vol. I, part 4, pp. 250-62. 

* See Otis's Rept., 1899, pp. 51-52; also the Historia Negra of "Capitan Verda- 
des," pp. 179-84, for the full findings of the military commission in these trials, 
translated into Spanish. The two officers convicted were subordinates; their supe- 
rior, who was in direct charge of the prison, escaped conviction, with which finding 
of the commission General Otis disagreed. Their prosecution was due to the in- 
vestigations of Brigadier-General R. P. Hughes, the very active provost-marshal- 
general of Manila from early in September 1898, to late in May, 1899. After the 
action was well under way, the Spanish authorities made a demand that they be 
allowed to try and punish the offenders, which was refused. Later, one of the 


When the Americans entered the city, Bilibid Prison con- 
tained about two thousand prisoners, neariy all Filipinos, and 
about half of them charged with political offenses under the 
Spanish regime, while of those supposed to be held on purely 
criminal charges a large proportion had no definitely formulated 
cases against them, and some had been awaiting trial in the slow- 
going courts for not only months but years. The political of- 
fenders were soon released, and on July 1, 1899, the prison 
contained only about one thousand prisoners, of whom two 
himdred were there upon conviction under the operations of 
American military courts. In this " jail-delivery " some few bad 
criminals escaped, mainly owing to the faulty character of the 
Spanish records or the absence of records, and the Spaniards 
had a good deal to say about the turning of these criminals 
loose upon the population.^ 

The question was also raised by Filipinos as to the return 
by the American Government of property which had been em- 
bargoed by Spain, under the decree by General Blanco, during 
1896 and 1897. Under the law of military occupancy, it not 
yet being certain what would be the future sovereignty over 
the islands, it had to be held that the United States might 
be responsible to Spain for retaining and administrating these 
possessions; and, though the properties and all their proceeds 
under American control were subsequently turned over to the 
owners by order of the Secretary of War, considerable criti- 
cism was meanwhile excited among the Filipinos.^ 

prisoners, who had prominent social connections, was released on payment of his 
fine, subscribed by Spaniards, and upon presentation of a petition headed by Arch- 
bishop Nozaleda. 

* See Rept. War Dept^ 1901 1 vol. I, part 7, p. 79 (the previonsly cited report of 
General G. W. Dayis). Also, Otis's Rept., 1899, pp. 12-13. That the 1898 " jaO- 
delivery" was not complete as to prisoners held in Bilibid without the proper 
formulation of charts against them was indicated by the release of nearly one hun- 
dred more in 1900, through the writ of haheoi cnrptut. 

« See Otis't Rept., 1899, pp. 38-39, 288. The particular case in point was that of the 
estate of a prominent family of half-casten, most of them in Hongkong since 1896 
or 1897, who had in May induced Consul-General Wildman to cable to Washinq^ton 
their " allegiance *' to the United states, and later to implore Senator Hanna in their 


The attempts of the Spanish judges of lower courts to exer- 
cise jurisdiction, in several instances plainly in behalf of inter- 
ested parties, compelled the military authority to intervene and 
suspend their operations. General Merritt's proclamation of 
military government had contemplated the continuance of the 
civil courts already in existence in the city, and, in organizing 
provost courts on August 22, he had exempted from the oper- 
ations of the civil courts only those cases in which one or more 
of the parties should be connected with the American army. 
General Otis found it necessary to modify the inferential jur- 
isdiction thus left residing in the existing civil courts by pro- 
viding, on October 7, that they should have no jurisdiction 
whatever in criminal cases, and should exercise jurisdiction in 
civil cases " subject to such supervision as the interests [of the 
military government] might demand." The judges of the Au- 
diencia (Spanish supreme court) refused to act under such su- 
pervision, and, from that time until the following May, Manila 
was without civil courts.* 

Operating in another branch of the former administration, 
certain Spanish officials and other Europeans, as well as a few 
Americans, undertook to carry through a very badly conceived 
plan for plastering over with fictitious mining claims a goodly 
portion of the public domain of the archipelago. The mining 
bureau, a branch of the Spanish Directorate of Civil Admin- 
istration, was not formally taken over by the American author- 
ities until March, 1899, and in the interval from May 1, 1898, 
when not only were the officials in Manila effectually " bottled 
up," but mining prospectors had small chance to do any work 
in the rest of the archipelago, three times as many claims 

behalf (Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 334, 361). General Otis remarks that Consuls Wildman 
and Williams were very active in their behalf. 

* Otis's Rept., 1899, pp. 11-12, 35-36. See also the r^sumd of «' Military Com- 
missions and Provost Courts," by Military Secretary Crowder, in Rept. War Dept., 
1901, vol. I, part 4, pp. 245-4:7. A summary of the more important military orders 
afEeoting governmental administration, up to the time of civil government, is given 
in the preliminary number of the Official Gazette of the Philippines, published at 
Manila under date of January 1, 1903. 


were denounced as had ever been established in all the pre* 
ceding years. These frauds were readily discovered by the 
American officer who, in 1900, took charge of the bureau, but 
meantime and thereafter attempts were made to float fictitious 
mining companies on the strength of the recognition which 
had been obtained from the Spanish officials.^ 

Anticipating the military occupation of Manila, if not of 
other portions of the archipelago, the Government at Wash- 
ington had, on July 19, sent out to General Merritt transla- 
tions of the Spanish customs tariffs in the islands, only modi- 
fying them by making them applicable against Spain as 
against other nations and by imposing an internal-revenue tax 
on tobacco and its manufactures. When this document arrived, 
the new customs authorities were already administering the 
old laws, with their cumbersome surcharges and faulty classi- 
fications, as best they could ; and, partly on the ground that 
the status quo ante had already been proclaimed, Spanish and 
other foreign merchants in the city were quick to protest 
against the comparatively few changes made. Finally, after 
several postponements to permit shipments contracted for in 
Spain under the old privilege of free entry of goods from 

^ Lieutenant C. H. Burritt, the industrioas o£Bcer in charge of the mining bureau 
during 1900 to 1903, made a moit entertaining report on this matter to General 
MacArthur in 1900 (Rept. War Dept., 1900, vol. i, part 10, appendix II). He shows 
that the claims filed from May 1, 1898, to March 29, 1899, numbered 1618 and 
oovered almost 150,000,000 square meters, while those established during all the 
preceding years of Spanish rule numbered 594 and covered about 50,000,000 
•quare meters of territory. One of the steps taken in the effort to comply, osten- 
■ibiy, with the very precise Spanish provisions as to proof of claim, surveys, etc., 
WM to get the certificate of United States Consul Williams in Manila to the au- 
thenticity of the documents used in filing. In one case, at least, the report shows 
the consul's certificate to state that, " because of want of custody of Spanish books 
of record in such matters, I, as representing whatever of Spanish authority that 
remains, do hereby recognize," etc. With the definite transfer of sovereignty to 
the United States, the post of United States consul at Manila became, of course, 
an anomaly; in January, 1901, Mr. Williams was made consul-general at Singa- 
pore. Other points brought out in Lieutenant Burritt's report are the plundering 
of the survey maps of the mining bureau and the malicious destruction of a micro- 
scope and of other property, during the time the Spanish officials remained ia 



there (with the payment merely of the surcharges for harbor 
improvement, etc.) to be received by these merchants, the 
tariff was put into effect on November 10 ; the new excise kid 
upon tobacco had, however, been omitted from it, as it was 
devised without knowledge of the conditions in the Philip- 
pines, and was virtually prohibitive of the manufacture and 
sale of cigarettes.^ 

The difficulties attendant upon the resumption of inter- 
island trade were yet more embarrassing. The foreign busi- 
ness houses were anxious to obtain the waiting hemp and 
tobacco crops upon which their money had been advanced, and 
the Government was also desirous of having this commerce 
renewed, with its influence toward the normalization of condi- 
tions throughout the archipelago. But there were two other 
factors to be taken into account : the Spanish military author- 
ities held possession of the principal ports of the central is- 
lands, and theoretically asserted the sovereignty of Spain over 
all the archipelago outside of Manila ; and the Filipinos were in 
possession of practically all Luzon, as well as of some of the 
hemp ports in the Bisayas, while the Government at Malolos, 
everywhere more or less obediently recognized by them, had 
imposed a 10 per-cent tax on all inter-island shipments, be- 
sides establishing various regulations which gave wide oppor- 
tunity for "squeeze." As between the Spaniards and Americans, 
it was easily agreed that vessels flying the American flag 

1 See Otis's Rept., 1899y pp. 14, 30, 48-49; also, Collector James F. Smith's 
humorous report of 1901 {Rept. War DepL^ 1901 y vol. I, part 4, p. 283). There was, 
in some cases, very serious doubt of the good faith of merchants who claimed to have 
contracted for goods from Spain before the outbreak of war and to have been pre- 
vented from securing their free entry in Manila by the events of the war, as well 
as a likelihood that some of the shipments had been purchased elsewhere than in 
Spain and reinvoiced from there. Among the War Department documents are 
Customs Tariff and Regulations of the Philippine Islands, 1898, and Tariff Circulars^ 
1898-1900 (Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines). The revised tariff, as put into 
effect in November, 1898, was also republished in Manila under the foregoing 
title. For a War Department ruling on a case of Spanish goods arriving after the 
tariff went into effect against Spain, see Magoon's Reports (long title, Law of Civil 
Government under Military Occupation: Washington, 1902), pp. 625-30. 


should be permitted to enter the Spanish ports, in return for 
a like privilege for vessels flying the Spanish flag and entering 
Manila Bay. Most of the vessels in the inter-island trade had 
hoisted the American flag, under fictitious transfers to Amer- 
ican citizens (which transfers were winked at by the American 
authorities, in order not to render inter-island traffic an impos- 
sibility), as a vessel with the Spanish flag was liable to prompt 
seizure in ports held by the FiHpinos. For fear of subsequent 
claims for damages against their Government, the Spanish 
authorities in the Bisayas refused to give clearances for such 
ports ; and, as those vessels traded from port to port, and the 
Filipinos were constantly gaining control of new points, with 
the withdrawal of Spanish troops, they were frequently stopped 
after having cleared satisfactorily from Manila. Complaints 
and discontent, of course, succeeded, and the natural result 
was that the foreign business houses were led more and more 
to come to amicable terms with the insurgent authorities, a 
thing which some of them had already been very forward in 
doing, and which bore consequences of importance later on, 
when some of these houses, in order to carry on their profit- 
able trade in war-times, furnished the funds which maintained 
insurrection against the United States.^ 

From the outset of American administration in the Philip- 
pine Islands, the customs taxes have produced much the greater 
portion of the revenue: this is now the consequence of the 
governmental policy as adopted into laws, not of conditions 
which, as at the outset, limited the operations of American 
tax-collectors to Manila. As we have seen, the customs reve- 
nues, due in large part to the discrimination in favor of im- 
ports from Spain, and also in no small degree to both incom- 
petent and corrupt administration of the customs service, were, 

> See Otis's Rept., 1899, pp. 45-48, 70-71. After November 26, the merchants 
were warned that all inter-island traffic was at their own risk. A new aspect was 
pat upon affairs with the outbreak of insurrection ap^ainst the United States, as 
Aguinaldo forbade the entry of a ship flying the American flag into any Filipino 



up to 1898, secondary to the receipts from the personal taxes. 
The cedula (personal registration certificate), reputedly so un- 
popular with the Filipinos, was at first abolished; but the 
people were so habituated to its use, and to the necessity of 
having it as a means of establishing identity, that it was 
restored, with only a nominal charge for issuance (at first, 20 
cents Mexican). The tax on house-rents was continued in 
Manila, as well as various forms of municipal licenses, with 
some modifications ; but the internal-revenue taxes involved, 
for the most part, the conduct of business of a general char- 
acter throughout the archipelago, and all such were held un- 
collectible by the military occupant of the capital city. The 
public revenues obtained from these various sources were 
made disbursable for purposes connected with the administra- 
tion of government, as distinguished from purely military pur- 
poses, and a military officer was appointed auditor of these 
civil funds.^ 

The Manila branches of the two large English banking 
concerns of the Orient were pressing to have the Spanish pro- 
hibition of the importation of Mexican dollars removed, as the 
amount of currency on hand was insufficient for the sudden 
increase of trading operations in the city incident to the re- 
opening of commerce and the occupation by an army from the 
United States. They claimed that only thus could they be 
sure of continuing to quote a rate of two Mexican dollars for 
one American, or better; and upon their pledge to maintain 
such a ratio, their request was granted.^ 

1 See Otis's Rept.^ 1899, pp. 30-33 ; also pp. 275-94 (appendix O, Report of the 
Treasurer of Public Funds). From the first, there was a tendency among the mili- 
tary officers to stretch the public civil funds to cover really military purposes, 
notably for transportation of officers about the city, rent of quarters, etc. 

• The banks continued to make a profitable business of exchange until July, 
1900, when the tronble in China sent silver up and disturbed the ratio, causing these 
banking concerns very speedily to seek relief from the Government. Until then, 
they had continued to quote such rates as gave them a profit on exchange whichever 
I way it was made. See Report of Taft Philippine Commissionf 1900, pp. 8o-87, for 
a history of this matter. 



In another important respect, existing kws having an eco- 
nomic bearing were modified, namely, by the abolition of 
Spanish regulations as to Chinese immigration, registration, 
etc., and the substitution for them in September of the United 
States prohibitory laws and regulations, with some modifica- 
tions in the latter designed to permit the entry of Chinese 
who coiJd prove former residence in the islands. Supposedly, 
this was a change dictated from Washington. The traditional 
hostility between Filipinos and Chinese made it also a popular 
measure in the islands. Inside the city, the military govern- 
ment from the first employed the Chinese extensively as la- 
borers. Outside, they were quite generally liable to become 
the victims of native hostility or had to purchase immunity if 
they continued their business operations ; the connection of 
various wealthy Chinese half-castes with the revolution as con- 
tributors, and in several instances their active association with 
its military organization (notably in the case of General Paua, 
of Albai province), did not signify anything in this respect, as 
Chinese half-castes in the Philippines invariably are recognized 
as Filipinos and assume that status.^ 

* Otis*8 Rept.f 1899f pp. 33-35. There seems to be no published evidence as to 
whether or no Washington dictated the Chinese ezclosion order ; but it maj fairlj 
be assumed that action in so important a matter was not taken without consulta- 
tion. However, in February, 1899, when the Chinese Minister at Washington 
made his first queries about this matter, Secretary of State Haj apparently did 
not know of Otis's exclusion order. (See Foreign Relations^ United States^ 1899, 
pp. 207-17, for the correspondence of that year on the subject, the exclusion order 
iteelf, a circular of the Philippine customs administration dated September 28, 
1898, being cited on p. 211.) In August, the State Department informed Minister 
Wa that the exclusion order was a ** military measure," as yet not a settled policy 
of the United States Grovemment ; the minister had entered formal protest 
agmisft it. 



It is now necessary to turn back and examine the steps in 
the formation of the rival organization of government which 
was in active opposition to the remnant of Spanish power left 
in the archipelago and was preparing for opposition to the 
Americans, in case they attempted to take the place of Spain. 
Indeed, in the light of subsequent events, the processes of 
revolutionary organization and the character of the govern- 
ment instituted by the Filipinos, obscured as they have been 
by conflicting testimony and by the meagerness of the evi- 
dence made public, become the queries of greatest importance 
connected with the events of 1898. A resume of the insur- 
gent proclamations up to the capture of Manila has already 
been given, and enough was therein brought out to indicate 
that the revolution was not organized from below, but im- 
posed from above — this only with reference, for the moment, 
to the civil organization of government, and leaving out of 
consideration the question whether the masses were eager to 
volunteer for military service or were coerced into it. For the 
very reason that the spontaneity of the movement is somewhat 
in doubt, it becomes important to discover the persons and 
the personalities behind it and to inquire as to their repre- 
sentative character. 

The first thing made clear by the study of the records is 
that Aguinaldo, whose name was always and everywhere em- 
ployed, first in the Tagalog provinces and later in other parts 
of Luzon and the Bisayas, and whose name has constantly ap- 
peared in these pages as if he were the very soul of the move- 
ment, was really a subordinate — though a gilded and insignia- 
clad subordinate, to be sure — in the camp where the revolution 


was making. Many partial explanations of this fact have been 
offered : the view most favorable to Aguinaldo (which imphes, 
too, that he was not really a subordinate) is that he was 
shrewd enough to draw to himself all sorts and factions of 
Filipinos and to balance them one against another, while at 
the same time sufficiently disinterested and sincerely solicitous 
for the welfare of his country and his people to take advice 
and counsel from all sides and to subject his personal ambi- 
tions and wishes to the opinions of men of greater education 
and attainments ; a very common opinion, held by Filipinos of 
discrimination as well as by Americans, is that he was the 
merest figurehead. There is considerable truth, it is probable, 
in both these views. The personal jealousies and factional dis- 
sensions which seem inevitably to attend every purely Filipino 
movement, and generally to its disruption, made it all the 
more easy for a Filipino of not too decided views and of no 
arrogance of intellectual attainments to gather about him his 
prominent countrymen of different camps who would almost 
surely have set up rival claims if one or the other of their 
own number had assumed leadership. Moreover, if name and 
prestige with the masses were essential, what more natural 
than that the middle<;lass Filipino who had estabhshed him- 
self as a quasi-divinity by his military operations in Cavite in 
1896, who had been deemed by the Spaniards of sufficient 
importance to balance the account, along with a mere hand- 
ful of rifles and a score of companions, against $800,000 
in 1897, and who now came back surrounded by all the 
glamour which familiarity with the American conqueror in 
Manila Bay could give him, should be regarded as the man of 
the hour ? 

If we were here passing judgment on Aguinaldo personally, it 
would be necessary to note that there is no satisfactory proof 
of his insincerity in the cause he espoused, and that he proved 
at least capable of maintaining his position as the balance be- 
tween the Filipino factions and as the idol of the masses until 


the insurrection and he himself were driven into hiding; but 
that judgment we may well leave for the events themselves to 

The Aguinaldo, however, whom a great many Americans 
have since 1898 been constructing from his proclamations, his 
instruments of government, and the false prominence given to 
his name in everything was really another man, whose name 
was Apolinario Mabini. He was the Aguinaldo who devised 
the schemes of government, afterward ostensibly ratified by 
the representatives of the people ; who dictated nearly every 
important move up to the transfer of the organization to 
Malolos ; who thereafter, except when there were momentary 
changes of oracle, continued to speak through the mouth of 
Aguinaldo the President, in matters of civil organization, and 
to a large extent even in the direction of military operations, 
until his downfall from control in May, 1899. Mabini, though 
a student-radical, was, as previous mention of him will have 
disclosed, not the less a radical of radicals. A man of ideas 
and not of action, he soon found himself the inspiring lever 
of a machine created out of human masses stirred from 
lethargy by the name and prestige of another, for whom in- 
tellectually he had considerable contempt ; and some of the 
analogies of his favorite study, the French Revolution, seemed 
to have moved him to re-perpetrate it in the hitherto lethargic 
tropical Orient. Obviously, here was a man whose friendship 
or whose hostility to the United States might prove to be very 
important to the Government, if its future poUcy was to in- 
volve connection with the Philippines in one form or another. 
Yet no American, whether of the army or of the navy, seemed 
for a long time to have ascertained what position in the midst 
of affairs was held by this paralytic who had been carried over 
to Cavite soon after Aguinaldo arrived; and it was only 
through Filipinos favorable to the Americans that it was 
later discovered that he was the chief obstacle at Malolos to 
their efforts toward conciliation. It suited Mabini's dispo- 


sition as well as bis aims at the time to remain in the back- 
ground. He seems to have been at least suspicious of the 
Americans from the first, and, though he had been connected 
•with the revolt of 1896 only as a sympathizer, he was now 
fully bent on seeing his dream of an independent Filipino 
republic realized.^ 

All the proclamations, decrees, and other published docu- 
ments of Aguinaldo of May, June, July, and August, 1898, 
were from the pen of Mabini, with the probable exception of 
two or three of the shorter proclamations in which Aguinaldo 
protests his unfitness for the position which he had just so 
boldly assumed.'^ Besides those which have been found avail- 
able for citation above, Mabini, whose pen scarcely ever 
rested, edited a great many other documents and projects, some 
of which attained printed form later as regulations of the exec- 
utive department or as laws of the Congress, while others have 
never seen the light.^ One of these, issued in pamphlet form 

^ See above, p. 93, footnote, for Mabiui's own statement of his change of atti- 
tude between 1896 and 1898. Contrary to the belief generally entertained in the 
United States, Mabini was not an old man, but was barely thirty-three at the 
time of his death from cholera at Manila in 1903, hence only about twenty-eight, 
or slightly younger than Aguinaldo, when these two joined forces at Cavite in 
1898 ; the paralysis of his lower limbs led to the belief that he was old, and he was 
prematurely old, physically at least, though not altogether through the visitations 
of Providence. He came of humble parents, pure Tagalogs, of Tana wan, Batan- 
gai, and, after getting his bachelor's degree in arts, worked as an employee of the 
Spanish civil administration and in a lawyer's office in order to be able to finish his 
coarse in law, which he did in 1895. His connection with Liga Filipina was men- 
tioned in the chapter m (footnote), p. 93, as cited above; after his release from 
arrest in 1897, he returned to his native town of Tanawan, where he lived quietly 
until shortly after Aguinaldo arrived at Cavite. He was wide awake to all that 
was going on, however, and had already, in April, before Dewey's arrival, ad- 
dressed a manifesto to " the Filipino Revolutionists," taking sides against Spain at 
the moment when some of the active participants in the revolt of 1896-97 were 
protesting their loyalty. 

* This Spanish habit of groveling in the dirt and protesting one's personal un- 
fitness or incapacity for a task he is voluntarily taking upon himself has left its 
mark upon almost all the Filipinos ; scarcely one of them ever opens a speech in 
public or starts a contribution to a newspaper without wasting much time or space 
by protesting his own inability to enlighten bis auditors or readers, so vastly 
superior to him in wisdom. 

' Some of these are now, in manuscript form, in the possession of Mabini's 
brother at Manila, who has offered them for tale in order to secure funds with 


from the official printing establishment which the revolu- 
tionists set up at Bakoor in July, 1898, was perhaps the most 
interesting document of the whole Filipino revolution. It con- 
tained Mabini's " Constitutional Programme of the Philippine 
Republic," and was so entitled. Many of the provisions of the 
constitution as drafted by Mabini had already been promul- 
gated in the Aguinaldo decrees, and this work formed the 
basis of the constitution afterward adopted at Malolos. A dis- 
cussion of the modifications subsequently made in this scheme 
of government and of the practical workings of it constitutes 
practically the whole history of the insurrection as a civil or- 
ganization. Yet in some ways a more interesting and a more 
significant document was that published under the same cover, 
entitled " The True Decalogue." It is a sort of political Ten 
Commandments, inculcating the Christian doctrine of love of 
God and fellow-man, but proceeding therefrom to develop a 
doctrine especially fitted to the circumstances, viz., that all 
Filipinos should see in their fellow-countrymen " something 
more than in their fellow-man," should cultivate their intelli- 
gences, and should reject all authority but that which was sanc- 
tioned by themselves. The significance of such a doctrine, given 

which to publish the memoirs left by Mabini at his death (from two chapters of 
which, as given advance publication in a Manila newspaper, citations have already 
been made herein). Mabini's decree of July 30, 1898, providing for the organi- 
zation of the revolutionary army, underwent various modifications, but it was the 
basis of the similar decree of Aguinaldo (published only in El Heraldo de la Re~ 
vcluddri) and the regulations issued later on. The Library of Congress seems to 
have only the reprints of a few of these documents made at Nueva Cflceres in 
1899 (see A List of Books on the Philippine Islands in the Library of Congress^ 
p. 164) ; and, in general, American writers and American publications have given 
but scant consideration to the documentation of the insurrection in the Philippines. 
The appeal to foreign powers for recognition, under date of August 6, after the 
presidents of a few towns could be got together to give the affair a representative 
diaracter, was particularly Mabiniesque, and his manuscripts show that it was his 
work. This, as seen above, has received wide publication ; quite the contrary is 
true of his manifesto of August 18, 1898, " against the unjust procedure of the 
American Army " (in refusing to share the occupation of Manila with the Fili- 
pmos), which was intended only for Filipino circulation, and which the objections 
of the Filipinos working for conciliation caused to be partially or wholly sup- 


to the masses in a semi-religious form at such a time, is ap- 
parent enough ; it is not less interesting as shedding a strong 
light upon the mental makeup of the new leader, Mabini. 
His ideas, as set forth in the " True Decalogue " and in the 
accompanying manifesto, for a revolution of customs and 
habits along with the poUtical revolution, were excellent, though 
he seemed to make scant allowance for the fact that such 
internal revolution comes only by evolution. But over and 
above all else in connection with this strange document, one 
cannot but think of the unconscious intellectual egotism and 
of the almost total lack of humor of the man who put it forth.* 
Just how far Mabini was identified with the practical steps 
taken for the extension of the revolution as a military organ- 
ization, it is not easy to say ; and it is readily apparent that 
herein lay the real work of the propaganda, and that, if he 
was not supreme in this respect, it is easy to exaggerate the 
importance of the leadership he exercised. He was always an 
idealist and a man of theories, rather than a practical organ- 
izer, much more of a political critic than of a statesman ; and 
the work which was done in the Tagalog provinces in May 
and June, in other parts of Luzon in the next three months, 
and thereafter in the Bisayas, was by no means mere work of 
the pen. Mabini, as we have seen, declared that he did not 
belong to the Katipunan of 1896 and 1897, because, as he 
says, he did not then think the time had come for armed 
revolt, and because, as he does not frankly say, he was not 

' This docament haa never, so far at the writer has noted, found any mention 
in American publications. Even leaving aside the fact that the history of the con- 
stitution adopted at Malolos in January, 1899, is only to be traced in the light of 
Blabini's " Programme " and in his early decrees, it is strange also that the jour- 
nalists in the Philippines should have overlooked such a " feature " as the *' True 
Deealogne." Two versions of this document were printed at Bakoor in July, 
1806 ; the Tagalog pamphlet was entitled PanxihUa ta Pagkahand nang Republica 
nang PUipina»t and the Spanish Utle is a translation of this : Programa constitu* 
eioruU de la Republica Filipina. Aguinaldo's name appears only as authorizing the 
sale of these pamphlets among the people at a p«Mta apiece, to obtain funds for 
the revolution. The author owes his copies of thtft Ttrtioos respectively to Messn. 
Clecnente J. Zulueta and Florentino Torres. 


the sort of man to employ some of the methods of the Kati- 
punan. It is rather hard to conceiye of this idealist, who was 
busy with efforts to teach the people their duties as patriots, 
sanctioning a resort to such methods as were implied in Agui- 
naldo's order including all Filipinos, regardless of their wishes, 
in the Katipunan and threatening them with this organization's 
severe penalties for disloyalty to it.^ The leaders who had in- 
spired and maintained the Tagalog revolt of 1896-97 under- 
stood, however, that the people with whom they had to deal 
could not yet be held together simply by an appeal to ideals, 
and that a resort to military coercion and to the methods of 
secret organization was necessary. Yet Mabini himself, if not 
actually inspiring such methods of organization, could not have 
been without cognizance of them ; and, if he ever stopped to 
reconcile them with his ideas of a revolution of conscience 
and a propaganda of sentiment, it was probably on the basis 
of his declaration that he had become satisfied that in 1898 
the great majority of the people had turned against Spain be- 
cause of her maladministration and her recent cruelties. And, 
moreover, there are not lacking indications that Mabini was, 
in the early months as well as later, closely identified with the 
military programme.^ It was in connection with this pro- 

^ This order, which was issned on July 15, the day when Aguinaldo forwarded 
to Dewey the proclamations of independence and the decrees organizing the rev- 
olutionary government, is among the captured documents now in the War Depart- 
ment at Washington. A translation of its most significant paragraph was given in 
Cong. Recordy 67th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6130, in a speech of Senator Spooner, and 
reads as follows : " All Filipinos must understand that they are now in the Kati- 
punan, whether they want to be or not, and hence it is the duty of all to contribute 
life and property to the arduous enterprise of freeing the people, and he who 
disobeys must stand ready to receive the corresponding punishment. We can not 
free ourselves unless we move forward united in a single desire, and you must 
understand that I shall severely punish the man who causes discord and dispute." 

* Indeed, it is only too plain how well such appeals to the race instinct as Ma- 
bini put in religious form in his " True Decalogue " concorded with the secret 
propaganda of the Katipunan, which was founded more frankly on racial feeling 
and contemplated the resort to more brutal methods. Many versions of the oath 
of the Katipunan have been given, but they all practically amount to the same 
thing, differing somewhat in phraseology. Here is the form of initiation and oath, 
translated from the original Tagalog, from a document signed March 6, 1900, by 


gramme, however, that Aguinaldo displayed his dominance ; 
though it was not altogether undisputed, especially later on, 
when the revolution had expanded to include a wider range 
both of men and of territory. The influences of favoritism and 
nepotism were again at work with Aguinaldo, as they had been 
in 1896-97, and his relatives and personal associates of Cavite 
were so prominent as to give the lie to Mabini's attractive pic- 
ture of a government free from " spoils," founding its dis- 
tinctions upon merit and achievements.^ 

** Moises Abueg," filed as " No. 514-15 of Captured Insurgent Documents " in 
the War Department and reproduced here by the courtesy of Captain J. R. M. 
Taylor : — 

** 1st. From to-day yon will be a brother of the Katipunan, you will understand 
your obligation to regard with esteem the true brother of the Katipunan, because 
we are born in one and the same country, of one and the same people, descendants 
of one and the same blood and color, that is to say, sons of one common mother. 

** He who desires to become a brother will be asked the following questions : — 

** 1st. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will never do injury to the 
Philippines ? 

" 2d. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will help the Filipino people 
in their aspirations ? 

" 3d. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will always esteem our 
brothers of the Katipunan ? 

" 4th. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will be able to assassinate 
your parents, brothers, wife, sons, relatives, friends, fellow-townsmen, or Katipu- 
nan brothers should they forsake or betray our cause ? 

" 6th. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will shed your last drop of 
blood in defense of our Mother Country ? 

" 6th. Do you swear before our Lord Jesus that you will sacrifice your life and 
goods when there is the slightest possibility of our brothers being in need of 

*' For all of this, that we, your brothers in the Katipunan, may have evidence 
of all you have sworn, you will allow us to extract a drop of your blood with which 
to write your name, so that we, your brothers of the Katipunan, may know that 
you will never betray our cause. 

*' This being done, and the blood being drawn, his name will be written in his 
own blood, and although it is but a little drop, he will never up to the last hour 
of hit life cease to remember to be on his guard as a true brother, for it is blood 
drawn from his own body. 

*<MoiBE8 Abueo. 
•* March 4th, 1900." 

^ Whether Mabini ever raised his voice against this favoritism at the time does 
not appear ; others did later on, though guardedly, and with the entrance of new 
elements into the revolution, especially men of education and position, it was some- 
what onrbed. In hit posthumoui memoirs (in which Mabini, who wai deposed 


Coincident with the transfer of the insurgent capital from 
Cavite to Bulak^n province early in September, the revolution 
entered upon a new phase. This was not, however, because of 
the fact that the first revolutionary Congress assembled 
and was formally opened at Malolos on September 15,^ but 
because there were associated with the congress, and there 
were coming into the executive councils of the revolution at 
the time a number of men of wider experience and education, 
conspicuous among whom were several distinctive conservatives 
who unquestionably enjoyed great prestige and respect. As far 
as the Assembly itself was concerned, it was representative in 
character in no proper sense of the word ; its members had not 
been chosen by the voice of the people, and they were to a 
very slight degree real representatives of the provinces or the 
different tribal divisions for which they were the nominal 
spokesmen.^ Moreover, the Assembly was rarely ever more 

from power in May, 1899, judges Aguinaldo very harshly), Mabini says : ** Be- 
lieving that the aggrandizement of the people was only his own personal aggran- 
dizement, he [Aguinaldo] did not judge the merits of men by their capacity, char- 
acter, and patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and relationship which 
united them to him ; and, desiring to have his favorites disposed to sacrifice them- 
selves for him, he showed himself lenient toward even their faults." {El Corner^ 
do, Manila, July 23, 1903.) 

1 For a description of this event, see a letter of F. D. Millet, Harper's History , 
pp. 65-72. Among the accompanying illustrations are also those of the menu of 
the banquet given at Maloloa on September 29, which was declared " Philippine 
Independence Day." 

* No one seems ever to have analyzed carefully the membership of the Assem> 
bly, though various general statements have been made about it. The Govern- 
ment at Washington cabled in 1901 for a list of its members, showing those elected 
and appointed, but the one on file in the War Department does not seem to be 
final or authoritative. It is not of vital importance, in any event, to know just how 
many were elected and how many were appointed directly by Aguinaldo; for, as 
will be seen further along, the elections conducted in the provinces were held by 
commissioners of his own appointing (usually by his military representatives), and 
the men who were chosen in this way, whether as municipal or provincial officers 
or as representatives at Malolos, could not be chosen unless acceptable to the per- 
sons in charge at the center of insurgent affairs. The decrees of June 18 and 23 
provided that the representatives should be chosen by the votes of the chiefs of 
the towns of each province, but where the majority of the towns of a province had 
not yet liberated themselves from Spanish control, " the Government shall have 
power to appoint provisionally those persons who are most distinguished for high 
character and social position." Most of the provinces of Luzon (which alone had 


than the mouthpiece of the men who held executive positions, 
either in the military or the civil organization or in both, and 
such divisions as on rare occasions took place among the mem- 
bers were, with one or two exceptions, merely the echoes of 
dissensions among the principals of the insurrection. The dis- 
cussions of the constitution of the new government occupied 
the Assembly for over two months, and kept certain political 
theorists quite busy ; it ended in the adoption of practically 
the same instrument as Mabini had drawn up, and meanwhile 
the government was administered by decrees as it had been 
before the Assembly was convened, though that body was oc- 
casionally consulted. The real contest going on for several 
months at Malolos was not fought on the floor of the Assem- 
bly, except as echoes of it were there heard. It was, at first, a 
contest between conservatives and radicals to see which should 
direct the framing of the plan of government and of a policy 
to be adopted as to future relations with the United States ; 
entering upon a new phase at about the time the treaty was 

been civilly organized under Spain) were to have two representatives each, though 
Cavite (which had not yet become a civil government under Spain) was, like Ma- 
nila, to have three; the military governments, including all the provinces of the 
fiisayaa, and the comandancias were to have one representative each. I have a copy 
of the official list of the representatives, furnished by a member of the Assembly. 
It contains ninety-four names, but the column headed provinces, which should 
show the district supposed to be represented by each member, is blank. Of the 
ninety-four members therein listed, forty-eeven are known to me to be Tag^Iogs, 
of whom thirty-four live all or a part of the time in Manila; eight are Ilokanot 
(one a resident of Manila) ; there are two each from the Kagayan Valley, Panga- 
sinan and Pampanga, and two Bikols, the latter residents of Manila; only four are 
certainly from Bisayan provinces, of whom one is probably Tagalog by descent; 
and twenty-seven names I am unable to place, among whom there may be a few 
Bisayans. The list includes such military men as Pio del Pilar and Isidoro Torres. 
The majority are half-castes, and it is probable that some among the twenty-seven 
unclassified are or were also residents of Manila. In January, 1899, Aguinaldo's 
commissioners to treat of a modus vivendi with the Americans admitted that no 
delegates to the assembly representing other islands than Luzon had been elected, 
being appointed instead (Sen. Doe. SSlt 67th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2711). The list of 
members which they furnished (ibid., p. 2760) is, with the change of one or two 
names, the same as that analyzed above, as is also the list printed with the official 
edition of the Constituci6n politico de la Repuhlicn Filipino, which contained ninety- 
two names. lAter, appointees were added to make the number one hundred and 


signed at Paris, it became a contest between the partisans of 
peace and those of war. 

Long before the fall of Manila, the effort of the Span- 
iards to draw the Filipino conservatives to themselves had 
^^fracased," to use the expressive Spanish intransitive. Some 
of these men were in the Filipino camp before the 13th of 
August, and Aguinaldo seemed instinctively to feel that they 
were the Filipinos whom he should put forward for negotia- 
tions with the Americans following the events of that day. 
There can be very little doubt that, with the exception of a 
very few conspicuous sycophants and hirelings of the Span- 
iards, this class of Filipinos were quite as glad to see the 
downfall of Spain written upon the wall as were their brothers 
who had taken a more decided position and had striven to 
bring about that downfall. Those who were simply wait- 
ing to see how events would turn, and then to cast their 
fortunes on the winning side, were only too numerous, both 
in Manila and in the provinces. But there was a handful of 
men who, besides having property interests at stake, held very 
decided opinions both as to the fitness of the masses for inde- 
pendence and of their self-appointed leaders to guide them, 
and who, furthermore, even had they felt satisfied on these 
points, were sufficiently well posted on international politics 
to predict failure for any attempt at that juncture to establish 
an independent government in the Philippines. The fact that 
these men were now willing to associate themselves to some 
degree with the Aguinaldo organization is testimony to the 
great importance which that organization had already assumed 
among the people, at least of Luzon ; quite as much as that, it 
is also evidence that Aguinaldo himself felt that it was im- 
portant to have these men nominally if not actively iden- 
tified with his cause. ^ In September, the place of Secretary of 

1 General (then Major) J. F. Bell, who had been among the Filipinos a great 
deal before August 13, in a special report to General Merritt (Sen. Doc. 62^ 
p. 381), remarked upon the efforts of Aguinaldo to ally with himself prominent 
and wealthy Filipinos, as early as August 29. 


Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet, which had been left open until 
some one with prestige could be named for it, had been be- 
stowed upon Cayetano S. Arellano, generally recognized as 
the Filipino of most solid legal attainments and a man re- 
spected by all, Spaniards as well as Filipinos. Judge Arel- 
lano, who had been named by the Spaniards a member of the 
"Consultative Assembly," and had for three months been 
eagerly sought also by the Cavite organizers, had held himself 
rigidly aloof from affairs until the fall of Manila somewhat 
cleared the situation. He had, however, in private letters urged 
upon the Filipinos the desirability of securing definitely the 
aid and protection of the United States for whatever should 
be the future government. This idea was actively pressed upon 
Aguinaldo by Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, himself the nephew 
of a prominent deporte of 1872, a physician and a man of at- 
tainments in Oriental linguistics and in the bibliography of 
the Philippines, and who, after long residence in Paris and 
Spain, returned to Manila a few years before the war between 
Spain and the United States. Aguinaldo conferred upon him 
the nomination of Director of Diplomacy in the Department 
of Foreign Affairs. Gregorio Araneta, a prominent young 
lawyer of Manila, of Bisayan birth, also of the conservative 
party, was made Secretary of Justice, and Benito Legarda, a 
wealthy half-caste business man of the capital, was named Di- 
rector of Agriculture, Commerce, etc. Aguinaldo's military 
associates, Baldomero Aguinaldo and Mariano Trias, retained 
respectively the posts of Secretary of War and Secretary of 
the Treasury, while Felipe Buencamino was for a time head 
of the Bureau of Public Works. The membership of the 
Cabinet shifted so often that it was afterward difficult at times 
to say just who was who or what. The main thing to note is 
that the more characteristic conservatives remained but a short 
time in it. In the background was always Mabini ; and, though 
Aguinaldo listened with deference and with every evidence of 
agreement to the counsel of the men whose names he was glad 


to make ostentatious display of, they soon discovered that he 
was really giving his ear to some one else. The project of ad- 
dressing to the United States Government a manifesto asking 
the establishment of a protectorate on lines mutually accept- 
able was the chief aim of the conservatives. Aguinaldo gave 
his verbal assent, and ostensibly the foreign policy of the 
Government was to be directed to that end; in fact, it seems 
to have been so decided by a formal vote of the Cabinet; but 
the representatives who had been empowered to speak for the 
Malolos Government in Paris and London and those sent to 
the United States were not instructed along those lines. " Ask 
for the recognition of our independence," was their word from 
Mabini; and to the conservatives at home, Mabini, though at 
the outset not holding any official position at all, claimed that 
he thought it would be more dignified to wait for the United 
States to propose the idea of a protectorate. At the beginning 
of November, the distinctive conservatives virtually dropped 
their connection with the Malolos Government, though they 
did not all formally renounce their relationship with it until 
late in December. Whatever connection these gentlemen main- 
tained with the Malolos organization from November to Feb- 
ruary following was for the purpose of exerting their influ- 
ence for peace, and, in some cases at least, this connection was 
maintained at the express request of General Otis.^ The atti- 

^ See Otis'i Report, 1899, for bis statements aboat how he kept in touch with all 
that was going on at Malolos. The fact that these conservatives were so decidedly 
favorable to a peaceful arrangement with the United States, and that it was only 
this class of men with whom General Otis came in contact, seems to explain in 
large part his remarkable optimism, lasting almost up to the outbreak of hostili- 
ties ; he appears to have taken it for granted that tbe conservatives were going to 
control. Senor Arellano has been, since 1899, the Chief Justice of the Philippine 
Court; Senor Araneta was one of its members under the military government, and 
is now Solicitor-General; Senores Pardo de Tavera and Legarda were members of 
the Taft Philippine Commission. Felipe Buencamino is authority for the statement 
that Arellano wrote him in June, 1898, from the province of Laguna, whither he 
had retired and where he remained until after the fall of Manila, presenting the idea 
of union with the United States, and saying: " Avoid all doing and undoing, and 
when America has established a stable order of affairs, then it will be time enough 
to make laws." That remained consistently the political creed of this able jurist. 


tude of the conservatives has been stated by one of them as 
follows : — 

As soon as it seemed highly probable that the sovereignty of Spain 
in this archipelago would be transferred to America . . . the idea 
occurred to certain of the wealthy and educated residents of this 
capital and of some adjoining provinces of immediately accepting the 
new sovereignty. As the absolute independence of the country was 
impossible, owing to its peculiar conditions and those of its inhabi- 
tants, on account of its situation and of the dangers to which it was 
exposed by the conflicting interests of the foreign powers and the 
ulterior designs which they might have upon any or all of the islands, 
these people thought that this was the best thing that could be done.^ 

Against this class of men, ordinarily of the greatest pres- 
tige and influence among their people, there was arrayed the 
paralytic young ex-law clerk Mabini, firm in his ideal of racial 
unity and independence, and becoming more and more bitter 
toward the Americans every day that it seemed more likely 
they would stand in the way of the realization of his dream ; 
while behind him — yet for the most part not really in sym- 
pathy with his intellectual aims — were the miUtary chiefs and 

who, Governor Taft has repeatedly stated, would honor the highest bench of any 
country. For testimony on these points, especially regarding the e£Port of the 
conserratives in September and October of 1898 to address to the United States 
an appeal for a protectorate, see exhibits B and C of Mac Arthur^ 8 Report of 1901 
(Rept. War DepL, 1901, vol. i, part 4, pp. 117, 120); Rept. Phil. Comm., 1900, vol. 
n, pp. 390-92 (Dr. Tavera's testimony); and Sen. Doc. 62, p. 604. The last cita- 
tion is from the testimony at Paris of General Whittier, who stated that he had a 
personal interview with Aguinaldo at Malolos on October 25, when the latter said 
"that his people were divided into two parties — those in favor of absolute inde- 
pendence and those of an American protectorate; that the parties are about equal; 
that he is waiting to see who will have the majority ; in that case to take his posi- 
tion." Dr. Tavera, testifying in Aug^ist, 1899, gave it as his opinion that Agui- 
naldo merely pretended to accept the conciliatory policy in the early fall of 1898 
and that he identified the conservatives with him to " keep them from forming a 
party." In exhibit B of MacArthurU Report, Buencamino says that the plan of a 
protectorate was adopted in the Cabinet meeting, but that at the same time the 
youthful propagandist, Teodoro Sandiko, came to Aguinaldo from Manila and as- 
iored him that the Japanese consul had told him his country would help the Fili- 
pinos to their independence, and thereupon independence stock once more rose in 
the Malolos market. 

^ See exhibit C (statement of Florentine Torres, of MacArthur*t Report), cited 
in preceding note. 


civilian place-hunters, now occupying positions of greater 
power, prestige, and gain than ever before, or than they might 
expect to hold in any stable society, and having no desire to 
relinquish these benefits. There was a large number of mod- 
erately educated men, especially in the provinces, who, from 
former association with the Filipino propaganda of reform, or 
from having been made to suffer recently at the hand of Spain, 
or from a natural sympathy of race, were inclined to go with 
the Malolos Government in anything it might do ; if reached, 
these men might readily fall in with the position of the out- 
spoken conservatives, especially after the Malolos mihtary or- 
ganization began to commit abuses in their localities, but 
otherwise they would accept the decision of their compatriots 
at the center of affairs, whether for independence, a protec- 
torate, or even quite complete American control. As for the 
great majority of the people, they, as always, awaited the word 
from above ; it was to be taken into account, however, even 
though their initiative in this or any other matter is com- 
pletely out of the question, that the stories they had heard 
about the Americans, first from the Spaniards and now from 
the military Filipinos, made them quite ready to regard the 
newcomers as a scourge to be averted if possible. 

It is less important to make a detailed study of just what 
were the ideals of government of certain Filipinos, as revealed 
in the constitution and decrees of Mabini and the constitution 
as modified in some degree by the Assembly, than it is to com- 
pare these pretensions as to what government should be with 
the practical workings of the institutions which the Filipinos 
called into being. Of course, it is easy to be unfair to them in 
doing so ; it was a time of war and social disturbance, and the 
government they put in operation can in no sense be consid- 
ered to have had a fair trial. On the other hand, we have, for 
these present purposes, to deal with facts, not with written 
proclamations, and it is also to be borne in mind that the the- 
oretical constitutions of men like Mabini do not by any means 


indicate what sort of government the Filipinos would conduct 
for themselves if they had a fair start and were working under 
normal conditions. Even with all allowance for the unsettled 
state of affairs in 1898 and 1899, there are certain discrep- 
ancies between the principles of the revolution as proclaimed 
at Bakoor and Malolos and the actual operations of its various 
branches which we cannot overlook.* 

First, we have to note that the strict separation of execu- 
tive, legislative, and judicial powers, proclaimed both in the 
Mabini and Malolos instruments in various ways, was a thesis 
merely. It was not only infringed by various provisions for 
expanded powers of the executive that were written into these 
constitutions themselves, but was virtually rendered null and 
void by the operations of the clique of men who directed the 
Government and who could base almost any assumption of 
power by the executive upon the reading of some of the vague 
" provisional clauses " of the constitution. Mabini and the 
others, who, to a lesser degree, dabbled in constitutional writ- 
ing, were not at all familiar with the history of parliamentary 
and constitutional government in those countries wherein in 
modern times such government had been originated and car- 
ried through to success. Their model was Spain and the Span- 
ish-American countries, and the direct connection of the 
Filipino constitution with those of Spanish or semi-Spanish 
institutions, particularly with those of the Argentine Republic 
and Mexico, may be easily traced. Part of the preamble to the 
Constitution of the United States was copied literally ; but in 
the main such influence as that constitution had upon the 
Malolos document is seen in provisions which came to the lat- 
ter filtered through the constitutions of Spanish-American 

' As the Malolos Constitution has been widely circulated in Rept. Phil. Comm.f 
1900 (vol. I, exhibit iv), and in Sen. Doc. t08 (part 1, p. 207 et teq.)^ and as this 
document was so largely based upon the draft made by Mabini, it has been thonght 
unnecessary to make either of these documents a part of this rolume. The Span- 
ish text of the Malolos Constitution may be found in the official editions issued 
from the Barasoain press in 1890, under the title Corutitucidn politica de la Repub- 
Uca Filipina. 


republics. Mabini provided for the election of the President 
of the Republic by delegates, or electors, of the provinces, 
themselves chosen by delegates from the municipalities, as in 
Mexico ; at Malolos, this was altered so as to provide for the 
election of the President by the Assembly itself — thus vio- 
lating at the very outset the principle of mutual independence 
of the three branches of the government. He had a four-year 
term, and Mabini gave him an absolute veto, which the Malo- 
los Assembly provided might be overruled by a two-thirds vote. 
Whereas Mabini conferred upon the Assembly the specific 
powers ordinarily considered vital to parliamentary govern- 
ment, discussion at Malolos and the growing demand for ex- 
ecutive control caused these powers to be sadly curtailed, and 
they appeared only in a modified form, and negatively, as 
prohibitions upon the power of the executive to negotiate 
treaties, alienate territory, etc., except after the consent of the 

The qualifications, manner of election, and number of mem- 
bers of the Assembly were not prescribed in the constitution, 
but left to a special law, which had been passed upon the lines 
laid down by Mabini in his draft. As for qualifications, aside 
from that of being twenty-five years of age or more, there 
were only certain general stipulations that the men chosen 
must be fit and worthy, of which the most specific was a 
property qualification (itself indefinite), to the effect that 
every representative must possess a " steady income assuring 
him a decorous and independent life." Plainly, the provision 
of Mabini that, after the census had been taken, there should 
be one representative for each 25,000 people (though not 

^ One of the instances of the failure of the Filipino authorities to preserve the 
separation of the powers of government (or, more probably, really to comprehend 
what was so repeatedly proclaimed as a principle of their government) is seen in 
Aguinaldo's instructions to the President of the Assembly on November 16, 1898, 
that he should report weekly all members absent and the excuses given fop 
absence. (See brief of same, p. 42 of the compilation of insurgent documents by 
J. R. M. Taylor entitled Report on the Organization of Civil Government by Emilio 
Aguinaldo and his FollowerSj which will be cited hereafter as Taylor's Rept.) 


more than five to any one province) would require men of 
property; the taxing capacity of the Filipino people would 
make a congress of 250 men a heavy burden. The idea of a 
permanent committee of the legislature to sit during its re- 
cesses and see that the government is not looted by the execu- 
tive (that seems to be its chief end) was copied from the legis- 
lative schemes of Spain and the Spanish-American countries. 
Though it was provided that no national debt should be in- 
curred without the consent of the Assembly, and that this 
body should also fix the size of the army, nevertheless the pro- 
vision whereby it should pass on the budget annually presented 
by the executive might easily warrant the incurring of ex- 
penditures by the executive which the legislature would be 
compelled to pay; the initiative in this respect lay with the 
executive, not with the legislature. In providing for the right 
of the members of the Cabinet to appear on the floor of the 
Assembly and take part in the discussion, yet requiring them 
to withdraw before the vote, there was some confusion of ideas 
as to the separation of powers; apparently, the Filipinos halted 
between a plan of responsible cabinet government and that of 
which the United States is the principal example, as when 
they proclaimed their government to be " popular, representa- 
tive, alternative, and responsible." 

Again, such a provision as that giving the President power 
to " see that in the entire territory speedy and complete jus- 
tice shall be administered " was open to all sorts of possibili- 
ties for interference, not merely with local governments, but 
also with the judiciary. As a matter of fact, the new Govern- 
ment never came to possess a real judiciary, and therein lay 
perhaps its chief defect, considering the opportunity which its 
quasi-military tribunals afforded for abuses. No provision was 
made for courts in the constitution, except that inferentially 
there was to be a supreme court; its organization and that of 
all subordinate courts was left to the Assembly to provide by 
laws, except that the Chief-Justice and Attorney-General were 


to be nominated by the Assembly " with the concurrence of 
the President and his Cabinet," and it was asserted that these 
judicial officers should have "absolute independence of the 
executive and legislative powers." Mabini's constitution had 
provided an elaborate system of courts, from the supreme court 
to the justices of peace, including district audiencias and pro- 
vincial courts. In spite of the oft-declared separation of the 
branches of government, the courts were, according to him, 
to "see to the execution of their judgments." Yet they were 
strictly limited to the application of the particular law to the 
particular case; there was, in repeated ways, the appearance 
of the Spanish idea of hedging about the discretion of the 
judge, who becomes, under that system, a sort of refined auto- 
maton for the application of the haii^fine distinctions of a lit- 
eral code to the adjudication of a specific right or the pre- 
measured punishment of a criminal. Evidently having the 
abuses of the Spanish summary courts in mind, Mabini strove 
to throw about the individual the safeguards of such a bul- 
wark as the writ of habeas corpus ; not knowing what that 
procedure was, he but stabbed after it with his pen in the 
dark. At Malolos they followed him in providing that every 
man arrested must be arraigned within twenty-four hours, and 
must be committed for trial or released within seventy-two 
hours ;^ but no penalty was ever provided for the violation of 
this guaranty, nor was any specific procedure provided as the 
remedy for such violation. Similarly, with the declarations as 
to the inviolability of domicile and other individual rights; 
and Mabini's very definitely worded prohibition of the confis- 
cation of property, except by the exercise of the right of emi- 
nent domain, was not closely copied in the Constitution of 
Malolos, which would appear to have left the door open for 
the embargo and enjoyment of the income of private prop- 
erty, if not actually for its confiscation. Nor was Mabini fol- 
lowed in his prohibition upon the entail of property (in line 

' The full benefits of this guaranty were, however, accorded only to Filipinos. 


with his idea of a republic which should eventually place all 
men upon an equaHty), nor in his prohibition of the pain of 
death, except for military insubordination in the face of the 
enemy, nor in his other rather vague efforts to do away with 
the abuses of military courts. For, in the mean time, military 
courts and the courts of civihans which might virtually be 
called military courts were in full operation under the pro- 
visional decrees of Aguinaldo, and these courts furnished 
what administration of justice there was in most of the prov- 
inces for a long time — except directly under the sword of 
the district commander of the Filipino army. The decrees 
of June gave the municipal and provincial executive officers 
jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, which were to be con- 
ducted for the time being under the existing Spanish codes : in 
criminal cases, the municipal chief was to conduct the prelim- 
inary examination and remit prisoners for trial to the provin- 
cial board of four members; in civil cases, the municipal coun- 
cils of four members were to sit as a court of first instance, 
and their decisions went on appeal to the provincial board; in 
both civil and criminal cases, there was appeal to a permanent 
committee of nine members of the Assembly of the central 
government. As legal attainments were not specifically re- 
quired for any of these offices, it may be supposed that such a 
system, even though temporary, left a very large opening for 
all sorts of abuses. Yet a distrust of courts and of judges, born 
of years of experience under the thoroughly corrupt Spanish 
judicial system in the islands, had spoken in a dozen generally 
worded safeguards of Mabini's, and had appeared in the final 
constitution as Article 81 : " Any citizen can institute a public 
prosecution against any of the members of the judicial power 
for the crimes they may commit in the exercise of their office.'' 
It is quite common in Spanish- American countries for local 
executive officers to possess also the powers of a sort of police 
judge; but here the entire judicial power, both in civil and 
criminal matters, was turned over to the executive and legis- 


lative branches of government. Perhaps it is even fortunate 
that the events which brought one war upon the heels of 
another in the PhiHppine provinces prevented this civil juris- 
diction from being exercised. And even before the second 
war brought the excuse for the proclamation of martial law, 
the military power was almost invariably supreme in the prov- 
inces, as well in judicial matters as in executive. Aguinaldo's 
decree of June 23 had devoted a whole chapter to "Military 
Courts and Procedure," wherein, in place of the strict prohibi- 
tion on the trial of civilians by military courts which Mabini 
was reserving for the future, the clauses as to what constituted 
military offenses, not only in their definition of what consti- 
tuted spies, but also in their inclusion of those who committed 
robbery or arson, opened the way for the military commanders 
most thoroughly to police the country and impose their ideas 
of law through the military courts. And under the existence 
of martial law, of course, Mabini's guaranties of individual 
rights were relegated to the distant future. 

Following Mabini, the Malolos Constitution guaranteed the 
rights of petition and association and of freedom of speech and 
of the press, but it omitted Mabini's clause " without previous 
censure " in affirming the liberty of the press, which was some- 
what significant, even had not all these rights been suspended 
throughout the whole period of the revolution.* If the guar- 

^ It has already been shown that the first periodical of the revolution was sup- 
pressed because not under the immediate control of the authorities at Bakoor. 
On July 4, 1898, Aguinaldo had issued a decree establishing El Heraldo de la Revo- 
lucion (afterward Gaceta de Filipinas) as the official organ of the Revolutionary 
Government, and providing further that " while the abnormal circumstances of war 
continue, every kind of publication is prohibited unless licensed by the Govern- 
ment." (See Disposiciones del Gobiemo Revolucionario de Filipinas, pp. 55-56 ; this 
pamphlet was the first document issued by the press just established at fiakoor, 
which was later transferred to Barasoain, near Malolos.) Mabini's idea had been 
that each provincial government should as soon as possible publish a newspaper in 
the local dialect, in order to enlighten and instruct the masses. Such periodi- 
cals were later on started in Batangas, Camarines, and perhaps in one or two other 
provinces ; but they had a brief existence, and were not altogether encouraged by 
the Filipino military authorities. The official gazette above mentioned continued 
in existence until the collapse of the insurgent organization at Tarlak, and during 


anties of individual rights which only a well-organized and 
respected judiciary could assure were nullified by the absorp- 
tion of judicial power into the executive, it was hardly to be 
expected that such liberties as depended largely or wholly 
upon a subordination by the executive of its own powers to 
the interests of individual freedom would be more carefully 
preserved. The theoretical scheme of government which the 
Filipinos put forth did not back its elaborate protestations and 
assertions of individual rights by any specific safeguards and 
forms of procedure designed to secure what was so generously 
promised ; but we might waive all questions of their theory of 
government, if we found that actually, regardless of forms em- 
ployed, their local institutions assured to the people of the 
provinces and of the municipalities the security from abuse and 
the actual freedom of life which it was the announced aim of 
the revolution against Spain to achieve. It is more important 
to know what was the actual state of affairs in the provinces 
between the time of the overthrow of Spain's authority and 
that of the appearance of the American army than to analyze 
the Constitution of Malolos or the manifestoes of Mabini. It 
was in local government that Spain had started to make re- 
forms, had achieved so little, and had left the people so gen- 
erally dissatisfied and restless. We should expect a Filipino 
government to set to work at once to remedy the defects of 
the municipal and provincial regime, which touched the masses 
of the people in their daily life, whereas the central Govern- 
ment was far-removed and virtually non-existent to most of 
them. What did the Filipino reformers of Bakoor and Malo- 
los actually do? 

the time from September, 1898, to November, 1899, sereral dailies openly or 
•ecretly allied with the insurrection were printed at Manila and at the yarious insur- 
gent capitals, the one of most note and of longest life being La Independencxa. They 
were more properly newspapers than the ofBoial gazette, but were scarcely under 
less close control of the authorities. Though La Independencia was for a time the 
mouthpiece of General Luna, it never ventured to speak freely the criticisms oa 
Aguioaldo's party which Lunm made io private. 


First, they made the entire scheme of local government, 
clear down to the outlying barrios of the towns, center in 
themselves, just as it had previously centered in the governor- 
general. One might wonder why there should be in the Cabinet 
a Department of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce, when 
there was already a Department of the Interior ; but it speedily 
appears that the Department of the Interior was the clearing- 
house of governmental operations in the provinces and muni- 
cipalities, and that "intervention of the Government" in the 
affairs of these local entities was provided for in the constitu- 
tion, exactly as it was under the Spanish Directorate of 
Civil Administration. The old Spanish system of municipal 
and provincial organization was also retained ; and the few 
modifications made in it by the decrees of June 18 and 20 
were never actually carried into effect in the towns. Even 
where some opportunity for local initiative was left to the local 
officials, they did not improve it. It was enjoined upon the 
municipal councils, for instance, that they must give especial 
attention to keeping up and improving the schools, and the 
Malolos Constitution made education "obligatory and gratui- 
tous"; but it was not a time of devotion to matters of educa- 
tion, and, while there were schools in most of the towns, at 
least until active fighting came near at hand, the curriculum 
and the methods continued to be the same as before, and the 
teachers had either no pay at all or the same wretched pay as 
ever, and resorted to the usual methods of squeezing it out of 
the pupils in fees, to living in the schoolhouse or renting part 
of it, and so on.^ 

In the matter of the suffrage, the new Filipino Government 

^ Mabini had, as had most of the revolutionists of the intellectual type, great 
dreams of future educational reforms. Under his provisional constitution, private 
schools were to be allowed to flourish, but the Government should also adopt a 
complete system, comprising a primary school in each town aud large barrio, a 
" college " (Spanish secondary school) in each province, and a university in Manila. 
Tagalog was to be the official language of instruction, but English and French (not 
Spanish) should be taught in the secondary schools, and when the knowledge of 
English became sufficiently common, it should be the official language. 


was no more generous, if always as generous, with the people 
whom it was supposed to represent as the Spanish Government 
had been. The principalia of each town had included those 
famihes in which village offices had been virtually hereditary, 
and had in 1893 been extended to include also the principal 
taxpayers ; this local aristocracy really comprised, as a rule, 
all the Filipinos of education or property, and the chief defect 
of the system lay in that it did not impose the test along those 
lines, and thus use the franchise as a stimulus to advancement 
(something of little consequence, however, in the Spanish sys- 
tem, since the voters exercised no real influence in local af- 
fairs, and government was a thing from above or was at the 
dictation of the friar curate). The Aguinaldo decree of June 
18 provided that the local officers should be elected by a gath- 
ering of the " citizens most distinguished for their education, 
social position, and honorable conduct," provided they were 
twenty-one years old and were " lovers of PhiUppine independ- 
ence." This was a new way of perpetuating the principalia ^ 
though it might, reasonably interpreted, have opened the way 
for the exercise of the suffrage by those members of the new 
middle class who had in some places begun to rise from the 
ranks by virtue of possessing a degree of education. Such a 
loose clause, however, left it in the power of the election au- 
thorities to admit or exclude whom they pleased, especially in 
view of the test of loyalty to the revolutionary government 
which was implied in the phrase " lovers of Philippine inde- 
pendence."* And it is a matter of fact that the elections were 

1 Mabioi apparently planned for a broader basis of suffrage when conditions 
should be more favorable ; but that might wait, as his entire provisional constitu- 
tion waited, till the country was ** prepared " bj the revolutionary government " to 
be a tnie republic." The clauses were, however, drawn loosely, as were nearly 
all of Mabini's, and might have been so interpreted as to restrict the suffrage 
very closely ; moreover, it is noticeable that he always put forth rather vague ed- 
ucational and property qualifications for the holding of office. In the new muni- 
cipal law which Mabini later drew in more definite form, and which was not 
passed because of the outbreak of war, the lines were drawn more definitely in 
favor of both education and property as qualifications not only for holding o£Bce 
bat also for voting. The significant thing is that the man who was perhaps 


managed as the authorities at Bakoor or Malolos had previ- 
ously dictated ; in those places where there was reason to fear 
that this would not be so easy, Aguinaldo's military represen- 
tatives, almost invariably Tagalogs, simply took charge and 
ran the civil organization, unless it was disposed to be amica- 
ble and acknowledge their authority. From Bakoor, and later 
from Malolos, Aguinaldo sent out commissioners to organize 
the towns of each province, and municipal elections were held 
under the control of these men, while provincial elections were 
either so held or the electors were gathered at the Filipino 
capital itself to choose their of&cers under the eye of authority. 
In all cases, no civil officer could assume his functions until 
his election had been formally accepted and promulgated by 
Aguinaldo. There is plenty of evidence that the elections so 
held no more expressed the free choice of the people interested 
than did those which had previously been subject to the dic- 
tation of the Spanish friar or the Spanish provincial governor.^ 

inclined to be most liberal about Filipino suffrage should have recognized the 
necessity for its limitation to the comparatively few. And still he proposed in his 
constitution that the chief executive officers of both towns and provinces should 
not be chosen by vote, but be nominated by the President from lists prepared by 
the local councils. 

1 Taylor's Rept. says (pp. 11-13) : "The commissioner of elections was ap- 
pointed by Aguinaldo, usually from the military commanders in the province 
where the election was to be held. ... It is evident that the commissioner ap- 
pointed to supervise really chose the municipal authorities ; a limited group of ad- 
herents confirmed his selection. . . . Men who had been on friendly terms with the 
Spaniards were usually excluded from all participation. . . . Aguinaldo usually 
approved the decision of his representative. One case of informality which led to 
his disapproval of the election was that the presidente who had been certified to 
him as elected was reported to have been on good terms with the Spanish author- 
ities of the town. . . . The number of electors evidently depended upon the will 
of the commissioner appointed to hold the election. ... In the town of Lipa, Ba- 
tangas, with a population of 40,733, at the election held July 3, 1898, a presidente 
was chosen for the town ; 25 votes were cast for him. On November 23, 1898, 
at an election held at Bigan, Ilokos Sur, for presidente, to succeed one who had 
been elected representative in Congress, 116 votes were cast ; the population of 
Bigan is 16,000. October 5, 1898, at an election held at Gamu, Isabela province, 72 
votes elected a presidente ; the population of Gamu is 6101. October 7, 1898, at 
Echague, Isabela province, a presidente was elected for whom 54 votes were cast ; 
the population is 5400. October 2, 1898, at Kabagan Nuevo, Isabela, 111 men 
voted out of a population of 6240. . . . The town of San Jos^, Batangas, protested 


With a few changes of the names of officers, the system of 
municipal and provincial government was merely a continua- 
tion of that already in existence, conforming to the Maura law 
of 1893. The only new features in local administration to be 
borne in mind are that, in the towns, the police or quasi-mili- 
tary control which had formerly been in the hands of Span- 
iards was now in those of Filipino miUtary chiefs or of the 
local officials themselves, and that the superior authorities of 
the provinces, who had the same close supervision over the 
towns as of old, were now Filipinos instead of Spaniards. The 
friar was gone, or was a prisoner in his former place of power, 
and this, to be sure, was in some respects the greatest change 

unayailingly to Aguinaldo against the result of an election held at 10 p.m. in a storm 
of rain being considered valid." On August 9, 1898, the local presidentes of Pam- 
panga province had been assembled under Aguinaldo's eye at Bakoor to vote for 
the four members of the provincial government ; and, on the very day that Ma- 
nila fell, one of Aguinaldo's commissioners and Cavite friends was conducting at 
Old Cavite a similar election for Bataan province. In December, 1898, over forty 
presidents of towns in the Bikol province of Camarines, in southern Luzon, were 
summoned all the way to Malolos to select their provincial officials. Similarly, 
in the case of Fangasinan, a province of northern Luzon, of doubtful loyalty to 
Aguinaldo, in the preceding September ; for the form of the act of this election 
and Aguinaldo's approval, as well as a similar document in the case of a muni- 
cipal election in Bataugas, see ibid.f pp. 34-37. Immediately thereafter (pp. 37- 
51) follow briefs of various decrees and executive orders of the Revolutionary 
Government. Among them is one of August 10, 1898, wherein, at the time of the 
departure of a military expedition for the provinces of the Kagayan Valley, under 
the command of Aguinaldo's associate, Daniel Tirona, the latter is endowed with 
all the powers possessed by the President with reference to the appointment of 
commissioners and approval of elections in northern Luzon. The central Govern- 
ment used its power of " intervention " in the local governments : we find, for in- 
stance, that permission to open a drug-store in one of the Cavite towns was passed 
upon by the Secretary of the Interior ; we find decrees of Aguinaldo permitting 
the annexation of new barrios to towns or of towns to provinces to which they 
had not formerly belonged (one, allowing a town in Tayabas to be renamed 
** Aguinaldo " ; another, declining the petition of the people of Paete, Laguna, to 
rename their town *' Rizal" ) ; we find orders of the Secretary of the Interior to 
the provincial governors to check abuses of authority being committed in their 
towns, and a reminder of Spanish rule in the prohibition of the use of corporal 
punishment by local officials ; similar orders for the inspection of municipal ac- 
oonnts to prevent eml)ezzloment ; and, just before the outbreak of war with the 
United States, an order from this source that the towns be cleaned up and better 
police measures be taken, as it is desired to show strangers *' that the Filipinos 
know what is customary among civilized people." 


wrought by the new regime ; but his successor in the pulpit, the 
once despised native coadjutor, usually sought to exercise the 
same control over local affairs as had his Spanish predecessor, 
and, where the municipal chief was a man of force enough to 
resist his control, there was commonly a continual clash be- 
tween the two. This contest, where the civil officers were not 
disposed to be mere puppets, was made three-sided by the pre- 
tensions of the military chiefs of the provinces and of their 
subordinates to the exercise of powers over the people in all 
sorts of ways. Between them all, it is a question if ever before 
the humble Filipino had had so much bossing. 



Spain had, as we have seen, employed her taxing powers in 
the Philippine Archipelago so as to create monopolies or favors 
for herself and her own citizens; so as to bear unduly upon 
the masses, thus tending to stifle ambition; so as to put a 
handicap upon new industries and economic progress generally, 
thus limiting the opportunities for the individual to rise; and 
so as to restrict, if not wholly prevent, local improvement and 
initiative, through the absorption by the central Government 
of practically all the products of taxation. Here, then, there lay 
open to the public economist so many opportunities for reform 
as to embarrass his decision upon a comprehensive system 
which should do more toward achieving the professed aim of 
the revolutionists than the best constitution ever written, by 
giving them economic freedom, the most real freedom there 
is. It is hard to find any evidence, however, that there was 
embarrassment in this particular way at Bakoor or Malolos. 
Mabini had but a dim comprehension of the most simple prin- 
ciples of public economy, and his thinking was wholly in another 
line; to him, reform was merely a political charter. Those 
Filipinos who had some definite ideas as to faults in the Span- 
ish economic system were not in power. Doubtless in time, 
had the insurgent organization survived, the system of taxa- 
tion would have been changed, perhaps improved, and at any 
rate it is quite sure that the more unpopular imposts would 
have been abolished or reduced. All we know is that, so long 
as it did rule, its first thought was for the products of taxa- 
tion, and not for the forms in which it should be laid ; hence, 
there was a disposition not to let go any of the imposts that 
had produced money for Spain, and there was no little ingenu- 


ity displayed in obtaining new and additional war taxes with- 
out going on record as creating a new form of impost. Nor 
■was the hold of the central Government relaxed; it continued 
to control the financial administration clear down to the last 
barrio. The municipalities had the same sorry privilege as 
under Spain of levying and collecting for their own use what 
they could obtain from market and fishery licenses, fees for 
registering cattle, etc. All money collected under the general 
levies must be reported quarterly to the provincial board, and 
only so much of it was to be left in the town as was imme- 
diately needed for current expenses. The provincial officers 
must send all surpluses to the central Government, which ex- 
ercised through its control of the local budgets the right of 
deciding just how much should be spent in every town.^ The 
new Government had sustained at the outset the loss of the 
customs revenues of Spain; Manila, where much the greater 
part of the foreign trade was carried on, remained in the hands 
of the Spaniards, and the Filipinos succeeded the Spaniards 
in the possession of Iloilo and Sebii only for a little while, 
and when conditions forbade trade. They recouped them- 
selves in some of the hemp and tobacco ports they held by 
imposing a ten per cent ad valorem tax on exports from 
the provinces to Manila, and in one form or another they 
continued to make the hemp crop pay money to their or- 

* This system was perpetuated in the Constitution of Malolos. which virtually 
turned the entire control of the fiscal policy and administration into the hands of 
the central executive. Mabini clung to the same idea of central control of all the 
funds of government; in his constitution, he provided that one third of the money 
collected in the towns should go to the provincial treasury and two thirds to the 
central Government. That the insurgent organization should at first have con- 
tinued the system already prevailing, and should have sought to draw from the 
towns all the fimds possible, was not strange, especially as some of the Spanish 
sources of revenue were now cut off; but the constitutions of Mabini and of Malo- 
los expressed the ideas of their makers as to what the Government ought to be in 
the future, and in them one discovers no evidence of a comprehension of where 
Spain had most seriously crippled internal improvement. In the budget for 1899, 
proclaimed by Aguinaldo without the intervention of Congress, the towns were al- 
lowed, as a means of replacing the former revenues from cock-fights and gambling 
games, to tax all meat sold one cent per pound. 


ganlzation for a long time after this organization had really 
ceased to exist. But these were all really special war levies 
rather than evidences of Filipino ideas upon methods of taxa- 
tion.* Spain's other chief source of revenue, the cedula tax, 
which produced more than the customs, was retained; its 
unpopularity with the Tagalog masses led to its being re- 
duced at first to a peseta (twenty cents Mexican) per quarter, 
it being assessed only against males over eighteen years of age, 
but it was restored in February, 1899, as a war tax, called 
a " certificate of citizenship," but in reality imposed accord- 
ing to the old Spanish regulations. ^ It could not, however, 
even if well enforced, produce so much as formerly, owing 
particularly to the loss of the collections from the Chinese 
and others in Manila who paid higher rates for cidulas,^ So 

1 Mabuii*s ideas on taxation, as revealed in his provisional constitution, are in- 
teresting : ♦* Care will be taken to make the contributions direct and very easily 
borne." . . . 0£Rce-holders are to be exempt from all forms of taxation [not so 
confusing a provision as it might seem, as Mabini had in mind taxes assessed di- 
rectly upon persons rather than upon possessions]. . . . He would have a sort of 
income-tax, levied upon those who receive " an annual income more than covering 
the necessities of a comfortable existence." . . . The urban tax was the only real- 
property tax he had in mind, and that was a tax on rents, not on value, of real es- 
tate. . . . There is much unconscious humor, therefore, in his reiteration of a be- 
lief in direct taxation, especially when he also says as to customs duties: " Recourse 
will be had to indirect taxation only to protect the industries of the country, or 
when the burden it imposes is compensated by some benefit, or, at most, to restrain 
undue luxury." After thus curtailing, as he apparently supposed, the opportuni- 
ties for unduly expanding the Philippine tariflf system, he naively provides: "So 
also the rates of duty will be fixed with regard to the tariffs established in the 
neighboring ports and in the greater part of the other nations of the world." 

* The old division of the population into eight classes was retained, but the 
basis was made the ownership of real or personal property, not occupation: those 
"owning, controlling, or managing a capital in money or property" of over 
$25,000 were to pay 8100 a year; so on, down to 81000 capital; the sixth nnd 
seventh classes, the most numeroiis, being those over eighteen years of age, with- 
out property to the value of SIOOO, paid, as imder Spain, the males 82 and the 
females 81. 

* Methods were not lacking, however, for making the Chinese who came under 
the jurisdiction of the Filipino (rovemment in the provinces pay at least their 
full share. In authorizing the appointment of CapUanes de Sangleyes ('* Captains 
of the Chinese," local officers who, under the Spanish regime, were invested 
with anthority not only to collect the registration fees, but also to enforce certain 
police and hygienic regulations among their ooantrymen) on October 20, 1898| 



also the old Spanish system of forced labor was retained ; this 
was perhaps because of the exigencies of a time of war, but 
at any rate it was true that the humble Filipino had, in losing 
his Spanish masters, retained the same Filipino masters in the 
village caciques, whose power was unchecked, and had ac- 
quired new military masters of his own race. The local chiefs 
were already skilled in using him as their personal "fag," and 
they now found no interference with their enjoyment of this 
privilege from higher Spanish officials; if the public got any 
greater benefits than formerly out of the use of the labor thus 
embargoed in its name, there remained no evidence that this 
was so/ 

The new Government voluntarily deprived itself of what 
revenues it might have secured for the central treasury by the 

Aguiiialdo stated that for the time being they would have no power but that of 
collecting taxes from their fellows. See the brief of decrees, etc., already cited, 
in Taylor* 8 Rept. 

^ In consequence of the pressure of those Filipinos still remaining at Malolos 
who had some comprehension of the fact that, if their reform did not begin with 
the masses, it was no reform at all, Aguinaldo issued a decree on January 5, 1899, 
abolishing the old fifteen-day tax of forced labor, and proclaiming that henceforth 
the Government would pay wages for all the services rendered to it and all the 
citizens would be treated alike. (It is supposed, also, that the fact that the Ameri- 
cans at Manila and Cavite had from the first paid regularly, by the day or week, 
high wages to their Filipino employees, had something to do with the issuance of 
this decree.) But this remained a dead-letter; it was bound to be so, in view of 
the inveterate caciquism of the Philippines (which virtually makes whole popula- 
tions the peons of certain families), unless the central Government was able to 
enforce it, and took stem measures to do so, and the central Government winked 
at the violations of the decree. Indeed, on March 21, Aguinaldo, in response to 
queries from the provinces, decreed that the revenue deficiencies produced by the 
abolition of forced labor should be covered by the work of men who had not paid 
their registration tax, and, if necessary, the people might be exhorted, on patriotic 
grounds, to "work for the public good." On April 17, it was specifically provided 
that those who had not paid the personal contribution could be forced to work; 
but one familiar with Philippine conditions will understand that the loophole left 
by the decree of March 21 was quite sufficient to insure the continuance of the 
old abuse. The April 17 decree hints that the Spanish methods of 1897 were being 
copied by the new Filipino authorities, in so far at least as concerns the charging 
for military passes from town to town. Again, on June 9, 1899, we find Aguinaldo 
instructing his provincial officers to secure donations of horses and carts for the 
army, exempting those who donate them from " carrying baggage and doing other 
personal services " for the army. (See Taylor^s Rept. for these decrees.) 


continuance of the old Spanish system of selling monopolistic 
privileges for conducting cockpits, lotteries and other gambling 
games ; but it is to be feared that its subordinate provincial and 
municipal officers not infrequently found it convenient to con- 
vert revenue from these sources, in a more irregular manner, 
to their own pockets/ The Spanish tax on the rental value of 
town property, the nearest approach there had been to a tax 
on real property, was retained, but it had never been produc- 
tive of much revenue outside of Manila. It was in connection 
with their efforts to expand the revenue by special war taxes 
that the revolutionists made their only approach to basing 
their impositions on real property. Mabini's idea for an as- 
sessment of one per cent on all real property, land as 
well as buildings, for the purpose of securing registration in 
the land records, now in possession of the Filipino pro- 
vincial governments, was expressed in a decree of Novem- 
ber 7. How far, with the continuance of their rule, the 
revolutionists would have gone on from this step to institute 
a real-estate tax, it is impossible to say, as this provision was 
apparently designed for employment only on the single occa- 
sion and for the emergency. The issuance of Government 
bonds seemed to offer a more easy way of raising money from 
the provincial Filipinos who possessed much property; where 
these bonds were not subscribed with real or feigned willing- 

^ Mabini provided in his constitution that lotteries, raffles, gambling licenses, 
and the cockpit monopolies should be " in the future onlj sad reminders of the 
Spanish Government," though cock-fights could still be held on one Sunday of 
each month and on civil holidays. Part of this provision was incorporated into the 
Aguinaldo decree of June 20. But deep-rooted customs, however good or bad, are 
not thus easily wiped out, and cock-fighting and card-gaming were interfered with 
only by the operations of war and the depletion of the gamesters' pocketbooks. 
Cock-fighting had, indeed, been absolutely prohibited, along with card games for 
money, in a decree of Aguinaldo on August 16, 1898 ; the repetition of these pro- 
visions on March 24, 1899, is some indication of how far they were obeyed. The 
idea that Mabini had in mind, namely, that for such diversions there be substi- 
tuted athletic exercises and village fairs, was a most salutary one ; but such re- 
forms, these Filipinos were to learn, do not come by prohibitive laws. The opium 
monopoly was retained, in a modified torm^ for the purpose of getting revenue 
from the Chinese. 


ness, there was no great hesitancy about applying virtual 
coercion. " Loans " and " donations," with informal promises 
to repay when the financial affairs of the new Government 
should be in better shape, were also resorted to, as was the 
seizure of property, mostly that of the religious orders and of 
Spaniards, but sometimes of Filipinos not considered properly 
zealous for the cause. A great many of the latter were in 
Manila, and there can be no doubt that much of the money 
raised from them, especially in 1899 and thereafter, was vir- 
tually a sort of blackmail ; even assuming that the majority of 
them were desirous of doing something to assist the revolu- 
tionary campaign, it is quite certain that the size of their con- 
tributions was, in very many, if not most cases, dictated by 
an anxiety to protect their property interests in the provinces, 
and later on even by fear for their own persons. On a par 
with the compulsory subscriptions to bonds was the organiza- 
tion of co5perative companies with high-sounding names, every 
'' good Filipino " being supposed to take stock in them.^ 

^ Taylor^ s Rept, contains the only important data thus far published regarding 
the sources of revenue of the Revolutionary Government (see pp. 15-19, 56-101 ; 
also the briefs of decrees, 37-51) ; and these data are very incomplete. They show 
that the revolutionary central Government should have received, from May 31, 
1898, to September 1, 1899, 2,586,733.48 pesos ; but there is discrepancy between 
this sum and the actual receipts, as recorded in the final ledgers, of some 530,000 
pesos, while over 700,000 pesos are not traceable, in the accounts available, to any 
particular province. Of the money traceable to provinces, it is significant that, ex- 
cept for Samar and Leite (where tribute was laid on the exports of hemp), which 
contributed about 200,000 pesos, practically all the rest came from Luzon, partic- 
ularly from the tobacco and hemp provinces ; less than 5000 came from all Panai 
and less than 3500 from Sebd or from Mindanau, while Negrog, the island most 
important for its sugar crop, contributed a paltry 834 pesos. " Seizures " of one 
sort and another represent nearly 432,000 pesos, of which 70,000 were in cash; 
"loans," 143,000 and " donations," 76,000 pesos. Captain Taylor finds that 6 per 
cent bonds for at least 500,000 pesos were issued, in denominations of 25 and 100 
pesos ; the cash-books show that 388,500 should have been paid in on subscriptions 
by September 1, 1899, but the ledgers reveal that only 233,000 had been recorded 
as paid up to October 19, 1899, a very noticeable discrepancy, even for faulty 
bookkeeping. The annual budget, approved by Aguinaldo, under his war powers, 
on February 12, 1899, just after the outbreak of war with the United States (see 
pp. 68-77), shows an approach to systematization of taxes and revenues; these 
were estimated to be 6,324,729.38 pesos. Perhaps it was to this sum that Felipe 
Buencamino had reference when he testified {Hearings Com. Inso Aff.^ p. 307) that 


Ostensibly, the foreign merchants of the archipelago paid 
the export and other taxes levied by the insurgent Govern- 
ment on the trade of the provinces carried on by sea/ In fact, 
it was, of course, paid in part by the foreign consumers of 
Philippine products and in still larger part by the Filipino 
producers and consumers themselves. Import duties were also 
for a short time levied, but never worked satisfactorily ; and 
there was much fluctuation in the minds of the revolutionary 
authorities about the export dues, which were first five, then 
ten per cent, and at intervals abolished entirely, while it is to 
be feared that they were sometimes as much as the military 
commander at a shipping-point thought the foreign merchants 
would stand, or were gauged by "arrangements" made with 
him by the latter. They were taken off in early 1899, upon 
the representations of the foreign business men that they 
did damage chiefly to Filipino interests, but were restored on 
April 1 of that year, under the name of a " pilotage tax " (the 

Againaldo's commissioners " to request donations from the rich in the provinces 
. . . have assuredlj coUected more than $50,000,000, but the Philippine treas- 
ury . . . reoeived nothing bat $7,000,000 " ; he declares also that the provincial 
and municipal officials " appropriated to themselves all the public materials and 
built their own houses." Among the decrees and orders of Aguinaldo were the 
following of significance : One of September 23, 1898, ordering provincial gov- 
ernors to arrest and punish men collecting funds for the insurrection without au- 
thority ; one dated August 22, 1898 (probably issued in November and dated 
back), appointing committees to collect contributions in Manila ; and one of No- 
Tember 16, 1898, instructing the presidents of towns in Pampanga, where many 
of the wealthier residents were not in sympathy with the Tagalog administration, 
" to see that the national loan is subscribed for." One of the means by which Fil- 
ipino patriotism was exploited at the time is cited by T. H. Pardo de Tavera (Bib- 
lioteca JUipinOf p. 168), who says of the " Philippine Electricity Company " that it 
was organized by an employee of the lighting-plant in Manila " who was suddenly 
transformed into a general of Aguinaldo's army. The company was only an ex- 
ploitation of the unfortunate stockholders." The project, a favorite of Aguinaldo's, 
of organizing a bank with large capital, the shares to be subscribed only by Fili- 
pinos, was abandoned at Malolos in December, 1898. War contributions were 
levied not alone upon the rich or well-to-do ; when the insurrection began to 
•offer the strain of fighting and defeat, the masses were everywhere called upon 
for contributions in kind, sometimes even losing their entire crops. 

^ At first, a duty of five per cent ad valorem was also laid on all goods shipped 
from one point to another by rail or by river, as well as by sea ; but this part of the 
decree of October 17, 1898, was repealed on November 15 (Taylor*s RqU., p. 57). 



amount being, however, ten per cent of cargo, not an assess- 
ment upon tonnage). The foreign owners of vessels engaged 
in the inter-island trade had already paid at Malolos (in one 
case, at least, to Aguinaldo in person) license fees for these 
vessels. The very remarkable decree of November 30, 1898, 
that foreigners doing business in the provinces should pay an 
amount anywhere from 100 to 5000 pesos for a license was 
revoked on January 23, 1899, when war seemed imminent and 
it was desired to use the foreign houses as bankers for the 
revolutionary organization ; but it was not forbidden to the 
foreigners to " gain favor " with the organization, or with its 
chief agents, and the captured records reveal that the former 
knew how most effectively to do so.^ 

The avowed chief aim of the revolution was to free the 
Filipino people from the domination of unpopular ecclesiasti- 
cal masters, and to secure for them the religious, political, and 
social freedom which that domination had denied them. It 
would, therefore, not be unfair to judge the organization 
which had assumed the burden of this programme by what it 
accomplished, and proposed to accomplish, in these respects. 
The all-important religious question, underlying all others, 
should be considered under two aspects: first, as to how 
far the people were secured in the enjoyment of religious 
freedom ; and, second, as to what attitude the Revolutionary 
Government, which assumed to represent the people, adopted 

1 Taylor's Rept. was written primarily to bring forth important evidence 
showing the connection of a suit brought against the United States. The part 
foreign business houses had in prolonging the opposition to the United States, 
is especially full of data on this subject (see pp. 17-18, 56-101, particularly 
pp. 80-81 for donations of rice to the insurgent army by one of the most promi- 
nent companies of Manila). See Tel. Corr. Aguinaldo^ p. 33, for the message of one 
of his agents in Manila on December 22, 1898, to the effect that the high license 
fee on foreigners doing business in the provinces was " impolitic at this time, when 
we seek the sympathy of the powers." See ihid.j p. 18, for an indication that in the 
preceding August the British railroad company operating the line to Dagupan was 
already working in harmony with the Filipino Government. La IndependenciOf 
November 16, 1898, presents the complaint of the Government collectors that 
the railroad company bad not yet paid its taxes for September and October. 


toward the Roman Catholic Church, and particularly toward 
the friars. 

By "religious freedom " is here meant not so much a theo- 
retical attitude as to the old questions of separation of Church 
and State and of freedom of worship, which were not of great 
or immediate practical importance among a people so uni- 
formly Roman Catholic as the Filipinos. Rather is it of vital 
concern to discover how far, with the forcible removal of their 
former ecclesiastical masters, the people were liberated from 
the petty tyranny that had been exercised over them in their 
social life as well as in matters of conscience, and how far, if 
at all, their new Government undertook to make sure that this 
tyranny was no longer exercised. It need not occasion sur- 
prise that decrees of the President, both before and after the 
question was supposed to be settled at Malolos, violated the 
principle of separation of Church and State; but it is of sig^ 
nificance that so little effort was made to reform abuses against 
which outcry had been made, and that, both from govern- 
mental provisions and from the testimony of individuals, we 
obtain evidence that the people were subjected to dictation as 
before* in their family and local affairs, though now by priests 
of their own color, who had less prestige and undivided au- 
thority than their predecessors and hence not uncommonly 
clashed with the local officials. That the people preferred the 
new masters to the old, especially in this time of the arousing 
of racial sympathies, was most likely true ; but that they were 
the actual gainers, except in this matter of sentiment, has at 
least not been made plain. The establishment of civil marriage 
and the revival of the schedule of fees for religious services 
that had been promulgated by Archbishop Sancho de Santa 
Justa y.Rufina in 1772 were, indeed, efforts at the reform of 
abuses ; but aside from the fact that the schedule of fees was 
by no means always observed by native priests, the Govern- 
ment not only does not seem ever to have conceived any 
broader plans for reform in the matter of ecclesiastical ca- 


ciquism, but, had it promulgated such plans, they would have 
been nullified by its repeated efforts to employ the priests to 
serve its cause as propagandists or as instruments to restrain 
the people or to incite them to do its will.^ 

The religious question was the subject of one of the few real 
discussions which took place in the Assembly at Malolos. Prefer- 
ential importance has herein been assigned to the deeds of the 
Kevolutionary Government as showing how far it could have 
been expected to guarantee a new era of freedom of thought 
and action in religious as in other matters; yet the discussion 
and final vote on this question at Malolos, which stand only 
as an expression of Filipino theory as to what government 
should be, has also its significance. When a vote was reached 
on the question of recognizing the equality of all forms ©f 
worship and proclaiming the separation of Church and State, 
on November 29, 1898, the result was at first a tie, and the 
friends of freedom of worship finally prevailed by a single 
vote, cast by a general of the revolutionary army who had 
been one of the secretaries of the meeting and at first refused 

* Civil marriage and civil registry had been established by the decree of June 
20, though not in the form in which they figured in the provisional constitution of 
Mabini, nor afterwards in the Malolos Constitution, which put in effect the exact 
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code on this matter (simply nullifying, therefore, 
the exceptions to that code as it was promulgated in the Philippines in 1889). 
The decree of June 20 provided that civil marriage was obligatory, and ecclesi- 
astical marriage, if performed, should follow it; it consisted simply, so far as re- 
gards the ceremony, in the signing of a document before the municipal chief to the 
effect that the marriage was by "mutual consent"; but the publication of notice 
thereof was required to be made during three weeks in a manner very similar to 
the proclaiming of banns by the Church. From July, 1898, to late 1899, the 1772 
schedule of fees were so many times enjoined upon the native priests, in decrees, 
circulars, letters, etc., as to confirm the information that it was not by any means 
uniformly observed. Among the briefs of decrees and orders of Aguinaldo, al- 
ready cited above, may be found these: July 26, 1898, the priests are to preach 
loyalty to the insurrection; August 10, 1898, church questions are to be left to the 
Congress; September 1 (also December 9), 1898, the civil authorities are to avoid 
conflicts with the Filipino priests, and are again reminded that the decision as to a 
religious policy is for the Congress; nevertheless they are to see that the July 26 
decree is enforced; June 24 and August 10, 1899, provincial officials and certain 
priests are to see that the parish funds in the hands of the Filipino priests are 
invested in the national bonds, in order " to avoid loss." 


to vote.^ Moreover, the article thus incorporated into the con- 
stitution was a negative sort of clause, of the briefest sort, 
quite in contrast with the specific clauses in which Mabini had 
proclaimed his theories as to freedom of conscience, while 
there was conspicuously lacking the clause whereby Mabini 
had exempted all religious societies, not subject ecclesiasti- 
cally to the jurisdiction of the ordinary, from the freedom of 
association guaranteed to all others. And in January, when the 
constitution was finally put in force with the clauses conferring 
full dictatorial powers upon Aguinaldo in case of war, the en- 
tire provision as to separation of Church and State was sus- 
pended until the meeting of a "Constituent Assembly," and 
it was provided that the municipaHties should employ and pay 
the native priests. Certain circumstances make it difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that there was, in late 1898 and early 
1899, some sort of flirtation between the Roman Catholic 

^ An acconnt of this day's session, with brief summaries of the discussion, wiU 
be found in La Independencia for November 30, 1898. Only fifty-two representa- 
tives were present, of the approximately one hundred members of the Assembly 
as listed ; at least thirty-five of these were Tagalogs, six were Ilokans, and the 
real representative of the Bisayas seems not to have had any part in the matter. 
This was an unusually important meeting of the Assembly, and more interest had 
been aroused over it than over almost any other day's session; yet the number 
M above stated was swollen by eight officers of the army. The Manila attorney, 
Felipe Calderdn, who was afterward to be identified very prominently with the 
•nit against the Roman hierarchy at Manila for the possession of the estates of 
St. Joseph's College, was the chief spokesman for making the Roman Catholic the 
state religion. Some of his arguments are worth mentioning: he declared that aU 
nations but Belgium have an established church, — disregarding the United States, 
not to say Mexico, upon whose constitution a great deal of the document then 
under discussion was based; England's trouble in Ireland he thought an example of 
the disasters consequent upon doing away with the State Church; the separation of 
Church and State be pronounced a " pure Utopia," possible in pure reason, but 
never in practice; the Filipinos were united in one religion, and they ought not to 
open the way for discord, but should foster national unity; and he considered that 
the principle of majority rule implied also that the religious views of the majority 
should prevail over those of the minority; while, to the objection that the Papacy 
would interfere in the working of government, he retorted that it never had done 
io. The session was rather disorderly, as the speakers were somewhat heated. The 
first vote was 25 to 25. It was objected that the presiding officer had no power to 
resolve the tie, and that officer, Pedro Patemo, was apparently not eager to do so. 
Pablo Tekson, later governor of BulaklUi province, finally cast the deciding vote 
in faTor of freedom of worship. 


hierarchy at Manila and the clique in control at Malolos, or 
some members of it. Perhaps, on the part of the friar hier- 
archy, this was only an attempt to try diplomacy with the or- 
ganization which had so rapidly extended its control through- 
out the archipelago and which held in its power several 
hundred members of the religious orders. Undoubtedly, the 
Malolos dictators for a time entertained the notion of recog- 
nition by the Vatican, in the same way that they bolstered 
themselves up with hopes of recognition by Japan, by Ger- 
many, or by other nations; and they crazily imagined that cling- 
ing to the friar prisoners would help them secure such recog- 
nition. Certainly, there was at no time anything in common 
between these two parties, unless they regarded opposition to 
the Americans as such. Yet the hierarchy allowed itself to 
appear at times in 1898 to be dallying with men known to be 
in the councils of Aguinaldo, and often appeared to be hostile, 
passively if not actively, to American sovereignty, until the 
arrival of an American archbishop as apostolic delegate in early 
1900 caused a "right-about-face" in its attitude. And Fili- 
pinos not hitherto distinguished for their friendliness to the 
friars, or to the Church itself, were, in 1898, suspiciously fond 
of dwelling upon "religious unity"; the new Filipino "chief 
military chaplain " became a much more important figure in 
the revolution than his predecessor in the office had been in 
1896-97 ; and it was planned to negotiate at Rome for the 
full recognition as parish priests of the Filipino coadjutors, 
just as they were to be used as the effective political propa- 
gandists of the insurrection in the field.^ Exactly what was 

^ There are only certain suspicious circumstances upon which to base the hy- 
pothesis that there was some sort of flirtation between Malolos and the arch- 
bishop's palace in Manila; and all are explainable upon grounds indicated above. 
Until all those concerned shall speak frankly, we shall not know the truth. Gre- 
gorio Aglipai, the Filipino priest who, as " war chaplain," gradually assumed vir- 
tually the control of a bishop over the native priests in most of northern Luzon, 
who afterward organized and led the guerrilla warfare against the United States 
in North Ilokos and Abra provinces, and who became the head of the " Independent 
Philippine Church," the important schism from Catholic ranks in the Philppines, 


going on is not plain, and it may be that the revolutionists' 
plans were simply incoherent on this point, as on some others, 
and not capable of explanation. Whatever may have been the 
truth, the Filipino Government claimed, in holding the friars 
prisoners and in taking charge of their estates, to be acting in 
behalf of and as representative of the people; and it is more 
to the point to discover in what manner and in what degree 
they thus benefited the people. By an "additional article" to 
the constitution, appended at the time of the clauses providing 
for war in January, 1899, all the property of any sort belong- 
ing to the religious corporations was "understood to be re- 
stored to the Filipino people" from May 24, 1898. This was, 
as appears, simply a retroactive clause designed to give legal 
authorization to the confiscations already carried out. So also 
the clauses of the 1899 budget, adopted a few weeks later, 
providing for the administration of the friar estates by respon- 
sible parties or for their lease at auction, were measures de- 
signed to give some show of regularity to the handling of this 

is a central figure in the whole religions controversy from 1898 on. He has claimed 
(in the Manila TimeSy January 1, 1903, and in the New York Independenty Octo- 
ber 29, 1903) that in the summer of 1898 the Spanish archbishop and governor- 
general in Manila enlisted his services to negotiate with the insurgents in the field 
for cooperation with the Spaniards against the Americans ; that Bishop Hevia, of 
the Nueva Segovia Diocese, a prisoner in 1898 and 1899 in the Kagayan Valley, 
conferred upon him authority to perform the bishop's duties in that diocese; and 
that his general authority over the native priests in the province, acting as " mili- 
tary chaplain " under Aguinaldo, was recognized, and he was used as an agent by 
Archbishop Nozaleda at Manila. It is true that Aglipai, like others, was asked 
to nrge upon the Filipinos cooperation with the Spaniards. He is not snfiBciently 
•pecific about his other statements. It is, however, worthy of note, that, in spite of 
the virtually episcopal powers which he had assumed over the provincial clergy, 
he was not declared excommunicated by Nozaleda until very late in the day. It 
was Aglipai who was employed, in accordance with a decree of Agninaldo of June 
24, 1899, to inspect all the parishes of northern Luzon and see that their funds 
were invested in national bonds; the forwarding of funds by native priests to 
Archbishop Nozaleda was declared to be a " highly nnpatriotic act" The Dic- 
tator's decree of October 26, 1898, directing that appointments to parishes by Noza- 
leda would not be recognized, shows that at least no formal entente was ever reached 
on these matters, jiiRt as its implied requirement that preferment to parishes must 
reside in the Revolutionary Government is another indication of bow far this 6ot- 
•nunent came in practice from realizing Mabini's ideaL 


property by the comparatively small faction of revolutionists 
who had exercised the authority all the time, but who had 
just before shown that they dominated policy as well as prac- 
tice at Malolos by rushing through the provisional clauses of 
the constitution and framing up formal authorization for their 
dictatorial control, virtually thrusting the conservative Fili- 
pinos to one side.^ The property which it was claimed had in 
times past been usurped from the people was not restored to 
the people, who were instead to continue to pay the old rentals 
to new landlords, though landlords of their own race. No de- 
tailed accounts seem ever to have been kept to show in what 
manner this property was administered, what were the pro- 
ceeds from it, and how these proceeds were applied. Before 
many months, most of the territory in which friar properties 
lay was in the hands of the American army. Its tenants were 
made thereafter (secretly) as before to pay their old rentals, 
on the ground that they were contributing to the revolution ; 
but there are serious reasons for suspecting that, as in 1898, 
private parties were beneficiaries of the losses of the friars. 
Certainly, the tenants themselves had no gain to report.'^ 

The 300 friars whom the Filipinos made captives were a very 
conspicuous minority among the 8000 or 9000 Spaniards who 
at one time or another were made prisoners of the Filipinos 
in Luzon ; for not only was the Government of Spain con- 

1 For the provisions regarding the lease or administration of the friar estates 
by the Revolutionary Government, see Taylor's Rept., pp. 70-73. It may be sig- 
nificant, in connection with the hints above as to the revolutionists trying to come 
to terms with the Church, that the " additional article," formally confiscating the 
friar property, was held in abeyance so long at Malolos. 

2 Filipino gossip was busy in 1898, and later, with the intimate connection of 
members of the Ag^inaldo family and close friends of Agninaldo with the han- 
dling of friar property in Cavite and Mindoro. One of the first steps taken after the 
revolution was organized in Cavite in May and June of 1898 was the sending of 
an expedition from Batangas to seize the estates of the Recollects in Mindoro, in 
which island some of the Aguinaldos had conducted business operations. The con- 
cern of Fmilio Agninaldo over the sale of cattle seized on this estate is indicated 
in Tel. Corr. Aguinaldos p. 27. It should be added that no part of the money thus 
obtained had ever been traced to Emilio's hands; indeed, it is not now traceable 
at all. 


cerned in their behalf, but the Vatican also on repeated occa- 
sions evinced its solicitude, by representations made directly 
at Washington or through the medium of France and Spain, 
and the United States Government finally directed its com- 
mander at Manila to use all efforts in their behalf. Washings 
ton had at first stood upon Admiral Dewey's assurances that 
the revolutionists accorded excellent treatment to the prison- 
ers, and it had, after the occupation of Manila, for a long 
time been indisposed to take any step that would seem to in- 
terpose the Americans between the Spaniards and Filipinos. 
But as the statements from Home about the treatment of the 
friars became rather definite charges in place of rumors, and 
as the question was interjected to a slight extent into the ne- 
gotiations at Paris, Washington finally went so far as to 
instruct Otis by cable on October 28 to " use every possible 
means to secure their [the friars'] release and care for them." ^ 

^ The cable instrnctions of August 1 to Dewey and Merritt to prevent mis- 
treatment of the friar prisoners, if possible to do so, has been noted above (see 
p. 219). In this case, the complaint at Washington was made by Monsignor Marti- 
nellif at the instigation of Cardinal Rampolla. On August 29, the Spanish Gov- 
ernment complained, through the French ambassador at Washington, that the 
friars and other prisoners were being barbarously treated in the Philippine prov- 
inces. Admiral Dewey repeated in reply his previous information that the Span, 
ish prisoners were not cruelly treated, though neglected, for want of proper food, 
medical attendance, etc. The following instructions, sent on September 6 by Pres- 
ident McKinley to both Dewey and Otis, are especially interesting and enlight- 
ening (to the reader of to-day, though perhaps not to their recipients at the time) : 
** YoQ will exert your influence during suspension of hostilities between United 
States and Spain to restrain insurgent hostilities toward the Spaniards, and while 
maintaining a position of rightful supremacy as to the insurgents, pursue, as 
far as possible, a conciliatory course to all." Rampolla renewed his charges on 
September 13, making them specific as to the friars held prisoners in northern 
Lnzon being brutally treated. On September 16, replying to Spain's complaint 
through M. Cambon, Secretary Day said that the Government at Washington 
understood that the prisoners were " well treated." Yet on September 20, the 
War Department wired Otis : " If nnder control of your forces, protect [them] 
from inhuman treatment." Upon the renewed representations of the Vatican and 
of Cardinal Gibbons in October, along with further representations by Ambaa- 
Cambon, Otis was on the 18th of that month instructed to " use his good 
discreetly for the protection " of the friars, and finally the more urgent 
of October 28 (quoted above) was sent. Otis replied, on October 30, 
that Nneva Segovia' (the diocese of northern Luxon) did not recognize to any ex- 
tent Aguinaldo's aothority. (It had, ai a matter of fact, been organized in insor- 


This caused the correspondence which Otis held with Agui- 
naldo in November, endeavoring to make the latter see that 
the imprisonment of the friars was not justifiable according to 
international law, besides urging their release upon humani- 
tarian grounds. The contention of Aguinaldo, as drafted for 
him by Manila lawyers then at Malolos, was that the Spanish 
parish priests, as well as the civil officers, could be held pris- 
oners under the laws of war because they had been virtually 
or actually combatants against the Filipinos, the priests in or- 
ganizing the opposition to the insurrection, and the civil offi- 
cials by virtue of General Augustin's circular of April 23 
enlisting them all in the volunteer forces. It was also stated 
that the Spanish civil officers were being held " in order to 
obtain from Spain the liberty of the imprisoned and deported 
Filipinos," and the friars were being held both to assist in this 
purpose and " in order to obtain from the Vatican the recog- 

rection by troops sent from Cavite, and was in command of Aguinaldo's personal 
military representative, Daniel Tirona, who gave minute orders regarding the 
location and the treatment of Bishop Hevia and the friars with him.) The matter 
had also been brought up by the Spanish treaty commissioners at Paris, they 
asking for Spain the right to send reinforcements to deal with the Filipino insur- 
gents, on the ground that the United States was reported to be sending out troops 
and ships of war. The American commissioners denied these reports, but informed 
President McKinley that they thought every effort should be made to restrain 
the insurgents and maintain the status quo in the Philippines, since they could not 
take very strong ground with the Spaniards in the face of Dewey's cablegram of 
October 14. In this message, the admiral indicated how his attitude toward the 
Filipinos had undergone a change ; he said : " Distressing reports have been re- 
ceived of inhuman cruelty practiced on religious and civil authorities. . . . The 
natives appear unable to govern." (For the complaints from the Vatican and the 
instructions to Otis, see Corr. Rel. War, pp. 743, 788, 790, 793, 804, 831 ; for the 
correspondence with Dewey, see Bureau of Navigation, p. 125 ; also Foreign Beta- 
tions of the United States, 1898, p. 928 ; also ibid., pp. 808-11, 815-17 and 928-29, 
and Seti. Doc. 62, p. 314, for the representations through the regular diplo- 
matic channels and in course of the negotiations at Paris.) Some aspects of this 
matter were within the ken of the American press at the time ; as early as Aug- 
ust 11, 1898, the Nation treated editorially the question of American responsi- 
bility for the conduct of the Filipinos toward their friar captives. The daily and 
weekly press for the succeeding two months contains stray hints of informal inter- 
changes of opinion and information between Washington and the Vatican, and we 
find Archbishop Ireland, after conferences with President McKinley, setting out 
for Rome. 



nitionof the Philippine clergy."^ General Otis dropped the cor- 
respondence, because satisfied, according to his own state- 
ment, that the Filipinos would not give up the friars, while 
he was privately assured that they would soon release the 
Spanish civilians. Perhaps also the publicity which the Malo- 
los authorities had at once given to the correspondence and 
the indications that they were anxious to put him in the light 
of a self-constituted defender of the friars had something to 
do with the American commander's decision to let the matter 
drop. At any rate, the only practical outcome of the entire 
episode was that the Filipino leaders spread far and wide the 
report that the American commander in Manila was, like the 
Spanish governor-generals, under the control of the friars. A 
Various promises were made during the next few months as to 
the release of the religious and civil prisoners in the provinces, 
upon the urgent representations not only of Archbishop Noza- 
leda, who held some direct communication with Aguinaldo, 
but also of Seiior Arellano, who still retained a nominal con- 
nection with the Malolos Government, though actually re- 
moved from it.^ Finally, on January 23, when preparations 
were hastily being made for war, Aguinaldo decreed the re- 
lease of these prisoners and of all Spanish military prisoners 
who were sick. This decree was never meant to be carried out 
(unless, by carrying it out, the Filipinos could secure foreign 

* For the November correspondence on ibis subject, see Otis*8 Rept.f 1S99, pp. 
22-29. The Spanish text of the Aguinaldo letter of November 18 may be found 
in La Independmcia of November 22 ; it was considered final and unanswerable 
io the Malolos camp, and it closed the correspondence, as Otis did not send the 
reply which he had prepared. In La Independencia for November 16 will be 
found a lengthy editorial exposition of the Filipino (rovemment's attitude on the 
retention of the Spanish civilians and friars, quite likely prepared by the same 
hand which wrote the letter ; it is even more outspoken with reference to the idea 
that the retention of these prisoners would aid the Malolos Government in secor* 
iug recognition. 

* In his De/erua ohligada^ p. 37, Archbishop Nozaleda praises Chaplain Reaney 
of the United States Navy for his efforts in behalf of the prisoners, and claims 
that he (Nozaleda) induced Arellano to accept the place of Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs at Malolos, " only with the patriotic purpose of freeing the prisoners," but 
that the latter was forced to resign by the " Masons " who surrounded Aguinaldo. 


recognition and intervention), as subsequent events showed. 
It was repeated on July 5 and September 17 following ; but 
the friars and other prisoners who survived were released 
only as the advance of the American army set them free. 

The accounts that have been given, both by Americans and 
Spaniards, of the treatment accorded by the Filipinos to their 
prisoners have been very diverse and conflicting. This is in part 
due to the fact that in some places they were fairly well treated 
and in other places they were very badly treated. To bring out 
the facts, it is necessary to survey the operations connected 
with the spread of the revolution throughout Luzon and then 
to the central islands; in this way, we may at the same time 
discover its modus operandi as a military organization and 
somewhat about its character and the extent of its authority. 
We have already seen how the revolt was organized in the 
Tagalog provinces in June and July, also to some extent in 
Pampanga and Pangasinan and Sambales, and how the Span- 
iards were cut off and captured in an almost farcically easy 
manner. We have also seen that in these provinces, even in 
Cavite, close under the eyes of the revolutionary leaders, the 
proclaimed intention to conduct the war according to the most 
humane methods and civilized principles had not always been 
followed. Still, there were comparatively few authenticated 
eases of serious mistreatment of prisoners, most of these also 
being popular outbursts against certain friar priests, and there 
were some instances of scrupulously correct conduct toward 
the Spaniards.^ 

1 La Independencia, November 16, 1898, contains a letter signed by the late 
civil officials of the province of Pangasinan, including the governor and judge of 
first instance, and by some thirty civilians, all at the time (July 31, 1898) prisoners 
of Makabulos in Dagupan, and addressed to Governor-General Augustin at Manila, 
informing him that they were most chivalrously treated by their captors, and pro- 
testing against the reported shooting of Filipinos in Manila as being a possible 
provocation for a change in the treatment accorded to Spaniards held prisoners 
in the provinces. How far faith and credit are to be given to such a document is 
a question ; there may very likely have been some compulsion about the signing 
of it, and it could readily be interpreted as a threat on the part of the Filipinos 
to retaliate upon their prisoners. On the other hand, there was not much bitterness 


There had been no spontaneous uprising in the Ilokan 
provinces or in the Kagayan Valley (the Kagayan natives not 
being connected with the mutiny organized by a Cuban Span- 
iard on the steamer Compania de Filipinas off Aparri), though 
those districts which were most easily in communication with 
the capital had, of course, been greatly stirred up over the inci- 
dents occurring in Manila Bay, and there was some secret propa- 
ganda on foot among the Ilokans. The Tagalog organization at 
Bakoor did not feel ready to attempt any movement in northern 
Luzon until about the first of August ; they were waiting for 
more arms from China, they had their hands full in central 
Luzon, and they were not sure what would be the popular 
attitude in northern Luzon. When, finally, they had arms and 
men to spare for the expeditions to the Ilokan and Kagayan 
provinces, they entrusted the leadership entirely to Tagalogs, 
and the latter were very greatly aided, both in compelling the 
surrender of the small Spanish detachments and in winning 
the native people of those regions to their cause, by the news 
of the fall of Manila and of the naval rout of Spain in Cuban 

The Spanish military commander in the Ilokan provinces 
had, earlier in the course of the trouble, attempted to march 
into Pangasinan and join forces with his countrymen there; 

of feeling between Spaniards and Filipinos in Pangasinan, and there was unques- 
tionably some fraternization between tbem, even under the peculiar circumstances. 
Colonel Ceballos, the military commander captured when Dagupan surrendered 
on June 22, was at this very time accompanying the troops of Makabulos in their 
advance upon San Fernando de la Unidn, ostensibly as a mere observer, though 
perhaps under compulsion. El detastre Filipino (Barcelona, 1899), written by 
Carlos Ria-Baja, a prisoner of Makabulos, puts a rather di£Perent aspect upon the 
letter's treatment of the Spaniards. A very rabid Spanish book on the treat- 
ment of the Spanish prisoners, mostly Augustinian friars, in Pampanga is 
EpisodioB de la revoliuk^n Jilipina (Manila, 1900), by Joaquin D. Durdn, one 
of these friars; some of its charges have been proved well founded. See also 
Nuestra priiti6n en poderde lot revUucionarioa Jilipinos (Manila, 1900), by Ulpiaiio 
Herrero y Sampedro. Other Spanish l)Ooks and pamphlets on the subject, except 
as subsequently mentioned, are of little value or reliability; the history of the 
times may best be patched together from ioattered contributions and news items 
in the Manila press in 1898 and 1899. 


but he was cut off and made prisoner, as were they. His suc- 
cessor in command at Bigan seems to have felt that there was 
no great risk to his position, so long as the civil guard held in 
check any uneasiness on the part of the Ilokan towns. The 
same confidence must have prevailed among the Spanish civil 
officials. This and the friction between the civil and military 
authorities caused them to be caught off their guard when, 
at the beginning of August, forces under the youthful 
Tagalog leader, Manuel Tinio, started northward from the 
important Spanish port of San Fernando de la Unidn (which 
had been taken by a land movement from Dagupan, com- 
bined with the sending of reinforcements by steamer from 
Subig Bay) and rapidly threatened the scattered Spanish de- 
tachments in South and North Ilokos. After Bigran was 
abandoned, Tinio's advance was uninterrupted, and in Bangi, 
North Ilokos, the main body of the Spanish military force in 
that territory, numbering but 200 or 300 rifles, finding itself 
entirely cut off, surrendered to him. Other smaller detach- 
ments and scattered parties of civilians, who had hastily 
attempted to concentrate and escape when the alarm was 
spread early in August, were also captured at one and another 
point. Most of the civilians in North and South Ilokos and 
Abra, including particularly the friar priests of those regions, 
had managed, after a series of exciting adventures, to escape 
on small sailing-crafts, which rounded the capes of Northwest 
Luzon in stormy waters and landed them finally at Aparri. 
Thus Tinio missed the prize he especially sought, Bishop 
Jose Hevia of the Diocese of Nueva Segovia, who had been 
fleeing before his country's troops from Bigan, and who had 
escaped at Aparri at the head of a party of about threescore 
friar priests from those provinces, and a dozen nuns from the 
convent at Bigan. In the towns through which these fugitives 
had passed (along with other Spanish civilians, men and 
women), the friars had received many demonstrations of sym- 
pathy and evidences of regret that they were thus put to flight 


by the advance of the Tagalog forces ; unquestionably, these 
demonstrations of sympathy were to some extent sincere, as 
well as being mere outward expressions of Spanish-Filipino 
courtesy. The prisoners, mostly military men, who were cap- 
tured and held in the Ilokan provinces were, at least after 
their transfer to Bigan, treated quite well ; this was in part 
due to the fact that native residents of prominence frowned 
on any display of harshness or cruelty toward them, and in 
part to their being kept under the eye of Manuel Tinio, a 
humane commander. We have to record, however, that Bigan 
was promptly sacked, that Tinio proclaimed there a decree of 
the Revolutionary Government embargoing not only public 
property, but also that of the fugitives and prisoners, that the 
Spanish troops who capitulated on condition that lives and 
property be respected were searched and deprived of all their 
personal possessions, and that a Spanish lieutenant was stripped 
and publicly whipped before the house of the Filipino com- 
mander, Tinio's brother, at Lauag.* 

The Spanish fugitives who had managed to escape in boats 
had reached Aparri on August 20, and they looked forward 
every day to the arrival of a steamer which would bear them 

^ See Sastrdn, op. cit.f p. 541. Sastrdn takes most of his data regarding the 
spread of insurrection and treatment of prisoners in northern Luzon from Memorias 
del CautiveriOf published at Manila in 1900 by Father Graciano Martinez (Augus- 
tinian), one of the fugitives with Bishop Hevia. As I>anag was the scene of whip- 
pings later on which led to a cause celkbre in the American army, this incident of 
1898 may be remarked as bearing on the case of 1901. Whippings have been very 
common in that section, as in most others of the Philippines. The Spanish lieu- 
tenant in question was only getting a dose of his own medicine, which explains 
how he came to be singled out for such treatment. The Aguedo Agbayani who 
is mentioned (Father Martinez, p. 29, and SastT(Sn, p. 539) as being at the time so 
desirous of having the Spaniards remain, promising to organize the Ilokans to the 
number of 10,000 or 20,000, if necessary, to oppose the Tagalogs, was afterward as 
ardent a friend of the American military commanders in North Ilokos. At their 
urgent recommendation, he was made governor of the province by the Philippine 
Commission, when civil government was organized therein in August, 1901. This 
appointment was very bitt<;rly resented by the Ilokans who had been identified with 
the late insurrection, and they repeatedly charged Agbayani with having conducted 
ft sort of inquisition in his home, where men were beaten, one being killed, in order 
to make them give information of benefit to the American forces. 


to Hongkong. On the 25th, the Compania de Filipinas, which 
had figured in the Olongapo episode in July and had later 
been used in the successful attack upon San Fernando de la 
Union, arrived off Aparri, almost direct from Cavite, where 
300 or 400 soldiers had been loaded on board under the chief 
command of Aguinaldo's friend, Daniel Tirona, with Agui- 
naldo's former private secretary, Jose Leyba, and another 
close associate, Simon Villa, as subordinate commanders, 
under full instructions as to dividing between them the mili- 
tary command of the Kagayan Valley and as to the civil or- 
ganization of the provinces of Kagayan, Isabela, and Nueva 
Vizcaya and their towns. As soon as this vessel had taken on 
board the pilot sent out from Aparri at her signal, she lowered 
the Spanish and raised the Filipino flag. Aparri was defended 
only by soldiers of the civil guard and a few Spanish marines, 
forty rifles in all, and their commanders surrendered at the 
instance of the Spanish civilians, who thought that resistance 
might earn a worse fate for them ; it had also been discovered 
that the people, always considered loyal to Spain, would not 
fight against their fellow-Filipinos, and two towns just above 
Aparri on the Rio Grande were ready to surrender, if they 
had not already done so, soldiers from the steamer having 
disembarked and prepared to occupy them. The terms of ca- 
pitulation provided that the lives and property of the Span- 
iards were to be respected, and that they should be free to go 
where they pleased, no exception being made of the friars, 
while the Spanish military men were expressly included when 
they should have yielded their arms.^ The promise of liberty 

1 Such, at least, are the terms of the document which purports to be a literal 
copy of the act of surrender, cited as appendix 1 to Father Martinez's El Cauti- 
verio. It has been understood that Tirona afterward disclaimed this particular 
agreement, or at any rate interpreted it as not including the friars, perhaps on the 
ground that it was made without his sanction by the officers in command of the 
100 soldiers who were landed on the opposite bank of the river from Aparri and 
gave notice of an attack on the town in two hours. In describing the event Fa- 
ther Martinez (pp. 44-52) says the Tagalogs declared they had 2000 men on 
board the steamer, and be seems to beliere it ; any one who has ever seen thil 


never was fulfilled with respect to any of the prisoners, and 
that of respect for life and property was in many instances 
violated both with the friars and with some of the Spanish 
civilians. The friars were at once confined together, and their 
money and jewels ( " watches," one of their number puts it) 
taken from them ; one, who tried to conceal the money he 
had, was beaten before the rest, and others suffered buffetings 
at Aparri. They were at first not given food by their jailers, 
but the soldiers on guard and some of the residents of Aparri 
prevented their suffering any real distress on this account. 
Some of the more prominent members, including the bishop, 
were marched off, and salvos of blank cartridges at first 
caused the others to believe they had been shot.^ The real 
hardships and abuses began with the order to transport all 
the friars and nuns and some few of the lay prisoners, women 

600- or 800-ton boat will know how impossible that could be. On the other hand. 
General Otis, in assuring Washington on September 4 (Corr. Rel. War, p. 787) 
that the Filipinos had no boat that could carry over 250 men, either did not take 
into account their possession of this vessel or overlooked the crowding capacity of 
Filipino boats. This was the expedition of which Spain had complained, through 
Ambassador Cambon, that it left Manila after the surrender to the Americans and 
comprised 700 men. Otis's information was that it left the bay August 10, which 
was probably incorrect, and that it bore only 100 or 200 men, which was certainly 
incorrect, unless it stopped en route in Subig Bay and there recruited more men. 
Secretary Hay's reply, based upon Otis's cablegram, was, therefore, somewhat 
misleading (Foreign Relations of United States, i5P5,pp. 810-11). Otis's reference 
in the message to the coming together of Aguinaldo and the northern Filipinos, 
and to the former being in accord with the " chiefs of priest party," probably 
sprang from the rumors he had heard of conferences recently had by Aguinaldo 
with Ilokans and Pangasinans, and to the identification with the revolution of Fa- 
ther Aglipai, who was soon to go north to organize the native priests and, through 
them particularly, to make the Ilokans join hands with the Tagalogs. 

^ See Father Martinez, op. cit., pp. 65-72. This writer has been rather can- 
tioQsIy followed, as his statement is wholly ex parte, and his pen, like that of 
most of his fellow-friars, was too often dipped in gall to warrant nnqnestioning 
acceptance even of his statements of fact. In the main, however, his testimony 
haa been corroborated by that of other witnesses, and, allowing for some exagger- 
ation, may safely be followed. Despite some of the worst abuses which he relates, 
and which must figure in this text because of their seriousness and significance, 
the reader will readily discover, between the lines of his book, that the actual 
state of the friars imprisoned in the Kagayan Valley was in general not so bad 
as he would make out, and some of the things he makes into martyrdom are very 


as well as men, up the river and distribute them among the 
various towns of Kagayan and Isabela. This happened about 
the middle of September, by which time these provinces had, 
by successive advances up the river, fallen under the control 
of Leyba and Villa. The former then completed the conquest 
of Northeast Luzon by pushing into Nueva Vizcaya, where 
he captured the Spanish officers of Isabela province and some 
few soldiers, who were cut ofE between the Filipino forces of 
central Luzon and those of the Kagayan Valley. The Span- 
ish provincial governor and register of deeds, who were brought 
back to Ilagan, were beaten and put in the stocks at intervals 
during eight days, Leyba himself, it is charged, finally taking 
a musket and raining blows upon the father and upon the 
governor, the former absolving the latter in what they thought 
would be their final punishment. The register of deeds died 
of further tortures at Tugegarau, whither he was taken at the 
instance of enemies of his residing there. The captain of the 
civil guard who had surrendered at Aparri, after enduring tor- 
tures by being strung up and whipped for three days, disap- 
peared one night and was, it is said, buried in some unknown 
place.^ The worst passions were let loose for a time in certain 
of the towns of that rich valley, the great tobacco-growing 
region of the Philippines, where the Dominican friars had 
reigned supreme in the moral and social realm, and first the 
Government, then great private tobacco companies, had helped 
rivet an economic slavery upon the sodden masses, and where 
the Filipino who aspired to any independence of thought or 

^ Fop these incidents, related with some very horrible details, mostly obtaiued 
by hearsay, see Father Martinez, op. cit., pp. 118-23. Martinez charges that Ley- 
ba's wrath was aroused at the governor of Isabela because he had carried off the 
provincial funds and had, before being captured in Bayombong, used them in pay- 
ing the arrears of salaries to the abandoned Spanish soldiers who were left in the 
mountainous regions. He states also that the captain of the Aparri civil guard had 
declared, when he yielded to the request of his fellow-countrymen to surrender, 
that he knew he was signing his own death-warrant. As he had been connected 
with the very bitter persecution of certain prominent Filipinos of the valley, and 
bad employed the weapons of torture and others of the reign of terror of 1896- 
97, he had some reason for his fears. 


action, rare specimen though he was, was promptly squelched 
if he would not be relegated to the place of a sycophant. Per- 
sonal and business jealousies entered into these few cases of 
barbarism, which were, after all, only imitations of similar 
cruelties perpetrated by the ruling race during the preceding 
two years, and which found echo later in several dark deeds 
of revenge under the shadow of American control in the 
valley. These were, moreover, exceptional instances among the 
lay prisoners of the Filipinos in this region. The latter were 
generally treated reasonably well. Not quite the same can be 
said of the friars ; after they had been distributed among the 
towns, unless they had come in some way under the direct 
animosity of Leyba and Villa, they were treated according to 
the attitude of the local civil officials, as a rule, which meant 
sometimes fairly well, sometimes indifferently, and sometimes 
badly. A few cases there were where the friars were beaten 
publicly or privately; two were physically exposed in one town 
where they had been parish priests ; and efforts were made by 
torture to compel several to confess to improper conduct. 
These cases were, however, mainly due to Tagalog subordinate 
military officials in certain towns. Most of the cases of actual 
physical abuse of the friars are said to have occurred under 
the immediate knowledge, if not at the instigation, of Leyba 
or Villa. Before advancing from Isabela on Nueva Vizcaya, 
the former had the water-torture administered to two priests 
caught in Isabela. The estate the Augustinians had cultivated 
he promptly seized, putting up a sign naming it " Jos^ Leyba." 
Three friars were given the water-torture there at the time of 
its seizure, to make them confess to living with women, and 
later on Villa had one of them strung up by the feet and 
whipped in the endeavor to find out about money supposed to 
be buried on the estate.^ But the first outbreaks of passion 

* See Father Martinez, op. cit., pp. 112-16. He says the water-torture was ad- 
ministered to the friars of Ilagan in ** an unusual and brutal manner," melted wax 
being dropped on the eyes at the same time that water was forced down the 


and a certain brutal delight in the power of command seemed 
soon to wear away, and the friars confined in the Isabela 
towns, equally with those in Kagayan, had, after the first few 
weeks, few things more serious to complain of than that they 
were humiliated in various ways, such as being made to clean 
streets, to carry water from the river, to form ranks and pa- 
rade, military fashion, in the sun at the caprice of the men in 
charge of them, etc.^ Though in some of the towns their food 
was not always the most satisfying, they lived really well in 
other towns, owing to the charity of prominent natives or of 
the foreign representatives of a large tobacco company. Of 
the one hundred and eighteen confined in the various towns 
of the valley, eight died before their release in December, 
1899 ; one or two of these were rather far advanced in illness 
at the time of their capture, but the other deaths may fairly 
be charged to exposure, hardships, and lack of proper food 
and attention, and probably two or three of them also to phys- 
ical abuse and torture.^ 

1 Father Martinez tells (p. 117) of the friars at Ilagan being compelled by Villa 
to take the instruments of the town band and sally forth to salute Leyba as he re- 
turned in triumph from Nueva Vizcaya. Also (p. 127), he charges that the latter 
commander confiscated the forty boxes of food and comforts which a pious mestiza 
of a prominent Manila family had got together in the capital and conveyed to 
Aparri herself, to distribute among the friars in the valley ; and that Leyba im- 
prisoned her and sent her overland to Malolos, her trip lasting three months. 

^ Appendix 2 to Father Martinez's El Cautiverio gives the names and places of 
confinement of 118 friars, of whom 60 were Dominicans, including Bishop He via 
and the provisor and the secretary of his diocese, and 68 were Augustinians, in- 
cluding the provincial, Father Zallo, who died from abuse and disease. This in- 
cluded not only most of the friars who had parishes in North and South Ilokos, 
but also all those having parishes in the Kagayan Valley, besides the few August- 
inians on the estate mentioned, and a half-dozen or more Dominicans resident in 
their convent college at Tugegarau. Moreover, in September, a Tagalog landing- 
party had taken possession of the Batanes Islands, off the north end of Luzon, 
and had carried away the Dominican fathers there, much to the undoubted regret 
of the backward populace of these islands (one of the first places to which the 
friars felt it safe to return in 1900-01), though they had refused to volunteer for 
resistance under the Spanish governor, who was slain by the Tagalogs. The infor- 
mation the Vatican furnished to Washington was that the captured religious num- 
bered 130, but this included also the nuns of Bigan. Aguinaldo back-handedly 
assured Otis in the November correspondence that the nuns were free to go where 
they pleased, but it was some time later before they were actually allowed to 
return to Manila. 



News of Aguinaldo's first order for the release of the nou- 
military prisoners reached this valley in February; but it was 
only the first of a series of disappointments based on similar 
rumors during 1899, and they were not reached by the Ameri- 
can advance until December of that year. Aside from the hope 
of forcing terms out of Spain or the Vatican by the retention 
of these prisoners, there seems also to have been some efPort 
on the part of the revolutionary leaders to profit more directly 
by the possession in their power of Bishop Hevia. " Military 
Vicar-General " Aglipai visited him at a time when the hier- 
archy at Manila had not yet disowned him, but was showing 
a disposition to use him, if possible, and, probably on this ac- 
count, was very well received by the bishop. He brought with 
him a number of seminarists who had pursued studies at Bigan 
and whom the revolutionists were very anxious to have or- 
dained to supply the visible lack of parish priests, and the 
bishop ordained a number of them. He refused to do so in 
the case of some of the students (including several who had 
been tortured as revolutionists at Bigan in 1896), who he said 
were not prepared for ordination ; and, when the order of re- 
lease was reported in February, Tirona was instructed from 
Malolos to secure the ordination of these seminarists in some 
way before letting Hevia or the friars go. Villa accepted the 
mission of pressing the matter on the bishop, and it is charged 
that, when the latter refused to yield to arguments or threats, 
he removed him to a private room and beat him with his 
hands and with a cane, afterward keeping him three days on 
rice and water in the effort to make him yield.* When such 

» So Father Martinez, pp. 163-64. He cautiously finds fault with the bishop for 
having been so compliant with Aglipaii but one cannot help wondering if letten 
Aglipai bore from Manila did not have something to do with this. The latter to- 
day claims that Hevia named him to discharge the duties of his bishopric for the 
time being. This incident grows the more curious when we learn that Aglipai 
made his visit as "Military Vioar^reneral " of the revolutionary organization 
which held the bishop and bii aasoeiates captive, and that they saw the numbers 
of La Independencia claiming for Aglipai all the powers of a bishop or of a Oftr* 
diaal (Martinez, pp. 176-77). 


things as this happened with a man whose position was more 
or less of a guaranty of safety, if not of respect, for him, we may 
imagine that the Tagalog military leaders were restrained in 
their dealings with the Kagayan populace only by the neces- 
sity of being somewhat tactful at least with the leaders, to 
prevent their becoming openly disloyal to Malolos, and we 
may perceive one reason why these people were ready to turn 
over their towns without resistance to the Americans when 
they arrived.^ 

1 Reference may here be made to the report to Admiral Dewey and the various 
magazine articles written by Paymaster W. B. Wilcox and Cadet L. R. Sargent, 
of the United States Navy, who in October and November, 1898, went on a trip 
overland through Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela, Kagayan, North and South Ilokos prov- 
inces. This report and these articles (published together as Sen. Doc. 66, 56th 
Cong,, Ist Sess.) have not in this work been followed in regard to the status of 
the prisoners, nor cited in connection with the discussion of the Filipino provincial 
and municipal governments. They have been quoted times without number in the 
United States, and on them alone very comprehensive conclusions have been 
drawn as to the Filipino Government being entirely successful. They are, in 
fact, remarkable, not for what the naval officers saw and learned, but for what 
they did not see. Compare, for instance, with the facts related above their state- 
ments (ibid., p. 35), that the friars " appeared in good health and we could detect 
no evidence of ill-treatment," and that Josd Perez, the Spanish ez-Governor of 
Isabela, "appeared to be enjoying all the ordinary comforts." They arrived at 
Ilagan just after the scenes of torture under Leyba and Villa. Their statements 
may, indeed, be taken as indicating that the Spaniards exaggerated the hardships 
they suffered, and that the punishment administered to Senor Perez was at least 
not such as to disfigure him; but it is plain that these Americans saw and learned 
only what the Filipino military officials intended for them to learn. One wonders 
how much Spanish they knew, and how much real investigating they did, when he 
reads such a statement as this: "The Catholic Church itself seems to have very 
little hold on the people of these provinces [Nueva ficij a, Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela, 
and Kagayan]." It was in these last two provinces precisely that the friars had 
held the people in the most complete state of subjection and backwardness in the 
islands, unless, perhaps, it might have been more complete in some parts of the 
Bisayas. The American officers noted that the native priests were very conspicuous 
in the Ilokan provinces, but not in the Kagayan Valley, hence this conclusion, 
among others which also evidence that they were unduly influenced by the state- 
ments of a few Filipinos of progressive ideas whom they met; they did not know 
that the Tagalog machine was in undisputed control in the Kagayan Valley, and 
that in the more advanced Ilokan country it had to temporize and to rely upon 
the influence of the native priests, who were in consequence often more prominent 
than the native civil officials, to the discontent of the latter. Some of the Americans' 
observations are interesting and are valuable in a confirmatory way; but their report 
is not a document upon which, by itself, to base conclusions of any importance. 
They were very solemnly impressed by the ceremony at Aparri wherein Tirona 



Practically all Luzon north of the Pasig River was thus in 
the possession of the revolutionists by the middle of Septem- 
ber, and they had established their control, so far as outward 
forms go, in all except the most remote mountain regions ; the 
conquest, too, had been most easy.^ Southern Luzon fell into 

turned over his authority to the new civil officials of the valley, and Mr. Sargent re- 
marks: " Had the Filipino Government been allowed to work out its own salvation, 
this movement could hardly have failed to become historical (ibid., pp. 22, 36)." 
The knowledge (which they could easily have obtained) that these officials were 
chosen at the dictation of Tirona himself would have saved solemnity at this point. 
The Wilcox and Sargent documents are only of value as interesting little bits of 
travel at an interesting time ; their authors could only have been qualified to pass 
upon the workings of the Filipino governmental machine had they previously been 
familiar with conditions in these very provinces. They seem to have been astonished 
at finding that the masses of the people were going about their business peacefully 
and quietly, instead of living in a state of semi-anarchy. One might have found 
as great peace and quiet in any Filipino village during 1899 and 1900, except 
when a fight was occurring right near; the Filipinos are not in the habit of going 
about things noisily, and they later conducted their operations of guerrilla warfare 
in and about villages which pursued their ordinary daily life in the most orderly 
fashion. Albert Sonnichsen's Ten Months a Captive among the Filipinos (New York, 
1901) is also of small value in so far as it describes the workings of government 
among the Filipinos, not alone because it is chock-full of errors about the system 
actually in vogue at the time, but also because the writer was totally without a 
basis of comparison with the preceding conditions. In the Philippine communities, 
peacef ulness and tranquillity are the traditional outward state ; but they may cover, 
and nearly always have covered, bossism of the most tyrannous sort, if not down- 
right abuses and outrages. On this line, Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent and Sounich- 
sen do not seem to have been very competent, or at least energetic, observers. 
Sonnichsen's book is more interesting than the writings of other Americans who 
were captives of the Filipinos in 1899 and 1900, and his attempts to speak favor- 
ably of the Filipinos g^ve it a judicial tone; but some of his statements compare 
rather queerly with these sentences in letters which he left behind in San Isidro 
on May 1, 1899, when General Lawton's advance was driving the Filipinos far- 
ther to the north: ** We have been treated in a most barbaric manner, starved, 
beaten and bound. . . . The Spaniards have been treated even worse than us, 
being tortured in the stocks and starved. Some hundreds are dying of dysentery 
and various other diseases, but, whether incapable or not, the Government does 
nothing for them. . . . For God's sake, can nothing be done for us? We have 
been starving, abused, and treated like animals." (Rept. War Dept., 1899, vol. i, 
part 6, p. 243, and Sen. Doc. 208, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., part 2, pp. 10-11.) 

^ The exceptions to this last statement are two : In the mountainous part of 
Morong, but not far from Manila, one hnndred Spaniards held out until the fall 
of Manila, surrendering on August 19. The other instance was the celebrated one 
of Baler, the scene of vigorous resistance in 1897. Forty-seven Spanish soldiers 
and three friars held this isolated port on the stormy east coast of Luzon from July, 
1898, when they were besieged in it, until June, 1899, sustaining repeated attacki. 


line with the insurrection almost as readily, though in a few 
cases the Spanish resistance was not quite so easily overcome. 
As for the Tagalog provinces, after Trias joined his old com- 
rades in June and took with him the rest of the native soldiers 
of Spain, it was only a question of capturing a few Spanish 
strongholds in order to give the Bakoor leaders full sway over 
Laguna, Batangas, and Tayabas as well as Cavite. Again, the 
Spanish officers started their efforts at concentration too late. 
Near Lipa, six hundred men had to surrender, and Lipa itself 
soon capitulated to Paciano Rizal ; the agreement that civilians 
and wounded were not to be made prisoners was not respected. 
Sixty more prisoners, Spanish civilians and troops, fell into this 
leader's hands at Kalamba, after which he moved on the im- 
portant town of Santa Cruz, on the Laguna de Bay. Six hun- 
dred or more Spanish civilians and soldiers were shut up here, 
including a half-dozen native members of the civil guard, the 
only members of that organization in Laguna who had not 
joined their fellow-countrymen. Before Manila fell, the Spanish 
authorities had tried several times to get the river gunboats 
through to the aid of the besieged towns of Kalamba and 
Santa Cruz, but the Filipinos held the banks of the Pasig River 
after the first week in June, and made it too warm for the 
Spanish boats. Three rather determined attacks upon Santa 
Cruz were repulsed before August 13 ; but after tlie capital 
had surrendered to the Americans, the Spanish military and 
civil officials of Laguna acceded to the terms of honorable 
surrender offered to them by Rizal's brother, by which the men 

They had stocked up with provisions, and refused all overtures made to them for 
an honorable surrender after the fall of Manila ; indeed they still refused to yield 
after they were assured that the archipelago had been transferred by Spain to the 
United States and the treaty had finally been ratified, twice refusing to see emis- 
saries whom General Diego de los Rios, the Spanish commander in authority in 
Manila in 1899, sent to them to order them to surrender and accept the safe-conduct 
of the Filipinos to Manila. They afterward declared that they thought the docu- 
ments that were brought to them were forged, and they did not believe the prom- 
ise of honorable surrender would be respected. They were treated as heroes upon 
their arrival at Manila. The captain and sixteen soldiers had died in the siege. 


under arms were to be retained as prisoners of war, but the 
civilians and a dozen friars were to be allowed to proceed to 
Manila. Rizal performed his part of the contract, bearing the 
noncombatant prisoners to the town of Pasig, the limit of his 
jurisdiction ; but here they were met by orders from Filipino 
headquarters to convey them as prisoners to Santa Ana, whence 
they were later transferred to Pangasinan, suffering the same 
fate as other Spanish civilians and friars.^ Into Batangas there 
had already been brought some few prisoners and the plunder 
obtained by the Aguinaldo family expedition to Mindoro, in- 
cluding lay brothers of the order of Recollects, whose estate it 
was the object of the expedition to seize ; several assassinations 
marred still more seriously the record of this expedition. The 
Spanish military commander in Tayabas ordered the concen- 
tration of all his fellow-countrymen living in that province in 
the capital in June, before the insurgent organization there 
was well under way ; 443 soldiers and some few civilians, in- 
cluding friars, were gathered in the church and convent and 
one or two neighboring stone buildings of the town of Tayabas, 
which wer